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                Docket No. 91556–Agenda 6–March 2002.

In re D.F. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois,

Appellant, v. Nancy F., Appellee).

Opinion filed September 19, 2002.

      JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

      In December 1999, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights, pursuant to the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). The petition, as amended in May 2000, alleged six separate grounds for a finding of unfitness: (1) substantial neglect of the children that was continuous or repeated (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999)); (2) other neglect of, or misconduct toward the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h) (West Supp. 1999)); (3) inability to discharge parental responsibilities (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West Supp. 1999)); (4) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West Supp. 1999)); (5) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children within nine months following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West Supp. 1999)); and (6) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West Supp. 1999)). Following a fitness hearing in May 2000, the trial court found respondent unfit under the first, second, fourth, and sixth grounds alleged. A dispositional hearing was held and the trial court found it to be in the children’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. She appealed.

      The appellate court reversed in part, vacated in part, andremanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.Specifically, the appellate court held that the trial court’s findingregarding the first ground, substantial neglect (750 ILCS50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999)), was against the manifest weightof the evidence. 321 Ill. App. 3d 211, 221. As to the secondground, “[o]ther neglect of, or misconduct toward” the children(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h) (West Supp. 1999)), the appellate courtreversed the trial court’s ruling on the basis that section 1(D)(h) isunconstitutionally vague. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 223. Finally, as to thefourth and sixth grounds, the appellate court vacated the judgmentof the trial court on the basis that the trial court consideredevidence of events occurring outside the applicable time periods.321 Ill. App. 3d at 223.

      Respondent also argued on appeal that the trial court erred bydenying her motion for substitution of judge for cause pursuant tosection 2–1001(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2–1001(a)(3) (West 1998)). The appellate court rejected thisargument, finding that respondent’s motion was prematurebecause it was filed prior to the filing of the State’s motion toterminate parental rights, which “initiated an entirely newproceeding.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 224. The appellate court furtherstated, in dicta, that if the motion had been identified as a motionto substitute judge as of right (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(2) (West1998)) and filed promptly after the filing of the terminationpetition, it would have been error for the trial court to deny it. 321Ill. App. 3d at 224.

      We granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).

BACKGROUND

      Respondent is the mother of three daughters, E.K. (bornSeptember 16, 1987), T.K. (born November 30, 1991), and D.F.(born February 13, 1997). In December 1997, the State filed apetition for adjudication of wardship, alleging that the girls wereneglected, pursuant to section 2–3(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of1987 (705 ILCS 405/2–3(1) (West 1996)). In April 1998,respondent admitted and stipulated to the State’s allegations thatthe children were not receiving proper or necessary support orother care necessary for their well-being (705 ILCS 405/2–3(1)(a)(West 1996)), based on the unsanitary condition of the home. TheState agreed to the dismissal of a separate allegation that D.F. wasliving in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS405/2–3(1)(b) (West 1996)), based on the diagnosis of“nonorganic failure to thrive” syndrome. The girls wereadjudicated neglected minors and made wards of the court. D.F.continued to reside with respondent and her husband, Chris F.,while E.K. and T.K. spent an extended period of visitation inWisconsin with their father, John K., and his wife, Karen K. Later,the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) wasappointed guardian and placed the two older girls with their father.The baby, D.F., who is a half-sister to the older girls, was placedwith foster parents.

      On September 17, 1999, following a permanency hearing, thetrial court entered a permanency order setting the goal for E.K. andT.K. as remaining in their father’s home and for D.F., as substitutecare pending a court determination on a petition to terminateparental rights. On that same date, respondent filed a motion forsubstitution of judge for cause, pursuant to section 2–1001(a) ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(a) (West 1998)).A hearing was held on November 1, 1999, before a different judge.Counsel for respondent argued that certain comments made by theoriginal judge evidenced bias or prejudice against the respondentparents. The State argued that the judge’s comments related to thecredibility of witnesses, including the respondent parents, andwere therefore appropriate. Counsel for DCFS pointed out that atthe same hearing in which the judge made the disputed comments,he also made comments that were favorable to the respondentparents. The guardian ad litem opposed the motion. The motionfor substitution of judge for cause was denied.

      In December 1999, the State filed a petition to terminaterespondent’s parental rights as to all three children. (The petitionalso sought to terminate the parental rights of D.F.’s father. He isnot a part of the present appeal. See In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d461 (2000).) After conducting the required hearings into thefitness of respondent and the best interests of the children, the trialcourt terminated her parental rights, placing full legal and physicalcustody of E.K. and T.K. with their father and also giving him theauthority to consent to their adoption by their stepmother. The trialcourt also terminated respondent’s rights with respect to D.F.,appointing DCFS as her guardian, with the power to consent toadoption. Because the issues in this case relate only to the trialcourt’s finding of unfitness, we limit our summary of thetestimony to that adduced at the fitness portion of the terminationproceedings.

      Child protective investigator Mike Mucci testified that hevisited respondent’s home in September 1995 in response to a hot-line report of environmental neglect. The home was extremelycluttered, with the floors and flat surfaces such as chairs andcountertops piled with clothing and other items. A litter box in thebathroom was overflowing with cat feces and there were cat fecesthroughout the house. Three cats and three kittens were present.The electricity had been turned off and the food in the refrigeratorwas spoiled. The house smelled strongly of spoiled food and caturine and feces. E.K. was seven years old at the time and T.K. wasfour. As a result of this investigation, respondent was indicated forenvironmental neglect and services were offered. The householdalso included respondent’s second husband, Robert Riley, whomshe accused of domestic violence. Mucci subsequently learned thatRiley was a sex offender and he informed respondent of this fact.The children were interviewed and given physical examinations.E.K. reported that she had seen Riley touch her sister in thevaginal area. Riley was indicated for risk of sexual harm andrespondent was advised to allow her children to have no furthercontact with him.

      Betty Schapmire, another DCFS investigator, received a hot-line report of environmental neglect in November 1997. Shevisited respondent’s home and found respondent living with hernew husband, Chris F.; their infant daughter, D.F.; her twodaughters, E.K. and T.K.; and an adult roommate in a twobedroom apartment. The apartment was very cluttered, particularlyin the bedrooms and the kitchen. A cat litter box in the hallwaywas “filled to the top” with feces and overflowing onto the floor.The odor of cat feces was “heavy” and noticeable when sheentered the door to the apartment. The bedroom floors werecovered with clothing to the point that the doors could not be fullyopened. The floor in the girls’ bedroom was not visible due to theclutter. Dishes were stacked on the kitchen counters and bits offood were scattered on the kitchen floor. Schapmire filed anindicated report on the basis of environmental neglect and referredthe family for services.

      Schapmire also noticed during the visit that D.F. was quitesmall for her age. When questioned, respondent and her husbandwere unconcerned about D.F.’s size or weight. Schapmirearranged for a medical examination and the doctor diagnosed D.F.with nonorganic failure to thrive syndrome. Schapmire made anindicated report to that effect as well. It was this second indicatedreport that precipitated the filing of a petition for wardship.

      Schapmire stated that she checked DCFS records prior to herinitial visit to respondent’s apartment and was aware of the priorindicated reports for environmental neglect and risk of sexualabuse. However, when she asked respondent and her husbandabout prior involvement with DCFS, they denied any priorcontacts. She also learned from the DCFS records that there hadbeen a contact in 1994, prior to Mucci’s investigation. Respondentwas informed at that time that her then-husband, Riley, was a sexoffender. Thus, she had already been aware of Riley’s status as asex offender when Mucci informed her of that fact following his1995 investigation, but had continued to give Riley access to herdaughters.

      DCFS caseworker Theresa Kelly testified that she had beenassigned to respondent’s case since late 1997. Schapmire hadreferred this case to Family First for intensive services, first to dealwith the cleanliness issue and later to address D.F.’s failure tothrive. One of Kelly’s duties was to monitor the effectiveness ofthe services provided by Family First. Initially, T.K. was thin, herhair was dull, and she had poor hygiene and body odor. E.K. wascombative and argumentative. She yelled and swore at the FamilyFirst workers. Kelly stated that E.K. had become “parentified,”that is, the adults in the household had placed adult expectationson her and she responded by attempting to perform parentalfunctions. For example, she would answer the door when socialservices personnel arrived, and would lie to the workers, tellingthem that her mother was not at home. E.K. was also failing inschool. D.F. had been diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive,indicating problems with feeding and bonding. Respondent was inthe habit of feeding the baby in her walker, which is not conduciveto either weight gain or bonding. She made some progress in thisarea and D.F. slowly began to gain weight. Kelly also testified thatrespondent was frequently dishonest with the service providersand that the time needed to get to the truth took away fromproviding services. The family moved frequently. At the timeKelly became involved, an adult roommate named Kevin was alsoliving with respondent, her husband, and the three children.

       In early 1998, during a visit, John K. took the two older girlsto the dentist because T.K. was complaining of a toothache. Thedentist discovered four deep holes in her molars, including onethat was abscessed and one that was very close to being abscessed.He recommended a dental procedure that would have requiredtreatment on two separate days. DCFS asked respondent to allowthe children to remain in Wisconsin for the additional time neededto complete the dental work. They were on spring break at the timeand it would not have disrupted school attendance. Respondent,however, obtained an emergency order of protection in Du PageCounty (where her divorce from John had been entered) andutilized the services of the sheriff’s department in Wisconsin toremove the children. Respondent later explained to Kelly that shehad intended to take T.K. to a dentist, but admitted that she hadnot tried to make an appointment and could not afford to pay fordental care in any event. The needed dental work was eventuallycompleted on a subsequent visit to Wisconsin.

      Kelly further explained that the initial plan developed for thefamily called for the children to remain in the home. Specific goalsincluded maintaining an adequate environment; getting rid of thecats that were the source of much of the filth; following thedoctor’s recommendations regarding feeding of the infant;obtaining routine medical care such as immunizations; obtainingsteady employment or benefits sufficient to meet basic needs; andrefraining from negative comments about John and Karen K. InApril 1998, respondent and her husband were rated “satisfactory”on their progress under the initial plan, but the Family Firstpersonnel commented that they “had just minimally made theminimal parenting standards.” In addition, Family First expressedgrave concerns about the family’s economic and housing situationsremaining stable.

      At the August 1998 case review, respondent and her husbandwere rated “unsatisfactory” on every goal except cooperation withServices for Parent Infant Child Education (SPICE) byparticipating in therapy for the developmental delay that resultedfrom D.F.’s failure to thrive. Unmet goals included maintainingemployment, maintaining stable and suitable housing, cooperatingwith the home interventionist, attending counseling on a regularbasis, and adhering to court orders.

      Kelly also testified regarding an incident that occurred in July1998, when E.K. and T.K. returned from a visit with John andKaren K. Kelly was present at the “hand off” between John andrespondent. The girls appeared clean and healthy. They were tanand their hair was shiny. T.K. had gained some weight and lost her“waif-like appearance.” Respondent and the children left as Kellywas talking to John and Karen about the summer visit. Kelly askedabout a bruise she had noticed on T.K.’s thigh and Karenexplained that her leg had been pinched by the restraining bar ofa carnival ride several days before. Respondent then reappeared,“visibly agitated,” and insisted that T.K. show Kelly the bruise onher thigh and a smaller bruise on her arm. Kelly stated that she wasaware of the bruises and that Karen had already explained thecause. T.K. smiled and nodded in agreement when Kellymentioned the carnival ride. Respondent, however, insisted thatT.K. had been abused. Despite Kelly’s suggestion that it was aviolation of a court order to have such a discussion in front of thechildren, respondent persisted.

      Respondent subsequently contacted the caseworker inWisconsin to inform her of the alleged abuse. She told theWisconsin caseworker, falsely, that Kelly had been reprimandedand taken off this case. Respondent also took T.K. to a hospitalemergency room to have the bruise examined. Kelly then insistedthat the girls be brought to her office for an interview regarding thealleged abuse. When they arrived, they smelled of urine, feces, andbody odor. Their skin was ashen and their hair was dull. Theinterview took place within a week of their return from Wisconsin.During the interview, E.K. said that her mother left her at afriend’s house rather than take her along to the emergency roombecause E.K. would have told the doctor the truth. T.K. admittedtelling the doctor that Karen hit her with a wooden spoon but alsoadmitted that this was a lie. She lied to the doctor because hermother and her grandparents promised her “lots of fun things” anda swimming pool.

      Kelly also testified about difficulties with telephone contactsbetween the girls and their father. Respondent would not allow thegirls to talk to their father, telling them that it was against a courtorder for them to do so. By this time, in August 1998, respondenthad taken in another cat. D.F. was beginning to gain weight, butshe was still thin and her hair was dull. Respondent indicated toKelly that she thought the baby was gaining too much weight andthat the pediatrician agreed with her. However, when Kellycontacted the doctor, she learned that the doctor was pleased withthe baby’s weight gain and advised that it should continue. Ratherthan being below the lowest percentile on the growth charts, D.F.had reached the twenty-fifth percentile for her age.

      Dr. Marty Traver, a licensed clinical psychologist, testifiedthat she evaluated respondent for DCFS on two occasions, inNovember 1998 and December 1999. In 1998, Traver foundrespondent to have average intelligence and appropriate affect, but“no insight into her situation with DCFS.” For example, she didnot accept the diagnosis of failure to thrive regarding D.F., and shedid not agree that unsanitary conditions in her home were a seriousconcern.

      Respondent made several statements to Traver that were “notcongruent with the report” provided by DCFS. Respondent toldTraver that she first became involved with DCFS in September1997. The case history, however, showed involvement as far backas 1994. Respondent did not acknowledge unsanitary conditionsin her home, admitting only to the “normal amount of dirtydishes.” Respondent also believed that her youngest child wasmerely small for her age and that the caseworker persuaded thedoctor to diagnose failure to thrive.

      Traver administered various personality and psychologicaltests. Respondent produced an invalid profile in several tests bygiving answers designed to present herself in a unrealisticallypositive light. Her answers showed “significant resistance” to thetests and were “highly defensive.” Traver concluded thatrespondent’s strengths included her intellectual functioning andher love for her children. On the other hand, she did not exhibitempathy. She failed to maintain stability in employment, housing,or relationships. Despite evidence of unhygienic conditions andthe children’s unmet need for dental care, respondent “did notunderstand concerns about her parenting” and “appeared to blameothers for her situation.” With regard to respondent’suntruthfulness, Traver found that respondent “often impulsivelymakes up responses” when she wants to present herself in apositive light and that she may be “somewhat delusional” in that“her denial system is very strong.” In response to DCFS’s inquiryabout respondent’s compliance with court orders, Traver statedthat respondent would be unlikely to comply if an order did not“make emotional sense to her.” She has a “sense of entitlementand tries to manipulate situations.”

      Traver diagnosed a personality disorder with histrionic,narcissistic, and passive-aggressive features. She concluded thatrespondent had the intelligence needed to meet minimumparenting standards. However, respondent’s defensiveness andfailure to acknowledge her problems made it unlikely that shewould be motivated to comply. Traver recommended bothindividual and marital therapy.

      Traver evaluated respondent again in 1999 and found that shecontinued to have poor insight into her situation. Traveradministered another battery of tests, in part because DCFS hadagain expressed concern that respondent’s level of mentalfunctioning was low. Traver found that respondent’s intellectualfunctioning was average but that she lacked empathy for othersand showed narcissistic traits. Respondent still did not understandwhy D.F. had been removed from her custody. Traver describedher as living “partly in a fantasy world and partly in reality.” Shehad made no progress as far as understanding her parentingdeficiencies. Because her denial system was so strong, respondentwas at risk for relapsing into unsanitary living conditions. Traverrecommended further counseling.

      Holly Hardin, a clinical psychologist, counseled respondentfrom February 1999 to August 1999. During that time, respondentattended 13 of 20 scheduled sessions and did not complete several“homework” assignments. Hardin testified that, overall,respondent did not make satisfactory progress. After a great dealof discussion, respondent finally acknowledged that there was“some value” in dental care for the children. She continued tobelieve that John K.’s efforts to obtain dental care while thechildren were visiting him was merely a ploy to increase the lengthof the visits. Respondent also resisted taking any responsibility forthe infant’s failure to thrive. She insisted that she had been worriedabout the baby gaining too much weight and that the pediatricianhad placed the baby on a “diet.” Respondent tended to blameothers, particularly John K., for all of her difficulties. Respondentdid acknowledge her habit of lying or exaggerating and seemed torecognize that it affected her parenting ability. However,respondent did not do the assigned homework or practicealternative behaviors that could have led to progress on this point.Respondent did begin to understand that her impulsivenesscontributed to her frequent job changes, her nomadic lifestyle, andother factors that were disruptive in the household, but she did notmake any progress changing this behavior. Hardin’s most“generous” evaluation was that, although respondent had begun tounderstand some issues, she had not made sufficient progress for“true change” to have occurred. The prognosis for change was“very poor,” because respondent was unwilling or unable tochange.

      Court-appointed special advocate Shannon Perkins testifiedthat she was assigned to respondent’s case from April 1999 to May2000. Her primary role became one of attempting to verifywhether the information provided by respondent about her housingand employment situations was true. Respondent had five differentemployers during the 13-month period. In each case, theexplanation given by the employer for respondent’s terminationdiffered from respondent’s story. Perkins believed that respondenttried to meet the goals of the client service plan, but that “whenthings got too much” for her, she “quit and put the blame onsomebody else.” In addition, respondent was “unwilling to takeadvantage” of the services offered to help her get D.F. back.

      Respondent testified that she had been married to John K.from 1985 to 1993. Upon their divorce, they were awarded jointcustody of E.K. and T.K. She was granted physical custody. Sheand John had no contact from 1993 to July 1997. During that timeshe moved seven times, twice out of state, and changed her nametwice due to remarriage. She acknowledged that she failed toinform the court that had jurisdiction over the custody and supportof E.K. and T.K. of her many address changes. She denied,however, that she intentionally kept the children from John andstated that she kept in touch with his parents and that he couldhave reached her at any time by contacting her mother. She alsodenied using E.K.’s name and social security number to obtaintelephone services in 1994, when the child was six or seven yearsold. Respondent stated that she had never seen the proffered creditreport listing an outstanding telephone bill in E.K.’s name forservices to an address in Streator, Illinois, at which she admittedliving in 1994. Respondent apparently had at least eight differentjobs and moved several more times during the pendency of thiscase. She continued to minimize the significance of the failure tothrive diagnosis, claiming that D.F. “never lost weight” while inher care, she just gained weight “slowly.” Respondent stated thatD.F.’s sudden increase in weight once she was in a foster homemust have been due to her moving from formula and baby food tosolid food. Finally, respondent remains convinced that at leastsome of the DCFS personnel involved in this case were personalfriends of John and Karen K. and were trying to make sure that shelost her children. She testified to her belief that T.K. was coercedinto recanting her accusation of abuse by Karen.

      In the end, however, respondent stated that she believed it wasin the best interests of E.K. and T.K. to remain with their father inWisconsin, but that her parental rights should not be terminated.She also believed that if D.F. could not be returned to her, custodyof D.F. should be given to her husband’s mother and stepfather,who live in North Carolina.

      Karen K. testified that she and John made many attemptsbetween 1994 and 1997 to locate E.K. and T.K. He calledrespondent’s mother, who told him that she did not know wherethe respondent was. Karen even wrote to a television talk show inthe hope of obtaining publicity that would lead to their finding thegirls. Finally, in 1997, Karen obtained respondent’s phone numberby having a friend pose as a high school classmate of respondentand call her mother, pretending to be looking for respondent for ahigh school reunion. Karen also testified that T.K. admitted to herthat she lied about the source of her bruise because her mother andgrandparents promised her camping trips and a swimming pool.

      Following arguments by counsel and the guardian ad litem,the court issued its ruling. After summarizing the history of thiscase in detail, the court commented on D.F.’s failure to thrive,observing that although D.F. “did a little better” in respondent’scare after Family First became involved, the baby “prospered oncenot in her care.” In addition, respondent and her husband, “aftermonths and months of work, really hadn’t resolved the issues inthis case and, indeed, created new issues and new concerns.” Thecourt then commented on respondent’s history of lying. The courtnoted that the lies were not limited to “white lies,” like claimingto have quit a job rather than having been fired to make herselflook better in the eyes of another. Specifically, the court found thatrespondent was not telling the truth about John’s inability to seeE.K. and T.K. from 1993 to 1997. “[I]n fact,” the court stated, “shewithheld or secreted her children from their father during thatperiod.” The court also concluded that respondent lied about “thebruise situation” and “put her child up to making a falsestatement.” Withholding the older children from their father “fora period of years is a serious act of neglect.” Having a child falselyaccuse Karen of hitting her was an “extremely serious substantialact of neglect or misconduct toward a child.” In addition,“environmental matters on several occasions were serious.” Insum, the court found “substantial neglect over a period of years,”under section 1(D)(d) of the Act, based on four factors:environmental matters, D.F.’s failure to thrive, withholding E.K.and T.K. from their father, and the “bruise situation.” The courtfound three additional grounds for unfitness proven, and two ofthe asserted grounds unproven.

      On appeal, the appellate court held that the trial court’sfinding of unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(d) was against themanifest weight of the evidence. 321 Ill. App. 3d at 221. However,before reaching this conclusion, the appellate court interpretedsection 1(D)(d), “substantial neglect of the child if continuous orrepeated” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West 1998)), as requiring acts ofneglect “so severe that giving the offending parent an opportunityto remediate them would be unconscionable.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at220.

ANALYSIS

      The involuntary termination of parental rights upon thepetition of the State is governed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(705 ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West 1998)), and the Adoption Act (750ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 1998)). A two-step process is mandated.First, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, thatthe parent is “unfit,” as that term is defined in section 1(D) of theAdoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)). In re D.D., 196Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). If properly proven, any one of the severalgrounds that are enumerated in section 1(D) is sufficient for afinding of unfitness. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)(providing that a finding of unfitness may be based on “any one ormore” of the enumerated grounds). If the court makes such afinding, it will then consider whether it is in the best interests ofthe child that parental rights be terminated. See 705 ILCS405/2–29(2) (West 1998); In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 209 (2001).

      When the respondent parent challenges the sufficiency of theevidence, a reviewing court will reverse a trial court’s finding ofunfitness only where it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417. If, however, the questionpresented is one of statutory construction, we will review it denovo. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418. We, therefore, address the firstquestion discussed by the appellate court–the interpretation ofsection 1(D)(d)–de novo.

Substantial Neglect

      Section 1(D)(d) provides that a person may be declared anunfit parent upon proof of “[s]ubstantial neglect of the child ifcontinuous or repeated.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West Supp. 1999).The Act does not define the terms “substantial” or “neglect,” butdoes contain a definition of “neglected child”:

“any child whose parent or other person responsible forthe child’s welfare withholds or denies nourishment ormedically indicated treatment *** or otherwise does notprovide the proper or necessary support, education asrequired by law, or medical or other remedial carerecognized under State law as necessary for a child’s well-being, or other care necessary for his or her well-being,including adequate food, clothing and shelter; or who isabandoned by his or her parents or other personresponsible for the child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(Q)(West 1998).

      This definition provides a baseline for a finding of neglect,but does not distinguish neglect from substantial neglect. In theabsence of a statutory definition indicating legislative intent, anundefined word must be given its ordinary and popularlyunderstood meaning. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 211. Webster’s defines“substantial” as “consisting of, relating to, sharing the nature of,or constituting substance” and as “considerable in amount, value,or worth.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280(1986). Synonyms include “consequential,” “considerable,”“material,” “meaningful,” “momentous,” “significant,” and“weighty.”

      As an initial matter, we agree with the appellate court that thelegislature’s use of the term “substantial neglect” in section1(D)(d) evidences a recognition that there are degrees of parentalneglect, ranging from “neglect” to “substantial neglect.” Whileneglect may justify state intervention (see, e.g., 705 ILCS405/2–3(1) (West 1998)), substantial neglect, if continuous orrepeated, is grounds for the outright termination of parental rights(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(d) (West 1998)).

      In its effort to further clarify the meaning of “substantialneglect,” the appellate court contrasted section 1(D)(d), underwhich a parent’s rights may be terminated outright, with certainprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act under which “the parentresponsible for the neglect is given an opportunity to remediate thecircumstances that gave rise to the neglect finding.” 321 Ill. App.3d at 220. On the basis of this comparison, the appellate courtconcluded that the legislature’s use of the modifier “substantial”in section 1(D)(d) “manifests the legislature’s belief that somecases of neglect are so heinous that a child’s best interest can onlybe served by severance of parental rights without giving the parentthe chance to remediate.” 321 Ill. App. 3d at 220. Undoubtedly,such cases do involve substantial neglect. However, the appellatecourt then extended this reasoning even further by concluding that“when the State alleges unfitness under section 1(D)(d) of the Act,the instances of ‘substantial neglect’ should be such thatremediation would not be an appropriate option.” 321 Ill. App. 3dat 220. No authority was cited for this conclusion, whichimpermissibly reads into the statute a limitation that the legislaturedid not express. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000).

      Although the appellate court has formulated one possible testof “substantial neglect,” it is by no means the only possiblestandard. For example, substantial neglect could be distinguishedfrom neglect on the basis of harm–neglect poses a risk of harm,while substantial neglect causes actual harm or, perhaps,permanent harm. The legislature could have defined substantialneglect in any one of a number of ways, but has chosen not to doso. Instead, the legislature has apparently intended for a trial courtto apply the ordinary meaning of the term “substantial” to theentire body of evidence before it. Thus, whether remediation wasor might have been attempted and whether actual harm resultedfrom the neglect are factors to be considered when assessing thedegree of neglect. Neither is a limitation or condition thatconstrains the trial court’s judgment.

      The appellate court’s rigid definition of substantial neglectalso ignores the wide range of factual circumstances in whichthese cases arise. For example, the State might proceed initially bygiving a parent the opportunity to remediate but discover as thecase goes on that the neglect has been so extreme, or theconsequences so grave, that it constitutes substantial neglect. Inanother case, the State might recognize substantial neglectinitially, but provide remedial services to the parent because theneglect, while substantial, has not yet been repeated or continuous.See D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 422 (noting that in cases involvingtermination of parental rights, each case is sui generis).

      We must conclude that the legislature intended for the trialcourt to determine whether neglect in a given case, proven by clearand convincing evidence (D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417) and based onthe totality of circumstances, is substantial. We note that trialcourts are not unfamiliar with the concept of substantiality. Aglance at Black’s Law Dictionary reveals, among other entries, thesubstantial-capacity and substantial-step tests in criminal law, thesubstantial-certainty test and the substantial similarity-standard incopyright law, the substantial-continuity doctrine in corporate law,the substantial-factor test in tort law, and the doctrine ofsubstantial performance in the law of contracts. Black’s LawDictionary 1442-43 (7th ed. 1999). The adjective “substantial” isnot in need of precise and inflexible definition. Substantial neglectis a matter of degree, and one which the trial court, as the finder offact, is in the best position to assess.

      We find, therefore, that the appellate court’s unduly restrictivedefinition of the statutory term “substantial neglect” is in error.There being no need for the creation of a bright-line rule to divideneglect from substantial neglect, the proper role of a reviewingcourt in this case is to determine whether the trial court’s findingof unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N.,196 Ill. 2d at 208. A determination will be found to be against themanifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion isclearly evident (C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 208) or the determination isunreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented(Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 83, 106(1995)). Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, wegive deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it isin the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of theparties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with theevidence that a reviewing court cannot possibly obtain. Areviewing court, therefore, must not substitute its judgment forthat of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, theweight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997).

      The trial court, in its comments from the bench, stated that itsfinding of substantial neglect was based on four factors: (1) theunsanitary conditions in respondent’s home, (2) D.F.’s failure tothrive, (3) respondent’s withholding E.K. and T.K. from theirfather for several years, and (4) respondent’s manipulation of T.K.into making false accusations of physical abuse against Karen K.The implication was that even if no single one of these, standingalone, constituted substantial neglect, the cumulative effect of allfour was substantial and affected all three children.

      Neglect may take many forms. The statutory definition of aneglected child mentions, inter alia, lack of proper nourishment,denial of needed medical care, lack of education, failure to provideadequate clothing and shelter, and abandonment. 750 ILCS50/1(Q) (West 1998). Section 1(D)(d) does not require that onesingle form of neglect be proven to be substantial. We agree withthe trial court that substantial neglect may result from thecumulative effect of several forms of neglect. As this courtobserved many years ago, “[n]eglect *** is the failure to exercisethe care that the circumstances justly demand. It embraces wilfulas well as unintentional disregard of duty. It is not a term of fixedand measured meaning. It takes its content always from specificcircumstances, and its meaning varies as the context ofsurrounding circumstances changes.” People ex rel. Wallace v.Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 624 (1952).

      Respondent argues, however, that of the four bases relied onby the trial court, only the second, failure to thrive, was relevantto D.F. The first reported instance of environmental neglectoccurred prior to her birth, so that her exposure to unsanitaryconditions in the home was neither continuous nor repeated. Shealso asserts that the third and fourth bases relate only to the oldergirls. Similarly, she argues that D.F.’s failure to thrive cannot beconsidered a factor in assessing the degree of neglect of T.K. andE.K.

      D.F.’s situation differed from that of her half-sisters in severalrespects. She alone was diagnosed with nonorganic failure tothrive syndrome and was in need of SPICE services to overcomeher developmental delay. She was too young to have been directlyaffected by respondent’s habit of lying and of inducing herchildren to lie on her behalf.

      This court has never had occasion to consider whetherevidence supporting a finding of unfitness as to one of a parent’schildren may serve as a basis for a finding of unfitness as toanother child. We agree with the numerous appellate courtdecisions that have concluded that such evidence may be relevant.See In re G.V., 292 Ill. App. 3d 301, 307 (1997) (evidence thatrespondent failed to protect child who was killed by her paramourcould serve as basis for termination of parental rights to otherchild); In re S.H., 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 400-01 (1996) (evidenceof respondent’s sexual abuse of one child may serve as basis forterminating of parental rights to other children, even when theevidence relates to events that occurred prior to the birth of someof the children); In re Henry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 778, 792 (1988)(even though two of the respondent mother’s eight children wereborn after she had been found unfit with regard to older children,the trial court properly considered her earlier neglect as a basis forfinding her unfit with regard to the infants). We conclude thatdepending on the type of neglect alleged, evidence of neglecttoward one child may be relevant to the question of a parent’sfitness with respect to another child.

      In the present case, E.K. and T.K. lived in extremelyunsanitary conditions, twice resulting in DCFS intervention. Thetestimony regarding filthy floors, spoiled food, and cat fecesthroughout the home on two separate occasions, several yearsapart, supports a finding that the environmental neglect was notonly severe, but was, at best, repeated, and at worst, continuous.They had poor personal hygiene that resulted not only in dirty hairand skin, but offensive body odor. Their dental needs wereneglected to the point that T.K. had an abscessed tooth and severalthat were bordering on that condition. The dentist stated that shemust have been in extreme pain. Indeed, when dental care wasfinally provided to her by her father, respondent interfered. Inaddition, respondent deliberately kept E.K. and T.K. hidden fromtheir father for four years, during which she moved seven times.She married a convicted sex offender and remained with himdespite being informed of the risk to the girls. Only after anincident of domestic violence and a second notification by DCFSof his status as a sex offender did she separate from her secondhusband. Respondent pressured T.K. to make a false accusationagainst her stepmother. The record also demonstrates that she wasin the habit of making the girls lie for her, as when E.K. would besent to answer the door to falsely tell caseworkers that her motherwas not at home. The trial court concluded that these variousforms of neglect, considered as a whole, constituted substantialneglect “over a period of years.”

      Having reviewed the record in detail, we cannot say that thetrial court’s determination of substantial and continuous neglect ofE.K. and T.K. was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on theevidence presented. We, therefore, reverse the appellate court, andhold that the trial court properly found respondent unfit as to E.K.and T.K. on the basis of section 1(D)(d) of the Act.

      Respondent argues, however, that the evidence at the fitnesshearing was not sufficient to support the judge’s finding that shewithheld E.K. and T.K. from their father for four years and that,therefore, this particular form of neglect cannot be considered partof a pattern of overall neglect. We disagree. Karen K., whom thetrial court specifically found to be a credible witness, testifiedregarding the efforts she and John K. made from 1993 to 1997 tolocate his daughters. She described eventually having to resort tothe pretext of a class reunion and having a third party contactrespondent’s mother, who had previously denied knowingrespondent’s whereabouts. Karen’s testimony was corroborated,in part, by respondent’s own testimony in which sheacknowledged frequent moves and name changes and admittedthat she did not notify the circuit court of Du Page County, whichhad retained jurisdiction over issues related to her divorce fromJohn, of her address changes. In addition, the trial court tookjudicial notice of relevant portions of the case file, which furthercorroborated Karen’s testimony regarding their unsuccessfulefforts to locate the girls for several years. And, finally, the trialcourt found that respondent lied on repeated occasions tocaseworkers, therapists, and to the court, thus making her denialson this issue unworthy of belief. Her refusal, as late as August of1998, to allow E.K. and T.K. to speak on the telephone to theirfather, and her telling the girls that she was doing so because therewas a court order prohibiting it, further undermined her credibilitywhen she disclaimed any deliberate hiding of the girls from theirfather. In the end, the trial court’s findings of fact with regard tothis particular form of neglect were not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

      As to D.F., even if the other grounds affecting her sisters arenot considered, her failure to thrive combined with the horrendousconditions of the home could be deemed substantial neglect. Atthe time D.F. was diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive, herweight was so low that it was below the first percentile on theweight charts. After respondent was instructed on the proper wayto feed the baby, she was still in the habit of leaving D.F. in thewalker with a bottle, expecting the child to feed herself. Afterbeing instructed to get rid of the walker, respondent continued touse it, hiding it when caseworkers or service providers were in thehome. On one occasion, after D.F. was placed in foster care,respondent, during supervised visitation, placed the baby on herback on a table and handed her a bottle. Not until the caseworkerintervened, pointing out that the formula was draining down thebaby’s neck onto the table, did respondent pick her up to feed herproperly. Respondent’s neglect of D.F.’s nutritional and bondingneeds resulted in her very low weight and in developmental delaythat required therapy. Again, we cannot say that the trial court’sdetermination of substantial neglect based on respondent’sresponsibility for D.F.’s failure to thrive and on the unsanitaryconditions under which D.F. lived for several months, at a timewhen she was old enough to be crawling on filthy, feces-strewnfloors, was unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidencepresented. The neglect was also continuous, beginning in D.F.’sinfancy, before the diagnosis of failure to thrive was made, andcontinuing even during supervised visits with the child.

      Respondent argues, however, that the State should beestopped from relying on the diagnosis of failure to thrive as abasis for finding her unfit. Citing no authority for such anapplication of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, she asserts thatbecause the trial court dismissed the allegation of neglect based onD.F.’s failure to thrive as part of the original neglect adjudication,the State may not now use that allegation as a basis for finding herunfit. She claims that, in effect, she gave up her right to litigatethis claim when she stipulated to the allegations of environmentalneglect in return for the State’s agreement to dismiss the failure tothrive allegation.

      She is mistaken. The doctrine of collateral estoppel appliesonly when the point or question at issue was fully litigated in aprevious case and there was a final judgment on the merits. Thedoctrine is not applicable to other matters that might have beenlitigated. Nowak v. St. Rita High School, 197 Ill. 2d 381, 390(2001). The dismissal of the initial allegation of neglect based onfailure to thrive did not constitute a decision on the merits. See Inre Chilean D., 304 Ill. App. 3d 580 (1999) (the State voluntarilywithdrew the petition to terminate parental rights after the findingof unfitness, but before consideration of the best interests of thechild; thus, the unfitness finding was not a final adjudication onthe merits and the parent cannot be estopped from relitigatingfitness in the future). In any event, the doctrine of collateralestoppel requires “two separate and consecutive cases arising ondifferent causes of action.” Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 389. The presentcase, although taking place in several stages, does not meet thisrequirement for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

      Respondent next argues that the environmental neglect cannothave been substantial because the State did not act immediately toremove all three children from the home. Respondent cites noauthority for this assertion and we find none. We conclude that thefact that the children were left, for a time, in respondent’s homedespite its appalling conditions goes to the weight the finder offact might give to this information. As we observed earlier, evenif the environmental neglect, standing alone, was not substantial,it was part of an overall pattern of neglect that was substantial.

      Respondent also asserts that she has remedied theenvironmental conditions that gave rise to the initial adjudicationof neglect, pointing to the trial court’s ruling that the State failedto prove that she had not made reasonable progress. If a finding ofsubstantial neglect is based on her “dirty house,” she argues, thenthe provisions in the Act relating to reasonable progress andreasonable efforts (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)), “would berendered superfluous” because a parent could make bothreasonable progress and reasonable efforts, but still be found unfitbased on section 1(D)(d).

      The finding of substantial neglect was not based entirely onthe condition of the house. Rather, the environmental neglect wasone of several factors that contributed to the trial court’s findingof substantial neglect. In any event, respondent’s argument aboutthe interplay between sections 1(D)(d) and 1(D)(m) is withoutmerit. The grounds for a finding of unfitness contained in section1(D) of the Act are listed in the alternative. Thus, the legislatureclearly intended that a parent could make both reasonable effortsand reasonable progress, defeating allegations of unfitnesspursuant to section 1(D)(m), and still be found unfit based on oneof the other listed grounds. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998).Reasonable efforts and reasonable progress are not affirmativedefenses that can be raised by a parent to refute an allegation ofneglect under one of the other subsections of 1(D). Rather, lack ofreasonable efforts and reasonable progress are separate and distinctbases for a finding of unfitness. A parent in respondent’s position,who has been found unfit on another ground, may certainly argueto the trial court at the best interests stage that her efforts andprogress demonstrate that it would be in the best interests of thechildren for her to retain parental rights.

      In sum, we find that the trial court’s judgment that respondentis unfit based on her substantial and continuous neglect of E.K.,T.K., and D.F. is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.The judgment of the appellate court, which reversed the trialcourt’s ruling on this matter, is reversed.

Vagueness

      Because parental rights may be terminated upon proof, byclear and convincing evidence, of a single statutory ground forunfitness, it is unnecessary to consider whether section 1(D)(h) ofthe Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(h) (West 1998)) is unconstitutionallyvague, as held by the appellate court. We, therefore, vacate thatportion of the appellate court’s judgment.

      Similarly, we need not consider the appellate court’s rulingwith regard to the other two grounds upon which the trial courtfound respondent unfit.

Motion for Substitution of Judge

      Section 2–1001 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits a partyto a civil action to petition for a substitution of judge for any oneof several enumerated reasons. 735 ILCS 5/2–1001 (West 1998).Respondent sought a substitution of judge for cause, pursuant tosection 2–1001(a)(3), and a hearing was held as required. 735ILCS 5/2–1001(a)(3) (West 1998). The judge who presided at thehearing determined that respondent had not shown cause anddenied the motion.

      Respondent argued before the appellate court that the trialcourt erred by denying her motion for substitution of judge forcause. The appellate court rejected her argument but did notreview the merits of the trial court’s ruling. Instead, the appellatecourt found her motion untimely because it was filed before theState filed its petition to terminate parental rights, which accordingto the appellate court, “initiated an entirely new proceeding.” 321Ill. App. 3d at 224. The appellate court then commented that if therespondent had filed a motion for substitution as of right pursuantto section 2–1001(2) (735 ILCS 5/2–1001(2) (West 1998)), anddone so promptly upon the State’s filing of the terminationpetition, it would have been error for the trial court to deny it. 321Ill. App. 3d at 224.

      The State, as appellant, argues to this court that the appellatecourt’s additional comments are dicta and urges this court tovacate that portion of the appellate court’s judgment or else toaddress the issue on the merits. In addition, the State points outthat the appellate court offered no authority for its conclusion thatthe filing of a petition to terminate parental rights, in a case thathas been proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act for severalyears, “begins a new case within that case number.” 321 Ill. App.3d at 224. Respondent argues, in turn, that if the terminationproceedings are new proceedings that permit either party to obtaina substitution of judge as of right, the new proceeding should bedeemed to have begun when the permanency goal is changed tosubstitute care pending determination on a petition to terminateparental rights.

      After a careful review of the transcripts of the hearing onrespondent’s petition for substitution and of the hearing in whichshe asserts the judge displayed some bias towards her, weconclude that the judge’s comments, while critical of respondent’scredibility, did not demonstrate bias against her. We, therefore,affirm the judgment of the trial court denying respondent’s motionfor substitution for cause. We need not consider the issue raisedsua sponte by the appellate court–whether the motion wastimely–because the motion failed on the merits. The remainder ofthe appellate court’s discussion of this issue, concluding that thefiling of a petition to terminate parental rights initiates an entirelynew proceeding, is dicta, which we vacate.

CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of thejudgment of the appellate court which reversed the circuit court’stermination of respondent’s parental rights under section 1(D)(d).We vacate that part of the appellate court’s judgment which heldsection 1(D)(h) unconstitutional. We affirm that part of theappellate court’s judgment which affirmed the circuit court’sdenial of respondent’s motion for a substitution of judge, but wereject the rationale offered by the appellate court. The judgment ofthe circuit court is affirmed.

Appellate court judgment affirmed in part,

 vacated in part, and reversed in part;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

      JUSTICE RARICK took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.