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Docket No. 88267-Agenda 20-May 2000.

In re CONSOLIDATED OBJECTIONS TO TAX LEVIES OFSCHOOL DISTRICT No. 205, For the Years 1991 Through 1996(People Who Care, Appellant, v. Tax Objectors, Appellees).

Opinion filed October 26, 2000.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises from objections filed by tax objectorschallenging the real estate taxes levied by the board of educationof Rockford School District No. 205 (school district) to fundequitable remedies ordered in separate federal litigation involvingschool desegregation. The circuit court of Winnebago and BooneCounties granted summary judgment in favor of the tax objectorsand held that the provisions of article IX of the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 1998)) didnot authorize funding the equitable remedies in this case. Whenthe school district did not file an interlocutory appeal, People WhoCare, the plaintiff in the federal litigation, filed a petition tointervene. The circuit court allowed the petition and certifiedquestions for appellate review. On interlocutory appeal, theappellate court answered the certified questions and affirmed thecircuit court's ruling. 306 Ill. App. 3d 1104. We granted PeopleWho Care's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

This court granted leave to file amicus curiae briefs in supportof People Who Care. The Illinois Association of School Boards,the Illinois Association of School Administrators, and the board ofeducation of the City of Chicago filed a joint brief, as did theChicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.,the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, andthe American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois. The Large UnitDistrict Association filed its own amicus brief.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of theappellate court.

BACKGROUND

In 1989, People Who Care filed a class action against theschool district in federal court, alleging that the school district hadengaged in a pattern of intentional segregation and discriminationon a system-wide basis. In that action, People Who Care soughtequitable and declaratory relief, and specifically requestedinjunctive relief. Prior to full adjudication on the merits, theparties entered into two court-approved interim agreements, whereliability was not admitted. The first interim order modified areorganization plan adopted previously by the school district. Thesecond interim order was in the form of a preliminary injunctionpursuant to which the school district was directed to carry out adetailed and comprehensive plan for system-wide changes in theoperation of its schools. In conjunction with the second interimorder, the federal court found that the school district wasauthorized to use the Tort Immunity Act to fund the cost of theremedial measures. This allowed the school district to levyadditional property taxes and issue bonds.

In 1993, following a hearing, the magistrate judge issued areport, recommending that the school district be held liable forviolating the constitutional rights of the minority student class.The federal court in 1994 entered a declaratory judgment orderholding that the school district had unlawfully segregated anddiscriminated against its students. The federal court also entereda permanent injunction order against the school district, directingit to eliminate all vestiges of discrimination against the African-American and Hispanic students. People Who Care v. RockfordBoard of Education School District #205, 851 F. Supp. 905 (N.D.Ill. 1994).

In 1996, the federal court entered a "Comprehensive RemedialOrder" (CRO), requiring the School District to implement andfund detailed system-wide desegregation remedies including astudent assignment plan to desegregate schools, educationalprograms to address discrimination, and long-term capitalimprovements such as the renovation and construction of schools.The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals modified certain portions ofthe remedial requirements set forth in the CRO. People Who Carev. Rockford Board of Education School District No. 205, 111 F.3d528 (7th Cir. 1997). Throughout this time, beginning with the firstinterim order, funds to implement remedial programs were raisedby real estate taxes levied and bonds issued under the TortImmunity Act.

Separate from the aforementioned federal class action, taxobjectors challenged the 1991 through 1996 real estate taxes leviedby the school district under the Tort Immunity Act to fund thedesegregation remedies in the federal class action. The schooldistrict successfully had the cases removed to federal court. Thefederal court ruled that the school district had the authority underthe Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to pay for the desegregationremedies. In re Application of the County Collector of the Countyof Winnebago, Illinois, for Judgment & Order of Sale for Taxes onLands & Lots upon Which the General Taxes &/or SpecialAssessments for the Year[s] 1991, 1992 & 1993 are Delinquent,918 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1996). The Seventh Circuit Court ofAppeals reversed on jurisdictional grounds and remanded thematter to the circuit court of Illinois. In re Application of CountyCollector, 96 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 1996).

Upon remand from the federal court, the circuit court grantedsummary judgment in favor of the tax objectors. The circuit courtdetermined that the Tort Immunity Act did not authorize theschool district to pay for remedial measures implemented underthe second interim order. The circuit court also determined that theTort Immunity Act did not authorize the school district to pay fordesegregation remedies ordered by the federal district courtsubsequent to the liability determination.

When the school district did not pursue an interlocutoryappeal from the circuit court's ruling, People Who Care wasgranted leave to intervene. The circuit court then certified thefollowing questions of law for interlocutory appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308):

"(a) Whether the Rockford School District (the'District') was authorized by the Illinois LocalGovernment Employees Tort Immunity Act ('the TortImmunity Act') to levy taxes to fund remedies agreed toby the District and/or ordered by the Federal Court inPeople Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education 89 C20168 ('the People Who Care case'):

(i) in a 1991 consent decree;

(ii) after the District was adjudicated guilty in 1994 andenjoined generally to provide a comprehensive remedy;and/or

(iii) after a Comprehensive Remedial Order was enteredin 1996 and the District was expressly ordered by theFederal Court to use the Tort Immunity Act levy to fundthe remedies (including FY 97 remedial programs andCertificates of Participation)[.]

(b) Whether the District was authorized by the TortImmunity Act to levy taxes to pay the debt service ongeneral obligation bonds issued to fund capitalimprovement remedies agreed to by the District orordered by the Federal Court in the People Who Carecase[.]

(c) Whether taxpayers are precluded from challengingany of the aforesaid taxes under principles of res judicataor collateral estoppel[.]"⁽¹⁾

The appellate court initially denied People Who Care'sapplication for leave to appeal; however, this court issued asupervisory order directing the appellate court to allow the appealand to answer the certified questions. The appellate courtanswered certified questions "(a)" and "(b)" in the negative. Theappellate court declined to address certified question "(c)" andfound it waived because the parties did not brief that question. Theappellate court therefore affirmed the circuit court's rulings thatthe use of the tax levies under the Tort Immunity Act to fundremedies in the People Who Care case was not authorized.

ANALYSIS

The issue before this court, as presented in the certifiedquestions, essentially is whether the school district is authorizedunder the Tort Immunity Act to levy taxes to fund the cost ofcomplying with injunctive remedies. Because this issue involvesthe interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law, weconduct de novo review. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davisv. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998); Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d166, 171 (1997).

In construing the meaning of a statute, this court's primaryobjective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. The language of the statute provides the best indicationof the legislature's intent. Department of Public Aid, 183 Ill. 2d at554. We will not depart from the plain language of the statute byreading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions conflictingwith the express legislative intent. Barnett v. Zion Park District,171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). Moreover, where the statutorylanguage is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect withoutresorting to other aids of construction. Gem Electronics ofMonmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475(1998). We also note that statutes imposing a tax are strictlyconstrued against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.Gem Electronics, 183 Ill. 2d at 475. Keeping these principles ofstatutory construction in mind, we now examine the relevantprovisions of the Tort Immunity Act.

Sections 9-107 and 9-102 (745 ILCS 10/9-107, 9-102 (West1998)) are the two provisions of the Tort Immunity Act directly atissue in this appeal. Both provisions fall under article IX of theTort Immunity Act, which is entitled "Payment of Claims andJudgment." 745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 1998). Section9-107 authorizes a local public entity to levy taxes upon alltaxable property within its territory for purposes of section 9-102.745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 1998). Section 9-102 of the TortImmunity Act in turn empowers a local public entity "to pay anytort judgment or settlement for compensatory damages for whichit *** is liable in the manner provided in this Article." 745 ILCS10/9-102 (West 1998). It is evident from these provisions thatsection 9-107 sets forth a tax-levy power and section 9-102explains the circumstances for utilizing such a tax levy. The issuehere is whether section 9-102 provides authority for the schooldistrict to levy taxes in this case under section 9-107.

In addressing this issue, we must resolve whether theinjunctive remedies in this case constitute "compensatorydamages" within the meaning of section 9-102. The term"compensatory damages" is not defined in section 9-102 oranywhere else in the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we rely onthe plain and ordinary meaning of the word. See In re Estate ofCallahan, 144 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (1991). We also apply a strictconstruction of the term because it is included in a statute thatshould be considered a taxing statute given the tax-levy provisionin section 9-107. See Canteen Corp. v. Department of Revenue,123 Ill. 2d 95, 105 (1988).

Compensatory damages are "[d]amages sufficient in amountto indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered." Black's LawDictionary 394 (7th ed. 1999). Damages in turn are "[m]oneyclaimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation forloss or injury <the plaintiff seeks $8,000 in damages from thedefendant>." Black's Law Dictionary 393 (7th ed.1999). In lightof these definitions, the plain meaning of the term "compensatorydamages" is a monetary award paid to a person as compensationfor loss or injury. We hold that the use of the term "compensatorydamages" in section 9-102 limits application of that provision tothe payment of monetary awards in tort judgments or settlements. People Who Care argues that the term "compensatorydamages" is not limited to monetary awards but also includes thecosts of complying with injunctive remedies. An injunction,however, is "[a] court order commanding or preventing an action."Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999). "Compensatorydamages" clearly differ from an injunction such that injunctiveremedies do not constitute "compensatory damages." Accordingly,section 9-102 does not apply to the payment of costs of complyingwith injunctive relief.

In support of its argument, People Who Care asserts that thiscourt's decision in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90 (1992), is controlling in determiningthe definition of "compensatory damages" as used in section9-102. We disagree.

Outboard Marine involved a dispute between an insured andits insurance company regarding the insurance company's duty todefend the insured against underlying environmentalcontamination actions brought by governmental agencies. Theissue before this court in Outboard Marine concerned theconstruction of insurance policies, which required the insurancecompany to defend "suits against the insured seeking damages."The court therefore addressed whether the underlying actionsagainst the insured, which sought primarily equitable relief in theform of mandatory injunctions and the costs of complying with themandatory injunctions, fell within the coverage afforded by thepolicies so as to trigger a duty to defend.

In construing the insurance policies' provision regarding"damages," this court sought to determine the intent of the partiesas to the damages covered by the policies. The court noted that,because the policies were comprehensive general liabilityinsurance policies, they were broad types of policies requiring theinsurer to assume a wide scope of risks. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill.2d at 115. In light of the broad nature of the policies, the courtthen interpreted the term "damages," which the policies did notdefine. The court examined Webster's definition of damages andnoted that it contained no distinction between legal compensatorydamages or the costs of complying with a mandatory injunction.Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 115-16. Rather, damages includesthe money required to be expended in order to right a wrong.Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 116. The court then determinedthat, given the broad scope of the comprehensive general liabilitypolicies and the dictionary definition of damages, the partiesintended the policies to cover liability for property damageregardless of whether liability is equitable or legal in nature.Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 117. Consequently, the policiescovered costs incurred in complying with injunctive remediesbecause such costs constituted damages. Therefore, the court heldthat, under the policies at issue, the underlying actions were suitsseeking damages so as to trigger the insurance company's duty todefend the insured. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 117.

Our decision in Outboard Marine has no application to thiscase. Unlike the issue in this case, it did not involve theconstruction of a taxing statute or the application of the TortImmunity Act. Outboard Marine involved the interpretation ofinsurance policies between contracting parties. Its discussion ofdamages was in the context of broad insurance policies and withrespect to the policies' intended scope of coverage. Ourdetermination in Outboard Marine that the term "damages"included the costs of complying with a mandatory injunction istherefore not applicable to the interpretation of "compensatorydamages" contained in section 9-102 of the Tort Immunity Act.Parenthetically, we note, however, that the court in OutboardMarine acknowledged the difference between "compensatorydamages" and equitable relief by referring to "compensatorydamages" separately from the costs of complying with amandatory injunction. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 115-17.

We note that when construing a statute, a court also considerseach provision of the statute in connection with every other section(Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 388-89), and the purposes to be achieved bythe law (In re Estate of Callahan, 144 Ill. 2d at 43). For thisreason, we examine section 2-101 of the Tort Immunity Act andthe purpose underlying the Tort Immunity Act in construing theterm "compensatory damages."

Section 2-101, which is part of article II of the Tort ImmunityAct, states in pertinent part that "[n]othing in this Act affects theright to obtain relief other than damages against a local publicentity or public employee." 745 ILCS 10/2-101 (West 1998). Thephrase "[n]othing in this Act" indicates that section 2-101 appliesto the entire Tort Immunity Act, and that it is not limited to thesections contained in article II, which addresses the scope ofimmunities. Consequently, section 2-101 provides guidanceregarding the relief that may be paid and funded through a tax levyunder article IX of the Tort Immunity Act. Moreover, section2-101 recognizes the distinction between damages and other typesof relief. The phrase "relief other than damages" contained thereinrefers to injunctive relief. See Romano v. Village of Glenview, 277Ill. App. 3d 406, 410-11 (1995) (determining that, although theinjunction in that case may have required the expenditure ofmoney, injunctive relief did not constitute damages under the TortImmunity Act); Anderson v. Sutter, 119 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 1074-75(1983) (determining that the Tort Immunity Act does not apply toa suit for an injunction because injunctive relief constitutes reliefother than damages under section 2-101). This interpretation issupported by the traditional distinction between damages remediesand injunction remedies. See D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies