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In re ESTATE OF WILLIE JOLLIFF, Deceased

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

Edith Porter appeals the Cook County circuit court's orderholding section 18-1.1 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS5/18-1.1 (West 2000)) unconstitutional and dismissing herstatutory custodial claim under that section. We reverse andremand.

BACKGROUND

In 1970, Willie Jolliff and his wife, Dorothy, separated, butsubsequently never divorced. On March 28, 1977, Willie wascompletely disabled after suffering a brain stem injury in a motorvehicle accident. Three months later, Porter, Willie's sister, wasappointed conservator of his person and estate. Willie resided ineither a hospital or a skilled-care facility for nearly 10 years untilPorter brought him into her home in 1987, where he stayed formore than 12 years. Willie died intestate on August 30, 1999.Between 1977 and 1999, Porter collected $275,880 in conservatorfees and $70,925 in helper fees from Willie's guardianship estate.

After Willie's death, Dorothy filed a petition for letters ofadministration. Cheryl Jolliff, one of Willie and Dorothy'sdaughters, was appointed independent administrator of Willie'sestate. On July 13, 2000, Porter filed a $200,000 statutorycustodial claim under section 18-1.1. Porter's claim stated:

"Edith Porter, Sister of the deceased, was the plenaryGuardian of the Person and Guardian of the Estate forWillie Jolliff, deceased, from the period 1977 thoughAugust 30, 1999, the decedent's date of death. During theperiod 1987 up to and including August 30, 1999, EdithPorter was the primary caretaker and personally cared forher brother, Willie Jolliff, who was adjudicated a disabledperson in the Circuit Court of Cook County in 1977. Fromthe period 1987 until the date of death in 1999, WillieJolliff resided full time with Edith Porter at her home. Thenature of Willie Jolliff's disabilities were extensive andincluded the following: 100% physically disabled and100% mentally disabled due to a brain stem injury; he wasunable to perform activities of daily living independentlysuch as bathing, grooming, dressing, meal preparation andlaundry; Mr. Jolliff was unable to transfer himself fromone body position to another without assistance; herequired full time assistance to attend any out of the homefunction and/or activity.

Edith Porter, now age 68, assumed full-time care of herbrother, Willie Jolliff since 1987. During the period 1977-1987, while Willie Jolliff was a full-time resident of askilled care facility, Edith Porter, as plenary guardian, wasvery involved in the care, supervision and daily care planof Willie Jolliff."

Cheryl filed a motion to dismiss Porter's claim, arguing thatsection 18-1.1 violated various constitutional provisions. The trialcourt agreed with Cheryl. The court held that section 18-1.1violated both the special legislation clause and the equal protectionclause of the State constitution. Quoting an opinion by anothertrial court judge, the court stated:

" 'In this case the statute creates a gift for only certainpersons who provide care for the ward to the exclusion ofall others who could have provided the same care. Thedetermination that only the spouse, parent, brother, sisteror child of the ward may receive this gift excludes allothers who may be similarly situated. A doting niece,nephew, grandchild or friend who otherwise meets therequirements of Section 18-1.1 is denied the gift itbestows. The classifications in the statute create asituation for gifts for only certain persons, to theexclusions of others, and therefore is a denial of equalprotection.

***

This court is unable to determine why only certainrelatives were selected to receive the gifts by means ofclaims as stated in the statute. Moreover, Section [18-1],the general law, should be applied in this instance.Section [18-1] of the Probate Act clearly provides that aclaim may be filed against the estate of the disabledperson or a decedent for the care of a disabled person.' "

The court also held that section 18-1.1 violates the dueprocess clause of the state constitution because it creates anirrebuttable presumption that one of the beneficiaries named in thestatute, who lives with and cares for a disabled person for threeyears, has suffered a minimum amount of damages. Again, quotingthe same trial judge, the court stated:

" 'Such a presumption violates due process in that it isarbitrary and unreasonable and denies heirs and legateestheir property without due process of law. *** The statemay have a legitimate purpose in compensating a personwho provides nursing and other care for a disabledperson, but it does not have an interest in providing a"gift" to such a person in addition to the compensationreceived for such care. The statute does not set forth anyrequirement as to the proof necessary to show the extentof care provided. Neither does it provide any facts orstandards to determine the percentage of disability inorder to determine the minimum award.' "

According to the court, the statute also was arbitrary because thelegislature failed to articulate a reason why the minimum amountswere chosen.

Finally, the court held that section 18-1.1 violates theseparation of powers provision of the state constitution because itrequires a court to award a statutory minimum amount without anydiscretion to award a lesser amount. According to the court, thelegislature unconstitutionally encroached upon the power of thejudiciary to decide cases. The trial court dismissed Porter's claim,and she appealed directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d R.302(a)(1).

ANALYSIS

Section 18-1.1 provides:

"Any spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of adisabled person who dedicates himself or herself to thecare of the disabled person by living with and personallycaring for the disabled person for at least 3 years shall beentitled to a claim against the estate upon the death of thedisabled person. The claim shall take into considerationthe claimant's lost employment opportunities, lostlifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress experiencedas a result of personally caring for the disabled person.The claim shall be in addition to any other claim,including without limitation a reasonable claim fornursing and other care. The claim shall be based upon thenature and extent of the person's disability and, at aminimum but subject to the extent of the assets available,shall be in the amounts set forth below:

1. 100% disability, $100,000

2. 75% disability, $75,000

3. 50% disability, $50,000

4. 25% disability, $25,000[.]"

755 ILCS 5/18-1.1 (West 2000).⁽¹⁾

Under section 18-1.1 a claimant must meet two requirements:(1) the claimant must be an immediate family member-a spouse,parent, sibling, or child-of a disabled person; and (2) the claimantmust have dedicated himself or herself to the disabled person forat least three years. The legislature referred to "living with andpersonally caring for" a disabled person in describing the term"dedicate," but that term encompasses more than care. SeeWebster's Third New International Dictionary 589 (1993)("dedicate" means "to commit to something as a constant goal orway of life"). Section 18-1.1 laudably recognizes the often unseenand intangible sacrifices made, and opportunities foregone, byimmediate family members who commit their lives every day tomaking the lives of disabled persons better.

All statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality,and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of clearlyrebutting this presumption. Miller v. Rosenberg, 196 Ill. 2d 50, 57-58 (2001). A court will affirm a statute's constitutionality if thestatute is reasonably capable of such an interpretation. See Miller,196 Ill. 2d at 58; Delany v. Badame, 49 Ill. 2d 168, 171 (1971)(this court will resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of a statute'svalidity). The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law, andour review is de novo. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198Ill. 2d 21, 31 (2001).

In this appeal both Porter and Cheryl repeat the argumentsthat they made before the trial court. We address these argumentsin turn.

Special Legislation/Equal Protection

Porter asserts that the trial court erred in holding that section18-1.1 violates the special legislation clause and the equalprotection clause of the Illinois Constitution. The speciallegislation clause of our state constitution provides: "The GeneralAssembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law isor can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can bemade applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination." Ill.Const. 1970, art. IV,