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Docket Nos. 96299-Agenda 21-September 2003.

In re MARY ELIZABETH GORECKI, Attorney, Respondent.

Opinion filed November 20, 2003.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of thecourt:

The respondent in this attorney discipline case, Mary ElizabethGorecki, concedes that she violated the Illinois Rules of ProfessionalConduct when she left three messages on a telephone answeringmachine which falsely indicated that the president of the Kane Countyboard could be bribed into providing a county job. At issue in this caseis the appropriate sanction to impose for this misconduct. For thereasons that follow, we suspend respondent's license to practice lawfor a period of four months.

BACKGROUND

In February 2001, the Administrator of the Illinois AttorneyRegistration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a complaintbefore the Hearing Board (see 166 Ill. 2d R. 753(b)) which allegedthat respondent left three messages on a telephone answering machinestating that a county job could be obtained from the chairman of theKane County board, Mike McCoy, if payments were made to McCoyunder the guise of "campaign contributions." The complaint allegedthat the three messages were false, in that respondent had no reasonto believe that a job could be obtained by making payments to McCoy,and, further, that respondent knew that making payments to McCoyto secure employment with Kane County would be illegal or improper.Based on the alleged misconduct, the respondent was charged with:(1) stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a tribunal,legislative body, government agency, or official in violation of Rule8.4(a)(6) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (155 Ill. 2d R.8.4(a)(6)); (2) engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(4) of the Illinois Rulesof Professional Conduct (155 Ill. 2d R. 8.4(a)(4)); and (3) engagingin conduct that tends to defeat the administration of justice or bringthe courts or legal profession into disrepute in violation of SupremeCourt Rule 771 (134 Ill. 2d R. 771).

A disciplinary hearing was held before the Hearing Board inNovember 2001. Evidence presented before the Hearing Boardestablished the following facts.

Respondent has been licensed to practice law in this state sinceNovember 1991. From 1991 to 1996, she served as an assistantState's Attorney in the Kane County State's Attorney's office. In1996, respondent entered private practice where she concentrated oncommercial matters. In September 1999, respondent announced hercandidacy for the office of State's Attorney of Kane County. In March2000, respondent won the primary election and, in November 2000,she was elected Kane County State's Attorney. Respondent wasserving as the State's Attorney of Kane County at the time of thisappeal.

Sometime in 1998, while she was in private practice, respondentwas contacted by Jane Morrison, a deputy sheriff in Kane County andthe sister of a long-time friend of respondent. At the disciplinaryhearing, Morrison testified that she called respondent seeking help ingetting a job for her boyfriend, Eric O'Neil. O'Neil had earlier appliedfor a job as a highway maintainer for the Kane County department oftransportation but had not received an offer.

According to Morrison, respondent stated that she would makesome phone calls and get back to her. Sometime thereafter,respondent phoned Morrison and left three messages on Morrison'shome answering machine. The messages were recorded on a cassettetape, which Morrison kept. The recorded messages were played forthe Hearing Board and a transcript of the messages was admitted intoevidence. The first message stated:

"Hey Jane, I talked to uh two people uhm, the first personI talked to uhm who, you know, allegedly works inside uh,started talking about Eric's interview, and you know saidsomething like oh 'He didn't interview well ...' And I said Iheard he interviewed great and you know I ... I just said andI heard there like you it's allegedly test scores and thereweren't scores and this and that and the other thing and so Ijust said okay thanks for the information. I talked to I wentback to my primary source, he just said, 'Meg, quit f-in'around, get the money together and do it if you're gonna doit, uhm just meet with your client, get the money, set up anappointment with McCoy, you know, uhm, sit down, talk toEric about it uhm, you know.' There are no guarantees in lifebut he said this is the only way to get it done. If you want thejob done uh, you take the bull by the horns and uh you offerhim the money, you know. Of course, there are no ... youmake 'campaign contributions.' That's what I meant to say... (laughs). Give me a call uh I'll be in and out this weekend.Uh (cuts off) ... ."

The first message was cut off because of a time limitation on theanswering machine. The second message began immediatelythereafter:

"Jane, I don't know when your birthday is or when Eric'sbirthday is but the two of you like need to buy each other anew answering machine, like very soon, cause like I cannottake the music. Anyway, I talked to Mike McCoy, uhh he'son board, everything's uh squared up. The only thing he'sgetting back to me on is whether or not there are anypositions left. Just that simple. Uhm (inaudible) highway,street maintenance, snow removal, etc., and he goes youknow Meg, I think we've filled the three spots and I said Iheard there were six, blah, blah, blah. We went back andforth he's gonna get back to me today or Monday. I'll talk toya. Bye."

Morrison testified that, sometime after the second message, shehad an unrecorded phone conversation with respondent. During thisconversation, respondent explained how the bribery scheme wouldwork. According to Morrison, respondent told her that an attorney-client contract would be completed and that a check for 10% to 15%of O'Neil's annual salary, somewhere between $4,000 to $6,000,would be written to respondent's law firm. This sum would then bebroken down into increments of less than $1,000 and would go intoMike McCoy's campaign fund in the name of various contributors.Morrison recalled that respondent expressed regret that Morrison'smother, an alderman in Aurora, did not get along with McCoybecause respondent could otherwise use the mother's name as one ofthe contributors.

Within two weeks of the first recorded messages, Morrisonreceived a third and final message on her answering machine:

"Uh, guy who got it is from Big Rock. I didn't get hisname, but he, he was hired, but he doesn't start, he hasn'tstarted yet, and that's why no one knows his name,apparently, 'cause he's not working day-to-day with thecronies yet. He starts mid-September, allegedly, and, as Isaid, it's some guy from Big Rock. Um, I was also told thatthey potentially have two more spots. Um, whether or notthose are even gonna be posted, they don't know. Um, andthis other guy I talked to said I'm wasting my time unless Igo, ya know, straight to McCoy. He said if there's gonna betwo more spots, it's gonna be up to McCoy to open those up,ya know, financially, through whatever budgeting processthey had originally budgeted, 'cause I guess your numbers areright. Like they had six spots budgeted. Now four are ... ."

At the disciplinary hearing, Morrison testified that she wasshocked by respondent's suggestions about bribing McCoy and didnot follow them. Morrison stated that she kept the tape-recordedmessages until February 2000 when she turned the answering machinetape over to the Kane County's sheriff's office. This led toinvestigations by, among others, the sheriff's office, the ARDC and aspecial prosecutor.

Although the primary election campaign for Kane County State'sAttorney was underway in February 2000, when Morrison turned overthe answering machine tape, Morrison denied that the timing of thedelivery of the tape was politically motivated. Morrison testified thatshe waited more than a year to give the tape to her superiors at thesheriff's office because, during that time, she was experiencing adifficult pregnancy and was having marital problems. She explainedthat, once she returned from maternity leave, she gave the tape to thesheriff's office. According to Morrison, the fact that the primaryelection campaign was going on was coincidental.

On cross-examination, Morrison was asked whether she knewwhich candidate for State's Attorney her mother had supported in theprimary election. Morrison stated that she did not know. Morrison'stestimony was then impeached with an earlier deposition in which shestated that she knew her mother was supporting respondent'sopponent in the election. Morrison also acknowledged on cross-examination that she was in possession of the answering machine tapewell before her pregnancy began in January 1999, and that shecontinued to work as a deputy sheriff until the eighth month of herpregnancy, in September 1999. Morrison also conceded that when shefirst spoke to the Kane County sheriff's department about theanswering machine tape in February 2000, and recounted theunrecorded telephone conversation she had with respondent, she didnot include two details: (1) that respondent had discussed creating anattorney-client contract and (2) that a specific sum of between $4,000and $6,000 would be paid to respondent.

Mike McCoy, chairman of the Kane County board since 1996,testified by way of videotaped deposition. McCoy stated that, in KaneCounty, a highway maintainer's job was to plow snow and do othermiscellaneous jobs pertaining to the county highways. Applicants forthe position of highway maintainer were required to take a test andwere interviewed by a panel, who then ranked the applicants. McCoystated that his only input into the process of hiring highwaymaintainers was to ensure that special consideration was given tominority applicants.

McCoy stated that in 1998 or 1999 the highway department hadsix vacancies for the job of highway maintainer. McCoy testified thatshortly after these vacancies were filled, respondent contacted him andstated that she had a client who was interested in one of the positions.Respondent did not identify the client. McCoy stated that he toldrespondent that no jobs were available, but respondent said shethought two positions were still open. McCoy then told respondentthat he would get back to her. He did not do so, however, and nothingfurther occurred.

McCoy testified that he had never met or heard of Eric O'Neilbefore February 2000, when reports of respondent's taped messagesappeared in the press. McCoy stated that he had read transcripts of themessages left on Morrison's answering machine and that respondent'sreferences to him were false. McCoy also stated that he had neveraccepted a bribe and that he considers himself to be an honest civilservant. McCoy acknowledged that he is often asked to and doesrecommend people for various county jobs. However, he stated thatno new employee was ever expected to kick back any money to himor to make payments to a political party or to a political campaign.

When asked whether respondent's statements damaged hisreputation or hurt him politically, McCoy answered that he did notthink so. McCoy stated that he did not think that "anyone reallybelieved" respondent's statements. McCoy noted that he ranunopposed in the election for Kane County board chairman and thathe obtained the second highest vote total in Kane County.

The parties stipulated that a special prosecutor was appointed toinvestigate persons implicated in the recorded messages. The specialprosecutor filed a report which provided, in part, that no evidenceexisted that McCoy had ever engaged in the illegal or dishonestconduct described in respondent's telephone messages and that thematter was closed without convening a grand jury.

Respondent testified at her disciplinary hearing. When askedabout the messages on the answering machine and her conversationswith Morrison, her recollection was somewhat limited. She recalledthat Morrison contacted her about finding a job for O'Neil. She alsorecalled stating to Morrison that she would make some calls and thatshe did not, in fact, do so. Respondent did not remember, however,any of the details of her conversations with Morrison or the timing ofthe messages she left Morrison.

Respondent acknowledged leaving the messages on Morrison'sanswering machine. She stated repeatedly that she had no explanationfor the messages and that she could not "even imagine" saying thosewords. Respondent denied having any psychological or substanceabuse problems at the time she left the messages. Respondentacknowledged that, in an earlier statement, she had indicated that sheleft the messages in an effort to get Morrison to stop calling her aboutgetting a job for O'Neil. At the disciplinary hearing, however,respondent stated that this was not true. Respondent further admittedthat the statements she made to Morrison were false and that she didnot talk to anyone about obtaining a job for O'Neil.

Respondent spoke to a reporter about the phone messages inMarch 2000. Respondent admitted that she was not entirely candid inher responses to the reporter. She stated that she responded with a"knee-jerk" political reaction to the reporter's inquiries and that shewas "completely defensive and rationalizing all of it." In September2000, respondent held a press conference in which she acknowledgedthat she made the fabricated statements to Morrison but stated that themessages on the tape had been "taken out of context." Respondenttestified that, at the time of the press conference, she was "still tryingto rationalize or give it some explanation" and that she did not thenhave the courage to take full responsibility for her actions.

Respondent also admitted that she was not forthright inresponding to an initial request for information sent by the ARDC inApril 2000. Respondent stated that she did not understand howserious the charges were and, further, that the denials contained in herresponse to the ARDC were rationalizations. Respondent submitteda supplemental response to the ARDC in August 2000, in which shetook full responsibility for the statements on the tape, admitted thatthe statements were fictitious and apologized for her improperconduct.

Respondent apologized repeatedly before the Hearing Board forher actions. She stated that she has never given anyone a bribe, hasnever accepted a bribe, and has not been the subject of any priorARDC complaints or letters of inquiry. She expressed remorse anddismay for her conduct and stated that her statements to Morrisonwere the most horrible thing she has ever done and the worst thing shecould have done to the legal profession. Respondent stated that shehad apologized to Mike McCoy but believed that no apology wassufficient for what she had done. She also stated that she came to thedisciplinary hearing to make a public apology. She expressed hopethat her reputation and standards had "shown through."

Several witnesses attested to respondent's good character andreputation. Substantial evidence was also introduced showing thatrespondent had a long history of community and charitable activities.

At the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Boardfound that the Administrator had proved by clear and convincingevidence that respondent had engaged in the misconduct as charged.After weighing the mitigating evidence against the severity of themisconduct, the Hearing Board recommended a six-month suspension.The dissent recommended censure. Respondent filed exceptions. TheReview Board affirmed the findings of misconduct but recommendeda two-month suspension. The Administrator filed exceptions to thiscourt.

ANALYSIS

Before this court, respondent concedes that her conduct inleaving the three phone messages on Morrison's answering machineviolated the Rules of Professional Conduct, as charged by theAdministrator. Further, although respondent argued before theReview Board that censure was the appropriate sanction in this case,she has since abandoned that position. Like the Administrator,respondent now agrees that a suspension is warranted for hermisconduct. Thus, the only point of disagreement between the partiesin this case is the appropriate length of the suspension to be imposed.The Administrator argues that a year's suspension is in order, whilerespondent contends that a two-month suspension (the dispositionrecommended by the Review Board) is appropriate.

The purpose of attorney discipline is not punishment. Rather,attorney discipline is undertaken to protect the public, to maintain theintegrity of the profession, and to protect the administration of justicefrom reproach. In re Spak, 188 Ill. 2d 53, 67-68 (1999), quoting In reFox, 122 Ill. 2d 402, 410 (1988). In determining the appropriatesanction to impose, we must consider the nature of respondent'smisconduct and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. In reLidov, 129 Ill. 2d 424, 430 (1989). We may also consider thedeterrent value of a sanction and whether the sanction will helppreserve public confidence in the legal profession. In re Discipio, 163Ill. 2d 515, 528 (1994). The disciplinary recommendations of theHearing Board and Review Board are advisory only. The ultimateresponsibility for imposing discipline rests with this court. In reEckberg, 192 Ill. 2d 70, 85 (2000).

In considering the nature and severity of respondent'smisconduct, the parties dispute whether this court should take intoaccount Morrison's testimony regarding the unrecorded phoneconversation in which respondent allegedly stated that, to facilitate thebribery scheme, an attorney-client contract would be completed andthat a sum of between $4,000 to $6,000 would be conveyed torespondent's law firm. Respondent contends that the unrecordedconversation was not specifically mentioned in the Administrator'scomplaint and, therefore, the conversation constitutes unchargedconduct that should not be considered by this court. Moreover,according to respondent, neither the Hearing Board nor the ReviewBoard made any express finding regarding the conversation.Respondent further notes that, unlike the other statements for whichthe Administrator seeks to sanction respondent, the conversationdescribing the details of the bribery scheme was not recorded.Respondent contends that Morrison's description of the unrecordedconversation changed from when she first described it to the KaneCounty Sheriff's office, with the description becoming more detailedover time. Respondent also argues that Morrison's actions withrespect to respondent were politically motivated and that hertestimony regarding the unrecorded conversation was not credible.Accordingly, respondent maintains that the testimony should not beconsidered by this court.

The Administrator disagrees. The Administrator contends that theunrecorded conversation was not uncharged conduct because thecomplaint referenced, in addition to the phone messages, "a series ofconversations" between Morrison and respondent. Further, citing toPeople ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 349(1937), the Administrator maintains that a disciplinary complaint neednot plead the evidence. The Administrator also observes thatrespondent was the only other party to the conversation withMorrison and that, in her testimony before the Hearing Board,respondent never denied that the conversation took place. TheAdministrator maintains that there is no reason why this court shouldnot consider Morrison's testimony in full and that the testimony, alongwith the phone messages, describe a "detailed and elaborate" briberyscheme which merits a severe sanction.

Initially, we note that, although it was not stated as an expressfinding, the Hearing Board concluded that much of Morrison'stestimony regarding the unrecorded conversation was corroborated byher previous statements. After describing Morrison's testimony, theHearing Board noted that the report of the interview conducted by theKane County sheriff's office when Morrison first turned over theanswering machine tape had been admitted into evidence. That report,according to the Hearing Board, "confirmed Morrison's testimony"that she had been told by respondent that O'Neil would have tocontribute 10% to 15% of his salary, that the money would be givento respondent and that respondent would break the money down intofour smaller donations to McCoy's campaign fund. Neither theAdministrator nor respondent mention this statement by the HearingBoard or address its significance.

In any event, however, even if we were to set the testimonyregarding the unrecorded conversation aside, as respondent asks us todo, we do not believe the seriousness of respondent's misconductwould be materially affected. The gravamen of respondent'smisconduct in this case is not found in any particular detail containedin her statements, e.g., whether she mentioned an attorney-clientcontract. Rather, it is found in the general message which thosestatements conveyed. Although it is undisputed that respondent, infact, never spoke to McCoy about receiving kickbacks from O'Neiland that McCoy was never "on board" with any bribery scheme, thereis nothing of record to indicate that respondent was anything less thanserious in suggesting to Morrison that she should attempt to bribeMcCoy. Thus, even limiting the misconduct to the three phonemessages, as respondent contends we should, we are left with thesalient fact that respondent's statements endorsed, and evenencouraged, the bribing of a public official. As respondent herselfadmits, the phone messages, by themselves, violate the Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Respondent's statements are unquestionably avery serious matter and we view them as such in deciding theappropriate sanction here.

The parties also dispute whether the seriousness of respondent'smisconduct may be gauged by the impact it had upon Mike McCoy.Respondent points to McCoy's testimony that he suffered no harm tohis reputation and that, in his election for chairman of the KaneCounty board (which took place after respondent's statements becamepublic), he received the second highest vote total in Kane County.From this, respondent argues that McCoy suffered "no actual harm"and, therefore, that it would be inappropriate to consider the effect ofrespondent's conduct upon McCoy in measuring the seriousness ofher actions. We reject respondent's argument for two reasons.

First, after Morrison turned the answering machine tape over tothe Kane County sheriff's office, a special prosecutor was appointedto investigate the matters raised by the tape. As a person mentionedon the tape, McCoy was a principal subject of this investigation andwas questioned by the special prosecutor as to his involvement in anyillegal conduct. Except for respondent's statements, McCoy wouldnot have had to endure the inconvenience and stress of the specialprosecutor's investigation. It is incorrect, therefore, to say thatrespondent's statements had no harmful effect whatsoever uponMcCoy. Second, and more importantly, part of the reason that falselyaccusing a public official of being amenable to bribery is viewed asserious misconduct is because it places the reputation of that innocentofficial at risk. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Atkin, 804Ohio St. 3d 383, 704 N.E.2d 244 (1999). In this case, it was fortunatethat, for whatever reason, respondent's statements caused no lastingdamage to McCoy's reputation or his political fortunes. However, thisfortuitous outcome does not mean that it would be appropriate toeliminate all consideration of Mike McCoy in measuring theseriousness of respondent's misconduct.

Respondent's statements, which were widely publicized andwhich prompted the appointment of a special prosecutor, created agenuine risk to McCoy's reputation. The reality of this risk isunderscored by the fact that respondent was a former assistant State'sAttorney. As the Review Board noted, as a former assistant State'sAttorney, respondent "had, and would have been perceived as having,a greater level of awareness of the workings of public officials; thus,her representations as to their integrity, or lack thereof, carried greaterpotential weight." We have previously held that attorney disciplineshould be "closely linked to the harm caused or the unreasonable riskcreated by the [attorney's] lack of care." In re Saladino, 71 Ill. 2d263, 276 (1978). In this case, we believe that the risk of harm toMcCoy's reputation created by respondent's statements wasunreasonable and may be properly considered in assessing theseriousness of her misconduct.

In addition to contesting the inherent seriousness of respondent'smisconduct, the parties also dispute whether certain other factors maybe weighed in aggravation against her. The parties disagree, forexample, as to whether respondent's failure to provide an explanationfor the phone messages should be considered an aggravating factor.In this regard, the Hearing Board stated the following:

"Respondent's total lack of explanation for her messagesto Morrison during the hearing also is disturbing to us andmust play a part in our assessment of her character. Despitea plea on our part for any rationale for her words, none wasforthcoming. Although we are tempted to suggest a reasonfor her behavior, and several have come to mind, it is notwithin our province to speculate on her motivation. Sufficeit to say that we find it difficult to accept her claim that shehas a complete and total lack of recall regarding the timingand intent of the taped messages."

The Review Board disagreed with the above statement.According to the Review Board, if respondent "had attempted at thehearing to provide reasons for her conduct, these attempts might wellhave been perceived as a rationalization and undermined the sincerityof her remorse. Alternatively, if the acts are viewed as aberrant orirrational, then an attempt to rationally explain these acts long afterthe event is an unrealistic burden." Thus, the Review Board concludedthat respondent's "failure to state a reason for her statements wasimmaterial" to the consideration of the appropriate sanction in thiscase.

Before this court, the parties now dispute which of the abovepositions is correct. The Administrator argues in favor of the HearingBoard's position, while respondent urges us to adopt the position ofthe Review Board. In our view, respondent and the Review Boardhave misapprehended the significance of the Hearing Board'sconclusions.

The Hearing Board was not asking for respondent to providenonexistent reasons for her conduct. The Hearing Board was explicitabout what it found troubling, stating: "we find it difficult to accept[respondent's] claim that she has a complete and total lack of recallregarding the timing and intent of the taped messages." In otherwords, the Hearing Board did not find respondent credible when shetestified that she could not remember why she left the messages onMorrison's answering machine. Deference is given to the HearingBoard on questions of credibility (Spak, 188 Ill. 2d at 66), and a lackof candor before the Hearing Board is a factor that may be consideredin aggravation (see generally In re Stillo, 68 Ill. 2d 49 (1977)).Respondent's inability to provide an explanation for the messages,because it was not believed by the Hearing Board, is a factor that mustbe given some weight against her.

In its report, the Hearing Board also made the followingstatement:

"As impressed as we are with the testaments toRespondent's character, we believe that those attestations aresomewhat undercut by the lack of candor displayed byRespondent when she initially was confronted with hermisdeeds. Respondent's deceptive responses to the mediaand the Administrator is an aggravating factor that castssome doubt not only on her integrity but also on her ability toacknowledge her mistakes. Although she stated that she was'rationalizing' her actions and responded with a 'knee-jerk'reaction, we believe that her rationalizations continued farbeyond any length of time during which she could claim to bestartled or confused by the disclosure of the taped messages."

The Review Board agreed with the Hearing Board thatrespondent's deceptive response to the ARDC's initial inquiry couldbe considered in aggravation. Respondent does not dispute this point.Accordingly, respondent's response to the ARDC weighs against herin determining the appropriate sanction here.

However, the Review Board rejected the Hearing Board'sposition regarding respondent's statements to the media. Accordingto the Review Board, "statements to media, by a political candidate,should not be judged as strictly as statements to a court, client, or theARDC. Additionally, given the context of media inquiries, some levelof latitude must be afforded to the person responding. *** Responsesto media questions, especially in the context of a heated politicalcampaign, generally should not be given much if any weight inaggravation in a disciplinary case. This is particularly true where, ashere, those responses are attempts to exculpate oneself fromaccusations that, at the time, may have legitimately appeared to bepolitically motivated."

Once again, the parties dispute whether the Hearing Board orReview Board was correct. Again, we conclude that respondent andthe Review Board have missed the import of the Hearing Board'sposition.

Respondent first spoke to the media about the phone messagesin March 2000. At the disciplinary hearing, respondent testified thatshe was not entirely candid in her statements at that time and that sheresponded with a "knee-jerk" political reaction. In September 2000,respondent held a press conference in which she acknowledged thatshe made the fabricated statements to Morrison. Even then, however,respondent stated that the messages on the tape had been taken out ofcontext. Respondent testified that, at the time of the press conference,she was "still trying to rationalize" her behavior and that she had notyet taken full responsibility for her actions. Based on these facts, theHearing Board concluded that respondent's public denials ofwrongdoing "continued far beyond any length of time during whichshe could claim to be startled or confused by the disclosure of thetaped messages" and that her denials cast "some doubt not only on herintegrity but also on her ability to acknowledge her mistakes."

Clearly then, it was the length of time that respondent continuedto rationalize her behavior that troubled the Hearing Board. TheHearing Board was in no sense saying that off-the-cuff responses tothe media should be judged under the same standards as statementsmade in court. Although, in the context of this case, we do not giveit a great deal of weight, we agree with the Hearing Board'sconclusion that the length of time it took respondent to acceptresponsibility for her statements may be considered in evaluatingrespondent's character and determining the appropriate sanction.

Balanced in mitigation against the foregoing misconduct andaggravating factors is what both the Hearing Board and Review Boardaccurately termed an "impressive" history of charitable andcommunity activities on the part of respondent. Without question,respondent has devoted a tremendous amount of time to serving theKane County community. Among other things, respondent has, for thepast 10 years, volunteered at a homeless shelter, the Hesed House, atleast once a month and on many holidays; worked with severelyhandicapped children; served for over 10 years on the Rosary HighSchool board of trustees; volunteered for 2