In re Eckberg

Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 88589

Docket No. 88589-Agenda 10-January 2000.

In re DAVID EUGENE ECKBERG, Attorney, Respondent.

Opinion filed July 6, 2000.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

The Administrator of the Attorney Registration andDisciplinary Commission (ARDC) filed a petition with the HearingBoard, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 758 (137 Ill. 2d R. 758),seeking a determination whether respondent, David EugeneEckberg, was incapacitated from continuing to practice law byreason of a mental infirmity or a mental disorder and should betransferred to inactive status. The Hearing Board determined thatalthough respondent had been incapacitated from continuing topractice law at the time the Administrator filed the petition,respondent was not incapacitated at the time of the hearing. TheHearing Board nevertheless recommended that, in order to remainon active status, respondent should abide by conditions whichrequired his continued medical treatment and monitoring for aperiod of five years. The Review Board affirmed the findings andrecommendations of the Hearing Board. However, the ReviewBoard modified the conditions to reduce their scope and extent.Respondent appeals the recommendation by the Review Board thatconditions be imposed upon his continued practice of law. Thiscourt granted respondent's petition for leave to file exceptions. See166 Ill. 2d R. 753(e)). For the reasons that follow, we reject therecommendation of the Review Board, and we dismiss this action.



BACKGROUND

I. The Evidence

On December 20, 1996, the Administrator filed a petition,pursuant to Rule 758, requesting that the Hearing Board determinewhether respondent was incapacitated from continuing to practicelaw by reason of mental infirmity or mental disorder, and whetherhe should be transferred to inactive status pending removal of thedisability. The following evidence, relevant to the issues before thiscourt, was presented.

Respondent is 57 years old and was admitted to the practiceof law in 1968. Thereafter, he was an assistant State's Attorney, anattorney for a state governmental agency, and a privatepractitioner. Since 1978, respondent has worked as a solepractitioner in Chicago, handling cases involving unemployment,wrongful termination, domestic relations, criminal matters, andcondemnation proceedings. Also since 1978, respondent hascontinuously been a member of the Chicago Bar Association in-court referral panel, where he is assigned to a courtroom on oneday of the month. Approximately 50% of respondent's case loadconsists of these in-court referral cases, and, typically, these casesare disposed of on the same day that they are assigned torespondent. Respondent is also a participant in the Chicago BarAssociations' lawyer referral program and receives approximately20% of his case load, or four cases per month, from this program.Respondent has no prior disciplinary complaints filed against him.

In June 1996, the Administrator initiated an investigation ofrespondent's capacity to practice law as a result of two letterswritten by respondent to the FBI, an Illinois Supreme CourtJustice, and a United States Congressman. In the first letter, datedJune 9, 1996, respondent alleged that he was the object of aconspiracy directed by his co-counsel in a "sham" legal malpracticecase pending in the circuit court of Cook County. Respondentfurther alleged that his estranged wife and her father were alsoplotting against him. According to respondent, as a result of thisconspiracy, he was "under death threat," and was being followedon a constant basis for at least one month. Respondent's secondletter, dated June 16, 1996, contained similar conspiracyallegations.

Copies of respondent's two letters were sent by the SupremeCourt Justice to the ARDC, which requested that respondentcontact that office to discuss the matters contained in the letters.Respondent appeared at the offices of the ARDC on June 28,1996, and continued to claim that he was the object of harassmentand death threats made by his wife, her father, and other Illinoisattorneys. Respondent also expressed concern that his letters hadcome into the Administrator's possession. In a subsequent lettersent to the ARDC, respondent asserted that the ARDCinvestigation was "endangering [his] personal life [and] perhaps thelives of others." Respondent concluded this letter by asking that theARDC close his file.

On October 17, 1996, the Administrator requested thatrespondent voluntarily submit to a psychiatric examination by animpartial medical examiner. The next day, respondent appeared atthe offices of the ARDC and agreed to submit to a psychiatricevaluation. Arrangements were made for respondent to beevaluated by Dr. S. Dale Loomis, a board-certified psychiatrist, atDr. Loomis' office.

However, respondent did not meet with Dr. Loomis asscheduled because respondent was hospitalized in the psychiatricunit at Rush-Presbyterian St. Luke's Hospital on October 23,1996. Evidence at the hearing revealed that respondent had beenpreviously hospitalized at Lutheran General Hospital in 1989. Therecords from respondent's 1989 hospitalization made reference toprior psychiatric hospitalizations, and indicated that respondent hada history of psychiatric disturbances over a 20-year period. At thetime of his 1989 hospitalization, respondent was diagnosed ashaving a generalized anxiety disorder.

During respondent's 1996 hospitalization, which lasted fromOctober 23 to November 11, he was diagnosed as having ageneralized anxiety disorder, although bipolar affective disorderwas also suspected at that time. In addition, a neuropsychologicalevaluation indicated that respondent may suffer from frontal lobesyndrome, an organic brain disease which impairs judgment andbehavior. After his release from Rush, respondent voluntarilyadmitted himself to the psychiatric ward at Lutheran GeneralHospital on November 11, 1996, in response to his wife's reportto the local fire department that respondent indicated that heintended to commit suicide.

Subsequent to respondent's release from Lutheran GeneralHospital in December 1996, the Administrator filed the petition atissue in this case. At the hearing before the Hearing Board, fourpsychiatrists presented testimony. Three of these psychiatrists, Dr.S. Dale Loomis, Dr. Stafford Henry, and Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy, had examined respondent for the purposes of theseproceedings and testified on behalf of the Administrator. Thefourth psychiatrist, Dr. Carl Aagesen, was respondent's treatingpsychiatrist and testified on respondent's behalf.

Dr. Loomis testified that his initial contact with respondentwas during respondent's hospitalization at Lutheran General inNovember 1996. According to Dr. Loomis, during this one hoursession, respondent talked very rapidly, constantly spoke oftangential matters which made his speech difficult to follow, andclaimed that he was the target of a conspiracy in which he had beenconstantly followed and his phones tapped. Dr. Loomis testifiedthat respondent denied any medical reason for his hospitalization,instead asserting that he had been "railroaded" into the hospital byhis wife. On the basis of this initial examination, Dr. Loomisconcluded that respondent suffered from a bipolar disorder.

Almost one year later, in December 1997, Dr. Loomisconducted a second interview with respondent. Dr. Loomistestified that during their meeting, respondent's thought processeswere "extremely scattered," respondent behaved in an expansive,grandiose, and paranoid manner, and, after a period of time,respondent became resentful of being questioned. Based upon thissecond meeting, Dr. Loomis reaffirmed his diagnosis of bipolardisorder. He specifically disagreed with the conclusion ofrespondent's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Aagesen, that respondentsuffers from generalized anxiety disorder. Dr. Loomis testified that,if left untreated, respondent would likely experience "repeatedcycling episodes" of mania and depression, and recommended thatrespondent be treated with psychiatric management and a mood-stabilizing medication. Based upon his two sessions withrespondent, Dr. Loomis concluded that respondent was incapableof practicing law. On cross-examination, Dr. Loomisacknowledged that he was unaware of the types or complexity ofthe cases respondent handled before, during, and after hishospitalizations.

The Administrator also called Dr. Stafford Henry to testify. Heevaluated respondent during a 2