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Docket No. 93760-Agenda 5-March 2003.

In re WILLIAM M., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 
Appellant, v. William M., Appellee).

Opinion filed June 19, 2003.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in this case is the issue left open in In re A.G., 195 Ill.2d 313 (2001): whether a postadmission motion pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)) is ajurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. For thefollowing reasons, we hold that it is not.

BACKGROUND

The State filed a four-count delinquency petition againstrespondent, William M., in the circuit court of Kankakee Countycharging him with burglary and criminal trespass to twoautomobiles. On October 2, 2000, respondent appeared in courtwith his appointed counsel. Respondent's counsel informed thecourt that pursuant to a plea agreement, respondent would admitto the burglary allegations in exchange for the dismissal of thecriminal trespass charges, as well as the dismissal of an unrelateddomestic battery charge. The trial court admonished respondentthat an admission waived his right to remain silent, to require theState to prove the charges, to a hearing, to present evidence andwitnesses, and to cross-examine the State's witnesses. The trialcourt also informed respondent that the burglary charges wouldhave been Class 2 felonies if he had been charged as an adult.Respondent acknowledged that he had not been coerced and wasacting voluntarily. The trial court entered a finding of delinquencyand adjudicated respondent a ward of the court.

On November 15, 2000, a dispositional hearing was held.Respondent was committed to the Department of Corrections,Juvenile Division, for an indeterminate period. The trial courtadvised respondent of his right to appeal and further advisedrespondent that if he planned to appeal, he had to file a motion towithdraw his plea or a motion to reconsider his sentence within 30days. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, respondent'scounsel requested the filing of a notice of appeal and theappointment of the appellate defender. The trial court granted bothrequests. The clerk of the court filed the notice of appeal onNovember 27, 2000. Respondent's counsel, however, did not filea motion to withdraw respondent's guilty plea or a motion toreconsider his sentence.

On appeal, respondent argued that the adjudication ofdelinquency must be vacated because the record failed to showthat he was aware of the consequences of his admissions or that hewas informed of the potential dispositions he could receive if hewas adjudicated a delinquent minor. 328 Ill. App. 3d 974, 976.Respondent acknowledged, however, that he had failed to file apostadmission or postdisposition motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)prior to filing his notice of appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. TheState argued that the appellate court was required to dismissrespondent's appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976. The State claimedthat because respondent had failed to file a motion pursuant toRule 604(d), the appellate court was without jurisdiction toconsider respondent's appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 976.

Citing People v. McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), theappellate court held that a Rule 604(d) motion is not jurisdictionalin the same sense that a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 328 Ill.App. 3d at 976-77. The appellate court stated that the failure to filea Rule 604(d) motion raises questions of waiver as opposed toquestions of jurisdiction. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently,the appellate court characterized the issue before it as whether itshould consider respondent's appeal, rather than whether it couldconsider the appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate courtnoted that if the case were a criminal case, the proper procedurewould be to dismiss the case and allow respondent to pursue hisremedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. However,because the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply tojuvenile proceedings, dismissal of respondent's appeal wouldforeclose all review of respondent's claims, including a claim withconstitutional implications and a claim of ineffective assistance oftrial counsel. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Consequently, the appellatecourt held that respondent's failure to file a postdisposition motionin accordance with Rule 604(d) did not require dismissal of hisappeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. The appellate court, however, didnot consider the merits of respondent's appeal, but insteadremanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings incompliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978. This courtthen granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.315(a).

ANALYSIS

This court recently held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenileproceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 322 (2001). Because theminor in that case had filed a postadmission motion, however, thiscourt left open the issue of whether the filing of such a motion isa jurisdictional prerequisite to taking a delinquency appeal. In reA.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 322.

In the context of adult defendants, this court has stated that aRule 604(d) motion is a condition precedent to an appeal from aguilty plea. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107 (1988).Consequently, this court held in Wilk that the appellate courtproperly dismissed the appeals of those defendants who had notfiled motions to withdraw their guilty pleas in accordance withRule 604(d) prior to filing the appeals. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06.This court recognized that a defendant is denied the effectiveassistance of counsel, appellate review, and other potentialconstitutional issues when his attorney fails to adhere to Rule604(d) despite hearing the admonishments required by SupremeCourt Rule 605(b) (188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)). We noted, however, thatthe dismissal of the defendants' appeals did not leave thosedefendants without a remedy, because relief was available to thosedefendants pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Wilk, 124Ill. 2d at 107.

At issue in this case is the interpretation of the "conditionprecedent" language in Wilk. The State interprets the "conditionprecedent" language in Wilk as establishing that the failure to filea Rule 604(d) motion deprives the appellate court of jurisdictionover an appeal. The State further argues that because Rule 604(d)has been held to apply in the juvenile context, its jurisdictionalcomponent must also apply. In support of its argument that Rule604(d) is jurisdictional, the State cites In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d473 (1989).

In In re A.W., the appellate court relied on Wilk in holding thata juvenile's failure to file a motion to withdraw his admission ofjuvenile delinquency prior to filing his notice of appeal requireddismissal of the appeal. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 474. Theappellate court rejected the juvenile's attempt to distinguish Wilkon the ground that a defendant in a criminal case has the right toa hearing under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, while a juvenilehas no corresponding right. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.The appellate court acknowledged that there was language in Wilkindicating that the holding in that case would not leave defendantswithout a remedy. In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d at 475. The courtconcluded, however, that the language was not central to thecourt's holding and dismissed the juvenile's appeal. In re A.W.,185 Ill. App. 3d at 475.

In contrast, respondent argues in favor of the appellate court'sinterpretation of the "condition precedent" language in Wilk. Asnoted, the appellate court in this case relied upon People v.McKay, 282 Ill. App. 3d 108 (1996), in holding that a juvenile'sfailure to file a Rule 604(d) motion does not require dismissal ofhis appeal. The McKay court held that Wilk and its progeny do notwithdraw jurisdiction from the appellate court, but insteadwithdraw the decision whether waiver should bar the appeal of adefendant who has not filed a Rule 604(d) motion. McKay, 282 Ill.App. 3d at 111. In following McKay, the appellate court in thiscase acknowledged that its decision was in direct conflict with Inre A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), but nonetheless held thatrespondent's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) did not requiredismissal of his appeal. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977.

Upon review, we find that the court in McKay was correct inits determination that Wilk and its progeny do not stand for theproposition that the filing of a Rule 604(d) motion is required tovest the appellate court with jurisdiction. In arguing that Rule604(d) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a notice of appeal,the State points to language from of decision of this courtsubsequent to Wilk. Specifically, the State notes that in People v.Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), this court stated that when adefendant fails to file a motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), "theappellate court must dismiss the appeal, leaving the Post-Conviction Hearing Act as a defendant's only recourse."(Emphasis added.) Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 471. The State contendsthat the use of the word "must" indicates that compliance withRule 604(d) is jurisdictional. The State, however, overlooks thepreceding sentence, which provides that "[t]hough the appellatecourt may have jurisdiction, Rule 604(d) precludes it fromconsidering the appeal of such an error unless the defendant" firstfiles a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d). (Emphasis added.)Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 471. Contrary to the State's argument, then,a written motion pursuant Rule 604(d) is not required in order tovest the appellate court with jurisdiction over a defendant's appeal.

Moreover, as respondent argues, if the failure to comply withRule 604(d) deprived a court of jurisdiction, such noncompliancewould always require dismissal of a defendant's appeal. However,since our decision in Wilk, this court has recognized certainexceptions to the written motion requirement of Rule 604(d). Forexample, in Foster this court recognized an "admonitionexception" to Rule 604(d). Specifically, this court held that wherea trial court fails to issue Rule 605(b) admonitions, the appellatecourt may entertain an appeal from a sentence despite defendant'snoncompliance with the written motion requirement of Rule604(d). Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 473. We explained, however, that"[w]here the appellate court may consider an appeal despite adefendant's noncompliance with Rule 604(d), the appellate courthas no discretion and must remand for strict compliancetherewith." Foster, 171 Ill. 2d at 474.

Similarly, in People v. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d 378 (2002), thiscourt again addressed the written motion requirement of Rule604(d). There, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of firstdegree murder after his court-appointed psychiatrist found him fitto stand trial. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 379. At the defendant'ssentencing hearing, the psychiatrist testified that he would havefound the defendant insane at the time of the alleged offense underthe prior version of the insanity statute. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 380.While the defendant's appeal was pending before the appellatecourt, the defendant alerted the appellate court to the fact that thepublic act creating the new version of the insanity statute had beendeclared unconstitutional by this court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 381.Nonetheless, the appellate court denied the defendant's request tovacate his guilty plea or to allow him leave to file a motion towithdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at381.

On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that theappellate court had erred in denying his request to vacate his guiltyplea. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. The State argued that thedefendant could not challenge the validity of his guilty pleabecause he did not file a written motion to vacate his guilty plea inthe trial court prior to challenging that plea on appeal. Belcher,199 Ill. 2d at 382. This court agreed that, in the usual case, thedefendant's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleawithin the time allotted by Rule 604(d) would leave him withouta remedy. Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382. We stated, however, that:

"[w]hile it is true this court does not approve of anyfailure to comply strictly with the explicitly statedrequirements of Rule 604(d) (People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d93, 103 (1988)), the unusual and fact-specificcircumstances found in this case lead us to believe that theends of justice will be better served by permittingdefendant leave to file a motion to withdraw his guiltyplea in the trial court." Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 382.

We therefore remanded the cause to the trial court to give thedefendant an opportunity to file a motion to vacate his guilty plea.Belcher, 199 Ill. 2d at 383-84.

The fact that this court has recognized exceptions to thewritten motion requirements of Rule 604(d), then, reinforces ourstatement in Foster that those requirements are not jurisdictional.Because failure to comply with the written motion requirement ofRule 604(d) does not deprive a court of jurisdiction in the adultcontext, it follows that the failure to comply with the writtenmotion requirement does not deprive the appellate court ofjurisdiction in the juvenile context. Consequently, we affirm theappellate court's finding that respondent's failure to file a writtenmotion pursuant to Rule 604(d) did not deprive the court ofjurisdiction over the appeal. To the extent that the appellate court'sdecision in In re A.W., 185 Ill. App. 3d 473 (1989), suggests thatthe appellate court must dismiss a juvenile's appeal for lack ofjurisdiction when the minor fails to comply with the writtenmotion requirement of Rule 604(d), that decision is herebyoverruled.

We next must determine whether the appellate court properlyremanded this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings incompliance with Rule 604(d). As discussed, in the context of adultdefendants, we have acknowledged that an attorney's failure toadhere to Rule 604(d) despite hearing the admonishments requiredby Rule 605(b) falls "short of providing competentrepresentation." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 105-06. We recognized that:

"[t]he defendant, through no fault of his, is deprived of aright to be heard in the appellate court. Such assistance ofcounsel, coupled with the denial of appellate review,raises effective assistance of counsel constitutionalquestions. Furthermore, many of the grounds forwithdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration of which isdenied because of counsel's failure, themselves may raiseconstitutional questions." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106.

We observed, however, that a defendant is not left without aremedy because the defendant can raise his claims in apostconviction petition.

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has never beenheld to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at321-22 ("this court has not reviewed holdings of the appellatecourt concluding that relief from such [juvenile court] proceedingsis unavailable under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act").Consequently, dismissing a juvenile defendant's appeal for failingto comply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d)may leave a juvenile without a remedy for his claims, includingthose claims alleging constitutional violations.

The State contends that juveniles would not be left without aremedy in this situation because they could present their claims ina section 2-1401 motion (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)).Section 2-1401, however, does not provide a juvenile defendantwith a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.Although the remedial powers of section 2-1401 have been heldto extend to criminal cases, such a motion is intended "to correctall errors of fact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknownto the petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered,which, if then known, would have prevented its rendition." Peoplev. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 461 (2000). A juvenile's claim that hiscounsel was ineffective for failing to file a written motion pursuantto Rule 604(d) does not fall within those parameters. Moreover, asection 2-1401 petition is not intended to provide for a generalreview of all trial errors or as a substitute for a direct appeal.Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d at 461, quoting People v. Berland, 74 Ill. 2d286, 314 (1978). Consequently, we find that section 2-1401 is notadequate to preserve a juvenile's claims on appeal when hisattorney fails to comply with the written motion requirements ofRule 604(d).

Because a juvenile does not have an adequate means forpresenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a writtenmotion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find that dismissal is too harsha sanction for a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule604(d). We emphasize, however, that this court requires strictcompliance with Rule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adultcontext. We therefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails tocomply with the written motion requirements of Rule 604(d) priorto filing an appeal, the appellate court has no discretion and mustremand the cause to the circuit court for strict compliance withRule 604(d). Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's order inthis case remanding this cause to the circuit court for furtherproceedings in compliance with Rule 604(d).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate courtis affirmed.

Affirmed.

I write separately to address the dissents' related contentionsthat certain statements in the majority opinion are irreconcilablyinconsistent and that the majority's conclusion is improperly basedon the implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Actdoes not apply to juvenile proceedings. I believe that thestatements can be reconciled and that our conclusion is supportedby sound reasoning.

As the majority opinion states, the Post-Conviction HearingAct has never been held to apply to juvenile proceedings. Slip op.at 7. In the absence of such an affirmative holding, juveniledefendants necessarily face the possibility that no avenue ofreview exists for their claims, even when those claims allegeconstitutional violations. Slip op. at 7. In this case, however, theState argues that section 2-1401 offers such an avenue. Weexplicitly reject that argument, holding that a juvenile cannot usea section 2-1401 motion to present a claim that trial counsel failedto comply with the mandates of Rule 604(d). Slip op. at 8. Afteraddressing these initial matters, we conclude that "[b]ecause ajuvenile does not have an adequate means for presenting hisclaims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuant toRule 604(d), *** dismissal is too harsh a sanction." Slip op. at 8.

This last statement forms the basis for the dissenters'contentions that the opinion is internally inconsistent because itboth claims that the application of the Post-Conviction HearingAct in juvenile cases is an open question and implicitly assumesthat it does not apply. I believe these contentions are premised onan unduly loose interpretation of our statements and, thus, writeseparately to explain that the majority's conclusion, read in itsproper context, does not suffer from a fatal flaw.

In this opinion, we recognize the absence of any holdingauthorizing the use of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act for reviewof juveniles' claims. Slip op. at 7. We also reject juveniles' use ofsection 2-1401 for this purpose. Slip op. at 8. Properly read in thislimited context, our statement that "a juvenile does not have anadequate means for presenting his claims when his attorney failsto file a written motion pursuant to Rule 604(d)" merelyacknowledges the absence of any precedential authority supportingthe conclusion that juveniles such as the respondent have a viablemeans of appellate redress. See Slip op. at 8. It neither creates aninherent conflict with our prior statements nor necessarily relies onan implicit assumption that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act isinapplicable in juvenile proceedings. It merely recognizes theunsettled state of the law in this matter.

As for the dissenters' contention that the majority shouldaddress the issue of whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Actapplies to juveniles in this case, I believe that our decision todecline that opportunity is well justified. The parties offer minimalargument on the issue. Indeed, as appellant, the State does noteven raise the issue in its opening brief. Even more telling, therespondent's brief explicitly requests that we simply affirm theappellate court's remand, arguing that doing so would have thesame effect as a decision on the merits of the substantive issue,plus have the additional benefits of serving the court's interest injudicial economy, and avoiding the potential for overburdeningrelatively uneducated juveniles with the filing of pro sepostconviction petitions capable of surviving first stage review.Based on only this limited adversarial context, resolving an issueas important as the applicability of the Post-Conviction HearingAct in juvenile proceedings would be premature and unwise. Aquestion of such magnitude should be fully briefed and argued byopposing parties zealously advocating the relevant arguments priorto its definitive resolution by this court. Lacking the benefit ofsuch strong adversarial testing, this court declined to address themerits of the issue in this case. Thus, it remains an open questionwisely left for another day.

I join fully in Justice Freeman's partial concurrence andpartial dissent. I write separately only to underscore the internalinconsistency in the majority's resolution of the appeal in the caseat bar.

The majority concludes that "dismissal is too harsh a sanctionfor a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d)"because "a juvenile does not have an adequate means forpresenting his claims when his attorney fails to file a writtenmotion pursuant to Rule 604(d)." Slip op. at 8. Necessarilyimplicit in this conclusion is the determination that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings.Otherwise there would be adequate means for a juvenile to presenthis claims when his attorney fails to file a written motion pursuantto Rule 604(d). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 107-09 (1988)(when a defendant's attorney fails to file a motion to withdrawdefendant's guilty plea in compliance with Rule 604(d), defendantmay not pursue appellate review, "[t]he appropriate remedy forthese defendants lies in our Post-Conviction Hearing Act").

However, only a few paragraphs earlier, the majority statesthat it is leaving as an open question whether the Post-ConvictionHearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. Quoting In re A.G.,195 Ill. 2d 313, 321-22 (2001), the majority notes that " 'this courthas not reviewed holdings of the appellate court concluding thatrelief from such [juvenile court] proceedings is unavailable underthe Post-Conviction Hearing Act' " and concludes that "dismissinga juvenile defendant's appeal for failing to comply with the writtenmotion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenile withouta remedy for his claims." (Emphasis added.) See slip op. at 7.

If the question whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Actapplies to juvenile proceedings is truly an open one, as themajority claims, the majority should not be deciding this appeal asit does, based on the assumption that the Post-Conviction HearingAct does not apply to juvenile proceedings. As Justice Freemanpoints out, this court could just as readily assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does apply to juvenile proceedings. In sodoing, however, the appeal in the case before us would necessarilybe decided differently.

It should be apparent that resolution of the appeal in the caseat bar is dependent on deciding whether the Post-ConvictionHearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. For this reason, thecourt has no discretion to avoid addressing the issue. The issueneeds to be confronted head on.

Like Justice Freeman, I concur in the majority's holding thata defendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) does not deprivean appellate court of jurisdiction to consider the defendant'sappeal. However, because the majority assumes, without deciding,that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenileproceedings in reaching its conclusion that "dismissal is too harsha sanction for a juvenile defendant's failure to comply with Rule604(d)" (slip op. at 8), I, like Justice Freeman, cannot join fully inthe majority opinion.

JUSTICES FREEMAN and RARICK join in this partialconcurrence and partial dissent.

I agree with the majority's initial determination that adefendant's failure to comply with Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R.604(d)) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction toconsider the defendant's appeal. I also agree with the majority that,where the circuit court gives proper Rule 604(d) and Rule 605(b)(188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b)) admonitions to an adult defendant and thedefendant fails to comply with Rule 604(d), it is not appropriatefor the appellate court to remand the cause to the circuit court forstrict compliance with Rule 604(d). Instead, the appellate courtmust dismiss the appeal because the defendant has an adequateremedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)). See People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93(1988). I part company with the majority, however, because itassumes, without analysis or citation to authority, that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings,and does not provide an adequate remedy for the juvenile in thecase at bar. Moreover, the assumption the majority makes affectsthe very outcome of the present cause and is therefore contrary toprincipled judicial review. In my opinion, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is an issueof great import which this court must decide to reach the properresolution of this cause.

ANALYSIS

In Wilk, in the context of criminal proceedings, this courtconsidered what should be the effect of the defendants' failure tocomply with Rule 604(d). Both defendants had filed notices ofappeal of their guilty pleas without prior Rule 604(d) motions towithdraw the guilty pleas. This court first acknowledged theimpact upon a defendant's rights when there is a failure to complywith Rule 604(d):

"[A]n attorney who stands with his client in a criminalproceeding, hears the admonishments of the courtrequired by Rule 605(b), and fails to adhere to Rule604(d) by moving to withdraw the plea prior to filing anotice of appeal has fallen short of providing competentrepresentation. *** The defendant, through no fault of his,is deprived of a right to be heard in the appellate court.Such assistance of counsel, coupled with the denial ofappellate review, raises effective assistance of counselconstitutional questions. Furthermore, many of thegrounds for withdrawal of guilty pleas, consideration ofwhich is denied because of counsel's failure, themselvesmay raise constitutional questions." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at105-06.

This court also emphasized, however, the importance of Rule604(d):

"[The] purpose [of Rule 604(d)] is to ensure that before acriminal appeal can be taken from a guilty plea, the trialjudge who accepted the plea and imposed sentence begiven the opportunity to hear the allegations ofimproprieties that took place outside the officialproceedings and dehors the record, but nevertheless wereunwittingly given sanction in the courtroom. Rule 604(d)provides for fact finding to take place at a time whenwitnesses are still available and memories are fresh.[Citation.] A hearing under Rule 604(d) allows a trialcourt to immediately correct any improper conduct or anyerrors of the trial court that may have produced a guiltyplea." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 104.

The court then noted that exceptions to Rule 604(d) fashioned byvarious panels of the appellate court had circumvented anddefeated the purpose of the rule:

"If the appellate court elects to retain jurisdiction of theappeal and considers the merits of the defendant'scontentions, the rule has been ignored. If the appellatecourt remands the case for a motion to withdraw, to befiled and to be considered by the trial court, the case hastaken a needless trip to the appellate court, wasted thatcourt's time, extended the time within which the motionto withdraw must be filed under Rule 604(d), and attachesno consequences to the ignoring of the requirements ofthe rule of this court." Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 106-07.

Balancing the various interests at issue, this court affirmed thedismissal of the defendants' appeals. The court noted that,pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, the defendants hadan appropriate vehicle for the vindication of their rights. Wilk, 124Ill. 2d at 107.

In the case at bar, as in Wilk, respondent's attorney failed tocomply with Rule 604(d). Counsel did not file a motion towithdraw respondent's guilty plea or a motion to reconsider thesentence. Since respondent is a juvenile and not an adult, thequestion then becomes whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Actapplies to juvenile proceedings. If the Post-Conviction HearingAct applies to juvenile proceedings, respondent, like the adultdefendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedy for counsel's failureto comply with Rule 604(d). Conversely, if the Post-ConvictionHearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings, respondentdoes not have an adequate remedy for counsel's failure to complywith the rule. Due process considerations would dictate that, ratherthan dismiss respondent's appeal, this court remand to the circuitcourt for strict compliance with Rule 604(d). See People v. Foster,171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996) (this court remanded the cause for strictcompliance with Rule 604(d) where the trial court failed to givethe defendant the Rule 605(b) admonitions regarding Rule 604(d)).

The appellate court recognized that whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings is a crucialissue in this case. The court observed:

"Since the issue is one of waiver rather thanjurisdiction, the question is not whether we can considerrespondent's appeal but whether we should. Of course, ifthis were a criminal case Wilk would dictate dismissal,leaving the respondent to his remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ***." (Emphases in original.) 328Ill. App. 3d at 977.

The court then held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act does notapply to juvenile proceedings. 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977. Beingaware, however, that by its holding the juvenile's claim ofconstitutional violations would escape scrutiny, the court advancedan alternate resolution of the case:

"Because a juvenile, unlike an adult offender, has noalternative means of presenting his claims, we believe it isappropriate to invoke Supreme Court Rule 615(a): 'Plainerrors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticedalthough they were not brought to the attention of the trialcourt.' " 328 Ill. App. 3d at 977-78.

The appellate court remanded the cause to the circuit court forstrict compliance with Rule 604(d). 328 Ill. App. 3d at 978.

The majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the appellatecourt in determining that compliance with Rule 604(d) is notjurisdictional. However, unlike the appellate court opinion, themajority opinion does not determine, with proper analysis andcitation to authority, whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Actapplies to juvenile proceedings. Rather than determine this crucialquestion, the majority merely assumes that the Post-ConvictionHearing Act does not apply to juvenile proceedings. The majoritystates:

"The Post-Conviction Hearing Act, however, has neverbeen held to apply in juvenile proceedings. See In re A.G.,195 Ill. 2d at 321-22 ('this court has not reviewed holdings ofthe appellate court concluding that relief from such [juvenilecourt] proceedings is unavailable under the Post-ConvictionHearing Act'). Consequently, dismissing a juveniledefendant's appeal for failing to comply with the writtenmotion requirements of Rule 604(d) may leave a juvenilewithout a remedy for his claims, including those claimsalleging constitutional violations." Slip op. at 7.

Further, in rejecting the State's contention that a juvenile wouldnot be left without a remedy but could resort to a section 2-1401motion (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), the majority states:

"Section 2-1401, however, does not provide a juveniledefendant with a remedy equivalent to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. Although the remedial powers ofsection 2-1401 have been held to extend to criminalcases, such a motion is intended 'to correct all errors offact occurring in the prosecution of a cause, unknown tothe petitioner and court at the time judgment was entered,which, if then known, would have prevented itsrendition.' [Citation.] A juvenile's claim that his counselwas ineffective for failing to file a written motionpursuant to Rule 604(d) does not fall within thoseparameters." Slip op. at 7-8.

The majority concludes that:

"Because a juvenile does not have an adequate meansfor presenting his claims when his attorney fails to file awritten motion pursuant to Rule 604(d), we find thatdismissal is too harsh a sanction for a juvenile defendant'sfailure to comply with Rule 604(d). We emphasize,however, that this court requires strict compliance withRule 604(d) in both the juvenile and the adult context. Wetherefore hold that when a juvenile defendant fails tocomply with the written motion requirements of Rule604(d) prior to filing an appeal, the appellate court has nodiscretion and must remand the cause to the circuit courtfor strict compliance with Rule 604(d)." Slip op. at 8.

With due respect, my colleagues of the majority err in thatthey make an assumption which affects the very outcome of thiscase. Consider the alternate assumption, that the Post-ConvictionHearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. In that case,respondent, like the defendants in Wilk, has an adequate remedyfor counsel's failure to comply with Rule 604(d). Applying Wilk,it would also follow that the proper resolution of this case is todismiss respondent's appeal.

I note that this court is entrusted with the responsibility for ajust result and the maintenance of a sound and uniform body ofprecedent. People v. Wilson, 155 Ill. 2d 374, 379 (1993), quotingAmerican Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,Council 31 v. County of Cook, 145 Ill. 2d 475, 480 (1991), citingHux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967). Where, as here, an issueof import is relevant to the final determination of the cause and isnot yet decided by this court, the court is duty bound to considerthe issue and arrive at a reasoned decision concerning the issue.The court should not assume, without analysis or authority, thatthe issue has been decided in a particular manner. Nor should thecourt divorce itself from its responsibility by observing that noother court has ever decided the issue in a particular manner. In thecase at bar, this court is duty bound to consider whether the Post-Conviction Hearing Act applies to juvenile proceedings. The courtmay not merely assume that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act doesnot apply to juvenile proceedings.

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a remedy for adefendant who has suffered a substantial violation of his or herconstitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in theconviction. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2000). In assuming thatthe Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not apply to juvenileproceedings, this court has, without analysis, deprived all juvenilesof the comprehensive remedies afforded by the Act. I do not hereimply that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act should apply tojuvenile proceedings. Rather, I suggest that this court, as thesupreme judicial body of this state, must shoulder itsresponsibilities and come to a reasoned decision about the issue.

CONCLUSION

I cannot join fully in the majority opinion because themajority refuses to decide an important issue in the case at bar, andbecause the majority makes an assumption about that issue whichcontrols the very outcome of the case. While I concur in themajority's holding that a defendant's failure to comply with Rule604(d) does not deprive the appellate court of jurisdiction toconsider the defendant's appeal, I respectfully dissent from thebalance of the opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE McMORROW and JUSTICE RARICK joinin this partial concurrence and partial dissent.