Find Legal Information

Docket No. 89386-Agenda 19-January 2001.

In re ESTATE OF BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS (Peggy L. Parrish, 
Appellant, v. Rolf Hackman, Ex'r of the Estate of Budris
Andernovics, Deceased, Appellee).

Opinion filed September 20, 2001.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

The primary question presented in this appeal is whethersection 18-7(a) of the Probate Act of 1975 (Act) (755 ILCS5/18-7(a) (West 1998)) or section 2-610 of the Code of CivilProcedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West 1998)) applies whenan estate files a nonspecific response to a probate complainant'sclaim, demanding strict proof of that claim. In February 1989,plaintiff, Peggy L. Parrish, filed a 10-count complaint against theestate of Budris Andernovics, alleging that Andernovics breachedan oral contract to make a will. Subsequently, plaintiff argued thatshe was entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the estate'sfailure to deny explicitly her claim constituted an admission undersection 2-610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The estate arguedthat section 18-7(a) of the Probate Act allowed it to demand strictproof rather than directly admit or deny plaintiff's claim.

The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument, denied her claimon the merits, and ordered her to pay attorney fees as a sanction forfailure to comply with a discovery order. The appellate courtaffirmed. 311 Ill. App. 3d 741. Plaintiff now appeals. We affirmand hold that a trial court has discretion under section 18-7(a) ofthe Probate Act to demand plaintiff prove her claim when an estatefiles a response neither admitting nor denying the claim, butdemanding strict proof of it.

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff's complaint sought monetary damages and specificperformance of an oral contract to make a will. Plaintiff allegedthat she and Andernovics reached an agreement, allowing plaintiffto deed certain parcels of encumbered real estate to him. Plaintifffurther alleged that Andernovics agreed to pay the mortgages onthe parcels and deed the property back to plaintiff in his will, alongwith fee title to another parcel of property and a life estate in athird parcel.

Plaintiff filed her complaint in probate. Rather than admittingor denying plaintiff's claim, the estate's executor filed anonspecific response that stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

"NOW COMES ROLF HACKMAN, duly appointedExecutor of the Estate of BUDRIS ANDERNOVICS,deceased by Holland and Holland, his attorneys, to defendagainst the claim of PEGGY L. PARRISH against saidEstate, and hereby demands strict proof of said claim."

Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing thatthe estate's answer constituted an admission pursuant to section2-610 of the Code. Following a hearing, the trial court deniedplaintiff's motion. The estate then filed several interrogatories anda request to produce, and plaintiff effectively failed to respond todiscovery.

Plaintiff sought interlocutory review in the appellate courtunder Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308), arguing thatshe should have been granted judgment on the pleadings. Theappellate court denied plaintiff's request for appeal. Meanwhile,the trial court entered an order compelling plaintiff's discoveryresponses. Nevertheless, plaintiff persisted in disregarding theinterrogatories and requests to produce. Several months later, theestate filed a motion for sanctions. Plaintiff then renewed hermotion for judgment on the pleadings.

As a sanction for plaintiff's failure to comply with thediscovery order, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint withprejudice. On review, the appellate court reversed and remanded,instructing the trial court to issue a more lenient sanction. In reEstate of Andernovics, No. 3-93-0510 (1993) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23).

On remand, the trial court granted the estate attorney feestotaling $4,035. The trial court further directed that plaintiff andher attorney were jointly and severally liable for payment of thesanction. The trial court also conducted a hearing on the merits ofplaintiff's claim. At the hearing, plaintiff submitted evidence onlyas to the value of the real estate and other items subject to thealleged oral contract to make a will. Further, plaintiff heldsteadfast to her position that the estate's answer constituted anadmission. The trial court rejected plaintiff's claim, finding in partas follows:

"There is authority that in a suit for specificperformance of a contract to make a will the evidence andthe existence of the contract and its terms must be clearand explicit and so convincing that it will leave no doubtin the mind of the Court. Greenwood v. CommercialNational Bank of Peoria, 130 N.E.2d 753, 7 Ill. 2d 436(1955).

The Claimant elected to file a claim in this estate matterrather than a separate law suit. When the claimant files aclaim in an estate [proceeding,] the Probate Act [citation]applies. It has been suggested that the representatives ofan estate must be allowed a great deal of latitude in filinganswers to claims. The Probate Act specifically sets forththat a claim which is presented by the claimant or hisattorney or to which no pleading has been filed within thetime provided by the Act may be taken as proved or theCourt may require the claimant to prove his claim. Herethe Executor in his Answer demanded that the claim beproven. When the claimant filed the claim under theProbate Act the claimant must comply with that Act.Therefore, if a claim is filed in probate, the Probate Actapplies. The Probate Act and the Code of Civil Procedurerecommend that sections be liberally construed to the endthat controversies and rights of the parties may bespeedily and fairly determined.

Arguably, the Answer filed by the Estate is anadmission under [section 2-610(b) of the] Code ***.However, this Court finds that the admission is as to factswell pleaded and not as [to] conclusions of law. ThisCourt further *** exercise[s] its discretion *** to requirethat the Claimant prove her claim notwithstanding anyadmission made by the Estate. 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a). ***

The claim in this case is anything but routine. As aresult the Claimant should have submitted her cause andproved her claim. She has not done so. The Plaintiff's ***Claim is denied."

The appellate court affirmed under reasoning similar to thatof the trial court. We granted leave to appeal to consider primarilywhether section 18-7(a) of the Act preempts section 2-610 of theCode.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Section 18-7(a) of the Act Versus Section 2-610 of the Code

Plaintiff contends that the estate's answer constituted anadmission and therefore she was entitled to judgment on thepleadings. In support of this claim, plaintiff relies upon section1-6 of the Act. Section 1-6 provides that the Code shall apply toall probate proceedings except as otherwise provided in the Act.755 ILCS 5/1-6 (West 1998). Plaintiff further points to section2-610 of the Code, requiring that pleadings be specific. Section2-610 provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Every answer and subsequent pleading shallcontain an explicit admission or denial of each allegationof the pleading to which it relates.

(b) Every allegation *** not explicitly denied isadmitted, unless the party states in his or her pleading thathe or she has no knowledge thereof sufficient to form abelief, and attaches an affidavit of the truth of thestatement of want of knowledge, or unless the party hashad no opportunity to deny." 735 ILCS 5/2-610 (West1998).

Plaintiff invokes section 2-610 and In re Estate of Jensik, 34 Ill.App. 2d 130, 133 (1962) (allegations in an estate claim notanswered are deemed admitted), arguing that, because the estatefailed to deny explicitly the allegations contained in her complaint,the allegations must be deemed admitted.

Relying upon section 18-7(a) of the Act, the estate disagreeswith plaintiff. Section 18-7(a) provides in pertinent part that"[a]claim which is consented to by the representative *** or to whichno pleading has been filed *** may be taken as proved or the courtmay require the claimant to prove his claim." 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a)(West 1998). The estate contends that section 18-7(a) satisfies the"except otherwise provided" language in section 1-6, therebytaking the issue outside the scope of section 2-610.⁽¹⁾

Citing In re Estate of Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d 563, 566(1972), plaintiff urges us to reject the estate's contention. InGrimsley, the Department of Mental Health filed a claim againstthe decedent's estate for unpaid hospitalization expenses. In anunverified answer, the estate alleged that it had not received anystatements of unpaid expenses but did not deny that the chargeswere owed and did not request proof of the claim. The trial courtdenied the claim for failure to prove details surrounding thedecedent's hospitalization. The appellate court reversed, findingthat the Civil Practice Act (now the Code of Civil Procedure)required that the undenied allegations be deemed admitted withoutthe necessity of requiring proof.

The court in Grimsley found that the subject provision of theProbate Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 3, par. 199, now 755 ILCS5/18-7 (West 1998)) was "directed to instances where no answerhas been filed." Grimsley, 7 Ill. App. 3d at 566. Under Grimsley,plaintiff argues that section 18-7(a) does not apply because theestate filed an answer.

The issue before us is one of statutory construction. Statutoryconstruction presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo.Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995).The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the legislature's intent. Solich v. George & AnnaPortes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76,81 (1994). To determine the legislature's intent, courts first lookto the statute's language. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers,Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69 (1998). We accord a statute'slanguage its plain and commonly understood meaning. In rePetition to Annex Certain Territory, 144 Ill. 2d 353, 362 (1991).

The plain language of section 18-7(a) allows the trial courtwide latitude in allowing claims or requiring proof of claims. If "[a] claim *** is consented to by the representative," the trialcourt may accept the claim as plead or may require proof of theclaim. (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18-7(a) (West 1998).Likewise, if "no pleading has been filed," the trial court mayaccept the claim as plead or may require proof of the claim. 755ILCS 5/18-7(a) (West 1998). Thus, Grimsley cannot be read asholding that section 18-7(a) is directed solely to instances whenno answer has been filed. Section 18-7(a) also plainly applieswhen the estate consents to a claim. Accordingly, assuming theestate's response should be construed as an admission of herclaim, this determination does not take the case at hand outside thepurview of section 18-7(a). Construing section 18-7(a) inconjunction with section 2-610 of the Code, we believe noreasonable distinction may be drawn between a claim that is"consented to" by an estate and a claim that is "admitted" by anestate. Given this conclusion, the trial court was within itsdiscretionary authority to demand that plaintiff prove her claim.⁽²⁾

Nonetheless, in opposition to this determination, plaintiff citesIn re Estate of Brauns, 330 Ill. App. 322 (1947), maintaining thatBrauns stands for the broad proposition that the sufficiency of ananswer to a probate claim must be determined under the Code. InBrauns, the plaintiff filed a claim based upon judgment notesallegedly executed by the decedent. As a consequence, Brauns wasdecided under the specific provision of the Civil Practice Act thataddressed allegations concerning the execution of a writteninstrument. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, ch. 10, par. 159. Accordingly,Brauns has no relevance to the instant case because plaintiff doesnot allege the execution of a written instrument.

In sum, we hold that a trial court may, in accord with section18-7(a) of the Act and section 2-610 of the Code, require acomplainant to prove a claim when an estate files a nonspecificresponse, neither admitting nor denying the claim but demandingstrict proof.

Our decision on this issue is consistent with the long-standingprinciple that claims against an estate should be scrutinized withcare and should not be allowed except on clear proof. See In reEstate of Winan, 77 Ill. App. 2d 462 (1966) (abstract of op.);Bonamer v. Mahanna, 339 Ill. App. 277 (1950) (abstract of op.);Floyd v. Estate of Smith, 320 Ill. App. 171 (1943); In re Estate ofTeehan, 287 Ill. App. 58 (1936). The careful scrutiny of claims canonly be accomplished through the discretionary authority of thetrial court. The allowance of a disputed claim based on a purelytechnical application of section 2-610 of the Code is at odds withthe unequivocal language in section 18-7(a) of the Act and itspurpose.

Prior to the adoption of our current probate act, this court heldthat our county and circuit probate courts possessed legal andequitable powers to justify all claims against the estate "toascertain the true facts, and charge the executor with the amountjustly chargeable against [the estate], and no more." Millard v.Harris, 119 Ill. 185, 199 (1887). We view the discretionaryauthority afforded to the trial court by section 18-7(a) of the Actas an expression of the intrinsic supervisory role assumed by thecourt in probate matters. Unlike most civil litigation involving adispute between two parties, a probate proceeding implicates anynumber of creditors and any number of beneficiaries. A review ofthe Probate Act of 1975 as a whole reaffirms the trial court'sfunction as an overseer to the payment of claims against the estateand the distribution of the remaining assets to the beneficiaries andcreditors. One task of the court in that role, as announced inMillard, is to ensure only just claims are charged against theestate. To achieve this end, the trial court must be free to requireproof of claims.

Section 18-11 of the Act provides additional support for ourinterpretation that the trial court possesses discretion in allowingall claims. In pertinent part, section 18-11(a) provides:

"(a) The representative may at any time pay or consentin writing to all or any part of any claim *** to the extentthe claim has not been disallowed by the court ***. ***At the request of any interested person the representativemust establish the propriety of his allowance of anyclaim." (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/18-11(a) (West1998).

Thus, even the affirmative allowance of a claim by an estate'srepresentative remains subject to the review of the trial court.Moreover, the propriety of the estate's allowance of a claim maybe raised by any interested third party, requiring the estate to bearthe burden of establishing "the propriety of [the] allowance of anyclaim." 755 ILCS 5/18-11(a) (West 1998). Hence, it is ultimatelythe trial court's province to allow or disallow any claim, eventhose consented to or admitted by the estate.

B. Sanctions 

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly orderedthat she pay attorney fees as a sanction for her failure to complywith discovery. We reject plaintiff's contentions on this point.

It is well settled that a trial court may order sanctions againsta party refusing to comply with discovery. 134 Ill. 2d R. 219(c). Aparty disputing a sanction order for failure to comply withdiscovery must establish that noncompliance was reasonable orjustified under the circumstances. Hartnett v. Stack, 241 Ill. App.3d 157, 172 (1993).

The record indicates that the estate filed its initialinterrogatories and request to produce in December 1989. Plaintifffiled answers to interrogatories and a response to request toproduce, consisting in large part of objections. In June 1990, theestate filed a motion to compel discovery. Plaintiff argued that sheneed not comply because she was entitled to judgment on thepleadings. In August 1990, the trial court denied plaintiff's motionfor judgment on the pleadings.

The trial court entered an order compelling discovery in April1992, requiring plaintiff to comply within 28 days. Rather thanabiding by the court's order, plaintiff sought leave to appeal underSupreme Court Rule 308. The appellate court denied plaintiff'smotion. Notwithstanding the denial, plaintiff maintained herrefusal to comply with discovery and disregarded the order tocompel. In May 1993, the estate filed a motion for sanctions. Asa sanction for plaintiff's misconduct, the trial court dismissedplaintiff's complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court reversed and remanded, instructing thetrial court to issue a more lenient sanction. No. 3-93-0510(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellatecourt stated, however, that plaintiff was incorrect in her positionand she was obligated to proceed with discovery after theapplication for leave to appeal under Rule 308 had been denied.Nevertheless, after the remand plaintiff maintained her positionthat she was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

Therefore, we agree with the appellate court's observation:

"[Plaintiff] exhibited a stubborn refusal to comply withdiscovery rules from early on in this case. Despite the factthat her reliance on Grimsley might have justified herinitial noncompliance with discovery, once [the appellatecourt] denied her leave to appeal under Rule 308 allsubsequent refusals to comply on her part were patentlyunreasonable." 311 Ill. App. 3d at 746.

Considering plaintiff's disregard for the trial court's authoritysubsequent to the appellate court's denial of leave to appeal, weconclude that the trial court's award of attorney fees was notimproper. Boatmen's National Bank of Belleville v. Martin, 155Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993) (holding that the decision to impose aparticular sanction under Rule 219(c) is within the discretion ofthe trial court and, thus, only a clear abuse of discretion justifiesreversal). While we might have arrived at a different conclusion,we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 241 (1988).

We also reject plaintiff's argument that she should not besanctioned due to the estate's failure to comply with SupremeCourt Rule 201(k) (166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k)). Rule 201(k) provides:

"Every motion with respect to discovery shall incorporatea statement that counsel responsible for trial of the caseafter personal consultation and reasonable attempts toresolve differences have been unable to reach an accord***." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(k).

Strict compliance with Rule 201(k) is generally required andlitigants are not entitled to seek sanctions without first exercisingreasonable attempts to resolve discovery differences. Here,technical compliance with the rule was no longer an issue at thepoint the appellate court denied plaintiff leave to appeal. In otherwords, as the appellate court stated, plaintiff was obligated tocomply with the trial court's order compelling discovery and couldno longer refuse discovery based on her theory of the case whenthe appellate court denied her interlocutory review under SupremeCourt Rule 308.

In a related argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court'scalculation of fees was improper because the court failed toconsider whether the estate's attorneys billed at an hourly ratecomparable to other firms in the community. We reject plaintiff'sclaim on this point as well.

We agree that, pursuant to Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules ofProfessional Conduct, the community's usual and customarycharges are a relevant factor to consider in formulating an awardfor attorney fees. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a)(3). Other factors includethe skill and standing of the attorney employed; the novelty anddifficulty of the questions; the degree of responsibility in themanagement of the cause; the time and labor required; and theamounts involved and the benefits resulting to the client. See 134Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a). No exact formula exists in determining a properaward. While each factor is relevant, no single factor is conclusiveor dispositive. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 288Ill. App. 3d 743, 758-59 (1997) (finding that time records, whileimportant, are not conclusive).

As the appellate court observed, "[t]he trial court undertooka nine-hour, 2