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Docket No. 89599-Agenda 10-March 2001.

In re M.H. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. V.D., Appellee).

Opinion filed May 24, 2001.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In July 1998, the State filed a "Supplemental Petition forTermination of Parental Rights and Power to Consent toAdoption" (supplemental petition) with respect to each ofrespondent V.D.'s two minor daughters, M.H. and T.H.Respondent admitted to count III of the supplemental petitions,which alleged that she failed to make reasonable efforts to correctthe conditions which were the basis of the minors' removal or tomake reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to herwithin 12 months after adjudication of neglect. The circuit courtof Winnebago County, after inquiring whether respondentunderstood that she had a right to require the State to prove herunfit, accepted respondent's admission to count III. No factualbasis was elicited before the circuit court accepted the admissionof unfitness. Following a best interests hearing, respondent'sparental rights were terminated.

On appeal, respondent argued that the State should haveelicited a factual basis prior to accepting her admission, as theState is required to do when a criminal defendant enters a guiltyplea pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402(c) (177 Ill. 2d R.402(c)). The appellate court agreed and reversed and remanded.313 Ill. App. 3d 205. We granted the State's petition for leave toappeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

BACKGROUND

Respondent has six children. This appeal involves onlyrespondent's parental rights with respect to M.H., born on April28, 1993, and T.H., born on June 3, 1989. On August 1, 1995, thecircuit court adjudicated M.H. and T.H. neglected because theylived in an environment injurious to their welfare in that one oftheir brothers, J.H., played with matches and on occasion setthings on fire, thereby placing M.H. and T.H. at risk of harm. Thecircuit court appointed the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) as the minors' guardian and custodian andallowed DCFS to place the children with respondent. In February1996, M.H. and T.H. were removed from respondent's custodybecause of poor conditions in the home and were placed withrespondent's sister. Later, M.H. and T.H. were placed in separatefoster homes.

After M.H. and T.H. were adjudicated neglected, a hearingwas held in February 1998, regarding respondent's youngest son,Mi. H. During the hearing, respondent stipulated that M.H. andT.H. had been sexually molested by their brothers and thatrespondent had failed to protect them. Based on this stipulation,evidence, and testimony, the circuit court found Mi. H. to be anabused minor and made him a ward of the court.

In July 1998, the State filed two supplemental petitions fortermination of respondent's parental rights with respect to M.H.and T.H. The petitions alleged that respondent was unfit becauseshe (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 1996)); (2) failed to protect the minors from conditions thatwere injurious to their welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West1996)); and (3) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis of the minors' removal, or to makereasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her within12 months after the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 1996)).

During the January 1999 termination hearing, the Stateinformed the court that respondent would admit that she failed tomake reasonable progress towards the return of M.H. and T.H. toher home. Respondent's attorney stated that he had thoroughlydiscussed respondent's admission with her. The court then askedrespondent whether she understood her right to have the Stateprove by clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit:

"THE COURT: Okay. I want to be clear on the record,[V.D.], that you have a right of requiring [that] the Stateprove the allegations, including the allegations that youfailed to make reasonable progress on your service plan,that the State has a very high burden of proof, they candemonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that youfailed to follow through or failed to progress, basically, interms of meeting your service plan goals, finishingwhatever classes or counseling that was required in orderthat [M.H.] and [T.H.] can be returned to you. Do youunderstand that you have the right to require that the Statepresent a trial, and if you agree to this you are giving upyour right to that?

MR. BRENNER [respondent's attorney]: [V.D.]?

THE COURT: Did you want to take a moment to talkto your attorney more? You are hesitating, so I don't wantto be-This is a big step, and I want you to be comfortablewith it, and I want your [sic] to understand what's beingsaid. What I understand is if you admit to this then thequestion becomes, at the point in time we set the secondportion of it. It's a two-part consideration, first theunfitness issue and then what's in the best interests, andbefore anything would be done affecting your parentalrights findings would have to be made. It would have tobe found it would not be in the children's best interests togo home with you, or whatever, but the first part is-whatwe are talking about today-and you do have the right torequire the State to prove that you are unfit, so if you giveup that right I just want that to be made with yourunderstanding and your agreement. Do you understandthat?

[RESPONDENT]: Yeah.

THE COURT: Are you agreeable with that?

[RESPONDENT]: Yeah."

Without further evidence, the court accepted respondent'sadmission.

In April and June of 1999, the circuit court held hearings onthe best interests of M.H. and T.H. Based on the testimony ofcaseworkers, respondent, and respondent's husband, the circuitcourt found that it was in the best interests of M.H. and T.H. thatrespondent's parental rights be terminated.

The appellate court for the second district reversed holdingthat the circuit court was required to determine that a factual basisexisted for respondent's admission of unfitness. The appellatecourt analogized termination of parental rights proceedings tocriminal proceedings and stated that, although Supreme CourtRule 402(c) does not directly apply to admissions of parentalunfitness, the precautionary measures of Rule 402(c) should applyin parental rights termination proceedings. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 212.

The court relied on Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762, 71L. Ed. 2d 599, 612, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (1982), in which theUnited States Supreme Court stated that "the factfinding stage ofa state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears many of theindicia of a criminal trial." The appellate court concluded that theprotection afforded by a factual-basis inquiry is "necessary" andwill ensure that a parent's admission is knowing and voluntary. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 215.

The appellate court noted that no facts were elicited at thehearing pertaining to respondent's unfitness, and the supplementalpetitions contained only general allegations. Relying on In re D.L.,191 Ill. 2d 1 (2000), the court rejected the State's argument thatthere was sufficient evidence to accept respondent's admissionbased on the evidence presented at the February 1998 adjudicatoryand subsequent best interests hearings regarding respondent's son,Mi. H. The court concluded that since D.L. only allowed forconsideration of the parents' conduct within the 12 monthsfollowing the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency, thecircuit court could only consider evidence of respondent'sreasonable progress from August 1, 1995, to August 1, 1996. 313Ill. App. 3d at 216. The appellate court vacated respondent'sadmission of unfitness for lack of a factual-basis determination,reversed the order terminating respondent's parental rights, andremanded the cause to the circuit court for a new hearing todetermine respondent's fitness.

ANALYSIS

We first address the appropriate standard of review.Ordinarily, a circuit court's finding as to fitness is afforded greatdeference on review. The circuit court is in the best position tomake factual findings and to assess the credibility of witnesses;accordingly, a reviewing court will only reverse a circuit court'sruling if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reAdoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274 (1990). In the present case,however, the circuit court's ruling was based not on testimony orfactual findings, but solely on respondent's admission. Therefore,the question presented in this case, whether the circuit court wasrequired to elicit a factual basis prior to accepting respondent'sadmission, is a question of law and will be reviewed de novo.Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 516 (1998).

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitutionprovides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law." U.S. Const., amend. XIV,