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Docket No. 90732-Agenda 26-September 2001.

In re MARRIAGE OF MARK E. KATES, Appellant, and ANN M. KATES, Appellee.

Opinion filed November 21, 2001.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

The central issue in this appeal is whether, under section7(b-5) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West 2000)), deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testresults disproving paternity are a condition precedent to the filingof an action to declare the nonexistence of the parent and childrelationship. The appellate court held that such test results are acondition precedent to the filing of a section 7(b-5) action, andreversed the judgment of the circuit court of Macon County infavor of Mark Kates, who had filed a section 7(b-5) petition⁽¹⁾without first obtaining DNA test results. No. 4-00-0130(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We affirm thejudgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Mark Kates and Ann Kates were married in August 1990 inDecatur, Illinois. In late 1991 or early 1992, as a result of a homepregnancy test, Mark and Ann learned that Ann was pregnant. Itis undisputed that Ann told Mark at this time that he was not thechild's father. On August 9, 1992, Ann gave birth to a son, M.K.Mark signed the birth certificate as the child's father.

In June 1993 Mark filed a petition for dissolution of marriagein the circuit court of Macon County. In his petition, Mark allegedthat M.K. was not his son, and he asked that his name be removedfrom the birth certificate. Ann filed her entry of appearance andconsent to judgment. Neither Ann nor Mark was represented by anattorney.

On August 6, 1993, the day of the hearing on Mark's petitionfor dissolution of marriage, he and Ann reached an agreementunder which Mark was to pay $20 a week in child support. Theyinformed the court of this agreement. Following the hearing, thecourt entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage, finding thatone child, M.K., was "born to the parties" on August 9, 1992. Thecourt held that Mark was entitled to visitation with M.K. andordered Mark to pay child support of $20 per week, beginning onAugust 13, 1993. The payments were to be made to the circuitclerk.

Ann subsequently began receiving public assistance from theIllinois Department of Public Aid. In January 1994, the MaconCounty circuit court ordered the clerk to forward Mark's childsupport payments to the Department of Public Aid.

On January 8, 1996, the Macon County State's Attorney,acting on behalf of the Department of Public Aid, filed a petitionto modify Mark's child support payments, seeking an increase insupport. The State alleged that M.K.'s needs were not being met,as evidenced by the fact that he was receiving public assistance.The State also alleged that Mark was capable of paying anincreased amount of child support.

About two weeks later (January 24, 1996), Mark filed apetition to modify or correct the judgment of dissolution ofmarriage "as to [the] paternity" of M.K. In his petition, Markalleged that the original judgment for dissolution of marriage"mistakenly or improperly implied or indicated that the child bornto the defendant [Ann] was a child 'born to the parties.' " Markstated that he had undergone a vasectomy in 1984, prior to Ann'spregnancy, and that he was "unable to have children and has beenunable to have children since 1984." According to Mark, Ann hadtold him that he was not the father, and that the actual father wasP.W., a man with whom she had sexual relations at the time ofM.K.'s conception. The State moved to dismiss Mark's petition tomodify or correct judgment on the ground that it was substantiallyinsufficient in law, and the court granted the motion to dismiss.

A hearing was held in June 1996 on the State's petition toincrease Mark's child support. At the hearing, Mark stated thatM.K. was not his child. He explained that he had agreed to payAnn $20 a week in child support in order to "help her out."According to Mark, it was his understanding that the $20 supportamount would never be changed.

Ann testified that she and Mark initially agreed that Mark'sname would be taken off the birth certificate, but that Mark thendecided he wanted to keep his name on the certificate and "keepvisitation" with the child. According to Ann, Mark said he wantedto be the father of the child and wanted to raise it as his own. Annstated that she told Mark he was not the child's father on the nightwhen they did the home pregnancy test.

The court ordered Mark's child support payments increasedto $65 per week, finding that there had been "material changes incircumstances since the judgment [of dissolution of marriage] inthat [Mark's] income ha[d] increased." The court also allowedMark to claim M.K. for income tax purposes so long as Anncontinued to receive public aid.

In May 1997 Mark filed a motion to abate his child supportpayments, alleging that he had been laid off from work the monthbefore as a result of previous knee surgery and a back injury. Annfiled a cross-petition for rule to show cause why Mark should notbe jailed for failure to pay child support. At the hearing on themotion and cross-petition, Mark again asserted that M.K. was nothis child and that he and Ann had agreed that the original childsupport amount of $20 per week would never be changed. Annconceded that she had agreed not to increase the child support, butsaid that after she began receiving public assistance, theDepartment of Public Aid stepped in and sought an increase. Annhad no control over this action. She also testified that during thedivorce proceeding, Mark represented to the court under oath thatM.K. was his child. According to Ann, the court advised Markthen that he would be held to be the father from that point on.

The court denied both Mark's motion and Ann's cross-petition, and held both parties in contempt for misrepresenting thefact of M.K.'s paternity to the court during the divorce proceeding.The court fined each of them $200.

On January 26, 1999, Mark filed a "Petition to Determine theNon-existence of the Father and Child Relationship" pursuant tosection 7(b-5) of the Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West2000)). In his petition, Mark again asserted that he was incapableof fathering children because he had undergone a vasectomy in1984. He asked the court to order Ann and M.K. to submit to DNAtests to determine the child's paternity. The State moved todismiss Mark's petition, asserting that an adjudicated father isbarred from bringing a section 7(b-5) action unless he first obtainsDNA test results showing that he is not the child's natural father.The court denied the State's motion to dismiss, and ordered theparties to submit to DNA testing. This testing confirmed that Markwas not the biological father of M.K.

At the hearing on Mark's section 7(b-5) petition, Markacknowledged that he had undergone a vasectomy prior to hismarriage and that Ann had told him that he was not M.K.'s father.Nevertheless, at the time that M.K. was born, Mark was still"uncertain" as to whether he was the father. However, as a resultof the DNA testing ordered by the court, Mark was now "positive"that he was not the father. Ann repeated her previous testimonythat when she and Mark learned that she was pregnant, she toldMark that he was not the father.

On July 26, 1999, the court entered an order declaring thatMark was not the father of M.K. and vacating all orders regardingcustody, visitation and child support payments after January 26,1999, the date when Mark filed his section 7(b-5) petition.According to this order, the DNA test results, which were enteredinto evidence by stipulation, showed that there was no possibilitythat Mark was the father of M.K.

Ann thereafter appealed. In reversing the trial court's ruling,the appellate court held that under the plain language of section7(b-5), "all adjudicated fathers, as a condition precedent to filinga section 7(b-5) [action] must obtain DNA test resultsdemonstrating that they are not the child's natural father." Markhad failed to obtain these test results, and his petition thereforefailed to state a cause of action under the statute.

The court also held that Mark's cause of action was barred bythe "paternity statute of limitations" as stated in section 8(a)(4) ofthe Parentage Act. Under this provision, a section 7(b-5) action isbarred if brought more than six months after the (August 7, 1998)effective date of section 7(b-5) or more than two years after theadjudicated father obtains "actual knowledge of relevant facts,whichever is later." 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(4) (West 2000). The courtheld that Mark's cause of action was barred under the two-yearlimitations period because it was brought more than two yearsafter he obtained actual knowledge of relevant facts. The courtadded that "[e]ven if this action was brought within six months ofthe amendatory act of 1998, causes of action barred prior to theamendatory act were not reinstated by the Act." Thus the courtappeared to find that Mark had actual knowledge more than twoyears prior to the section 7(b-5)'s effective date, and concludedthat his cause of action was therefore time-barred before section7(b-5) was enacted, and could not be "reinstated" even thoughMark brought it within six months of August 7, 1998.

We granted Mark's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R.315. Before this court, Mark raises two main issues forconsideration: (1) whether, under section 7(b-5) of the ParentageAct, an adjudicated father must obtain a DNA test disprovingpaternity prior to filing a section 7(b-5) action; and (2) whetherMark's section 7(b-5) action in this case is time-barred regardlessof which limitations provision (either the six-month or the two-year period) is applicable.

ANALYSIS

Section 7(b-5), which was added to the Parentage Act onAugust 7, 1998, "provides a new cause of action allowing anadjudicated father to challenge the adjudication 'if' DNA testsestablish nonpaternity." In re Marriage of Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d968, 970 (2000). Prior to this amendment, a man adjudicated to bethe father of a child could not challenge the adjudication "evenwhere subsequent DNA evidence conclusively establishe[d]nonpaternity." Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 970.

Section 7(b-5) provides that:

"An action to declare the non-existence of the parentand child relationship may be brought subsequent to anadjudication of paternity in any judgment by the manadjudicated to be the father pursuant to the presumptionsin Section 5 of this Act if, as a result of deoxyribonucleicacid (DNA) tests, it is discovered that the manadjudicated to be the father is not the natural father of thechild. Actions brought by the adjudicated father shall bebrought by verified complaint. If, as a result of thedeoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests, the plaintiff isdetermined not to be the father of the child, theadjudication of paternity and any orders regardingcustody, visitation, and future payments of support maybe vacated." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5)(West 2000).

The central question presented in this appeal is the properinterpretation of section 7(b-5). In interpreting statutes, a court'sprimary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of thelegislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997); Kraft, Inc.v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). "The best evidence oflegislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, whichmust be given its plain and ordinary meaning." Paris, 179 Ill. 2dat 177. When the plain language of the statute is clear andunambiguous, the legislative intent that is discernible from thislanguage must prevail, and no resort to other interpretive aids isnecessary. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177; Davis v. Toshiba Machine Co.,America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 185 (1999). Statutes should be read as awhole with all relevant parts considered, and they should beconstrued, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous ormeaningless. Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189; Advincula v. United BloodServices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 16-17, 26 (1996). Statutory interpretationis a question of law and is therefore reviewed de novo. Yang v.City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001).

It is clear from the plain language of section 7(b-5) that thelegislature did not intend for an adjudicated father to be able tobring a section 7(b-5) action without first obtaining DNA testresults disproving paternity. As set forth above, the first sentenceof section 7(b-5) states that:

"An action to declare the non-existence of the parentand child relationship may be brought subsequent to anadjudication of paternity in any judgment by the manadjudicated to be the father pursuant to the presumptionsin Section 5 of this Act if, as a result of deoxyribonucleicacid (DNA) tests, it is discovered that the manadjudicated to be the father is not the natural father of thechild." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West2000).

The plain meaning of this language is that an action to declare thenonexistence of the parent and child relationship may be broughtonly if DNA test results show that the man adjudicated to be thefather is not the natural father of the child.

An analysis of the structure of the sentence quoted above fromsection 7(b-5) bears out this interpretation. This first sentence ofsection 7(b-5) consists of two clauses: an independent clause (notitalicized) which, were it not for the second clause, could standalone as a complete thought, and a subordinate clause (italicized)that is dependent upon the main clause for its meaning and thuscannot stand by itself. See M. Semmelmeyer & D. Bolander, TheNew Webster's Grammar Guide: A Complete Handbook onEnglish Grammar, Correct Usage and Punctuation 171 (1987). Therelationship between the two clauses is shown by thesubordinating conjunction "if," which is used to connect them. SeeGrammar Guide at 179; M. Shertzer, The Elements of Grammar46 (1986). The use of the subordinating conjunction "if" signalsthat the subordinate clause places a condition on the operation ofthe main clause. See Grammar Guide at 181; Elements ofGrammar at 46.

Thus the meaning of the first sentence in section 7(b-5) isimplicit in its structure. The main clause, which states that asection 7(b-5) action may be brought by an adjudicated father ifthe adjudication was made pursuant to certain presumptions, isconditioned by the addition of the subordinate clause. As set forthabove, the condition stated in this dependent clause is that DNAtest results must show that "the man adjudicated to be the father isnot the natural father of the child." 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West2000). Accordingly, this is a condition precedent to the filing of asection 7(b-5) action, which, as noted, may be brought only afterDNA test results disproving paternity have been obtained.

Our appellate court came to this same conclusion undersimilar facts in In re Marriage of Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d 968(2000). There, the respondent, who was the man adjudicated to bethe father, alleged in his section 7(b-5) action that he was "reliablyinformed and believed deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests woulddetermine that he is not [the child's] biological father." Lubbs, 313Ill. App. 3d at 969. The trial court dismissed the action for failureto allege DNA evidence establishing nonpaternity, and theappellate court affirmed. According to the appellate court, asection 7(b-5) action challenging an adjudication of paternity ispermitted "only if DNA testing has established, prior to the filingof the petition, that the adjudicated father is not the natural father."(Emphasis in original.) Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 970; see alsoDonath v. Buckley, 319 Ill. App. 3d 83, 87 (2001) ("Under theplain language of [section 7(b-5)] no person would have standingto file an action under section 7(b-5) until after the DNA test hadbeen completed"), citing Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d 968.

This interpretation of section 7(b-5) is also supported byanother provision in the Parentage Act, section 8(a)(4), which, asnoted, contains the statute of limitations applicable to section7(b-5). Section 8(a)(4), which like section 7(b-5) becameeffective on August 7, 1998, provides in pertinent part that:

"An action to declare the non-existence of the parentand child relationship brought under subsection (b-5) ofSection 7 of this Act shall be barred if brought more than6 months after the effective date of this amendatory Actof 1998 or more than 2 years after the petitioner obtainsactual knowledge of relevant facts, whichever is later. The2-year period shall not apply to periods of time where thenatural mother or the child refuses to submit todeoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests." (Emphasis added.)750 ILCS 45/8(a)(4) (West 2000).

As set forth above, according to the emphasized portion ofsection 8(a)(4), the two-year limitations period is tolled during anytime when the natural mother or the child refuses to submit toDNA tests. If, as Mark contends, a section 7(b-5) action tochallenge an adjudication of paternity may be filed without firstobtaining DNA test results, there would be no need for this tollingprovision. In such a case, if DNA test results disproving paternitywere not a condition precedent to the filing of a section 7(b-5)action, it would not be necessary to toll the two-year limitationsperiod for the time when the mother or child refuses to submit tosuch tests. Accepting Mark's interpretation here would render thetolling provision in section 8(a)(4) meaningless. See Advincula,176 Ill. 2d at 16-17, 26 (statutes must be read as a whole andshould be construed, if possible, so that no term is renderedsuperfluous or meaningless).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, Mark argues that DNA testresults disproving paternity are not a condition precedent to thefiling of a section 7(b-5) action, but rather are "a conditionprecedent to a finding that the man is not the father," whichfinding necessarily takes place after the section 7(b-5) action hasbeen brought. Under this interpretation, the conditional clause inthe first sentence of section 7(b-5) (requiring favorable DNA testsresults) would refer not to the main clause in this same sentence,but rather to the criterion for a court to declare the nonexistence ofthe parent and child relationship. In support of this argument,Mark points to the third (and final) sentence in section 7(b-5),which, as set forth above, provides that:

"If, as a result of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests,the plaintiff is determined not to be the father of the child,the adjudication of paternity and any orders regardingcustody, visitation, and future payments of support maybe vacated." 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5) (West 2000).

Mark appears to argue that because this third sentence linksfavorable DNA test results to the availability of section 7(b-5)relief, it therefore supports his contention as to the meaning of thefirst sentence: that a favorable DNA test result is a conditionprecedent to a judicial finding of nonpaternity, and thus to theavailability of relief. In each sentence, under Mark's interpretation,DNA results disproving paternity stand as a necessary prerequisiteto the availability of relief.

This interpretation departs from the clear meaning revealed bya plain reading of the statute. As noted, the first sentence ofsection 7(b-5) consists of a subordinate clause (beginning with theword "if" and stating the requirement that DNA test resultsdisprove paternity), which subordinate clause modifies or placesa condition upon the main clause. In the first sentence, this mainclause explicitly refers to the bringing of an action to declare thenonexistence of the parent and child relationship. It contains noreference to judicial findings of nonpaternity or to the availabilityof relief. Accordingly, the subordinate clause in the first sentenceplaces a condition not upon judicial findings or upon theavailability of relief, but rather upon the filing of a section 7(b-5)action.

A contrary construction would render the third sentence ofsection 7(b-5) redundant, since it also deals with the availabilityof section 7(b-5) relief. It is well settled that statutes should beconstrued, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous ormeaningless. See Advincula, 176 Ill. 2d at 16-17, 26 (statutes mustbe read as a whole and should be construed, if possible, so that noterm is rendered superfluous or meaningless); Texaco-CitiesService Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998).

Mark next argues that section 11(a) of the Parentage Actsupports his reading of section 7(b-5). Section 11(a) provides that:

"As soon as practicable, the court or an AdministrativeHearing Officer in an Expedited Child Support Systemmay, and upon request of a party shall, order or direct themother, child and alleged father to submit todeoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) tests to determine inheritedcharacteristics. If any party refuses to submit to the tests,the court may resolve the question of paternity against theparty or enforce its order if the rights of others and theinterests of justice so require." 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West2000).

Mark argues that under section 11(a), a circuit court has the powerto order DNA testing at the request of a party to a paternityproceeding. The thrust of Mark's argument appears to be that ifthe court has the authority to order DNA testing, this rendersmeaningless any requirement that DNA test results disprovingpaternity be obtained prior to the filing of a section 7(b-5) action.This argument is without merit.

The plain language of section 11(a) shows that it does notapply to causes of action filed under section 7(b-5). As set forthabove, section 11(a), which was enacted prior to section 7(b-5),states that a court "may, and upon request of a party shall, order ordirect the mother, child and alleged father to submit to [DNA]tests to determine inherited characteristics." (Emphasis added.)750 ILCS 45/11(a) (2000). As the emphasized terms indicate,section 11(a) applies only where there is an alleged father, andthus a question of paternity in the first instance. By contrast,section 7(b-5) applies not where the father has merely beenalleged, but where he has already been adjudicated a legal father.In such cases, unlike section 11(a), the issue before the court is nota question of paternity in the first instance, but rather whether aprevious adjudication of paternity should be vacated.

Further, if section 11(a) did apply to section 7(b-5) actions,it would conflict with section 8(a)(4) of the Parentage Act, whichas noted was enacted along with section 7(b-5) and contains thestatute of limitations applicable to section 7(b-5). Section 8(a)(4)implicitly allows a mother or child to refuse to submit to DNAtesting, since it provides for the tolling of the two-year limitationsperiod during times when the mother or child so refuses.

There can be no question that it is section 8(a)(4) and notsection 11(a) that applies here. As noted, the plain language ofsection 11(a) demonstrates that it applies only in cases where thereis an alleged father, and not to causes of action under section7(b-5), where the man has already been adjudicated a legal father.However, if there were a question as to which provision applies,it would be resolved in favor of section 8(a)(4), which specificallyrefers to the mother's or child's refusal to submit to testing, andthus is the more specific of the two provisions. See Stone v.Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d257, 266 (1992) (noting that in general, specific statutoryprovisions control over general provisions on the same subject).

Mark's next argument focuses not on the language of thestatute but on the effect that would result from requiring DNA testresults prior to the filing of a section 7(b-5) action. According toMark, imposing such a condition precedent would have the effectof severely limiting the number of fathers who could make use ofsection 7(b-5). If the adjudicated father did not have custody ofthe child (and Mark claims that most such fathers do not), it wouldbe difficult for him to obtain the required DNA tests, Markcontends, "since non-custodial parents cannot obtain electivemedical procedures without the consent of the mother." ThusMark implicitly argues that it is unreasonable to require DNA testresults prior to the filing of a section 7(b-5) action. We disagree.

As previously indicated, section 7(b-5) creates a new causeof action that allows an adjudicated father to challenge a previousadjudication of paternity. Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 970. Inallowing such a challenge, section 7(b-5) essentially runs counterto the strong judicial policy favoring finality of judgments (In reMarriage of O'Brien, 247 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750-51 (1993); In reMarriage of Halas, 173 Ill. App. 3d 218, 223 (1988)), a policy thatapplies with special force to adjudications of paternity, given theimpact of such adjudications on the interests of children (cf.Paternity of Cheryl, 434 Mass. 23, 32, 746 N.E.2d 488, 495-96(2001) (noting that where there is a substantial father-childrelationship and the father has provided the child with consistentemotional and financial support, "an attempt to undo adetermination of paternity 'is potentially devastating to a childwho has considered the man to be the father' "); Godin v. Godin,168 Vt. 514, 523, 725 A.2d 904, 910 (1998) (noting that manycourts have rejected attempts to reopen paternity judgments basedon post-judgment blood tests or other evidence, "absent clear andconvincing evidence that it serves the best interests of the child")).

In enacting section 7(b-5), the Illinois legislature determinedthat not every adjudicated father would be able to file an action todeclare the nonexistence of the parent and child relationship.Instead, only those who first obtained a DNA test disprovingpaternity could bring such a challenge. See Lubbs, 313 Ill. App. 3dat 971 (concluding that section 7(b-5) "creates a limited exceptionto the rule that an adjudicated father is barred from challenging theadjudication" (emphasis added)).⁽²⁾ It is clear that the legislature isfree to impose such limitations or conditions. See Buzz Barton &Associates, Inc. v. Giannone, 108 Ill. 2d 373, 383 (1985) (notingthat "the legislature may impose reasonable limitations andconditions upon access to the courts"); cf. Varelis v. NorthwesternMemorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 454 (1995) ("Acting withinconstitutional limits, the legislature is free to prescribe whateverrequirements it might choose to impose on the availability of reliefunder the [Wrongful Death] Act"); Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307,310 (1949) ("[U]nder the provisions of [the Wrongful Death Act]the legislature, having conferred a right of action for death bywrongful act, may determine who shall sue, and the conditionsunder which the suit may be brought").

Given that section 7(b-5) creates a new cause of action thatjeopardizes the finality of paternity adjudications, it is notunreasonable that the legislature chose to limit such an action toonly those adjudicated fathers who first obtained DNA testsdisproving paternity. We reject Mark's implicit argument that theimposition of such a limitation is unreasonable.

Finally, Mark argues that the appellate court erred inconcluding that his section 7(b-5) cause of action was time-barredunder both the two-year and the six-month limitations periods asstated in section 8(a)(4) of the Parentage Act. Section 8(a)(4)provides in pertinent part that:

"An action to declare the non-existence of the parentand child relationship brought under subsection (b-5) ofSection 7 of this Act shall be barred if brought more than6 months after the effective date of this amendatory Actof 1998 or more than 2 years after the petitioner obtainsactual knowledge of relevant facts, whichever is later."750 ILCS 45/8(a)(4) (West 2000).

Mark concedes that he had actual knowledge of relevant factsmore than two years prior to the filing of his section 7(b-5) action,and that it therefore was time-barred under the two-yearlimitations period. However, he contends that the appellate courterred in concluding that because Mark had knowledge of relevantfacts more than two years prior to the effective date of section7(b-5), his cause of action was therefore barred prior to theenactment of section 7(b-5) for purposes of the six-monthlimitations period as well. As previously noted, after concludingthat Mark's cause of action was time-barred under the two-yearlimitations period, the appellate court stated that "[e]ven if thisaction was brought within six months of the amendatory act of1998, causes of action barred prior to the amendatory act were notreinstated by the Act." Mark notes that, unlike the two-yearlimitations period, the six-month period referred to in section8(a)(4) contains no reference to "actual knowledge of relevantfacts." According to Mark, this six-month period is unaffected byprior knowledge of relevant facts. Instead, it refers to a "6 monthwindow [after the statute's effective date] for a 'legal father,' evenone with actual knowledge, to file a new cause of action to declarethat he is not the biological father regardless of his priorknowledge of relevant facts." (Emphasis added.) Mark thus arguesthat the appellate court erred in concluding that his section 7(b-5)cause of action was "barred prior to the amendatory act" forpurposes of the six-month limitations period. Because Mark'saction was filed within six months of section 7(b-5)'s effectivedate, he contends that it was timely filed under this six-monthperiod.

Whether Mark's section 7(b-5) action was filed within sixmonths of section 7(b-5) amendment's August 7, 1998, effectivedate is irrelevant, given our previous disposition of the centralissue in this appeal. We have already concluded that under theplain language of section 7(b-5), DNA test results disprovingpaternity are a condition precedent to the filing of a section 7(b-5)action. Because Mark did not obtain DNA test results prior tofiling his section 7(b-5) petition, his cause of action does not comewithin the scope of section 7(b-5) in the first instance. Thereforeit does not matter whether he met the limitation periodrequirements of section 8(a)(4), which apply only to actionsbrought under section 7(b-5).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that pursuant to the plainlanguage of section 7(b-5) of the Parentage Act, an adjudicatedfather must obtain DNA test results disproving paternity beforefiling a section 7(b-5) action to declare the nonexistence of theparent and child relationship. Because Mark did not obtain suchDNA results prior to filing his petition, the trial court erred ingranting his requested relief and declaring the nonexistence of theparent and child relationship. We therefore affirm the judgment ofthe appellate court reversing the circuit court's decision declaringthe nonexistence of the parent and child relationship and vacatingall orders regarding custody, visitation, and future child support.

Affirmed.

1. ¹Mark's section 7(b-5) action to declare the nonexistence of thefather and child relationship is styled a "petition" even though section7(b-5) states that "[a]ctions brought by the adjudicated father shall bebrought by verified complaint." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/7(b-5)(West 2000). The parties to this appeal as well as the courts below alsorefer to Mark's section 7(b-5) action as a petition. Accordingly, in thisopinion Mark's section 7(b-5) action is termed a petition.

2. ²As noted, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that thelegislature intended to place this limitation on section 7(b-5). However,even if this intent were not clear, it would be borne out by the legislativehistory. During floor debate, the senate sponsor of the measure statedthat:

"[W]e are trying to narrow it because frankly we are not tryingto open a Pandora's box, so that anybody could come in andsay, 'Ah, I don't think that's my kid,' because we would havechaos." 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 2,1998, at 51 (statements of Senator Fawell).