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Docket No. 93329-Agenda 5-January 2003.

In re JUSTIN M.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, 
Appellee, v. Justin M.B., Appellant).

Opinion filed March 20, 2003.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement with the State, JustinM.B. admitted to two charges alleged in juvenile delinquencypetitions. The circuit court of Vermilion County accepted theadmissions and sentenced him to five years of probation. After ahearing on a subsequent petition to revoke probation, the trialcourt committed Justin M.B. to the Department of Corrections,Juvenile Division. We granted leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315)to determine whether the requirement of section 5-620 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West1998)) that the court make a notation of a finding of guilt isjurisdictional in nature.

BACKGROUND

On February 2, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition in No.98-JD-15, which alleged that the minor, Justin M.B., committeda residential burglary. On April 13, 1998, the parties tendered awritten plea agreement to the court. The court accepted theagreement, which specified that the court would impose a sentenceof two years' probation.

On September 24, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition inNo. 98-JD-196, which alleged that Justin M.B. committedanother residential burglary. The State also filed a juvenile petitionrequesting that the court revoke the minor's probation for No.98-JD-15 because the commission of the second residentialburglary constituted a violation of the conditions of his probation.On October 19, 1998, the State filed a juvenile petition in No.98-JD-205, which alleged that he committed aggravated assault,aggravated battery, and unlawful use of a weapon.

At the adjudicatory hearing on February 9, 1999, the partiesoffered another written plea agreement under which Justin M.B.admitted committing residential burglary and aggravated battery.In exchange, the State withdrew the petition to revoke probationand the charges of aggravated assault and unlawful use of aweapon. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentencedJustin M.B. to five years of probation, without making an oralfinding of guilt. However, Judge Anderson referred to Justin M.B.as being under "my jurisdiction and a ward of this court." Thedocket sheet for this date states, "Admission accepted in each case;finding of delinquency entered. Proposed plea agreement approvedand incorporated as the court's dispositional order herein."

On July 2, 1999, the State filed a petition to revoke JustinM.B.'s probation, alleging he violated his probation by committingcruelty to animals. The hearing on this petition was held onOctober 19, 1999, before Judge Fahey. The parties stipulated toevidence, but the defense disputed the sufficiency of the evidence.The transcripts of the proceeding and the docket sheet both reflectthat the court found the State met its burden of proof. The courtcommitted Justin M.B. to the Department of Corrections, JuvenileDivision, for a 90-day psychiatric evaluation. On February 14,2000, the court heard testimony and committed him to theDepartment of Corrections for an indeterminate period.

Justin M.B. argues on appeal that the trial court lackedsubject-matter jurisdiction to enter the dispositional orders becausethe court never noted a finding of delinquency or guilt, as requiredby section 5-620 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 1998)).The appellate court acknowledged that an opinion from a differentappellate district analyzed the same issue and held the trial courtlacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter dispositional ordersgiven its failure to make an explicit finding of delinquency first.In re J.S.L., 197 Ill. App. 3d 148, 154 (1990). The appellate courtin the present case declined to follow J.S.L. because itsinterpretation was too "formalistic" (No. 4-00-0166 (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23)) and upheld the order ofcommitment.

ANALYSIS

The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that thecourt must effectuate legislative intent. Solich v. George & AnnaPortes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,83 (1994). The best indicator of legislative intent is statutorylanguage. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). If statutory language is plain, the courtcannot read limitations or conditions into the statute. In re D.D.,196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001). We review issues of statutoryinterpretation de novo. In re Application of the Cook CountyTreasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428, 432 (1998).

Section 5-620 of the Act states:

"After hearing the evidence, the court shall make andnote in the minutes of the proceeding a finding of whetheror not the minor is guilty. *** If the court finds that theminor is guilty, the court shall then set a time for asentencing hearing ***." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS405/5-620 (West 1998).

The juvenile proceedings concerning Justin M.B. occurred bothbefore and after the effective date of the amendments to the Actcontained in Public Act 90-590 (eff. January 1, 1999). However,these and prior amendments to this section changed only someterminology and section numbering.⁽¹⁾ Previous versions of thissection contained the same requirement of a notation of the findingof delinquency or guilt prior to the sentencing hearing. See 705ILCS 405/5-20 (West 1996); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par.704-8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 37, par. 704-8.

Neither party disputes that the language of section 5-620plainly requires the court to make a notation of the finding of guiltprior to sentencing. The issue presented by the parties is whetherfailure to comply with this statutory requirement deprived the trialcourt of subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the subsequentdispositional order. We need not reach this issue because we findthe trial court complied with the statutory requirement.

Defendant criticizes Judge Fahey for never making an oral orwritten finding that Justin M.B. was guilty prior to committinghim to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. JudgeFahey held a hearing on October 19, 1999, to consider the State'spetition to revoke probation in Nos. 98-JD-196 and 98-JD-205.The petition alleged the minor had violated a condition of hisprobation, which prohibited him from violating criminal statutes,by committing cruelty to animals (510 ILCS 70/3.01 (West 1998)).The State did not file a separate juvenile petition allegingdelinquency based on a cruelty to animals charge.

Petitions to revoke probation differ from petitions allegingdelinquency. Petitions to revoke probation presume the minoralready has been found delinquent or guilty and already has had adispositional order-a sentence of probation-entered against himor her. At a hearing on a petition to revoke probation, the State hasthe burden of going forward with the evidence and proving theprobation violation by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS405/5-720(3) (West 2000); see also People v. Beard, 59 Ill. 2d220, 226 (1974).

At the hearing on the petition to revoke probation in this case,the parties stipulated to the evidence, but defendant disputed thesufficiency of the evidence. Judge Fahey made an oral finding,also noted in the entry on the docket sheet, that the State had metits burden. Judge Fahey comported with the applicable statutoryprovision; he was not required to make a delinquency or guiltyfinding of any sort at a hearing on a petition to revoke probation.705 ILCS 405/5-720 (West 1998). Defendant has not raised achallenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, so we express noopinion on the issue.

We also review the adjudicatory hearing on February 9, 1999,at which Judge Anderson imposed the five-year probationary termfor residential burglary, No. 98-JD-196, and aggravated battery,No. 98-JD-205. The docket sheet entry for this date states:"finding of delinquency entered." "Docket" is defined as, "Aformal record in which a judge or court clerk briefly notes all theproceedings and filings in a court case." Black's Law Dictionary495 (7th ed. 1999). Section 5-620 requires the court to "make andnote in the minutes of the proceeding a finding of whether or notthe minor is guilty." 705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 1998). A docketentry, therefore, is an appropriate place for the court to record afinding of guilt in compliance with section 5-620.

Here, the court explicitly recorded a finding of delinquency onthe docket sheet. Although the amendment substituting the word"guilt" for "delinquent" in section 5-620 became effective in themonth preceding this hearing, we attach no import to court's useof the old term. The Act, before and after the amendment, retainedthe same definition for "[d]elinquent minor" (705 ILCS405/5-105(3) (West 2000); 705 ILCS 405/5-3(1) (West 1996)),and the current finding of "guilt" refers to evaluation of allegationsof delinquency (705 ILCS 405/5-601 (West 2000)). Therefore, thetrial court clearly complied with the requirement of section 5-620.

CONCLUSION

The trial court complied with the statutory requirement of awritten notation of guilt found in section 5-620 (705 ILCS405/5-620 (West 1998)), so we affirm the judgment of theappellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's probationrevocation and sentence.

Affirmed.

1. ¹Prior to this amendment, the court was required to make a findingof whether or not the minor is "delinquent" by "adjudication" ratherthan "guilty" at a "trial." 705 ILCS 405/5-20 (West 1996); 705 ILCS405/5-601, 5-620 (West 2000). Because of the timing of theproceedings and the effective date of the amendment, all four terms areused in this opinion.