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Docket No. 92947-Agenda 10-November 2002.

In re PARENTAGE OF M.J. et al., Minors (Alexis Mitchell, 
Indiv. and as Guardian and Next Friend on Behalf of Minors
M.J. and N.J., Appellant, v. Raymond Banary, Appellee).

Opinion filed February 6, 2003.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant, Alexis Mitchell, brought this action againstappellee, Raymond Banary, her former paramour, seeking toestablish paternity and to impose support obligations for twin boysconceived through artificial insemination by an anonymous donor.The circuit court of Cook County dismissed Alexis' suit. Theappellate court affirmed. 325 Ill. App. 3d 826. We allowed Alexis'petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. We also granted theLambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., leave to submitan amicus curiae brief in support of Alexis. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and hold that the IllinoisParentage Act does not bar common law claims for child support.

I. BACKGROUND

We initially note that Raymond brought his motion to dismissAlexis' complaint under section 2-619.1 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 1998)). A motionto dismiss "admits all well-pled allegations in the complaint andreasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts." In re ChicagoFlood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 184 (1997). With thatpresumption in mind, we review the factual background of thiscase.

Alexis is a single woman who was 40 years old at the time ofthe filing of her complaint, and Raymond is a male who was 57years old at the time of the filing of the complaint. Alexis andRaymond first met in 1986 and began an intimate relationshiplasting 10 years. When they met, Raymond introduced himself toAlexis as "Jim Richardson" and told her that he was divorced.

During their 10-year relationship, the parties discussedmarriage. Alexis and Raymond are of different races and,according to Alexis, Raymond told her that he would have to waituntil retirement to marry because his community would not accepta mixed-race marriage. Raymond promised Alexis that upon hisretirement, they would move to another community and bemarried.

The parties also discussed Alexis' desire to have children withRaymond. Despite their attempts to conceive, Alexis did notbecome pregnant, and it became apparent that Raymond could notfather children. In 1991, Raymond suggested to Alexis that shebecome artificially inseminated by an anonymous donor as ameans to have their child. Artificial insemination by a donor isalso known as heterologous artificial insemination. Alexis claimsthat Raymond promised her that he would provide financialsupport for any child born by means of artificial insemination.However, Raymond's written consent to the procedure was neverobtained. Alexis contends that Raymond orally consented to theprocedure and that but for Raymond's promise to support thechildren, Alexis would not have completed the procedure.

According to Alexis, with Raymond's continuing consent andactive encouragement, she attempted to become pregnant throughartificial insemination. Raymond provided financial assistance forthe insemination procedure; accompanied Alexis to the doctor'soffice for examinations; injected Alexis with medication designedto enhance her fertility; and participated in selecting the donor sothat the offspring would appear to be a product of theirrelationship.

On the fifth attempt, Alexis became pregnant and gave birthto twin boys in 1993. Raymond participated in selecting names forthe children. After the births, Raymond acknowledged the childrenas his own. He also provided support for them in the form ofmonthly payments of cash and the purchase of food, clothing,furniture, toys, and play equipment. In her complaint, Alexisfurther describes many family vacations with Raymond to 10different states and Mexico, and alleges that Raymond also paidfor the children's medical, travel, and entertainment expenses.

In 1996, Alexis discovered that Raymond was not named JimRichardson and that he was married. Upon discovering Raymond'strue name and marital status, Alexis ended their relationship. Since1996, Raymond has provided no financial support for the children.

Alexis filed a three-count complaint against Raymond seekingto establish paternity and impose a support obligation for thebenefit of the twin boys. In the first two counts, Alexis sought toimpose child support obligations by invoking common lawtheories of breach of an oral agreement and promissory estoppel.In the remaining count of her complaint, Alexis sought adeclaration of paternity and establishment of child supportpursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West1998)).

Raymond filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Alexis'common law claims, contained in counts I and II, wereunenforceable under the provisions of the Frauds Act (740 ILCS80/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) and contravened Illinois publicpolicy. Raymond also argued that all three counts should bedismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS5/2-615 (West 1998)) because Alexis failed to set forth a legallyrecognized basis for the imposition of a father-child relationshipor for child support under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS40/1 et seq. (West 1998)).

The circuit court granted Raymond's motion and dismissedAlexis' complaint. The circuit court interpreted the IllinoisParentage Act as requiring that a husband consent in writingbefore he is treated in law as the natural father of a child conceivedto his wife by means of artificial insemination. The circuit courtcommented that it would not be rational that unmarried coupleswould have fewer safeguards in such a matter. The circuit courttherefore held that Alexis' common law theories were notactionable because the Illinois Parentage Act expressly requireswritten consent. The circuit court did not refer to the Frauds Actin its dismissal of the complaint.

Alexis appealed the circuit court's decision, and the appellatecourt majority determined that Alexis' common law theories forchild support fail because the Illinois Parentage Act governsartificial insemination and requires that the "husband's consentmust be in writing." The appellate court held that written consentis required before an unmarried man becomes legally obligated tosupport a child born as a result of artificial insemination. Based onits decision, the appellate court did not reach the issue concerningthe Frauds Act.

II. DISCUSSION

As previously noted, Raymond brought his motion to dismissunder section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West1998)). Section 2-619.1 permits a litigant to combine a section2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)) motion to dismiss and asection 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) motion forinvoluntary dismissal into one pleading. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1(West 1998). A section 2-619 motion raises certain defects ordefenses and questions whether Raymond is entitled to judgmentas a matter of law. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d469, 494 (1994). A section 2-615 motion questions whether acomplaint states a cause of action. Illinois Graphics Co., 159 Ill.2d at 488.

When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)) or section 2-619 (735ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) of the Code, the court must interpretall pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorableto the nonmoving party. Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at189. A motion to dismiss should be granted only if Alexis canprove no set of facts that would support a cause of action. ChicagoFlood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189. We review both the dismissalof a complaint and the interpretation of a statute de novo. ChicagoFlood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189; People v. Robinson, 172 Ill.2d 452, 457 (1996).

In construing a statute, this court must give effect to the intentof the legislature. Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill. 2d 477, 484(1992). To ascertain legislative intent, we must examine thelanguage of the entire statute and consider each part or section inconnection with every other part or section. Castaneda v. IllinoisHuman Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989). Where thelanguage is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statutewithout resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v.Toshiba Machine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999).With these principles in mind, we now turn to the interpretation ofthe Illinois Parentage Act.

In 1984, the General Assembly enacted the Illinois ParentageAct (750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 1998)) "to define the legalrelationships of a child born to a wife and husband requesting andconsenting to *** artificial insemination." Pub. Act 83-1026, eff.January 5, 1984. Section 3 of the Illinois Parentage Act provides:

"(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physicianand with the consent of her husband, a wife isinseminated artificially with semen donated by a man nother husband, the husband shall be treated in law as if hewere the natural father of a child thereby conceived. Thehusband's consent must be in writing executed andacknowledged by both the husband and wife. Thephysician who is to perform the technique shall certifytheir signatures and the date of the insemination, and filethe husband's consent in the medical record where it shallbe kept confidential and held by the patient's physician.However, the physician's failure to do so shall not affectthe legal relationship between father and child. All papersand records pertaining to the insemination, whether partof the permanent medical record held by the physician ornot, are subject to inspection only upon an order of thecourt for good cause shown.

(b) The donor of the semen provided to a licensedphysician for use in artificial insemination of a womanother than the donor's wife shall be treated in law as if hewere not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."750 ILCS 40/3(a) (West 1998).

Any child born as a result of artificial insemination is consideredthe legitimate child of the husband and wife consenting to the useof the technique. 750 ILCS 40/2 (West 1998). Our interpretationof the express language of this provision of the statute indicatesthat the primary purpose of the Illinois Parentage Act is to providea legal mechanism for a husband and wife to obtain donor spermfor use in artificial insemination and to ensure that a child isconsidered the legitimate child of the husband and wife requestingand consenting to the artificial technique.

Section 3(b) of the Illinois Parentage Act also provides astatutory vehicle for women to obtain semen for artificialinsemination without fear that the donor may claim paternity. 750ILCS 40/3(b) (West 1998). Additionally, section 3(b) protectssperm donors from claims of paternity and liability for childsupport.

The parties dispute whether, under section 3(a) of the IllinoisParentage Act, the failure to provide written consent will precludethe establishment of a parent-child relationship and the impositionof a support obligation. This court has not conclusively interpretedthe written-consent provision of the Act. We have, however,commented that the provision in the Act that "the husband'sconsent to the [artificial insemination] procedure 'must be inwriting' could be considered a mandatory requirement forestablishing a parent-child relationship pursuant to the statute."(Emphasis added.) In re Marriage of Adams, 133 Ill. 2d 437, 444(1990), citing Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21 (1978) (theword "must" is generally construed in a mandatory sense.)

Whether a statutory provision is deemed mandatory or merelydirectory depends upon the intent of its drafters. People v.Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 (1980). An important aid in thedetermination of whether a provision is mandatory or directory isthe form of the verb used in the statute. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d at562. If the provision merely directs a manner of conduct, it isdirectory. Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d at 21. If the conduct is, however,prescribed in order to safeguard one's rights, the statute ismandatory. Andrews, 71 Ill. 2d at 21.

The first sentence of section 3(a) provides for theestablishment of a parent-child relationship by consent. Thesecond sentence of section 3(a) unequivocally requires that theconsent for establishment of a parent-child relationship be inwriting. This provision is clearly designed to safeguard rightsconcerning parentage. In light of the purpose of the written-consent requirement, we must conclude that the written-consentprovision of section 3(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act ismandatory. Thus, section 3(a) of the Illinois Parentage Actmandates that written consent be obtained before parentalresponsibility may be established. Consequently, the failure toprovide or obtain written consent will preclude a claim forpaternity and child support under the Illinois Parentage Act.Accordingly, the appellate court did not err in affirming the circuitcourt's dismissal of count III of Alexis' complaint.

We note that the language of the Illinois Parentage Act waslargely adopted from section 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act(UPA) (Unif. Parentage Act