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Docket No. 95669-Agenda 20-September 2003.

In re A.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Tracy H. et al.,Appellees).

Opinion filed November 20, 2003.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises out of the trial court's denial of the State'spetition to terminate the parental rights of Tracy H. and Stacey S. Theappellate court declined to entertain the State's appeal of the orderdenying the petition because the order was not a final order, and alsodeclined to consider the appeal under its discretionary authority. 335Ill. App. 3d 1009. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm thedecision of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

The natural father, Tracy H., and the natural mother, Stacey S.,had two children, J.H., born June 24, 1988, and A.H., born February26, 1990. In 1996, the father reported to the Department of Childrenand Family Services that the mother, who had custody of the children,was taking the children with her when she purchased and used illegalnarcotics. In March 1997, the children were adjudicated neglected andremoved from the mother's custody and placed with the father.

The trial court, however, removed the children from the father'scustody in July 1998 because he had violated a court order prohibitingcontact between the mother and the children. The court placed thechildren in foster care with their paternal aunt and uncle in DeKalb,Illinois. On June 2, 2000, the trial court changed the permanency goalfor the mother from "return home" to "substitute care" pending acourt determination on the State's petition for the termination ofparental rights. The trial court changed the permanency goal for thefather from "return home" to "subsidized guardianship" with thepaternal aunt and uncle. The trial court further ordered that there beno contact between the mother and the children. The parents appealedthis determination, which is not at issue here, and the appellate courtdid not disturb these rulings in a decision filed on May 18, 2001. Nos.2-00-0710, 2-00-0711, 2-00-0872, 2-00-0873 cons. (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23).

During the pendency of that appeal, the State filed petitionsseeking the termination of the mother's parental rights as to bothchildren. On October 17, 2000, the State filed separate amendedpetitions for each child seeking the termination of the mother'sparental rights and the additional relief of the termination of thefather's parental rights. The State further requested that the court"enter such further orders as may be appropriate."

During the unfitness stage of the proceedings, the trial courtheard testimony from 20 witnesses called by the State, six witnessescalled by the parents, and stipulations to the parents' drug screens andcriminal convictions. On August 14, 2001, the trial court found bothparents unfit. The parents do not challenge this finding.

During the best-interests stage, the trial court heard testimonyfrom six witnesses, a tape of an interview by counsel with the children,and argument. On October 5, 2001, the trial court held it was not inthe best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights ofeither parent. The trial court ordered "subsidized guardianship" as thepermanency goal for the children and continued the cases for apermanency hearing scheduled for February 5, 2002. The trial courtfurther orally admonished the parents that "you still risk possibletermination of your parental rights. Because that has not been grantedat this time does not mean it could not be granted in the future." TheState appealed the trial court's denial of its petition to terminateparental rights.

On appeal, the appellate court considered its jurisdiction suasponte and held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter becausethe October 5, 2001, order was not final or appealable. 335 Ill. App.3d at 1013. The court also declined to hear the appeal under itsdiscretionary authority. 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1014, citing 166 Ill. 2d R.306(a)(5). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315) and also allowed the Cook County public guardian leaveto file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (155 Ill. 2d R.345).

ANALYSIS

The State asserts that the appellate court improperly dismissedthe appeal because the order was final and appealable under SupremeCourt Rules 301 and 303 (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303). The parentsargue that the order appealed from was not final and, therefore, theappellate court properly dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.Because this appeal presents only issues of law, our review is de novo.In re D.S., 198 Ill. 2d 309, 321 (2001).

Except for appeals from delinquency judgments, "[i]n all otherproceedings under the Juvenile Court Act [705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.(West 2002)], appeals from final judgments shall be governed by therules applicable to civil cases." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R.660(b). Rule 301 allows appeals from final judgments of a circuitcourt in a civil case as a matter of right, and Rule 303 sets the timeframe for the filing of the notice of appeal after entry of the finaljudgment. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303. "A judgment is considered final 'ifit terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits ordisposes of the rights of the parties, either on the entire controversyor a separate part thereof.' " In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 59 (2002),quoting R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153,159 (1998). "A final order is one which sets or fixes the rights of aparty." Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 59.

Under section 2-13 of the Act, a petition seeking the terminationof parental rights and appointment of a guardian with power toconsent to adoption may be filed "at any time after the entry of adispositional order under Section 2-22" (705 ILCS 405/2-13(4)(West 2002)) and "before final closing and discharge under Section2-31" (705 ILCS 405/2-13(6) (West 2002)). Section 2-13 furtherprovides that "one or more motions in the best interests of the minormay be filed." 705 ILCS 405/2-13(6) (West 2002). Thus, the Actcontemplates the filing of more than one petition to terminate parentalrights.

Accordingly, the October 5, 2001, order is not final because it didnot end the litigation of the parties on the issue of termination ofparental rights and did not "set or fix" the rights of the parties oneither side of the controversy. Although the order decided theimportant issue of whether to terminate the parental rights at thatpoint in time, such does not, in itself, render the order final. "[T]hefact that an order resolves important issues does not necessarily renderit final." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 59. As stated by the trial court,the possibility still exists that the parental rights of the parents couldbe terminated in the future.

We find inapposite the cases cited by the State in support of itsargument that the denial of a petition to terminate is a final order. TheState directs our attention to In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382 (2003), and Inre Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002), cases involving the entry of an orderterminating parental rights. An order terminating parental rights andappointing a guardian to consent to adoption is a final order becausethe specific permanency goal is achieved and there is no need for theissue of termination to be reevaluated under the Act. Indeed, underthe Act, "[a]n order so empowering the guardian to consent toadoption deprives the parents of the minor of all legal rights asrespects the minor and relieves them of all parental responsibility forhim or her, and frees the minor from all obligations of maintenanceand obedience to his or her natural parents." 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2)(West 2002). It therefore sets the rights of the parent, who may thenappeal. This does not address the situation here, where a petition toterminate parental rights was denied such that the issue could berevisited and the parents retain legal rights with respect to the minors.

We also reject the assertion that an appeal of a denial of atermination petition is necessary to avoid unreasonable delay in thepotential adoption of the children causing the children "to remain inlimbo for an extended period of time," and contrary to a "prompt, just,and final resolution of their status." In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13(2000). Such an argument has no bearing on whether the order is"final" for purposes of Rules 301 and 303. The force of the State'sargument on this point is also lessened by the State's own prayer forrelief in its petition, which lacks a specific request for an orderappointing a guardian with the power to consent to adoption. See 705ILCS 405/2-13(4) (West 2002) ("[i]f termination of parental rightsand appointment of a guardian of the person with power to consent toadoption of the minor under Section 2-29 is sought, the petition shallso state"). The extent of the "delay" of the resolution of the children'spotential adoption also depends, therefore, on further petitions fortermination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian of theperson to consent to adoption.

We lastly note that the appellate court retains the discretion toreview an appeal from the denial of a termination petition under Rule306(a)(5), which permits appeals "from interlocutory orders affectingthe care and custody of unemancipated minors, if the appeal of suchorders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in theserules." 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5). We therefore disagree with amicusthat "like dispositional orders, if not immediately appealable, an orderdenying a termination petition could never be reviewed, a result thatwould be manifestly unfair and dangerous for children." As we statedin Curtis B., "Rule 306(a)(5) maintains the best balance betweenprotecting parental rights and ensuring expeditious resolution of thechild's placement status." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 63. Like thereview of permanency orders in Curtis B., orders denying petitions fortermination of parental rights "which need examination can, and will,be reviewed by the appellate court. The majority of cases, by notbeing subject to immediate interlocutory review, can proceed in amore timely fashion to determine the permanent placement status ofthe child." In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 63. Here, the State does notappeal the appellate court's denial to take this case under Rule306(a)(5), and we therefore do not address it.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of theappellate court dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Affirmed.