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Docket No. 90738-Agenda13-November 2001.

In re C.W. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Rosanna W., Appellant).

Opinion filed March 21, 2002.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court of CookCounty found that respondent, Rosanna W., was an unfit parentunder section 1(D)(g) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g)(West 1998)), because she failed to protect her daughter, C.W.,and her son, D.D., from conditions in their environment injuriousto their welfare. The circuit court subsequently terminatedrespondent's parental rights to C.W. and D.D., and respondentappealed. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuitcourt. No. 1-99-1843 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). We granted respondent's petition for leave to appeal.See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On April 30,1996, the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) took protective custody of C.W. (born July 17,1985) and her half-brother, D.D. (born July 26, 1991).⁽¹⁾ DCFS tookprotective custody after it received a hotline call from Carol Olsen,a social worker at C.W.'s school. Olsen had observed bruises onthe inside of C.W.'s legs, a possible burn mark on her leg, andfresh bruises on both arms.

On May 2, 1996, the State filed petitions for adjudication ofwardship (see 705 ILCS 405/2-13 (West 1996)), alleging that theminors were neglected in that their environment was injurious totheir welfare (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1996)), and thatthe minors had been abused (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i), (2)(ii)(West 1996)). At the hearing on the State's petitions, the partiesstipulated that Olsen would testify regarding her observations ofthe bruises on C.W. The parties further stipulated that Olsenwould testify that the bruises did not occur at C.W.'s school. Thetrial court found that C.W. was abused in that excessive corporalpunishment was administered by an unknown parent, guardian orlegal custodian (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(v) (West 1996)), andthat D.D. was neglected in that his environment was injurious tohis welfare (see 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 1996)). At thesubsequent dispositional hearing held on January 14, 1997, thetrial court adjudged C.W. and D.D. wards of the court and placedguardianship in DCFS. See 705 ILCS 405/2-22, 2-27 (West1996).

On May 20, 1998, approximately two years after C.W. andD.D. were taken into protective custody, the State filed, as to eachminor, a petition for appointment of a guardian with right toconsent to adoption (see 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998)),commonly referred to as a petition to terminate parental rights.The State alleged, in relevant part, that respondent was unfit inthat she failed to protect the children from conditions in theirenvironment injurious to their welfare (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g)(West 1998)), and failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions which were the basis for the removal of the childrenand/or failed to make reasonable progress toward their returnwithin nine months after the adjudication of neglect or abuse (see750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)).

In April 1999, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing onthe State's petitions to terminate parental rights. Testimony anddocumentary evidence introduced at the fitness portion of thehearing revealed that C.W. had been hospitalized once in 1992,and twice in 1994, with elevated levels of lead in her system.Between 1992 and 1994, she also underwent multiple surgeries toremove foreign bodies she had placed in her ear. C.W. wasdiagnosed with pervasive developmental disorder (autism) andmoderate mental retardation, and was described as trainablymentally handicapped. Beginning in 1992, C.W. attended a schoolfor exceptional children. Mary Gilmore, C.W.'s teacher for fouryears beginning with the 1993-94 school year, testified that C.W.was frequently absent. Gilmore noticed that C.W.'s clothes weresometimes dirty, and that she sometimes smelled of urine,requiring Gilmore to bathe C.W. at the school once or twice perweek. In April 1996, Gilmore noticed bruises and marks onC.W.'s legs and arms and spoke with Carol Olsen, the schoolsocial worker. Olsen examined C.W., but C.W.'s mental handicapprevented Olsen from discussing the bruises with her. Olsenplaced a call to the DCFS hotline. This was the tenth hotline callreceived by DCFS over an eight-year period concerningrespondent's children. At least five of these calls resulted in theissuance of "indicated reports,"⁽²⁾ based on evidence of physicalabuse, environmental neglect, inadequate shelter, or medicalneglect.

Bridget Broadway, a DCFS investigator, first met C.W. andD.D. on April 30, 1996, five days after Olsen's hotline call wasreceived by DCFS. Broadway attempted to interview C.W. atschool, but C.W. was nonverbal. Broadway observed fresh bruiseson C.W.'s legs and buttocks and evidence of old bruises. Inresponse to Broadway's questions, D.D. indicated that he chasedC.W. with sticks, and that he had been "whooped" by "Robert."Broadway also interviewed respondent, who offered differentexplanations for C.W.'s bruises. Respondent stated that the schoolwas responsible, and that her other children had chased C.W. witha hanger.

Broadway immediately took C.W. and D.D. into protectivecustody. Although Broadway did not observe bruises on D.D. atthat time, an examination by Dr. Poornima Narayen on thefollowing day revealed old marks on his left buttocks, some linearmarks on his back, one loop mark on his left thigh, and an old burnmark on his left hand. D.D. told Dr. Narayen that respondent"whooped" him with an extension cord. Following additionalhospital evaluation, D.D. was diagnosed with lead poisoning andadjustment disorder with anxiety.

C.W. remained in a DCFS emergency shelter until July 1996,at which time she was placed in a foster home through a programat Uhlich Children's Home (Uhlich). D.D. was placed in a fosterhome in May 1996, and three months later, was placed in anotherfoster home through the YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago(YMCA).

Kathy Grzelak, a caseworker at Uhlich, was assigned the casein July 1996. At that time, an initial client service plan, drafted inMay 1996, was already in place. Under that plan, respondent wasrequired to attend parenting classes and participate in counselingto address the issue of stress in child rearing. Respondentcompleted a parenting class in August 1996, and that same month,began counseling with Janet Dahm at the Adler School ofProfessional Psychology. In December 1996, Cynthia Michel, theprimary caseworker for the family at the YMCA, ratedrespondent's progress under the initial service plan satisfactory.

Grzelak and Michel drafted the next client service plan inDecember 1996. Under this plan, respondent was required tocontinue with therapy, complete a bonding assessment, and engagein domestic violence counseling. Respondent completed thebonding assessment in February 1997. The psychologist whoconducted the bonding assessment noted in his report that C.W.presented a "very demanding challenge" in light of her autism, andthat D.D. could be a "very demanding child to work with," in lightof indications that he may be suffering from ADHD (attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder). The report also stated thatproviding parenting for respondent's children would present a"most difficult task for the best and most qualified and patientparent."

Michel testified that the decision to include domestic violencecounseling in the December 1996 service plan was based on anumber of factors: (1) respondent's varying explanations for ablack eye she received over the 1996 Thanksgiving holiday; (2)respondent's complaint of a back injury at work, which Michelhad reason to believe did not occur on the job; and (3)respondent's history of domestic violence, as reflected in the casefile. Although respondent told caseworkers that she had beenattending domestic violence counseling at Sarah's Inn sinceFebruary 1997, when the referral was first made, it was laterlearned that respondent did not begin counseling until May 1997.Respondent had rescheduled visits with her children toaccommodate counseling sessions that she was not attending.Respondent received an unsatisfactory rating under the December1996 service plan.

The third client service plan was drafted in June 1997 andincluded Alvin, respondent's then live-in paramour. Respondentand Alvin began a relationship in 1994 or 1995, and begancohabiting in May 1996. Grzelak testified that the suspicion ofdomestic violence necessitated Alvin's participation in services ifthe children were to be returned to respondent. Grzelak's attemptsto involve Alvin in services were unsuccessful. Records indicate,however, that he completed a parenting class in May 1998, just asGrzelak's involvement with the case ended. Grzelak testified thatalthough respondent denied that Alvin was physically abusive,Grzelak became aware of a domestic battery allegation againstAlvin, dating back to October 1997. Grzelak rated respondent'sprogress under the June 1997 service plan unsatisfactory, notingin her written report that respondent had not provideddocumentation to support her claim that she had followed throughwith recommended services.

During Michel's involvement with the case, which ended inAugust 1997, she observed visits between respondent, D.D. andB.W. At times, C.W. was also present. According to Michel, visitsbegan well, but during the course of the hour, respondent'sinteraction with her children diminished and respondent wouldspeak with Michel about events in respondent's life not pertinentto the children. Michel indicated that respondent was a lovingparent, but not a capable parent. In the spring of 1997, based onMichel's own observations and the recommendation ofrespondent's counselor, Janet Dahm, Michel referred respondentfor additional parenting classes. Records indicate that respondentsuccessfully completed an eight-week parenting classapproximately one year later in May 1998. This was the same classattended by Alvin.

During Grzelak's involvement with the case, she observedvisits between respondent and C.W. Respondent was frequentlylate for the one-hour visits. During the visits, C.W. would seek outrespondent's attention, and when it was not forthcoming, C.W.would act out. Respondent, in turn, would laugh, but would notredirect C.W. or try to comfort her. If respondent's other childrenwere also present, C.W. received no attention from respondent.Respondent spent the time for visitation talking with any otheradult that was present about matters unrelated to the children.Grzelak testified that there was no improvement in the visits sheobserved during the two-year period she was involved in the case.When Grzelak's involvement ceased in May 1998, Grzelak did notbelieve that respondent was in a position for return of her children.At that time, Grzelak recommended that visitation with C.W. besuspended based on reports from the foster mother that, followingvisitation, C.W. was irritable, sometimes scratched herself, andfollowing the last visit in May 1998, had put paperclips on herwrists.

According to both Grzelak and Michel, respondent's supportof her children was sporadic. With the exception of a singleChristmas present for D.D. in 1996, and a birthday present forD.D. the following July, respondent did not send C.W. or D.D.clothes, gifts, cards, or letters.

The December 1997 client service plan generally requiredrespondent to continue prior tasks, including attendance atparenting classes, visitation with her children, and participation incounseling to address issues related to the removal of her children,the history of domestic violence, and parenting skills. In June1998, respondent received a satisfactory rating on the December1997 plan. The report notes that, in addition to the parenting classcompleted by respondent and Alvin in May 1998, respondent alsocompleted a 12-week class on domestic violence.

Respondent, who was called as an adverse witness by theassistant public guardian, testified regarding the volatilerelationships she had with each of the fathers of her three children.Respondent testified that Vernon P., C.W.'s father, was verballyabusive, but she denied that he was physically abusive. In August1990, several years after she separated from Vernon, respondentbecame involved with Darrell D., a drug user. Darrell is D.D.'sfather. When respondent attempted to break off the relationship,Darrell made threatening telephone calls, flattened her tires, andgenerally harassed her. Respondent reported to psychologists thatDarrell also hit her in the face. Respondent obtained fourrestraining orders against Darrell.

In late 1992, respondent became involved with Brian W.,B.W.'s father. According to respondent, prior to B.W.'s birth inMay 1993, Brian was verbally abusive. Shortly after B.W.'s birth,Brian became physically abusive. Respondent testified that Briangave her two black eyes, broke three of her toes, beat her in theface, and put a gun to her head. After one beating, respondent washospitalized. Respondent also testified that after the abuse began,she continued her relationship with Brian for over two years. InMarch 1996, respondent obtained a restraining order against Brian.

Respondent also testified that C.W., D.D. and B.W. had eachwitnessed one or more instances of abuse or harassment. Duringone occurrence in which Brian had pulled respondent into theplayroom and locked the door, C.W. dialed 911.

According to Janet Dahm's January 9, 1998, dispositionsummary, respondent missed 26 of 60 potential therapy sessionsbetween August 1996 and January 1998. Several sessions weremissed reportedly due to various injuries and illnesses. Beginningin August 1996, respondent did not attend counseling for fourweeks due to back pain related to an unspecified injury. In January1997, respondent reported that she had sustained a broken ribwhile lifting a patient during the course of her employment as ahome health-care aid. In October 1997, respondent cancelled asession due to weakness, dizziness and a persistent and severeheadache that prompted an emergency room visit. In earlyDecember 1997, respondent reported for a session with a swollenand bruised left eye. Later that month, she missed a session due topain in her shoulder, leg and abdomen, prompting anotheremergency room visit. Respondent consistently denied any abuseby Alvin. In her January 1998 report, Dahm stated that respondentmade "somewhat limited progress toward treatment goals."

Respondent called one witness, Carrie Kennelly. Kennelly,who was respondent's therapist beginning in March 1998, testifiedthat during the 13 months that she worked with respondent,respondent attended 40 sessions and missed 13 sessions. Issuesaddressed in counseling included parenting skills, particularly forspecial needs children; domestic violence; anger management; andissues related to the findings of abuse and neglect. According toKennelly, respondent showed progress, and although herattendance had been intermittent, she demonstrated a vestedinterest in learning the skills necessary to parent C.W. and manageher own anger. In sessions with Kennelly, respondent consistentlydenied any domestic violence in her relationship with Alvin. Shealso consistently denied knowledge of the abuse that led to thechildren's removal.

On April 15, 1999, the trial court ruled that the State had notproved, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent failedto make "reasonable efforts" or "reasonable progress" undersection 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 1998). The trial court found, however, that the State met itsburden under section 1(D)(g), and found respondent unfit as toboth C.W. and D.D., in that she failed to protect her children fromconditions in their environment injurious to their welfare. See 750ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 1998). The court explained to respondentthat the injurious conditions in the children's environmentconcerned the series of abusive men that she failed to eliminatefrom her life.

At the "best interests" portion of the hearing (see 705 ILCS405/2-29(2) (West 1998)), the trial court heard evidence of thevolatile relationship between respondent and Alvin, includingevidence of domestic disturbances in March 1998 and February1999 in which police were summoned. The court also heardtestimony from the current caseworkers, as well as C.W.'s fosterparent. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found thatit was in the best interests of C.W. and D.D. that respondent'sparental rights be terminated. The court stated that respondent hadmade a conscious choice to stay with people who physicallyabused her, and that respondent's children would not be safe in hercustody.

The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.No. 1-99-1843 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23). This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the involuntarytermination of parental rights involves a two-step process. First,there must be a showing, based on clear and convincing evidence,that the parent is "unfit," as that term is defined in section 1(D) ofthe Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)). If the courtmakes a finding of unfitness, the court then considers whether itis in the best interests of the child that parental rights beterminated. See 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998); In reAdoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276-78 (1990); see also In reC.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 209 (2001).

Although section 1(D) of the Adoption Act sets forthnumerous grounds under which a parent may be deemed "unfit,"any one ground, properly proven, is sufficient to enter a finding ofunfitness. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998) (providing that the"grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following"enumerated grounds (emphasis added)). Section 1(D)(g), relevantto this appeal, provides that unfitness may be based on the"[f]ailure to protect the child from conditions within hisenvironment injurious to the child's welfare." 750 ILCS50/1(D)(g) (West 1998).

Respondent maintains that, as a matter of law, a parent maynot be found unfit under section 1(D)(g) during a period of timethat the children were not in a parent's legal custody or care and,in fact, were in foster care. Respondent also maintains that a parentmay not be found unfit based on the same injurious environmentand the same conduct that led to the initial removal of the children.

The State argues that respondent is improperly reading alimitation into section 1(D)(g) that does not exist. The Statefurther argues that under respondent's reading of section 1(D)(g)the court is precluded from considering evidence of respondent'sconduct occurring either before or after the removal of herchildren, thus rendering section 1(D)(g) meaningless.⁽³⁾

Before addressing these arguments, we consider theappropriate standard of review. Where a challenge is made to thesufficiency of the evidence underlying a trial court's finding ofunfitness, a reviewing court will reverse such finding only whereit is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Syck, 138 Ill. 2dat 274. Respondent, however, does not challenge the sufficiencyof the evidence in this case. Respondent instead raises purely legalissues regarding the proper construction of section 1(D)(g). Wereview issues of statutory construction de novo. C.N., 196 Ill. 2dat 208 .

Our primary objective in construing a statute is to give effectto the intention of the legislature. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill.2d 96, 103 (2001). In pursuit of this objective, we turn first to thelanguage of the statute-the most reliable indicator of thelegislature's intent. Yang, 195 Ill. 2d at 103; In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d405, 419 (2001). Where the statutory language is clear andunambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids ofconstruction. In such a case, a court must give effect to the statuteas written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, orconditions that the legislature did not express. In re D.L., 191 Ill.2d 1, 9 (2000).

Under the clear and unambiguous language of section 1(D)(g),a finding of parental unfitness is only warranted where theevidence establishes that the parent failed to protect the child fromconditions in the child's environment injurious to the child'swelfare. It follows, therefore, that where a child has been removedfrom an injurious home environment and placed in foster care, aparent cannot be found unfit based on a "failure to protect" duringthe period the child is in foster care. See In re Massey, 35 Ill. App.3d 518, 521-22 (1976) ("Since the child has been in a foster homefor the past 6 years, the parents could not have failed to protect itduring this time"); see also In re J.D., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 1110(2000) (where appellate court accepted State's concession thatstatutory ground of failure to protect from an injuriousenvironment was not available as a basis for terminating parentalrights because the children were in foster care for several years andthe trial court, in its findings, referred to the period of time whenthe children were in DCFS custody).

The State argues, however, that a finding of unfitness undersection 1(D)(g) may be based on evidence of injurious conditionsin the parent's environment after the minor is removed and placedin foster care. The State explains that the parent's environment ishighly relevant because that is the environment which, "but for theintervention of the State, the child would still be exposed." It isalso the environment "to which the child potentially will bereturned." The State's reading of the statute cannot be reconciledwith its plain language.

Contrary to the State's argument, section 1(D)(g) makes nomention of the parent's environment following removal of thechild. It also makes no mention of the environment to which achild "would still be exposed," absent state intervention, or theenvironment "to which the child potentially will be returned."Further, nothing in the language of section 1(D)(g) suggests thatit was intended to address any circumstance other than a parent'sactual failure to protect his or her child. Under the State's readingof section 1(D)(g), however, a parent could be found unfit basedon speculation about the parent's future failure to protect.Similarly, nothing in section 1(D)(g) suggests that a parent may befound unfit based on a failure to correct or improve an injuriousenvironment following removal of the minor. Yet, under theState's reading of section 1(D)(g), a parent also could be foundunfit on that basis. Although the legislature could have providedmultiple and alternative bases for a finding of unfitness undersection 1(D)(g), it did not do so. Rather, the legislature provideda single ground of unfitness: "Failure to protect the child fromconditions within his environment injurious to the child'swelfare." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 1998). This court cannot, inthe guise of statutory construction, expand this ground of unfitnessbeyond its plain language; we must give effect to the statute aswritten. See D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9.

We do not imply that evidence of a parent's failure to corrector improve injurious conditions following removal of the child isirrelevant in determining unfitness. Section 1(D)(m) provides aseparate ground of unfitness that specifically addresses a parent'sfailure "to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions thatwere the basis for the removal of the child," and the failure "tomake reasonable progress toward the return of the child." 750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). "Reasonable progress" includes aparent's compliance with service plans and court directives, "inlight of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child,and in light of other conditions which later become known andwhich would prevent the court from returning custody of the childto the parent." C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17. Thus, evidence ofinjurious conditions which persist after removal of the child wouldbe relevant to an unfitness finding under section 1(D)(m). It isirrelevant, however, to an unfitness finding under section 1(D)(g).

The State argues, nonetheless, that under this court's decisionin D.L., evidence under section 1(D)(g) may include evidence ofthe parent's environment after removal of the child. In D.L. weconsidered whether a trial court was limited in the evidence itcould consider in support of unfitness under section 1(D)(m). Weobserved that, in some of the grounds of unfitness set forth insection 1(D), the legislature specified an applicable time period,and that in other grounds the legislature did not do so. D.L., 191Ill. 2d at 10-11. This demonstrated the legislature's belief that, "forpurposes of establishing certain allegations of unfitness, a parent'sconduct during a specified period of time would be relevant."D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 11. The State argues that following thereasoning in D.L., the absence of a specific time period in section1(D)(g) demonstrates that the legislature intended that there be nolimitation on the evidence submitted under this section. Wedisagree.

At the time of the termination proceeding in D.L., section1(D)(m) provided that a finding of unfitness may rest on the"[f]ailure by a parent to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from theparent, or to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechild to the parent within 12 months after an adjudication ofneglected minor, abused minor or dependent minor ***."(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1994). Weconcluded that, under the plain language of section 1(D)(m),evidence of unfitness was limited to that 12-month period. D.L.,191 Ill. 2d at 10. As already discussed, under the plain language ofsection 1(D)(g), evidence in support of this ground of unfitnessmust focus on the child's environment and the parent's failure toprotect before removal of the child from the injurious homeenvironment. Logic dictates that once the child is removed fromthe injurious environment, there can be no further failure toprotect.

The appellate court, based on its review of the record in thiscase, concluded that the trial court had based its unfitness findingon evidence of respondent's conduct after the removal of C.W.and D.D. We disagree. During the fitness portion of the hearing,the State introduced some evidence regarding respondent'sconduct and environment following the removal of her children,but introduced virtually no evidence regarding respondent'srelationship with Alvin, her then live-in paramour. Clearly, thecaseworkers harbored a suspicion that Alvin, like respondent'sprior paramours, was physically abusive, but evidence of suchabuse was not introduced until the best-interests hearing. The onlyevidence of abusive relationships offered during the fitness portionof the hearing concerned respondent's relationship with the fathersof her three children. The trial court's finding of unfitness,therefore, could not have been based on evidence that respondentcontinued to live in an injurious environment after the removal ofthe children. Rather, as respondent maintains, the trial court'sfinding of unfitness was necessarily based on respondent's conductbefore the removal of her children. Although this is precisely thekind of evidence a court must consider in making a determinationunder section 1(D)(g), respondent contends that, under the factsand circumstances of this case, such evidence cannot support thetrial court's unfitness finding. Respondent directs our attention tothe trial court's ruling rejecting the State's allegations thatrespondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct theconditions that led to the removal of C.W. and D.D. andreasonable progress toward their return. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 1998). According to respondent, "if the law allows the trialcourt to find reasonable progress and then in the next breathallows the court to terminate parental rights based on injuriousenvironment, which was a predicate for the removal of the minorsin the first place, this would render meaningless the receipt ofservice[s] by any parent, and the successful completion of theseservices."

Initially, we note that, contrary to respondent's argument, thetrial court did not terminate her parental rights "based on injuriousenvironment." The trial court's finding that respondent had failedto protect C.W. and D.D. from an injurious environment merelyallowed the State to proceed to the second stage of the bifurcatedtermination hearing, at which time the trial court heard evidenceas to the children's best interests. See Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 276-78.Only after hearing additional testimony from respondent and otherwitnesses did the trial court conclude that it was in the bestinterests of the children that respondent's parental rights beterminated.

As to the substance of respondent's argument, we disagreethat her allegedly successful completion of offered servicesprecluded a finding of unfitness based on her conduct which led tothe removal of her children. Although the provision of services toparents is an integral part of the statutory scheme (see C.N., 196Ill. 2d at 215-16), there is no requirement under section 1(D)(g)that a parent be permitted a period of time to correct or improve aninjurious environment before he or she may be found unfit on thisground. See In re B.R., 282 Ill. App. 3d 665, 670 (1996) (rejectingparent's contention that she could not be found unfit under section1(D)(g) because the trial court did not allow her a period of timeto correct the problem); see also In re M.M., 261 Ill. App. 3d 71,72-73 (1994) (rejecting parents' contention that they could not befound unfit under section 1(D)(b) for failure to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to thechildren's welfare, where they were not permitted time to makeprogress toward the children's return).

Additionally, evidence that a parent substantially completedoffered services, or otherwise refrained from prior objectionableconduct following removal of the child, does not somehowabsolve or erase the parent's initial failing that triggered Stateintervention and removal of the child. Rather, such evidence isappropriately considered at the second stage of the terminationhearing, at which the court considers whether it is in the bestinterest of the minor that parental rights be terminated. At thattime, the full range of the parent's conduct can be considered. SeeD.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 12-13 (holding that where the parent was foundunfit under section 1(D)(m), evidence of the parent's more recentconduct occurring outside the relevant statutory period may beintroduced at the best interests hearing); In re Adoption of D.A.,222 Ill. App. 3d 73, 79-80 (1991) (holding that a parent'sdeparture from a lengthy period of objectionable conduct does noteliminate the existence of grounds for determination that theparent is unfit; instead, it is a factor to consider at the best interestshearing).

Moreover, we note that the grounds set forth in section 1(D)each provide a discrete basis for a finding of unfitness. D.L., 191Ill. 2d at 8. Although the State may rely on several grounds in itspetition, a finding adverse to the parent on any one ground issufficient to support a subsequent termination of parental rights.D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 422. Here, the trial court found that the Statehad not proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondentfailed to make "reasonable efforts" or "reasonable progress" undersection 1(D)(m). See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). Aninsufficiency in the evidence under section 1(D)(m) did notpreclude the trial court from finding that there was sufficientevidence under the independent ground, also alleged by the State,set forth in section 1(D)(g).

We reject respondent's argument for the further reason that iteffectively renders section 1(D)(g) a nullity. As discussed earlierin this opinion, respondent argued, and we agreed, that anunfitness finding for "failure to protect" under section 1(D)(g)cannot be based on a period of time during which the childrenwere outside the injurious home environment and were in fostercare. We thus concluded that evidence of the parent's conductafter the removal of the children is irrelevant to this ground ofunfitness. Under respondent's present argument, evidence of aparent's conduct before the removal of the child is also irrelevantunder section 1(D)(g). Such a construction effectively eliminates"failure to protect" as a ground of unfitness. Respondentmaintains, however, that section 1(D)(g) would remain applicableto address instances where a parent, whose child is in foster care,fails to protect that child from an injurious environment duringparental visitation. Respondent cites no reported case in whichsection 1(D)(g) has been applied in this manner.

Just as we would not expansively read section 1(D)(g) toprovide for additional bases of unfitness not supported by the plainlanguage of the statute, we will not restrictively read section1(D)(g) so that, for all intents and purposes, it is meaningless. SeeIn re Marriage of Lasky, 176 Ill. 2d 75, 79 (1997) ("courtsconstrue statutory provisions in a manner that *** gives full effectto each provision wherever reasonably possible"); People v.Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345 (1984) ("statutes should beconstrued so that language is not rendered meaningless orsuperfluous"); Maiter v. Chicago Board of Education, 82 Ill. 2d373, 388-89 (1980) ("court will not assume that the legislatureengaged in a meaningless act"). We therefore reject respondent'scontention that unfitness under section 1(D)(g) cannot be based onevidence of the parent's conduct which gave rise to the removal ofthe children.

We note that decisions from our appellate court that haveexpressly considered whether a parent may be found unfit on thesame ground that formed the basis for the neglect adjudication andthe child's removal from the home are not in agreement on thisissue. Compare In re L.N., 278 Ill. App. 3d 46, 49 (1996) (holdingthat respondent's alleged failure to protect could form the basis forthe initial removal of the child from the home, but was irrelevantin the subsequent termination proceeding when the child had beenin foster care), with In re G.V., 292 Ill. App. 3d 301, 307-08(1997) (rejecting L.N., and holding that failure to protect a childfrom an injurious environment in support of the original neglectadjudication may also provide the basis for unfitness at asubsequent termination proceeding). The appellate court in thepresent case followed the reasoning in G.V. Based on ourdiscussion above, we agree that G.V. presents the better reasonedview.

Our conclusion that a parent may be found unfit under section1(D)(g) based on evidence of the parent's conduct which also ledto the removal of the child does not, contrary to respondent'sargument, "render meaningless the receipt of service[s] by anyparent, and the successful completion of these services." A statedpurpose of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is to "secure for eachminor subject [t]hereto such care and guidance, preferably in hisor her own home, as will serve the safety and moral, emotional,mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests ofthe community; to preserve and strengthen the minor's family tieswhenever possible, removing him or her from the custody of his orher parents only when his or her safety or welfare or theprotection of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded withoutremoval ***." (Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West1998). The State's Attorney and the court are bound to act infurtherance of this purpose. In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1991). Inthis case, the State believed that, notwithstanding any technicalcompliance by respondent with the service plans, respondent hadfailed to correct conditions in the home following removal of herchildren. The State was not required to disregard respondent'sinitial and substantial failing as a parent merely because sheparticipated in offered services.

CONCLUSION

As indicated earlier, respondent in the present case has notchallenged the sufficiency of the evidence introduced by the Statein support of the trial court's finding of unfitness, nor hasrespondent challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlyingthe trial court's order terminating parental rights. Respondent hasrequested only that this court "correct erroneous legal rulings bythe trial court and the [a]ppellate [c]ourt." Having rejected bothlegal arguments raised by respondent, we therefore affirm thejudgment of the appellate court, affirming the judgment of the trialcourt terminating respondent's parental rights.

Affirmed.

1. ¹A third child, B.W. (born May 26, 1993), was also taken intocustody. This appeal concerns respondent's parental rights only as toC.W. and D.D.

2. ²Under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act, if aninvestigation determines that credible evidence of the alleged abuse orneglect exists, an "indicated report" is made. 325 ILCS 5/3 (West 1998).

3. ³The public guardian of Cook County, who has filed a brief on behalfof C.W. and D.D., makes essentially the same arguments.