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Docket No. 92116-Agenda 7-May 2002.

In re J.W., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, 
v. J.W., Appellant).

Opinion filed February 21, 2003.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, J.W., a 12-year-old boy, was adjudicateddelinquent following his admission to two counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i) (West 1998)), andwas sentenced to a term of five years' probation. Among theconditions of his probation, J.W. was ordered to register as a sexoffender. In addition, J.W. was prohibited from residing in orgoing to the Village of South Elgin, Illinois, the community whereJ.W. lived and where the aggravated criminal sexual assaults tookplace.

J.W. appealed two of the conditions of his probationcontending that: (1) requiring a 12-year-old child to register as asex offender is unconstitutional; and (2) prohibiting J.W. fromresiding in or visiting South Elgin as a condition of probation isoverly broad and void. The appellate court affirmed the trialcourt's order. Nos. 2-00-0360, 2-00-0432 cons. (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). This court granted J.W.'spetition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We also grantedthe motion of the Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern UniversityLaw School and the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of theUniversity of Chicago Law School for leave to file a brief asamicus curiae.

BACKGROUND

The State filed its petition for adjudication on November 10,1999, alleging that J.W. had committed aggravated criminal sexualassaults against two seven-year-old boys, R.We. and J.P. OnFebruary 14, 2000, J.W. pled guilty to two counts of aggravatedcriminal sexual assault in exchange for the State's agreement towithdraw two other counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault.There was no agreement among the parties as to sentencing.Consequently, a sentencing hearing was held in February 2000.

At J.W.'s sentencing hearing, Dr. Kevin Breen, a psychiatrist,testified that he met with J.W. and his parents one time inDecember 1999, for approximately one hour, to determine whetherJ.W. was a danger to anyone else. Dr. Breen's report of thisexamination was entered into evidence. The report indicated thatJ.W. had admitted to five episodes where he convinced R.We. andJ.P. to have oral-genital contact with one another and with him.J.W. denied that the boys were physically coerced, but admitted heused verbal coercion. J.W.'s parents revealed to Dr. Breen thatJ.W. also had exposed himself on one occasion to a five-year-oldboy. J.W. denied having been physically, sexually or emotionallyabused, but admitted that he had seen his father's sexually explicitmagazines.

Dr. Breen concluded in his report that J.W. was minimizinghis sexual encounters with young boys, noting that J.W. had notmentioned the incident with the five-year-old boy. According tothe report, Dr. Breen's diagnosis of J.W. was paraphilia, nototherwise specified. Paraphilia is where a person engages in sexualactivity or sexual acts that are not sanctioned by society. Thediagnosis would have been pedophilia with a sexual attraction tomales, except that J.W. was not 16 years old, as required by thestandard criteria.

Dr. Breen testified at J.W.'s sentencing hearing that he wasnot aware of any incidents of anal sex or anal penetration betweenJ.W. and his victims, nor was he aware of allegations that J.W. hadintroduced a dog into his sexual acts. Dr. Breen'srecommendations for the treatment of J.W. included medication,cognitive behavioral therapy, and residential treatment. Dr. Breenrecommended residential treatment given the frequency of relapseamong individuals with sexual disorders. Dr. Breen testified that,given the frequency of relapse, J.W. would present a risk to thecommunity if he was not placed in residential treatment.

David Berg, an investigator with the Child Advocacy Centerof the Kane County State's Attorney's office, testified at thesentencing hearing that he investigated the case concerning J.W.Berg became involved in the case after the family of R.We. madea police report alleging that J.W. had put his mouth on R.We.'spenis and had R.We. put his mouth on J.W.'s penis. Theseincidents took place under the deck of a neighbor's house and inJ.W.'s home. R.We. said the sexual contact occurred between 5and 10 times. R.We. did not tell anyone about the incidentsbecause he feared retribution from J.W.

Berg also interviewed the other victim, J.P. J.P. lived nextdoor to J.W. J.P. told Berg that J.W. had put his mouth on J.P.'spenis and that J.W. had put his penis in J.P.'s mouth. J.W. alsotouched the penises of both victims.

In addition to the two victims, a five-year-old boy saw J.W.expose himself, and R.We.'s six-year-old sister witnessed anincident of oral sex between J.W. and R.We.

Berg initially spoke with J.P.'s stepmother on November 5,1999. In a follow-up conversation several days later, J.P.'sstepmother told Berg that J.P. had forgotten to tell him something,and indicated that J.W. had placed his penis in J.P.'s anus.Subsequently, both J.P. and R.We. told Berg there were severaloccasions where J.W. placed his penis in their anuses. J.P. toldBerg that he did not tell anyone about these incidents because J.W.told him not to tell.

Berg testified that approximately one week prior to thesentencing hearing, he again met with R.We., who told Berg thatJ.W. had his dog lick the penises of both boys. J.W. also told thetwo victims to try to penetrate the dog's anus with their penises,but they were unable to do so. The boys did observe J.W. penetratethe dog's anus. The incidents with the dog took place in J.W.'shome. In addition, both boys related that J.W. had directed themto penetrate one another, but they were unable to do so. Theseevents took place under the deck of the neighbor's home and atJ.W.'s home.

Therese Wrona, a therapist, testified that she had beeninvolved in the treatment of sexually abusive juveniles for 10years. Wrona first saw J.W. on December 7, 1999, and in January2000 began seeing him at least once a week. Wrona testified thatJ.W. was a danger to the community "to a certain degree." Wronarecommended probation for J.W., stating that "the longer the legalsystem hangs on to individuals such as [J.W.], the better." Inaddition, Wrona recommended a course of treatment specializedfor individuals that have problems with sexual aggression. Wronaalso stated that J.W. required 24-hour monitoring and supervisionby a person that understood the nature and seriousness of J.W.'sproblem. J.W.'s school should be informed concerning J.W.'shistory of sexually aggressive behavior so that the school couldmonitor J.W. and protect other students. Wrona further said thatJ.W. should not be around younger children, or even children hisown age, unless an adult who is aware of J.W.'s problems ispresent. Wrona's opinion was that J.W. should be allowed toremain in the community and should not be placed in residentialtreatment. With regard to the protection of the community, Wronabelieved that J.W. could return to his home in South Elgin,although given the publicity concerning the case, Wrona believedit might not be in J.W.'s best interest to return to his home.

Wrona testified that J.W. "groomed" his victims, meaningthat he approached the victims to assess his likelihood ofcommitting the sexual abuse. J.W. sought out his victims andselected his victims based upon their youth and their trust in him.Wrona said that J.W. initially did not feel any guilt, but shebelieved J.W. was beginning to appreciate the seriousness of hisacts.

J.W.'s parents testified at the sentencing hearing and indicatedtheir willingness to engage in intensive supervision andmonitoring of J.W. if he was allowed to return home. J.W.'sparents also indicated that if J.W. was allowed to return home,they intended to sell their home in South Elgin and move to adifferent neighborhood.

J.W.'s aunt, Monica Grant, testified on behalf of J.W. that sheresides with her husband in Elgin, Illinois. Grant stated that sheand her husband were willing to let J.W. live with them and wouldtake responsibility for his supervision.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, J.W. made astatement on his own behalf apologizing to the victims. The trialcourt then noted that, because J.W. was under the age of 13, hecould not be committed to the juvenile division of the Departmentof Corrections. See 705 ILCS 405/5-750(3) (West 2000). The trialcourt also noted that, even though the State had recommendedresidential treatment for J.W., the State had not determinedwhether there was a treatment center willing and/or able to takeJ.W. Accordingly, the trial court placed J.W. on five years'probation and directed the probation officer to determine whetherplacement was available for J.W. J.W. was to be placed inresidential treatment if such placement was available. If placementwas not available, J.W. was prohibited from going back to SouthElgin and was ordered to reside with his aunt, Monica Grant, untilhis parents moved out of South Elgin. J.W. also was ordered toregister as a sex offender and to comply with AIDS/HIV testingpursuant to section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2000)).

On March 1, 2000, the parties returned to court and informedthe trial court that residential treatment had been found for J.W.Accordingly, an order was entered placing J.W. at the treatmentcenter. Thereafter, in anticipation of J.W.'s imminent release fromthe treatment center, the trial court entered an order on August 22,2000, providing that J.W. was to reside with Monica Grant uponrelease, and would be allowed to reside with his parents once theymoved out of South Elgin.

J.W. then appealed the conditions of his probation requiringhim to register as a sex offender and prohibiting him from enteringor residing in South Elgin. The appellate court stated that J.W. wasrequired to register as a sex offender for the rest of his natural lifebecause he was considered a sexual predator under the SexOffender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 etseq. (West 2000)). The appellate court then rejected J.W.'s claimthat imposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-oldoffender violates substantive due process. The appellate court alsoheld that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itprohibited J.W. from entering or residing in South Elgin, notingthat J.W.'s parents had concurred in the restriction. In this court,J.W. again challenges the conditions of his probation requiringhim to register as a sex offender and banishing him from theVillage of South Elgin.

ISSUES

As a preliminary matter, we must address the State's claimthat this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal becauseJ.W. did not comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2dR. 604(d)). Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d)),provides, in pertinent part:

"No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea ofguilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 daysof the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trialcourt a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only thesentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is beingchallenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty andvacate the judgment." 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).

Recently, this court held that Rule 604(d) applies to juvenileproceedings. In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001). This court leftopen, however, the issue of whether a juvenile's failure to file apost-admission motion pursuant to Rule 604(d) serves as ajurisdictional bar to an appeal. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 322. The Statecontends that this question must be answered in the affirmative,maintaining that, if Rule 604(d) applies to juvenile proceedings,its jurisdictional component also must apply to juvenileproceedings.

With regard to this case, the State notes that J.W. enteredadmissions to the two counts of aggravated sexual abuse for whichhe was adjudicated delinquent, and that an admission in juvenilecourt is the equivalent of a guilty plea. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d313, 316 (2001). J.W., however, did not file a motion to withdrawhis admissions or to reconsider his sentence prior to filing hisappeal. Because J.W. did not comply with Rule 604(d) prior tofiling his appeal, the State contends that this court has nojurisdiction over J.W.'s appeal.

In response, J.W. states that, even if the filing of a motionpursuant to Rule 604(d) is a prerequisite to taking a delinquencyappeal, Rule 604(d) does not bar his appeal because he is notseeking to challenge his plea or to reconsider his term ofprobation. Rather, he is contesting the constitutionality of two ofthe conditions of probation imposed by the trial court, namely, thecondition that he register as a sex offender for the rest of his lifeand the condition barring him from entering the Village of SouthElgin. J.W. claims that because these conditions areunconstitutional, they are void. J.W. maintains that a void sentencemay be attacked at any time, even following a guilty plea and inthe absence of a motion to vacate that plea.

We need not decide here the issue left open in In re A.G. Weagree with J.W. that his challenge is to the constitutionality of twoof the conditions of his probation, not to the imposition ofprobation itself. J.W. is not challenging his plea or his sentence ofprobation. Consequently, Rule 604(d) does not bar J.W.'s appeal.

The State then argues that, even if this court has jurisdictionover this appeal, J.W. has waived any challenge to the conditionsof probation because he did not raise these issues in the trial court.J.W., however, maintains that a constitutional challenge to astatute may be made at any time.

J.W. is correct that, in general, a constitutional challenge to acriminal statute can be raised at any time. People v. Bryant, 128Ill. 2d 448, 454 (1989). Accordingly, J.W. has not waived hisconstitutional challenges to the Registration Act even though hefirst raised those challenges in the appellate court.

J.W. first argues that the trial court's order requiring him toregister as a sex offender for the rest of his natural life violatessubstantive due process and the proscription against doublejeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment inviolation of the eighth amendment to the United StatesConstitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII).

It is well settled that statutes are presumed constitutional andthat a party challenging the constitutionality of a statute has theburden of establishing its invalidity. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d1, 24 (2000). This court reviews de novo the constitutionality of astatute. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).

At the outset, we must address the appellate court's findingthat J.W. shall register as a sex offender for the rest of his naturallife. In ordering J.W. to register as a sex offender, the trial courtdid not specify the duration of registration. The appellate courtfound that, given the nature of the charges for which J.W. wasadjudicated delinquent, J.W. is a "sexual predator" as defined bythe Registration Act, so that the duration of registration is for therest of J.W.'s natural life.

In construing a statute, this court must ascertain and giveeffect to the legislature's intent in enacting that statute. Collins v.Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). To determine the intention of thelegislature, we first examine the language of the statute, which isthe most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. In re C.W.,199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). Where the statutory language is clearand unambiguous, a court must give effect to the statute as writtenwithout reading into the statute exceptions, limitations orconditions that the legislature did not express. In re C.W., 199 Ill.2d at 211-12. In addition, a statute must be read as a whole, and noword or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be renderedmeaningless. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111.

With the foregoing principles in mind, we must examine thedefinitions of "sexual predator" and "juvenile sex offender" as setforth in the Registration Act. Section 2 contains the definitions forpurposes of that Act. Section 2(A) defines a "sex offender." 730ILCS 150/2(A) (West 2000). Effective July 1, 1999, theRegistration Act was amended to add, inter alia, the definition ofa "juvenile sex offender." Section 2(A-5) of the Registration Actnow provides that:

" 'Juvenile sex offender' means any person who isadjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of thecommission of or attempt to commit a violation set forthin item (B), (C), or (C-5) of this Section or a violation ofany substantially similar federal, sister state, or foreigncountry law. For purposes of this Section, 'convicted'shall have the same meaning as 'adjudicated.' " 730 ILCS150/2 (A-5) (West 2000).

J.W. falls within the definition of a juvenile sex offender becausehe was adjudicated delinquent as the result of the commission ofa violation of item (B) of section 2, namely, aggravated criminalsexual assault. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2000).⁽¹⁾

Also included within the definitions in section 2 is the morespecific category of sexual predators. A "sexual predator"includes:

"any person who, after the effective date of thisamendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly is:

(1) Convicted of a violation of any of the followingSections of the Criminal Code of 1961 and theconviction occurred after the effective date of thisamendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly:

* * *

12-14 (aggravated criminal sexual assault)[.]"730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1) (West 2000).

Reading section 2(A-5) together with section 2(E) so that noword or paragraph is rendered meaningless, we conclude that J.W.clearly qualifies as a sexual predator under the Registration Act.Section 2 (A-5) provides that "convicted" has the same meaningas "adjudicated," for purposes of section 2. Section 2 defines asexual predator as a person who has been "convicted" ofaggravated criminal sexual assault. This statutory language is clearand unambiguous, so we give effect to the statute as written. J.W.has been adjudicated delinquent, or "convicted," as the result ofthe commission of aggravated criminal sexual assault. J.W.therefore falls within the definition of a sexual predator.

Section 3 of the Registration Act provides that sex offendersand sexual predators have a duty to register as required by theDepartment of State Police. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). Withregard to the duration of registration, section 7 of the RegistrationAct provides, in pertinent part:

"A sexually violent person or sexual predator shallregister for the period of his or her natural life afterconviction or adjudication if not confined to a penalinstitution, hospital, or other institution or facility, and ifconfined, for the period of his or her natural life afterparole, discharge, or release from any such facility. Anyother person who is required to register under this Articleshall be required to register for a period of 10 years afterconviction or adjudication ***." 730 ILCS 150/7 (West2000).

Generally, then, a juvenile sex offender would fall within theportion of section 7 that requires registration for a period of 10years after adjudication. However, with regard to juvenile sexoffenders who also are considered sexual predators, the durationof registration is for natural life. Consequently, we find that theappellate court correctly determined that J.W. is a sexual predatorso that the duration of J.W.'s registration is for the rest of hisnatural life.

In so holding, we note that J.W. has submitted as additionalauthority a recent decision of the appellate court finding thatjuvenile sex offenders are not required to register under theRegistration Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497, 500(2001). The Nicholas K. court based its finding on the fact thatsection 3 of the Registration Act, concerning the duty to register,does not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders. Nicholas K.,326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.

The additional authority submitted by J.W. does not changeour holding in this case. Although section 3 of the Registration Actdoes not specifically refer to juvenile sex offenders, section 3 doesprovide that sex offenders and sexual predators shall register. 730ILCS 150/3 (West 2000). Without addressing whether J.W. wouldbe required to register in any event because he is a sexual predator,we note that a juvenile sex offender is a sex offender, albeit aspecific category of sex offender. Juvenile sex offenders thereforeare included within the larger category of sex offenders requiredto register.⁽²⁾

This conclusion is supported by the legislative debatesconcerning House Bill 2721, which added the definition ofjuvenile sex offender to the Registration Act. Specifically,Representative Klingler explained to the House of Representativesthat the bill "requires juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent toregister." 91st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, March 10,1999, at 143 (statements of Representative Klingler). Likewise,Senator Klem explained to the Senate that the bill by adding thedefinition of juvenile sex offender as well as other definitions"imposes registration requirements of those persons." 91st Ill.Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 26, 1999, at 52(statements of Senator Klem).

The conclusion that juvenile sex offenders are required toregister is further supported by examining the Registration Act inconjunction with the corresponding Sex Offender and ChildMurderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2000)). The Notification Lawprovides that the Department of State Police is to establish andmaintain a sex offender database of those persons registered as sexoffenders under the Registration Act. 730 ILCS 152/115 (West2000). The Notification Law expressly includes juvenile sexoffenders. See 730 ILCS 152/105, 120(e) (West 2000).

Clearly, then, juvenile sex offenders do fall within thepurview of section 3 of the Registration Act and are required toregister. Accordingly, the appellate court properly concluded thatJ.W. is required to register as a sex offender for the rest of hisnatural life.

We next address J.W.'s claim that an order requiring him toregister as a sexual offender for the rest of his natural life violatessubstantive due process. When confronted with a claim that astatute violates the due process guarantees of the United States andIllinois Constitutions, courts first must determine the nature of theright purportedly infringed upon by the statute. In re R.C., 195 Ill.2d 291, 302 (2001). Where the statute does not affect afundamental constitutional right, the test for determining whetherthe statute complies with substantive due process is the rationalbasis test. People v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000). To satisfy thistest, a statute need only bear a rational relationship to the purposethe legislature sought to accomplish in enacting the statute. Peoplev. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d 328, 342 (1989). Pursuant to this test, a statutewill be upheld if it "bears a reasonable relationship to a publicinterest to be served, and the means adopted are a reasonablemethod of accomplishing the desired objective." People v. Adams,144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).

J.W. does not argue, nor do we find, that the statute at issueaffects a fundamental right. Accordingly, we analyze the statute atissue using the rational basis test. In People v. Adams, we notedthat an earlier version of the Registration Act was passed "inresponse to concern over the proliferation of sex offenses againstchildren" and was designed to aid law enforcement agencies byrequiring sex offenders to register with local law enforcementauthorities. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 386. The intent of the legislaturein enacting the Registration Act was "to create an additionalmethod of protection for children from the increasing incidence ofsexual assault and sexual abuse." Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 387.

In response to an adult defendant's claim that the RegistrationAct violated his right to substantive due process, we held that thepublic interest to be served by the Registration Act was theassistance of law enforcement in the protection of children.Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 390. We further held that the RegistrationAct served that purpose by providing officers ready access toinformation on known child sex offenders. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at390. We concluded that there was nothing unreasonable in thestatute's method of serving its purpose given the directrelationship between the registration of sex offenders and theprotection of children. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391. Accordingly, thestatute satisfied the requirements of substantive due process.Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 391.

Subsequently, we upheld a constitutional challenge to theNotification Law. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 430(2000). In Malchow, we held that the purpose of the NotificationLaw, like the Registration Act, was the protection of the publicfrom sex offenders. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 420.

In the context of a 12-year-old sex offender, the public interestto be served by the Registration Act remains unchanged. Thepublic interest is to assist law enforcement in the protection of thepublic from juvenile sex offenders. The Registration Act asapplied to a 12-year-old child serves that public interest byproviding police officers ready access to information on knownjuvenile sex offenders.

J.W. acknowledges that the public interest the RegistrationAct is intended to serve is the protection of the public from sexoffenders. J.W. argues, however, that in contrast to an adultoffender or even a juvenile that could be charged and tried as anadult, requiring a 12-year-old child to register as a sex offender forthe rest of his life is not a reasonable method of accomplishing theobjective of protecting the public. J.W. observes that juvenilestraditionally have been viewed as less culpable than adults and asmore amenable to rehabilitation and treatment. J.W. argues thatimposing a lifetime registration requirement on a 12-year-old childis at odds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act(705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)).

J.W. maintains that it is not reasonable to hold a child that hasbeen treated in the juvenile court system, and could only be treatedin the juvenile court system, to an adult standard of reporting andregistration for the rest of his life. J.W. observes that among thepurposes and policies of the Juvenile Court Act are the protectionand the rehabilitation of minors. J.W. also cites In re Nicholas K.,which in finding that juvenile sex offenders are not required toregister, concluded that requiring a delinquent juvenile to registeras a sex offender is inconsistent with the purposes of the JuvenileCourt Act. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500. The NicholasK. court observed that the overriding purpose of the Juvenile CourtAct is to promote the minor's best interest and to correct, notpunish. In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500-01.

It is true that one of the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act isthe rehabilitation of the minor. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c)(West 2000). However, effective January 1, 1999, the purpose andpolicy section of the Juvenile Court Act was amended to provide,in pertinent part:

"It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote ajuvenile justice system capable of dealing with theproblem of juvenile delinquency, a system that willprotect the community, impose accountability forviolations of law and equip juvenile offenders withcompetencies to live responsibly and productively. Toeffectuate this intent, the General Assembly declares thefollowing to be important purposes of this Article:

(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.

(b) To hold each juvenile offender directlyaccountable for his or her acts." 705 ILCS405/5-101(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 2000).

This court has recognized that the amendments to the purposeand policy section of the Juvenile Court Act represent afundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation toinclude the overriding concerns of protecting the public and ofholding juveniles accountable for violations of the law. In re A.G.,195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001). Indeed, confronted with a similarissue, the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized:

"[A]lthough we are aware that the juvenile justicesystem places emphasis on the best interests of the child,sex offenders of any age present unique problems. TheGeneral Assembly enacted the Sex Offender RegistrationStatute in an effort to protect society from both the adultand the youthful sex offender." Helman v. State, 784 A.2d1058, 1079 (Del. 2001).

Given the shift in the purpose and policy of the Juvenile CourtAct to include the protection of the public from juvenile crime andholding juveniles accountable, as well as the serious problemspresented by juvenile sex offenders, we find no merit to J.W.'sclaim that requiring him to register as a sex offender for life is atodds with the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act.

Nonetheless, in support of his claim that the registration of a12-year-old sex offender is not reasonable, J.W. also contends thatthere are other less offensive but equally effective means ofprotecting the public from juvenile sex offenders. For example,J.W. notes that even though he could not be subject toincarceration for more than 30 days due to his age (see 705 ILCS405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2000)), his probationary period must be atleast five years (see 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 2000)). Inaddition, J.W. observes that a trial court may impose conditions ofprobation, including that: the minor obtain therapy and treatment;the minor's contact with his or her victims and other children belimited or prohibited; the minor be subject to a period of homeconfinement; and the minor's parents be subject to monitoring orsupervisory conditions. See 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2), 5-110 (West2000).

J.W. concedes that the considerations at issue might bedifferent if the registration was for a limited period of time, ifdissemination of the information was limited in scope, or if theminor could be and was treated as an adult for purposes ofcriminal prosecution. In advancing this argument, J.W. reads theNotification Law as allowing the public unlimited access toinformation concerning juvenile sex offenders, including accessvia the Internet. J.W. maintains that requiring a 12-year-old childto register for the rest of his life as a sex offender and allowing thegeneral public unfettered access to identifying information aboutthat child is not a reasonable means of accomplishing thelegislature's goal of protecting the public and is offensive to thiscountry's fundamental precepts of justice.

We first observe that contrary to J.W.'s claim that theNotification Law gives the general public "immediate, unlimited,and permanent access to identifying information about him," theNotification Law actually strictly limits the availability ofinformation with regard to juvenile sex offenders. Specifically, theNotification Law provides:

"The Department of State Police and any lawenforcement agency having jurisdiction may, in theDepartment's or agency's discretion, provide theinformation specified in subsection (b) [i.e., offender'sname, address, date of birth, offense], with respect to ajuvenile sex offender, to any person when that person'ssafety may be compromised for some reason related to thejuvenile sex offender." 730 ILCS 152/120(e) (West 2000).

Consequently, information concerning a juvenile sex offendermay be disseminated to a member of the public only if thatperson's safety might be compromised for some reason and onlyin the appropriate agency's or department's discretion.⁽³⁾Information concerning juvenile sex offenders is not availableover the Internet. We find, therefore, that the extremely limiteddissemination of information concerning juvenile sex offenderssupports a finding that the registration of juvenile sex offenders isa reasonable means of protecting the public.

In addition, although J.W. suggests alternate means ofaccomplishing the legislature's objective in this case, it is wellsettled that the rational basis test does not require that the statutebe the best means of accomplishing the legislature's objectives.People ex rel. Lumpkin v. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d 117, 124 (1998). Itis best left to the legislature and not the courts to determinewhether a statute is wise or whether it is the best means to achievethe desired result. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d at 124. If there is anyconceivable basis for finding a rational relationship, the statutewill be upheld. Cassidy, 184 Ill. 2d at 124.

With the foregoing principles in mind, we must reject J.W.'sclaim that the statute at issue violates substantive due process.Clearly there is a rational relationship between the registration ofjuvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from suchoffenders. Requiring the registration of juvenile sex offenders,even where the offender is only 12 years old and the duration ofregistration is for life, is reasonable in light of the strict limitsplaced upon access to that information. Whether there are bettermeans to achieve this result, such as limiting the duration ofregistration for all juvenile sex offenders including juvenile sexualpredators, is a matter better left to the legislature.

As a final matter, we note that the amici assert that thelifetime registration and the notification requirements violateprocedural due process under the Illinois and United StatesConstitutions. J.W., however, has not raised a procedural dueprocess claim and in fact expressly stated that he was notchallenging the Registration Act and the Notification Law onprocedural due process grounds. Amici also claim that enforcementof the registration and notification requirements violate state andfederal constitutionally protected privacy interests. Neither theState nor J.W., however, has raised a privacy issue in his brief tothis court.

An amicus curiae is not a party to an action but rather is a"friend" of the court. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 234 (1991).Consequently, the sole function of an amicus is to advise or makesuggestions to the court. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234. An amicus takesthe case as he finds it, with the issues as framed by the parties.P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234. This court need not pass on grounds ofinvalidity solely urged by an amicus. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 234;accord Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 281 (1996).Consequently, we decline to address the procedural due processand privacy issues raised by the amici.

J.W. next contends that requiring a 12-year-old child toregister as a sex offender and allowing the public access toinformation concerning juvenile sex offenders violates the eighthamendment and the proscription against double jeopardy. TheState argues that J.W. has waived this issue, noting that J.W. didnot raise this issue in the trial court or the appellate court, nor didhe raise this issue in his petition for leave to appeal to this court.

The State is correct that J.W. did not raise these constitutionalchallenges in the trial court or the appellate court or in his petitionfor leave to appeal. As noted, however, a constitutional challengeto a criminal statute can be raised at any time. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2dat 454. Accordingly, we find that waiver does not barconsideration of these issues.

J.W. concedes that this court has held that the RegistrationAct and the Notification Law are not punitive and therefore do notviolate the eighth amendment. See People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d413 (2000). J.W. distinguishes Malchow, however, on the groundthat the defendant in Malchow was an adult, and on the groundthat the version of the Notification Law at issue in Malchowprovided for limited dissemination of the information in question,while the current version of the Notification Law provides thatanyone can access information on registered sex offenders at anytime, including through the Internet.

We first address the claim that the Notification Lawconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it allows forunlimited dissemination of information concerning juvenile sexoffenders. Both J.W. and the amici read the amendments to theNotification Law as providing for dissemination of informationconcerning juvenile sex offenders to anyone with access to theInternet. J.W. and amici argue that providing such informationover the Internet without restriction clearly is punitive when thesex offender is a 12-year-old boy.

As discussed above, however, J.W. and amici are reading theNotification Law incorrectly. The Notification Law specificallyaddresses juvenile sex offenders and provides that informationconcerning juvenile sex offenders is not available on the Internetand public access to information concerning juvenile sex offendersis limited to those whose safety might be compromised for somereason related to the juvenile sex offender. See 730 ILCS152/120(e) (West 2000). In fact, the debates concerning HouseBill 2721 reflect the limited dissemination of informationconcerning juvenile sex offenders. House Bill 2721 amended theNotification Law as well as the Registration Act to includejuvenile sex offenders. In discussing the registration of juvenilesex offenders, Representative Klingler observed that "Notification,however, is limited to schools and when public safety is at riskthen the juveniles would not be on the Internet." 91st Ill. Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, March 10, 1999, at 143 (statementsof Representative Klingler).

Public information concerning juvenile sex offenders thus ismuch more restricted than information concerning adult sexoffenders. Given that the dissemination of information concerningjuvenile sex offenders is even narrower than the dissemination ofinformation at issue in Malchow, we disagree with J.W. thatMalchow is distinguishable and is not binding precedent.

With regard to the fact that the defendant in Malchow was anadult, J.W. analogizes the lifetime registration requirement in thiscase to the imposition of the death penalty and observes that theimposition of the death penalty on a child under the age of 16constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

We find no merit to this argument. There is no question thatthe death penalty is a punishment. In Malchow and Adams,however, this court rejected claims that the Registration Act andthe Notification Law constitute punishment. We are not persuadedthat requiring a juvenile sex offender to register and allowing verylimited public access to notification concerning the juvenile'sstatus as a sex offender compels a different result. See In re Ayres,239 Mich. App. 8, 608 N.W.2d 132 (1999) (given strict statutorysafeguards protecting confidentiality of juvenile sex offenders,registration act as applied to juveniles neither punishes juvenilenor offends premise that a reformed adult should not have to carrystigma of youthful offense). We therefore reject J.W.'s claim thatthe Registration Act and Notification Law as applied to juvenilesex offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

As the State observes, J.W.'s argument that requiring him toregister as a sex offender violates the proscription against doublejeopardy is based on his claim that the registration requirementconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Because we hold thatthe registration requirement does not constitute punishment,J.W.'s double jeopardy argument likewise must fail. See Malchow,193 Ill. 2d at 426 (given holding that Registration Act andNotification Law are not punitive, defendant's claim that thosestatutes violate double jeopardy also must fail).

J.W.'s final argument is that the trial court's condition that henot reside in or enter South Elgin during the term of his probationis overly broad, unreasonable, and violates J.W.'s constitutionalrights. J.W. claims that banishing a 12-year-old child from theentire town in which he and his family resided is not reasonablyrelated to the goals of rehabilitating the minor or protecting thepublic. J.W. concedes that the Juvenile Court Act allows the trialcourt to impose, as a condition of a minor's probation, therequirement that the minor refrain from entering a specificgeographic area (see 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2)(r) (West 2000)), butargues that the condition here which provides for no circumstancesunder which J.W. can be present in South Elgin is too broad.

Section 5-715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:

"(2) The court may as a condition of probation or ofconditional discharge require that the minor:

* * *

(r) refrain from entering into a designatedgeographic area except upon terms as the court findsappropriate. The terms may include consideration ofthe purpose of the entry, the time of day, other personsaccompanying the minor, and advance approval by aprobation officer, if the minor has been placed onprobation, or advance approval by the court, if theminor has been placed on conditional discharge."(Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2)(r) (West2000).

Thus, the Juvenile Court Act allows a court to impose, as acondition of probation, certain restrictions on a minor's ability tobe present within a designated geographical area if the courtincludes terms whereby the probationer can enter the restrictedarea for legitimate purposes. The order in the case at bar, however,goes further-it prohibits J.W. from residing in his own home in thecommunity where he had been living with his family. Moreover,the order banishes J.W. from the Village of South Elgin withoutproviding any terms or exceptions to its application. Accordingly,J.W. is prohibited, as a condition of probation, from enteringSouth Elgin for any purpose. Consequently, the condition ofprobation imposed on J.W. in the case at bar is not one which isexplicitly provided for by statute.

Although the banishment condition of probation is notexpressly provided for by statute, it may, nonetheless, be aconstitutionally valid condition of probation. It has beenrecognized that courts have broad discretion to impose probationconditions, whether expressly allowed by statute or not, to achievethe goals of fostering rehabilitation and protecting the public. SeePeople v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997); People v. Harris,238 Ill. App. 3d 575, 581 (1992). Of course, the wide latitudegiven to courts in setting conditions of probation is not boundless.Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 580. The court's discretion is limited byconstitutional safeguards and must be exercised in a reasonablemanner. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581. "The constitutionalsafeguards, which circumscribe a trial court's exercise of itsdiscretion to impose conditions, are the basic constitutional rightsof the probationer." Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 581-82.

In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456, 460 (1989), it wasrecognized that probation conditions which impose geographicrestrictions on travel implicate liberty interests. Reference wasmade in Pickens to People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 621-22, 195 Cal. Rptr. 381, 386-87 (1983), wherein the court held:

" 'A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degreeof privacy, or liberty, under the Fourth, Fifth andFourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution[citations].' [Citation.]

A citizen has a basic constitutional right to intrastate aswell as interstate travel. [Citation.] Many otherfundamental rights such as free speech, free assembly andfree association are often tied in with the right to travel.[Citation.] The right to acquire, own, enjoy and dispose ofproperty is also a basic fundamental right guaranteed bythe Fourteenth Amendment to the United StatesConstitution. [Citation.]"

Although the condition of probation imposed on J.W. in thecase at bar-barring J.W. from residing in or going to SouthElgin-implicates his constitutional rights, a condition of probationwhich impinges on fundamental constitutional rights is notautomatically deemed invalid. Even fundamental constitutionalrights are not absolute and may be reasonably restricted in thepublic interest. City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 460(1997) (personal liberties are not absolute and only governmentalactions which intrude upon personal liberties arbitrarily or in anutterly unreasonable manner violate the due process clause);Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582; Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 622,195 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Thus, when deciding the propriety of acondition of probation imposed in a particular case, whetherexplicitly statutory or not, the overriding concern isreasonableness. In re M.P., 297 Ill. App. 3d 972, 976 (1998);People v. Ferrell, 277 Ill. App. 3d 74, 79 (1995). To bereasonable, a condition of probation must not be overly broadwhen viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to thatend. In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d 840, 843 (1998). In other words," '[w]here a condition of probation requires a waiver of preciousconstitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to theextent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compellingstate interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is anunconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamentalconstitutional rights.' " (Emphasis omitted.) In re White, 97 Cal.App. 3d 141, 146, 158 Cal. Rptr. 562, 565-66 (1979), quotingPeople v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 488 P.2d 630, 635, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 307 (1971).

When assessing the reasonableness of a condition ofprobation it is appropriate to consider whether the restriction isrelated to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of theprobationer. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d at 378; Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d at460. Other considerations are: (1) whether the condition ofprobation reasonably relates to the rehabilitative purpose of thelegislation, (2) whether the value to the public in imposing thiscondition of probation manifestly outweighs the impairment to theprobationer's constitutional rights, and (3) whether there are anyalternative means that are less subversive to the probationer'sconstitutional rights, but still comport with the purposes ofconferring the benefit of probation. Harris, 238 Ill. App. 3d at 582;In re J.G., 295 Ill. App. 3d at 843.

In the case at bar, the requirement that J.W. not reside inSouth Elgin is severe. At the time the condition was imposed, thefamily residence was located in South Elgin and the restrictionprevented J.W. from living with his parents until they sold thehome and moved to another community. In a California case,People v. Beach, a banishment order which required an elderlywoman to vacate the home she had owned and lived in for 24years was held invalid. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 622, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 387. The court found that the banishment served no validpurpose, stating:

"[T]he value to the public does not manifestly outweighany impairment of appellant's constitutional rights offreedom of travel, speech, association, assembly and tothe possession and enjoyment of her property. Simplycausing appellant to move from one geographical area toanother is of minimal value to the public when comparedwith the infringement of appellant's basic constitutionalrights." Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 623, 195 Cal. Rptr. at387.

The Beach court, when considering whether the banishmentorder would promote the probationer's rehabilitation, found thatthe condition might cause more damage due to the psychologicalstress that would be associated with such a move. Beach, 147 Cal.App. 3d at 622, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Further, the Beach courtheld that there were less subversive means that the court couldutilize to accomplish its goals.

The situation in Beach is distinguishable from the case at bar.Here, despite the harshness of the residency restriction, it is areasonable condition of probation. Clearly, this condition is relatedto the offenses. The victims of the sexual assaults for which J.W.was adjudicated delinquent were children living in J.W.'sneighborhood. Further, due to the nature of the offenses and thehostile public sentiment they engendered, removing J.W. from thelocation where the offenses took place would be in his best interestand a benefit not only to his rehabilitation, but to the rehabilitationof his victims. In addition, the harshness of the residencyrestriction in the case at bar is tempered to a large degree by thefact that J.W.'s family expressed a willingness to move out of thecommunity. From the record it appears that the court's order thatJ.W. not reside in South Elgin was not so much a restrictionimposed by the court as it was an affirmation of the parent'sexpressed intent to leave the community. For all of these reasons,barring J.W. from residing in South Elgin is a constitutionallyvalid condition of probation and not unreasonable.

At the same time, however, banishing J.W. from enteringSouth Elgin for any purpose is a condition of probation which isnot narrowly drawn and, thus, an unconstitutionally overbroadrestriction on J.W.'s exercise of his fundamental rights.

As noted earlier, a condition of probation is constitutionallyvalid if it is reasonable. However, a restriction on a probationer'stravel into a specified geographic area is reasonable and notunconstitutionally overbroad only if (1) there is a valid purpose forthe restriction, and (2) there is a means by which the probationermay obtain exemption from the restriction for legitimate purposes.In People v. Pickens, 186 Ill. App. 3d 456 (1989), our appellatecourt held:

"A court may, as a condition of probation or othersentence short of incarceration, bar a defendant fromcertain areas if the penalty is reasonably related to theoffense, provided that, if the defendant has a legitimateand compelling reason to go to that area or place, he mayapply to a specified authority for specific permission, ashere to the probation officer.

We find the proviso to the condition imposed,permitting the defendant to obtain specific writtenpermission from her probation officer to enter therestricted area if she had a legitimate reason to go there,removes the taint of banishment from the restriction andsubstitutes in its stead supervised guidance for permissiveentry to the area." (Emphasis in original.) Pickens, 186 Ill.App. 3d at 461-62.

In the present case, banishing J.W. from going to South Elginwas a condition imposed in an attempt to minimize the possibilityof J.W.'s contact with his victims. While this serves as a validpurpose for the restriction, the limitation imposed in the case at baris too broad because it fails to make any provision for J.W. toenter the area for legitimate purposes.

Section 5-715(2)(r) of the Juvenile Court Act authorizes thecourt, as a condition of probation, to require a juvenile to "refrainfrom entering into a designated geographic area except upon termsas the court finds appropriate." (Emphasis added.) This languageof the statute mirrors the constitutional requirement that thecondition of probation be narrowly drawn. For this reason, the trialcourt, by failing to strictly conform the condition of probation tothe requirements of the statute, imposed an overly broad andunconstitutional condition of probation. We therefore vacate theportion of the trial court's order of probation imposing thebanishment condition as written, and remand the cause so that thecourt may consider whether the geographic travel restriction is stillwarranted and, if so, what appropriate terms for entering thegeographic area should be applied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court,affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County, isaffirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded for furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part and

vacated in part;

cause remanded.

JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.

In the case at bar, this court upholds the constitutionality ofthe Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), which requires 12-year-old J.W., whowas adjudicated delinquent on two counts of aggravated criminalsexual assault, to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life.Although I believe this ruling to be legally correct, I writeseparately to express my concern over the harshness of thislifetime reporting requirement.

J.W. contends that imposing a lifetime registrationrequirement on juveniles, especially juveniles under the age of 13,violates substantive due process and the proscription againstdouble jeopardy, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment inviolation of the eighth amendment to the United StatesConstitution.

While I agree with the court that the registration requirementsmandated by the plain language of the Registration Act areconstitutionally valid, I recognize a certain tension between alifetime reporting requirement and the philosophicalunderpinnings of our juvenile justice system.

According to the provisions of our Juvenile Court Act, aminor under the age of 13 can never be prosecuted under thecriminal laws of this State, nor can a minor under the age of 13 bethe subject of an extended juvenile prosecution. 705 ILCS405/5-130, 5-805, 5-810 (West 2000). In my view, theseprovisions reflect a legislative understanding that children underthe age of 13, no matter how serious the offense charged, "simplyare too immature as a matter of law to be tried as an adult." In reRegistrant J.G., 169 N.J. 304, 325, 777 A.2d 891, 904 (2001).Children under the age of 13 have a diminished capacity to formcriminal intent. It seems incongruous, then, to make no distinctionin the treatment of juveniles under the age of 13 for purposes ofthe Registration Act.

I observe that, while all 50 states have adopted sex offenderregistration and community notification laws, often referred to asMegan's Laws (see State v. Misiorski, 250 Conn. 280, 292, 738A.2d 595, 601-02 (1999) (providing historical explanation ofMegan's Laws and their adoption throughout the country)), theimplementation of these laws, particularly with respect tojuveniles, varies greatly from state to state. Some states do notexpressly include juveniles in their law (see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.