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Docket No. 97898-Agenda 12-January 2005.
In re MARRIAGE OF JENNIFER PETERS-FARRELL, Appellee, and THOMAS PETERS-FARRELL, Appellant.

Opinion filed June 3, 2005.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

The following question was certified pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) from the circuit court of Cook Countyto our appellate court:

"Are requests for pharmaceutical records from [a]pharmacy protected under the Illinois Mental Health andDevelopmental Disabilities [Confidentiality] Act?"

The appellate court answered this question in the affirmative. 345Ill. App. 3d 603. We granted leave to appeal from the appellatecourt's judgment. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the following reasons, wevacate the judgment of the appellate court and dismiss this appeal asmoot.

I. BACKGROUND

Jennifer Peters-Farrell filed a petition for dissolution of hermarriage to Thomas Peters-Farrell. During the course of theproceedings, Thomas served subpoenas on three pharmacies seekingJennifer's prescription records, including the "name of the medication,what the medication is used to treat, dosage, how often refilled, copyof prescription and any other related records."

Jennifer moved to quash the subpoenas. In her motion, Jenniferasserted the Mental Health and Developmental DisabilitiesConfidentiality Act (Confidentiality Act) (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq.(West 2000)) prohibited disclosure of her prescription records withouta court order and the subpoenas constituted an attempt to circumventher privilege under the Act. The circuit court denied Jennifer's motionto quash the subpoenas, but certified the question noted above to theappellate court.

The appellate court allowed the interlocutory appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). 345 Ill. App. 3d 603.In answering the certified question, the appellate court held apharmacy's records of prescriptions issued to mental health recipientsare protected from disclosure under the Confidentiality Act. 345 Ill.App. 3d at 608. The appellate court filed its opinion on December 31,2003.

We granted Thomas' petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R.315(a)). Jennifer subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal forlack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the trial court had entereda judgment of dissolution of marriage that resolved all issues betweenthe parties. Jennifer asserted the parties filed a joint motion onDecember 30, 2003, notifying the appellate court of the entry of thejudgment. Jennifer attached a copy of the joint motion filed in theappellate court to her motion to dismiss this appeal. In the jointmotion, the parties stated "it has become commonplace for attorneysin not only domestic relations cases but personal injury cases to issuesubpoenas for pharmaceutical records as a discovery tool withoutaffording any privacy to the party whose records have beensubpoenaed." The parties acknowledged that the appeal was renderedmoot by the judgment, but nonetheless urged the appellate court todecide the certified question because it involved an important publicinterest. The parties further asserted this was a matter of firstimpression.

In his response to the motion to dismiss, Thomas noted Jenniferhad previously agreed in the joint motion to the appellate court thatthe certified question should be addressed under the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine. Thomas urged this court todecide the certified question under the public interest exception.

This court denied Jennifer's motion to dismiss the appeal. Weallowed the National Association of Chain Drug Stores, Inc., and theIllinois Department of Professional Regulation to file amicus curiaebriefs in support of Thomas. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

II. ANALYSIS

We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether theConfidentiality Act (740 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2000)) prohibitspharmacists from unauthorized disclosure of pharmaceutical recordsrelated to mental health or developmental disability services. Inreviewing the record, however, we must conclude the appeal wasrendered moot by entry of the judgment of dissolution and the petitionfor leave to appeal was improvidently granted.

An appeal is moot if no actual controversy exists or if events haveoccurred that make it impossible for the reviewing court to grant thecomplaining party effectual relief. People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430,435 (2004); In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003). Themootness doctrine stems from the concern that parties to a resolveddispute lack a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to assure theadversarial relationship that " ' "sharpens the presentation of issuesupon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult*** questions." ' " In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989),quoting People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77 (1983),quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82S. Ct. 691, 703 (1962). The existence of a real dispute is not a meretechnicality but, rather, is a prerequisite to the exercise of this court'sjurisdiction. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999).

We cannot grant Jennifer any effectual relief in this case becausethe judgment of dissolution resolved all issues, including her challengeto the subpoenas that sought disclosure of her prescription records.Therefore, this case is clearly moot.

Nonetheless, in his response to the motion to dismiss the appeal,Thomas urged this court to consider the certified question under thepublic interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Thomas did notcontend this case should be reviewed under the mootness exceptionfor cases involving an event of a short duration that is " 'capable ofrepetition, yet evading review.' " See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 258.

The public interest exception is applicable only if there is a clearshowing that: (1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) anauthoritative determination is needed for future guidance; and (3) thecircumstances are likely to recur. In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387(2003); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365. The exception is narrowlyconstrued and requires a clear showing of each criterion. In re IndiaB., 202 Ill. 2d 522, 543 (2002); Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365.

Here, there is no conflicting case law on the issue of whetherpharmacists are prohibited from unauthorized disclosure ofpharmaceutical records under the Confidentiality Act. This court hasdeclined to apply the public interest exception when there are noconflicting precedents requiring an authoritative resolution. See J.B.,204 Ill. 2d at 387-88; India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543; Walgreen, 186 Ill.2d at 365-66. In this matter, an authoritative determination is notnecessary. Therefore, the public interest exception is not applicablebecause at least one of the elements of the exception is absent.

We also note there are critical deficiencies in the record thatimpose an additional obstacle to meaningful review of the certifiedquestion. The record, filed after the petition for leave to appeal wasallowed, does not contain any information that would indicate theseprescription records were related to mental health or developmentaldisability services as required to invoke the protections of theConfidentiality Act. See 740 ILCS 110/2, 3(a) (West 2000). Therecord before us relevant to the certified question consists of thesubpoenas served by Thomas, Jennifer's motion to quash thesubpoenas, and the trial court order denying the motion to quash.These filings contain only general statements and descriptions.Nowhere in the record is there any indication of the type ofmedication prescribed or the condition the medication was prescribedto treat. Further, there is no report of proceedings of the hearing onthe motion to quash or any other proceeding to provide these criticalfacts. Simply put, the prescriptions and the condition they wereintended to treat are not part of the record. We note this informationmay be received and reviewed by the court in camera to prevent anyunauthorized disclosure of confidential information. However, inorder to address adequately this important issue, the record mustclearly show the information sought is of the type that may be subjectto regulation under the Confidentiality Act. Review is not warrantedwhere, as here, the record does not contain sufficient facts to allow usto address the issue.

Finally, we note the appellate court filed its opinion after thejudgment of dissolution was entered in the circuit court. The appellateopinion did not address the mootness issue. We conclude the appellatecourt should have dismissed the appeal as moot upon being notifiedjudgment had been entered in the circuit court because there is noapplicable exception to the mootness doctrine to allow review of thecertified question. Accordingly, the appellate court's judgment isvacated.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude this appeal is moot andthe petition for leave to appeal was improvidently granted. We vacatethe judgment of the appellate court and dismiss this appeal as moot.

Appellate court judgment vacated;
appeal dismissed.