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Docket No. 93453-Agenda 6-January 2003.

In re J.B. et al., Appellees (The People of the State of Illinois, 
Appellee, v. Wanda B., Appellant).

Opinion filed April 24, 2003.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

The circuit court of Cook County found that the respondent,Wanda B. (mother), was an unfit parent based on section 1(D)(q)of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)). Asamended, this section creates a presumption that a parent is unfitbased on a conviction for any of the specified crimes. The motherhad previously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child, oneof the listed crimes. The circuit court subsequently terminated themother's parental rights. She appealed but failed to seek a stay ofenforcement of the termination order. While the appeal waspending, the children were adopted. More than a year after theentry of the children's final adoption orders, the appellate courtfiled its judgment affirming the termination order. 328 Ill. App. 3d175.

In this appeal, the mother raises constitutional challenges toamended section 1(D)(q), but prior to reaching these issues, wemust consider the threshold issue of whether her appeal is mootpursuant to our recent decisions in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282(2002), and In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d 522 (2002). We hold that itis and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 1992, the mother pleaded guilty to aggravated batteryof one of her children and was sentenced to 70 days'imprisonment, receiving credit for the time she had already served.Subsequently, in March 1993 and March 1995, she gave birth tothe two children at issue in this appeal, J.B. and T.B., who weretaken into state custody shortly after birth and were lateradjudicated wards of the court. In 1998, the court enteredpermanency orders setting the goal of substitute care for thechildren, pending a decision on the termination of parental rights,and the State filed supplemental petitions to appoint a guardianwith the right to consent to their adoptions.

The State then sought summary judgment on the issue of themother's fitness based on amended section 1(D)(q) of theAdoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(q) (West 1998)) because she hadpreviously been convicted of aggravated battery of a child. Theamendment took effect after the mother's conviction, and, in heranswer, she challenged the amended section's retroactiveapplication and constitutionality. The circuit court granted theState's motion, finding that the retroactive application of theamended statute was proper because the mother's interest in herchildren was not an absolute vested right. Applying the amendedstatute, the trial court found the mother unfit as a matter of law.On August 10, 1999, the mother's parental rights were terminatedfollowing a best interests hearing. The mother filed a timely noticeof appeal but did not seek to stay the enforcement of thetermination order in either the circuit court or the appellate court.

On February 26, 2002, the appellate court affirmed, findingthat the amended statute could be applied retroactively and did notviolate the mother's due process and equal protection rights. Themother then sought leave to appeal to this court, but she did notraise the issue of retroactivity. After her petition was granted, thepublic guardian reported that J.B. and T.B. had been adopted bytheir foster parents on December 17, 1999, and February 9, 2000,respectively.

Prior to filing its brief, the State, joined by the publicguardian, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot based onthis court's decision in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002). Apetition for rehearing was pending in Tekela when the State filedits motion, and the motion was denied.

II. ANALYSIS 

On appeal, the State reiterates the argument that this courtshould not address the merit of the mother's claims because theappeal is moot. Thus, the threshold question before us is whetherwe may decide the issues raised in this appeal on their merits inlight of our recent holdings in In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002),and In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d 522 (2002).

In Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d at 296, this court held that the filing ofa notice of appeal does not act as a stay of an order terminatingparental rights. We reasoned that after the passage of the one-yearperiod to challenge an adoption in section 20b of the Adoption Act(750 ILCS 50/20b (West 1998)) any challenge to the validity of atermination order would be rendered moot since our ruling couldhave no practical effect on the controversy or the parties' rights inthe matter before the court. Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d at 292-93. See alsoIn re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1999).

Similarly, in this case the mother did not seek a stay of thetermination order, and the adoption orders had been in place forfar more than one year before the appellate court filed its decision.Applying the rationale in Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d at 292, to this case,the mother's challenges to the termination order were moot at thetime the appellate judgment was filed and remain moot in thiscourt.

Initially, the mother argues that Tekela is inapplicable becauseit did not involve a constitutional challenge. We disagree. Thiscourt recently applied the reasoning in Tekela to dismiss as mootan appeal of a termination order challenged on constitutionalgrounds. India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 544.

In India B., the mother was barred from presenting either adefense or further pleadings because she failed to appear at herparental fitness hearing. On appeal, she maintained that thesanction violated her constitutional rights to due process andcounsel. She also argued that if her appeal was deemed moot, thiscourt should apply an exception to the mootness doctrine.

In this case, the mother claims that this court may hear herappeal under only one such exception, the public interestexception. This exception was also raised by the mother in IndiaB. In that case, we explained that the public interest exception isapplicable only if it is clearly shown that: (1) the question is of asubstantial public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritativedecision to provide future guidance; and (3) the situation is likelyto recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d391, 395 (1994). In rejecting the mother's argument in India B.,we noted that the exception must be narrowly construed and eachof its criteria must be clearly established. India B., 202 Ill. 2d at543. We concluded that the case did not meet those "rigidstandards." India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543.

We declined the mother's invitation to apply the publicinterest exception in India B. because there were no conflictingprecedents requiring authoritative resolution. India B., 202 Ill. 2dat 543. Here, the mother cites no conflicting case law requiringauthoritative resolution. Since we are confronted with the samescenario as in India B., we are compelled to apply the samerationale. The exception is inapplicable in this case because atleast one of the criteria for the public interest exception is absent.India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543.

The mother, however, raises additional arguments refuting theapplicability of the India B. rationale. She briefly argues that theState may not rely on our mootness holding in that case because itdid not previously raise the one-year statutory limitations periodon contesting adoptions in this case. This argument ignores thebasic principles that questions affecting a court's authority to heara given controversy may be raised at any time (see In re Estate ofGebis, 186 Ill. 2d 188, 192-93 (1999)) and that reviewing courtshave a duty to raise such issues sua sponte if they are not raised bythe parties (Department of Central Management Services v.American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,182 Ill. 2d 234, 238 (1998)). We reject the mother's waiverargument.

The mother next attempts to distinguish her appeal from IndiaB. because, in that case, this court observed that the respondentwas unlikely to be subjected to the same penalty a second time.We note that this contention addresses the third prong of thepublic interest exception, the likelihood of recurrence. We neednot address this claim because, pursuant to our rationale in IndiaB., we have already determined that this case fails to satisfyanother prong of the public interest exception. Unless a case meetsthe "rigid standard" requiring each element of a mootnessexception to be clearly established, the exception is inapplicable.See India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543.

Although the mother explicitly acknowledges that this casemay be procedurally similar to Tekela and India B., she maintainsthat it is substantively closer to our decision in In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1 (2000). In that case, this court agreed to hear a constitutionalchallenge to the Adoption Act that otherwise would have beenmoot because "[t]he interpretation of the statute is of substantialpublic importance, the relevant appellate court precedents are inconflict, and the issue is one that is likely to recur." (Emphasisadded.) D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 8.

Unlike D.L., here there is no need for an authoritative decisionfrom this court. See India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543. Thus, we reject themother's contention that D.L. supports the application of thepublic interest exception in this case.

Alternatively, the mother claims that we should not rely onIndia B. because applying it effectively denies her the right to anappeal. She suggests that we take a "less formalistic approach" andrefuse to deem the appeal of a termination order moot unless thesubsequent adoption was based on either valid parental consent ora valid termination of parental rights. See Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d at299-300 (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). This approach ignores aparent's responsibility for preserving the opportunity to obtainappropriate relief by seeking a stay of the termination order. Asthis court made clear in both India B. and Tekela, it is this veryfailure to obtain a stay that precipitates the chain of eventspermitting adoption proceedings to continue lawfully, ultimatelycreating the mootness problem. India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 544; Tekela,202 Ill. 2d at 296. This case is procedurally indistinguishable onthis point. We are not persuaded to depart from our recentdirectives in this matter.

As we explained in Tekela, the right to meaningful appellatereview does not guarantee an absolute right to relief on the merits.Moreover, the right to appellate review of a termination order is"necessarily limited by its mootness." Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d at 294.We have adhered to this principle even in the face of a trial court'sfinding of unconstitutionality. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365-66.

In Walgreen, the trial court found two sections of theAdoption Act unconstitutional, but while the appeal was pendingthe biological mother consented to the adoptions, rendering theappeal moot. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 364. Despite the existenceof a circuit court decision finding the sections unconstitutional,this court refused to apply the public interest exception. Wenarrowly construed the exception and found that, although theappeal presented a question of substantial public importance, theneed for authoritative guidance was questionable because therewere no conflicting precedents. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365-66.As we noted,

"Our court has held that when an opinion on a question oflaw cannot affect the result as to the parties orcontroversy in the case before it, a court should notresolve the question merely for the sake of setting aprecedent to govern potential future cases. [Citations.]This limitation is no mere technicality. The existence of areal controversy is a prerequisite to the exercise of ourjurisdiction." (Emphasis added.) Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at365.

Although the procedural circumstances differ in the instantappeal, the two cases reflect the same underlying considerations:(1) this court's inability to issue any order capable of affecting theparent's rights to the adopted children and (2) the lack ofconflicting precedents requiring resolution to justify the impositionof the public interest exception. We continue to uphold ourestablished principles in this matter.

Finally, we note that our ability to address the substantiveissues raised in this appeal is further constrained by our long-standing proscription against resolving constitutional questionsthat are not essential to the disposition of the case. See People exrel. Sklodowski v. State, 162 Ill. 2d 117, 130-31 (1994). We maynot reach the merits of the mother's constitutional claims when, inlight of the similarity of our recent precedents, the legitimacy ofour actions would be highly questionable at best. India B. andTekela clearly direct parents wishing to appeal the termination oftheir parental rights to obtain a stay of enforcement of thetermination order and, whenever possible, to pursue expeditedproceedings to provide reviewing courts the opportunity to grantmeaningful relief. India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 537; Tekela, 202 Ill. 2dat 294-95.

In parental rights cases, countless issues of substantial publicimportance may arise. If we broadly interpret the mootnessexceptions to permit the review of cases that do not strictly meetour rigid standards, we would effectively obviate our holdings inTekela and India B. Such a broad interpretation of an exceptionwould result in a string of advisory opinions, including some ofconstitutional proportion, that would have no effect whatsoever onthe rights of the parties or the outcome of the case before the court.Our adherence to the established rule that mootness exceptions areto be narrowly construed (see India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543), and ourcontinued encouragement of the use of appropriate safeguards topreserve a parent's right to effective appellate review, such asstays and expedited proceedings (see India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 537),ensure that reviewing courts will continue to address claims onlyin cases within the proper scope of their authority.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on our recent decisions in Tekela and India B., as wellas for the additional reasons stated, we hold that this appeal ismoot. Since we lack the authority to consider the merits of thesubstantive questions raised, we dismiss the appeal.

The judgment of the appellate court is vacated, and the appealis dismissed as moot.

Appellate court judgment vacated;

appeal dismissed.