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Docket No. 89061-Agenda 3-January 2001.

In re D.D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. M.D., Appellant).

Opinion filed June 21, 2001.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

On April 23, 1999, the circuit court of Kane County issued anorder terminating M.D.'s parental rights to his son, D.D., afterfinding M.D. to be an unfit parent pursuant to sections 1(D)(m)and 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m), (D)(s)(West 1998)). The order was affirmed by the appellate court onappeal. 309 Ill. App. 3d 581. This court granted M.D.'s petition forleave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). For the reasons that follow,we now affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 18, 1996, Copley Hospital notified the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) that on July 17, 1996,Penny Warren (Warren) gave birth to a son, D.D., who had beenexposed to cocaine. A DCFS Division of Child Protection (DCP)investigator went to Copley Hospital and spoke with Warren,offering her services and drug treatment. Warren refused the offerof services and informed the investigator that she planned to giveD.D. to Elizabeth Washington (Washington), a woman whom shehad met two months earlier. After the investigator's visit, Warrenhad no further contact with DCFS. Warren left Copley Hospitaland disappeared. Despite diligent searches, DCFS was unable tolocate her.

D.D. was taken into protective custody by DCFS and, on July23, 1996, DCFS filed a petition for adjudication of wardship onthe basis that D.D. was abused and neglected. See 705 ILCS405/2-13 (West 1996). The petition alleged that D.D. wasneglected "in that he was born with cocaine in his urine which isnot a result of medical treatment administered to the mother orinfant," and abused "in that his mother created a substantial risk ofphysical injury to [D.D.] when she was pregnant; to wit: themother was taking cocaine or ingesting cocaine while pregnant."⁽¹⁾The petition listed D.D.'s father as "unknown."

Shortly after the petition was filed, DCFS was contacted byM.D., who identified himself as D.D.'s putative father. M.D.requested a blood test to establish paternity and notified DCFSthat, if he was D.D's father, he wanted D.D. placed withWashington, whom he identified as his fiancé. M.D. was unableto take custody of D.D. himself, however, because he was beingheld in the Kane County jail, awaiting trial on charges of homeinvasion and armed violence.

On August 12, 1996, M.D. appeared before the court,acknowledged paternity for D.D., and stipulated to the State'sneglect petition, admitting that D.D. was a neglected minorbecause he had been born with cocaine in his system. The courtdeclined, at that time, to remove D.D. from the care and custodyof DCFS. The court ordered shelter care to continue pending thecompletion of a home study on Washington. The court alsodirected DCFS to determine whether any blood relatives werewilling and able to care for D.D.

On September 17, 1996, DCFS filed a court report indicatingthat it had been in contact with Paulette D., D.D.'s paternalgrandmother, and June S., D.D.'s maternal grandmother, andlearned that there were no relatives available to care for D.D.

On December 17, 1996, Washington married M.D. at theKane County jail. Shortly thereafter, on December 23, 1996, M.D.was tried and found guilty of home invasion and armed violence(predicated on aggravated battery causing great bodily harm). Hewas sentenced to a term of 10 years' imprisonment for the armedviolence conviction, with a concurrent term of 6 years'imprisonment for the home invasion conviction.

On January 6, 1997, M.D. and his now-wife, Washington,petitioned the court to set aside the adjudication of neglect and allprevious shelter care orders and have D.D. placed in theguardianship and custody of Washington.

On January 10, 1997, DCFS filed with the court its completedhome study and investigation of Washington. According to thereport, the physical environment of Washington's home wasadequate, but Washington was unqualified to become a registeredfoster care provider under DCFS standards due to her extensivecriminal history.⁽²⁾

On January 14, 1997, the court denied M.D.'s petition to setaside the adjudication and shelter care orders. However, M.D. wasgiven leave to file a new motion for change of custody andguardianship. M.D. filed this motion on March 10, 1997.Evidentiary hearings were held on May 29 and June 27, 1997, andthe motion was denied.

In July 1997, at an administrative case review, DCFS changedthe permanency goal for D.D. to substitute care pending the filingof a termination petition. The case passed legal screening inSeptember 1997 and was referred to the State's Attorney for thefiling of a termination petition.

On March 9, 1998, the State filed a petition for thetermination of M.D.'s parental rights. Five grounds for findingM.D. unfit were alleged: (a) failure to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest, concern, or responsibility; (b) failure to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basisfor removal and/or failure to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of D.D. within 12 months of adjudication; (c) desertion; (d)incarceration which prevents the discharge of parental duties fora period in excess of two years, accompanied by little or noprevious contact and/or little or no support; and (e) repeatedincarceration as a result of criminal convictions, which hasprevented the discharge of parental duties. See 750 ILCS50/1(D)(b), (D)(c), (D)(m), (D)(r), (D)(s) (West 1998).

Hearing on the petition was initially set for July 9, 1998.However, on that date, M.D. filed a motion seeking a substitutionof judges. After a number of continuances, the motion was heardand granted on October 7, 1998. After several more continuances,evidentiary hearings on the termination petition were held onMarch 25 and 26, 1999.

In addition to the background evidence set forth above, thecourt received testimonial and documentary evidence, whichrevealed the following.

When D.D. was born on July 17, 1996, M.D. was in jailawaiting trial on charges of armed violence and home invasion.After a trial on December 23, 1996, M.D. was found guilty ascharged after it was shown that, on June 22, 1996, he entered thehome of Jeffrey Martin without permission and stabbed Martinwith a knife. M.D. was sentenced to concurrent terms of 10 yearsand 6 years, respectively. Darlene Bridge, the record officesupervisor at Sheridan Correctional Center (Sheridan), testifiedthat M.D. was incarcerated and serving his sentences at Sheridan.According to her most recent calculations, M.D. was scheduled tobe released on June 24, 2001.

DCFS records showed that, due to M.D.'s incarceration,M.D.'s opportunity to interact with D.D. was extremely limited.Between July 1996 and March 1997, M.D.'s only contact withD.D. occurred at the court house, on the few occasions when M.D.was brought from jail to attend court hearings regarding D.D.'scare and custody.

After M.D. was convicted and moved to Sheridan, a visitationschedule was established. Beginning March 11, 1997, a case aidebrought D.D. to Sheridan once each month for a scheduled one-hour supervised visitation. Visits at Sheridan took place in a large,cafeteria-like room where other inmates and their guests also werepresent. Before a visitation began, there often was a long waitwhile everyone was searched and processed. The visits generallydid not last the full hour because D.D. did not react well to thesurroundings and typically spent most of the visit crying.According to the case aide who supervised the visits, M.D. wasunable to engage D.D. or develop any bond with him.

Visitations also were sporadic. No visit took place in October1997 because the prison was in lock-down. At the November 1997visit, M.D., citing a concern for D.D.'s health, asked that visitationbe suspended. Visitations did not resume until May 1998.

After the May 20, 1998, and June 24, 1998, visits, the fostermother and the case aide reported to DCFS worker Rachel Weiss⁽³⁾that they were concerned about D.D.'s traumatic reaction to therenewed visitation. It was reported that D.D. would work himselfup into such a state that they feared for his safety. While cryingheavily, D.D. would put his fist in his mouth and gag himself.D.D. refused all physical contact with M.D. and would not evenlook at him. M.D., the aide said, appeared unmoved by D.D.'sdistress and incapable of taking any action to correct it.

Because of the reported difficulties, Weiss decided topersonally supervise the next few visits. Weiss accompanied D.D.and the foster mother to Sheridan on July 22, 1998, but no visittook place. When M.D. saw that Weiss was present, he refusedvisitation. Weiss immediately contacted M.D. by letter, explainingthat she would be personally supervising visitation for assessmentpurposes. However, after Weiss traveled to Sheridan with D.D.and the foster mother for the next scheduled visit on September11, 1998, M.D. again refused visitation.

A court hearing was held on September 16, 1998, at whichtime visitation problems were discussed. In the course of thishearing, M.D. made threatening statements toward Weiss in frontof the judge.⁽⁴⁾ The judge admonished M.D. regarding his behaviorand directed M.D. to cooperate with Weiss, whose job it was tosupervise visitation if she felt there was a need. Despite theseadmonishments, M.D. elected to cancel the next scheduledvisitation.

M.D. did not have another visit with D.D. until November 12,1998. On this occasion both foster parents accompanied D.D. toSheridan. Weiss supervised the visit and observed M.D.'sinteraction with D.D., who continued to cry and refuse all contactwith M.D. During this visit, M.D. spent much of the time speakingto the foster father, attempting to negotiate an agreement. M.D.indicated that he would be willing to voluntarily surrender D.D.for adoption if the foster parents would sign an agreement to allowhim to visit. In the course of the conversation, M.D. made aremark about knowing the foster parents' address. This remarkwas perceived by the foster parents as a subtle threat.

The next visit, on December 8, 1998, proceeded much thesame way-D.D. refused to interact with M.D. In the absence of thefoster father, M.D. tried to discuss his earlier proposal with thefoster mother. Weiss interceded and told M.D. that no agreementwould be made. Weiss then noticed M.D. gesturing to anotherinmate. Weiss found this nonverbal communication with anotherinmate to be threatening and inappropriate. As a result, the visitwas terminated.

In 1999, visitation was limited, by court order, to half-hourvisits. Visits took place in January and March, but not in February.The February visit was canceled by M.D. because he believed hewas being moved from Sheridan.

The State also presented evidence pertaining to M.D.'scompliance with the service plans developed by DCFS. Theservice plans, which had been discussed with and agreed to byM.D., recommended that M.D. participate in various services,including substance abuse counseling, anger management classes,parenting classes, and psychological testing and counseling.Steven Stocker, a Sheridan case work supervisor, testified thatsome of the services recommended by DCFS, though available atSheridan, had been unavailable to M.D. because of his advancedrelease date. There were other services, however, which wereavailable to M.D., although he never participated in them. Stockertestified that anger management classes were available and hadbeen recommended since January 1997, but M.D. never signed upfor them. Cooperative work training, a course that teaches lifeskills, including parenting, also was available to M.D. He did notregister for this class until January 1999, just two months beforethe termination hearings were held.

The court admitted into evidence State's Exhibits 8 and 9,which contained records of M.D.'s two prior criminal convictions.According to these exhibits, M.D. had been charged by indictmenton December 11, 1984, with three counts of murder in relation tothe December 9, 1984, stabbing death of Edward Ortega. M.D.also was charged with one count of attempted murder in relationto the December 9, 1984, stabbing of Juan Galindo. M.D. pleadedguilty to attempted murder in exchange for a dismissal of themurder charges. A sentence of 12 years' imprisonment wasimposed. The exhibits also revealed that M.D. was charged onJune 11, 1991, with two counts of attempted murder, one count ofhome invasion, and two counts of aggravated discharge of afirearm. The indictments alleged that on May 23, 1991, M.D.,while armed with a gun, entered the home of Dorothy Yagerwithout permission. While inside the home, M.D. fired the gun inthe direction of James and Dennis Pendall in an attempt to kill ordo great bodily harm to them. On July 13, 1992, M.D. pleadedguilty to one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm inexchange for an agreement to have the remaining charges nol-prossed. A sentence of seven years' imprisonment was imposed.

At the close of the State's evidence, the circuit court judgegranted M.D. a directed verdict on two of the unfitness groundsalleged in the petition-failure to make reasonable efforts (750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)) and desertion (750 ILCS50/1(D)(c) (West 1998)). M.D. then presented the testimony ofPaulette, his mother, and Washington, his wife. Only his wife'stestimony is relevant here.

Washington testified that she had known M.D. for about 18months before they were married in December 1996. In the fall of1995, shortly after they met, M.D. introduced her to Warren, whowas pregnant with M.D.'s baby. Washington said M.D. introducedher to Warren because she (Washington) wanted a child, but couldnot have any of her own, and Warren was looking for someone to"take over the baby when it was born." According to Washington,after they met, Warren agreed to allow Washington to adopt thebaby. No legal steps were taken to finalize the agreement,however. Washington said that M.D. gave her money toward thepurchase of a crib, clothes, and other items and promised tocontribute financial assistance for the baby in the future.

Washington also testified that she found M.D. to have a"mellow" and "good-natured" temperament. She said she hadnever seen him violent and he has never been angry with her.Although M.D. told her about his previous attempted murderconviction, she did not know about his conviction for aggravateddischarge of a firearm. However, Washington said, she did nothold a person's past against them and judged a person by the waythey treated her.

After all of the evidence was received, the court ruled M.D.unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(m) (failure to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child) and section 1(D)(s)(repeated incarceration). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m), (D)(s) (West1998).

On April 20, 1999, the court conducted a best interestshearing and determined it was in D.D.'s best interests to terminateM.D.'s parental rights. An order terminating M.D.'s parental rightsand authorizing the Guardianship Administrator to consent toD.D.'s adoption was issued on April 23, 1999. See 705 ILCS405/2-29 (West 1998). As noted earlier, this order was affirmedon appeal to the appellate court. This court granted M.D.'s petitionfor leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.(West 1998)) is a comprehensive statutory scheme which createsrights and duties that have no counterparts in common law orequity. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 65 (1993). In Illinois, when acourt conducts proceedings to involuntarily terminate parentalrights, its authority is statutorily derived and the scope andapplication of these proceedings are defined solely by thelegislature. In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 63-66; In re S.B., 305 Ill.App. 3d 813, 817 (1999); In re M.V., 288 Ill. App. 3d 300, 304(1997). A proceeding to involuntarily terminate parental rights isa drastic measure which determines whether, under our laws, aperson should continue to hold the legal status of parent or have"the entire bundle of parental rights, custodial and noncustodial,"forever removed. In re S.W., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 1157 (2000);see also In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999).

Parental termination proceedings are initiated by the filing ofa petition pursuant to section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act(705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)). Section 2-29 provides thata parent's rights may be terminated upon proof, by clear andconvincing evidence, that the parent is unfit, as that term isdefined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (West1998)). When deciding a parent's fitness, the court is not toconsider the best interests of the child but, rather, must focus onwhether the parent's conduct falls within one or more of theseveral "grounds of unfitness" described in section 1(D) of theAdoption Act. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990).A court's determination that clear and convincing evidence of aparent's unfitness has been shown will not be disturbed on reviewunless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.L.,191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000); In re A.S.B., 293 Ill. App. 3d 836, 843(1997). A decision regarding parental fitness is against themanifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion isclearly the proper result. In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062(1991).

Unfitness Pursuant to Section 1(D)(s)

Section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act provides that a parentmay be found unfit if:

"The child is in the temporary custody or guardianshipof the Department of Children and Family Services, theparent is incarcerated at the time the petition or motion fortermination of parental rights is filed, the parent has beenrepeatedly incarcerated as a result of criminal convictions,and the parent's repeated incarceration has prevented theparent from discharging his or her parental responsibilitiesfor the child." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(s) (West 1998).

The ground of a parent's repeated conviction andincarceration was added only recently to the definition of "unfitperson" in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. See Pub. Act 90-28,eff. January 1, 1998. For this reason, it has not yet been construedby this court.

In the case at bar, M.D. challenges the circuit and appellatecourts' interpretation and application of this unfitness groundunder the circumstances of this case. The dispute centers on thefinal phrases of the provision, "the parent has been repeatedlyincarcerated as a result of criminal convictions, and the parent'srepeated incarceration has prevented the parent from discharginghis or her parental responsibilities for the child." M.D. contendsthat these phrases, properly interpreted, provide that a parent maybe found unfit only when it can be shown that the parent wasunable to fulfill his or her parental duties as a result of beingrepeatedly unavailable, during the lifetime of the child, due toincarceration. Because, in this case, M.D. was incarcerated onlyonce during D.D.'s lifetime, M.D. argues that the provision doesnot apply to him. We disagree.

Whether the trial and appellate courts have correctlyinterpreted this statutory provision is a question of law and,accordingly, our review is de novo. See In re Application of theCook County Treasurer, 185 Ill. 2d 428 (1998). The cardinal ruleof statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the trueintent of the legislature (People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d 260, 269(1998); Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer PreventionCenter of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994); Kraft, Inc. v.Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990)), while presuming thelegislature did not intend to create absurdity, inconvenience, orinjustice (Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 394(1998)). When determining legislative intent, the starting pointalways is the language of the statute, which is the most reliableindicator of the legislature's objectives in enacting the particularlaw. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493 (2000); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996). Whenthe language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may notread in exceptions, limitations, or other conditions. People v.Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464 (1999); People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d154, 163 (1996). Only when the meaning of the enactment cannotbe ascertained from the language may a court look beyond thelanguage and resort to aids for construction. Gem Electronics ofMonmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475(1998); Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 81.

Applying the principles and standards above, we find thelanguage of section 1(D)(s) to be clear and unambiguous. Nowheredo we find a requirement that the repeated incarceration take placeduring the lifetime of the child. Nor would insertion of such alimiting condition be consistent with the "reason and necessity forthe law, the evils to be remedied, and the objectives to beobtained." Cummins v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 178 Ill. 2d474, 479 (1997); accord People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195(1993).

Section 1(D)(s) is contained within the Adoption Act and setsforth one of the grounds for finding a parent unfit. This groundmay then be used as the basis for terminating a parent's rightspursuant to section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act. Ourconstruction of this provision, therefore, must take into accountthe nature and purpose of the Juvenile Court Act. See In re K.B.J.,305 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1999). The stated purpose of the JuvenileCourt Act is to "secure for each minor subject hereto such care andguidance *** as will serve the safety and moral, emotional,mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests ofthe community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family tieswhenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of hisor her parents only when his or her safety or welfare or theprotection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded withoutremoval ***." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1998). Applying theplain language of the provision, without the addition of thelimiting language proposed by M.D., is consistent with the statedpurpose of the Act, and so we apply the provision as written.

Section 1(D)(s), no doubt, is applicable in situations where theparent, during the lifetime of the child, has had recurring absencescaused by incarcerations which have prevented the parent fromproviding his or her child with a stable home environment. See Inre M.M.J., 313 Ill. App. 3d 352 (2000); In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill.App. 3d 941 (1999). However, the plain language of the provisionallows for a broader application. We note, as the trial court did,that the final phrase of section 1(D)(s) uses the term "repeatedincarceration," not "repeated incarcerations." Though this mayseem a minor distinction, we find the legislature's use of thesingular form to be both deliberate and significant.

The plural form has a more narrow connotation. Had thelegislature used the plural form, stating "the parent's repeatedincarcerations have prevented the parent from discharging his orher parental responsibilities for the child," the specific referencewould be to the incarcerations themselves. A parent's unfitnesswould stem from these incarcerations-these absences-whichprevent the parent from discharging his or her parental duties.

The singular term, however, has a broader connotation. Byusing the singular form, stating "the parent's repeatedincarceration has prevented the parent from discharging his or herparental responsibilities for the child," the legislature makesreference to the general inclusive concept of "repeatedincarceration," suggesting that courts may consider the overallimpact that repeated incarceration may have on the parent's abilityto discharge his or her parental responsibilities-circumstanceswhich may flow from the fact of repeated incarceration, such asthe diminished capacity to provide financial, physical, andemotional support for the child.

The facts of this case provide a representative example. Therecord reveals that M.D. was just 21 years old when, on December9, 1984, he stabbed a person with a knife. After pleading guilty toa charge of attempted murder, he was sentenced to 12 years'imprisonment. M.D. could not have been out of prison long when,on May 23, 1991, he committed acts which resulted in hisconviction for aggravated battery and was sentenced to a term ofseven years' imprisonment. Then, soon after his release fromprison the second time and while aware that Warren was pregnantwith his child, M.D. was arrested on charges of home invasion andarmed violence. He was found guilty and imprisoned onconcurrent sentences of 6 and 10 years' imprisonmentrespectively.

To date, M.D. has been imprisoned nearly all of his adult life.He has acquired no appropriate life skills. Furthermore, hisrepeated incarceration demonstrates an inability to conform tosocietal norms. Even after becoming aware that he had fathered achild, M.D. committed acts, shortly before the baby was due,which caused him to be incarcerated at the time of the child'sbirth. Since D.D.'s birth, there has been no indication that M.D.has been able to form any bond with D.D. M.D. has demonstratedno real interest or ability in meeting any of D.D.'s needs, whetherthey be physical, mental, material, or emotional. We conclude thatM.D. has been prevented, not only by his present incarceration, butas a result of his repeated incarceration, from discharging hisparental responsibilities.

While M.D.'s present incarceration has precluded him fromproviding for D.D's physical and material needs for the entirety ofD.D.'s lifetime, the cumulative effect of M.D.'s repeatedincarceration has rendered him incapable of meeting D.D.'s moral,mental, and emotional needs.

Of course, in cases involving the termination of parentalrights, each case is sui generis and must be decided based on theparticular facts and circumstances presented. In re Adoption ofSyck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 279 (1990). In the present case M.D. hasbeen shown to be unfit pursuant to the plain language of section1(D)(s) because the evidence clearly and convincingly establishesthat M.D.'s repeated incarceration has prevented him fromdischarging his parental responsibilities to D.D. Under differentcircumstances, a parent's repeated incarceration, whether duringthe lifetime of the child or not, may not prevent the parent fromdischarging his or her parental duties and, therefore, would notestablish that parent's unfitness.

For the reasons stated, we find that the circuit and appellatecourts' interpretation of section 1(D)(s) was proper and theirdetermination that clear and convincing evidence establishedM.D.'s unfitness pursuant to section 1(D)(s) was not against themanifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, because parentalrights may be terminated upon proof, by clear and convincingevidence, of a single ground for unfitness (In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d1, 8 (2000); In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1002 (1999)), weneed not consider here whether M.D. also was unfit because hefailed to make reasonable progress pursuant to section 1(D)(m).

CONCLUSION

The appellate court's judgment affirming the trial court'sorder terminating M.D.'s parental rights is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:

If section 1(D)(s) of the Adoption Act is applied as written, itcannot serve as the basis for terminating M.D.'s parental rights.Section 1(D)(s) of the Act and section 1(D)(r), which precedes it,address the impact of parents' incarceration on their present abilityto fulfill their parental duties. Where a parent is incarcerated, he orshe previously had little or no contact with the child or providedlittle or no support, and the term of confinement is so lengthy thatthe parent will not be able to discharge his parental responsibilitiesfor a period in excess of two years, a finding of unfitness can besought under section 1(D)(r) of the Adoption Act.

Where the parent is faced with a shorter period ofincarceration, section 1(D)(r) is inapplicable. If the incarceratedparent has been in jail or prison before, however, the cumulativeeffect of the multiple but shorter incarcerations may be asdeleterious to the parent's parenting abilities as a single long jailsentence. Repeated absences due to jail confinement are scarcelyconducive to the exercise of child-rearing obligations. A parentwho has been jailed again and again for less serious offenses maytherefore be no more fit than a parent who has only been convictedonce but for a more serious crime.

The purpose of section 1(D)(s) is to address this situation. Itrecognizes that the length of a parent's present prison term is notdispositive. It eliminates any disparity by treating chronic minoroffenders the same as those who have offended less often but moreseriously.

Section 1(D)(r) of the Act plainly requires the parent'sincarceration to occur while the child is alive. In eliminating thedisparity between parents serving longer sentences and thoseserving multiple shorter sentences, section 1(D)(s) does not alterthis requirement. As I have just indicated, the chief distinctionbetween parents subject to section 1(D)(s) and those subject tosection 1(D)(r) is simply the duration of their incarceration.Nothing in section 1(D)(s) gives the court additional authorizationto look back and assess events which occurred before anindividual even became a parent.

Consider again what the statute actually says. Under section1(D)(s), the repeated incarceration must have prevented the parentfrom discharging his or her parental responsibilities. Until a childis born, however, there is no way for a parent's conduct tointerfere with his or her discharge of parental responsibilitiesbecause there are no such responsibilities to discharge. Forpurposes of evaluating fitness, the responsibilities of parenthoodcommence with a child's birth.

Before an individual actually has children, the only effectincarceration can have in terms of parenting is to handicap theindividual's ability to develop parental skills for use in the future.While I do not question that a person confined to jail or prison ona regular basis will have a more difficult time acquiring the lifeskills needed to be an effective parent, that is simply not the issue.In applying section 1(D)(s), we must look to the languageemployed by the legislature, and nothing in the language of thestatute makes failure to develop parenting ability before the childwas born a basis for a finding of lack of fitness now. What mattersunder the law is whether recurring confinement has had an adverseeffect on the parent's actual parenting activities since the child'sbirth.

For the foregoing reasons, I agree with M.D.'s contention thatin order for repeated incarceration to have prevented thedischarging of parental responsibilities within the meaning ofsection 1(D)(s), that incarceration must have occurred during thechild's lifetime. In the case before us, M.D. had not beenrepeatedly incarcerated during his child's life. He was onlyincarcerated once. As a result, section 1(D)(s) could not serve asthe basis for terminating M.D.'s parental rights. I therefore believethat it was incumbent on this court to consider the additionalquestion of whether M.D. was properly found unfit on thealternative ground that he failed to make reasonable progresspursuant to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. Accordingly, Idissent.

1. ¹On December 20, 1996, a default judgment of abuse and neglect asto D.D. was entered against Warren and, on April 23, 1999, Warren'sparental rights were terminated. The termination of Warren's parentalrights is not contested in this appeal.

2. ²Between October 1969 and July 1987, Washington was arrested 15times, mostly on charges of forgery, deceptive practices, and theft. Therecord reveals that Washington has two convictions-one in 1970, foraggravated assault, and one in 1981, for felony forgery and theft-andserved time on both convictions. Washington's most recent arrest wasin 1987, on a charge of aggravated battery.

3. ³Rachel Weiss took over as D.D.'s caseworker in February 1998,when the previous worker, Charles Moon, moved to a different DCFSfield office.

4. ⁴M.D. told Weiss she should have her "teeth kicked down her throat"because, he alleged, she had "disrespected" his mother.