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Docket No. 98597-Agenda 5-September 2005.

In re CHRISTOPHER K., a Minor (The People of the State of
Illinois, Appellant, v. Christopher K., Appellee.)

Opinion filed December 15, 2005.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial, respondent, Christopher K., was adjudicateddelinquent for the offense of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(West 1998)). The trial court imposed both a juvenile sentence and anadult sentence pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ)statute of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West1998)). The appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction, butreversed his adult sentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d 130, 154. The main issuebefore this court is whether the law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits thedesignation of a case as an EJJ prosecution after the appellate courtaffirms the denial of a motion to prosecute a juvenile as an adult undersection 5-805(3) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)).We hold it does not and reverse the appellate court's modification ofrespondent's sentence. We also affirm respondent's conviction. Indoing so, we hold the trial court did not err in determining respondentdid not unambiguously invoke his right to counsel.

BACKGROUND

On January 23, 1999, 16-year-old Willie Lomax was shot andkilled. Soon thereafter, respondent, who at the time was 14 years old,was arrested and taken into custody for the shooting. With his motherpresent, he was questioned by two Chicago Police Departmentdetectives. Ultimately, respondent provided oral and court-reportedstatements admitting his involvement in the shooting.⁽¹⁾

On February 1, 1999, the State filed a petition for adjudication ofwardship charging respondent with first-degree murder. The Statealso filed a motion to prosecute respondent as an adult pursuant tosection 5-805(3) of the Juvenile Court Act, which gives a juvenilecourt discretion to permit the prosecution of a minor under the state'scriminal laws (705 ILCS 405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). This procedureis known as a discretionary transfer of jurisdiction (705 ILCS405/5-805(3) (West 1998)). After a hearing, the trial court denied theState's discretionary transfer motion, and the State appealed.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the State'smotion. In re Christopher K., No. 1-99-3175 (2001) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). Initially, it rejected the State'scontention that respondent was engaged in "adult activities" to suchan extent that his behavior warranted transfer. The appellate courtthen reasoned that the trial court considered all the appropriatestatutory factors in ruling on the State's motion. According to theappellate court, the trial court correctly gave the seriousness of thealleged crime and respondent's history of delinquency the mostweight. The former factor weighed against respondent, because firstdegree murder is a serious crime, but the latter factor weighed in hisfavor, because he had only one prior station adjustment. Theremaining six factors enumerated in the discretionary transfer statutewere "equally split." Respondent's culpability, premeditated actions,and use of a deadly weapon all weighed against him, but his age, hiswillingness to participate meaningfully in available services, and theadequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile systemall weighed in respondent's favor. The appellate court concluded thatthe record supported the trial court's findings with respect to eachstatutory factor. Therefore, the appellate court held the trial court didnot abuse its discretion in denying the State's motion. In reChristopher K., No. 1-99-3175.

After the appellate court issued its mandate, respondent movedto quash his arrest for lack of probable cause, and to suppress anyevidence obtained as a result of his arrest. Respondent also movedseparately to suppress the statements he made to the police while incustody. The trial court denied both motions.

On June 20, 2001, the State filed a motion to designaterespondent's case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810 of theJuvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 1998)). When ajuvenile court designates a case as an EJJ prosecution, the minorsubject to the EJJ prosecution is entitled to a jury trial. 705 ILCS504/5-810(3) (West 1998). If the trial results in a guilty verdict, thetrial court must impose a juvenile sentence and an adult sentence,staying the adult sentence on the condition that the minor not violatethe provisions of the juvenile sentence. 705 ILCS 504/5-810(4) (West1998). The trial court granted the State's EJJ motion, and the caseproceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, the jury found respondent guilty of first-degree murder.Therefore, in accordance with section 5-810, the trial courtcommitted respondent to the Illinois Department of Corrections,Juvenile Division, until the age of 21 (705 ILCS 405/5-750(2) (West1998)) and imposed an adult sentence of 40 years' imprisonment (730ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 1998)), staying the latter on the conditionrespondent successfully complete his juvenile sentence.

Respondent appealed both his conviction and sentence. 348 Ill.App. 3d at 154. With respect to the sentence, the appellate courtfound the trial court erred in designating respondent's case as an EJJprosecution and, accordingly, in imposing a stayed adult sentence. 348Ill. App. 3d at 154. Specifically, the appellate court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred the application of section 5-810 torespondent's case. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The court reasoned thatthe State's EJJ motion was directed toward the same "ultimate issue"as the State's discretionary transfer motion, which the trial courtdenied, and which was affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at140. Therefore, the appellate court reversed respondent's adultsentence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 154. In addition, based on itsinterpretation of section 5-805 and section 5-810, the appellate courtheld the legislature intended discretionary transfer motions and EJJmotions to be filed simultaneously. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 142. Theappellate court rejected respondent's claims that section 5-810violates the principles of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000) (348 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43),and is unconstitutionally vague (348 Ill. App. 3d at 143-47).

With respect to respondent's conviction, the appellate court heldthe trial court did not err in denying respondent's motion to suppresshis statements to the police. 348 Ill. App. 3d at 151-53. The appellatecourt also upheld the trial court's denial of respondent's motion toquash his arrest and suppress related evidence. 348 Ill. App. 3d at153. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed respondent's conviction.348 Ill. App. 3d at 154.

The State filed a petition for leave to appeal with this court. Weallowed the State's petition (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) to address whetherthe law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of a case as an EJJprosecution after the appellate court affirms the denial of adiscretionary transfer motion. We also permitted The Juvenile LawCenter and a number of other organizations concerned with thewelfare of minors to file an amicus curiae brief in support ofrespondent (155 Ill. 2d R. 345).

ANALYSIS

I. Mootness

Prior to oral argument, the State filed a motion to dismiss certainissues respondent raised on cross-appeal as moot. We ordered theState's motion to be taken with the case. As a preliminary matter, weaddress this motion.

The issues on cross-appeal fall into three categories. First,respondent claims section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague. Heargues the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face because itfails to provide adequate notice to a minor as to what acts violate the"conditions" (705 ILCS 405/5-810(6) (West 1998)) of the minor'sjuvenile sentence for purposes of lifting the stay on the minor's adultsentence. He also argues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague onits face because it encourages arbitrary and capricious enforcement ofa minor's adult sentence by failing to specify what acts violate the"conditions" of the minor's juvenile sentence. In addition, respondentargues section 5-810 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to himbecause the trial court did not specifically identify the "conditions"attached to his juvenile sentence, thereby failing to provide him withadequate notice as to what acts could trigger his stayed adultsentence. Respondent also argues the statute is unconstitutionallyvague as applied to him because the trial court did not specificallyidentify the "conditions" attached to his juvenile sentence, therebyencouraging the arbitrary and capricious imposition of his adultsentence.

Second, respondent claims two Apprendi violations. He arguesthe initial designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution violatedApprendi because it increased his penalty for the alleged offensebeyond the statutory maximum absent proof to a jury beyond areasonable doubt of the factors necessary to designate a case as an EJJprosecution. Respondent reasons that the trial court's denial of theState's motion to prosecute him as an adult effectively set hismaximum sentence at commitment to juvenile detention until the ageof 21. The designation of his case as an EJJ prosecution, he concludes,exceeded this maximum. Additionally, respondent argues theprocedure in section 5-810 for lifting the stay on a minor's adultsentence violates Apprendi. Respondent reasons that section 5-810impermissibly allows a trial judge to extend a minor's sentence beyondthe statutory maximum after finding by a preponderance of theevidence that the minor committed a new offense or violated theconditions of the juvenile sentence. He reiterates that the applicablemaximum sentence is commitment to juvenile detention until theminor's 21st birthday.

Finally, respondent raises a fifth amendment claim. He argues thatwhile he was in police custody, he invoked his right to counsel, andthis right was not honored. Accordingly, he concludes the trial courtshould have suppressed the statements he made to the police.

In its motion to dismiss, the State points out that respondentturned 21 while this appeal was pending, successfully completing hisjuvenile sentence. The State concedes respondent's fifth amendmentclaim may not be moot because it relates to the validity of hisconviction, not to his sentence. It argues, however, that this courtcannot grant respondent any effectual relief on the other issues raisedin his cross-appeal. The State further asserts that the issue of whetherthe law-of-the-case doctrine bars the designation of respondent's caseas an EJJ prosecution falls within the public interest exception to themootness doctrine.

In objection, respondent requests that this court dismiss as mootall of the issues related to the designation of his case as an EJJprosecution, including the law-of-the-case issue. He also asserts hisfifth amendment claim is not moot and should not be dismissed. Inaddition, respondent argues that if this court considers the State's law-of-the-case issue under the public interest exception to the mootnessdoctrine, it should also consider respondent's vagueness and Apprendiclaims.

The threshold question before us is whether the issues raised inthis appeal are moot. An issue on appeal becomes moot where eventsoccurring after the filing of the appeal render it "impossible for thereviewing court to grant effectual relief to the complaining party."People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004). The mootnessdoctrine stems from the fear that parties to a resolved dispute lack astake in its outcome sufficient to ensure "that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court solargely depends for illumination of difficult *** questions." Baker v.Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, 678, 82 S. Ct. 691, 703(1962), quoted in Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d at 435. In general, this courtwill not consider moot issues. In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 45(2004).

Respondent's fifth amendment claim is not moot. This court haspreviously acknowledged that the completion of a defendant'ssentence renders a challenge to the sentence moot, but not a challengeto the conviction. People v. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d 267, 272-73 (1984).Nullification of a conviction may hold important consequences for adefendant. Lynn, 102 Ill. 2d at 273. Respondent's fifth amendmentclaim calls into question the validity of his conviction and therefore isnot moot.

On the contrary, the issues raised by the State and by respondentregarding the designation of respondent's case as an EJJ prosecutionare moot. Under section 5-810, the successful completion of thejuvenile sentence imposed on a minor in an EJJ prosecution terminatesthe minor's adult sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(7) (West 1998).Respondent successfully completed his juvenile sentence upon turning21. Therefore, he is no longer subject to the adult sentence imposedby the trial court pursuant to section 5-810. As a result, this courtcannot grant any meaningful relief to the State or to respondent byruling on the validity of the trial court's EJJ designation.

While this court generally will not consider moot issues, it maychoose to review such issues under the public interest exception to themootness doctrine. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 45. Therefore, we mustinquire whether the moot issues raised by the State and by respondentfall within the public interest exception. The exception applies when(1) an issue is public in nature, (2) it is likely to recur, and (3) anauthoritative determination of the issue is desirable for the futureguidance of public officers. In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402(2002). The exception is construed narrowly, and requires a clearshowing of each criterion. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d362, 365 (1999).

The law-of-the-case issue raised by the State is public in nature,because it pertains to the administration of the juvenile justice system.The issue is also likely to recur. It has the potential to arise anytime aminor eligible for discretionary transfer is prosecuted. At oralargument, respondent argued the issue implicates only the facts of thiscase. We disagree. The appellate court's law-of-the-case holdingeffectively precludes the State from ever filing an EJJ motion after thedenial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal,regardless of the underlying facts of the case. Finally, an authoritativedetermination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable for the futureguidance of public officers. In assessing the desirability of anauthoritative determination, this court has consistently looked towhether there is conflicting case law on the issue in question. See,e.g., In re Marriage of Peters-Farrell, 216 Ill. 2d 287, 292 (2005) (noauthoritative determination needed because no conflicting case law);In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382, 387-88 (2003) (same); Walgreen, 186 Ill.2d at 365-66 (same); Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 46 (authoritativedetermination needed because of conflicting case law); People v.Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 436 (2004) (same); Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.2d at 402; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196Ill. 2d 27, 33 (2001); In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2000) (same); Lucasv. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (1997) (same). While the appellatecourt's decision in this case does not directly conflict with prior caselaw regarding law-of-the-case doctrine, none of the cases cited by theappellate court apply the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar considerationof an issue defined by a different statutory section than the issuedetermined in the first appeal. Compare 348 Ill. App. 3d at 140, withPeople v. Tenner, 206 Ill. 2d 381 (2002); People v. Patterson, 154 Ill.2d 414 (1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24 (1988); People v.Rodriguez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 877 (2000); Lake Bluff Heating & AirConditioning Supply, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 117 Ill.App. 3d 284 (1983); Miscevich v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 110 Ill.App. 3d 400 (1982). Moreover, the appellate court did not clearlyexplain whether its conclusion that the State must simultaneously filea motion for discretionary transfer and an EJJ motion is dicta, or anecessary implication of its holding that the law-of-the-case doctrinebars the consideration of an EJJ motion after the denial of adiscretionary transfer motion is affirmed on appeal. See 348 Ill. App.3d at 141-42. For these reasons, we find that an authoritativedetermination of the law-of-the-case issue is desirable to guidejuvenile judges in the disposition of motions for discretionary transferand EJJ motions. Because the law-of-the-case issue meets the threecriteria of the public interest exception, we choose to consider it onthe merits.

We next turn to respondent's vagueness claims. We acknowledgeat the outset that facial and as applied vagueness challenges to section5-810 have the potential to recur anytime a case is designated as anEJJ prosecution. Moreover, whether section 5-810 isunconstitutionally vague on its face is an issue that is public in nature,because if the statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face, it has novalid application. See People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 394, 399 (2005)(noting that where a statute does not affect first amendment rights, itwill not be declared unconstitutionally vague unless it is not capableof any valid application). Whether section 5-810 is unconstitutionallyvague as applied to defendant, however, is an issue specific to thefacts of defendant's case. Therefore, it is not public in nature.Furthermore, we do not believe an authoritative determination ofeither of the vagueness claims raised by respondent is necessary at thistime. Our research discloses that only one appellate court decisionbesides the case before us has addressed a vagueness challenge tosection 5-810. See In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1 (2004). Theappellate court's resolution of the vagueness challenge in J.W. is notinconsistent with the appellate court's discussion of respondent'svagueness claims in this case. Compare J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 13-15(holding respondent had no standing to raise vagueness challenge tosection 5-810), with 348 Ill. App. 3d at 146-47 (holding the term"offense," as used in section 5-810, is not unconstitutionally vague).We are aware that neither the instant appellate court decision nor J.W.addresses the specific arguments respondent raises before this courtin support of his claims. This, however, merely further confirms that,as yet, there is no need for an authoritative pronouncement onvagueness challenges to section 5-810. For these reasons,respondent's as-applied and facial-vagueness claims do not fall withinthe public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

Finally, we address whether respondent's Apprendi claims fallwithin the public interest exception. These claims are public in naturebecause, like the law-of-the-case issue, they pertain to theadministration of the juvenile justice system. Specifically, theyimplicate the legislature's decision to allow judges to make EJJdesignations and determine whether to impose stayed adult sentenceson minors convicted in EJJ prosecutions. They also are likely to recur,as they may potentially be raised whenever a judge rules on an EJJmotion after the denial of a discretionary transfer motion is affirmedon appeal. However, we conclude that no authoritative determinationof these issues is necessary at this time. Our research discloses that theappellate court has thus far uniformly rejected respondent's claim thatthe initial designation of a case as an EJJ prosecution violatesApprendi. See 348 Ill. App. 3d at 143; J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 10-12;In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276, 289 (2002). The appellatecourt has yet to address respondent's claim that the procedure forlifting a stay on the minor's adult sentence in an EJJ case violatesApprendi. However, as we noted with respect to respondent'svagueness claims, this merely confirms that, at this time, there is noneed for an authoritative determination of this issue. Thus,respondent's Apprendi claims do not fall within the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine.

In sum, the law-of-the-case issue raised by the State and thevagueness and Apprendi claims raised by respondent are moot.However, we shall consider the law-of-the-case issue on the meritsbecause it falls within the public interest exception to the mootnessdoctrine. We shall also consider the fifth amendment issue raised byrespondent on the merits, because it pertains to the validity of hisconviction and is therefore not moot.

II. Law-of-the-case Doctrine

The law-of-the-case doctrine prohibits the reconsideration ofissues that have been decided by a reviewing court in a prior appeal.See generally 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review