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Docket No. 92643-Agenda 16-September 2002.

In re B.L.S., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois,
Appellant, v. B.L.S., Appellee).

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

B.L.S. was adjudicated an habitual juvenile offender andcommitted to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division,(DOC) until his twenty-first birthday, as mandated by section5-815(f) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS405/5-815(f) (West 2000)). The appellate court affirmed theadjudication and commitment, but held that B.L.S. was entitled tocredit for time spent in custody before sentencing. 325 Ill. App. 3d96, 100. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal.177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

The State asks this court to hold that B.L.S. is not entitled toreceive predisposition credit against his commitment. B.L.S. seekscross-relief, asking this court to hold that the appellate court erredin determining that a social investigation report was not requiredbefore committing him to the DOC. We affirm the appellate courtand hold that: (1) an habitual juvenile offender is entitled toreceive predisposition credit against a determinate sentence; and(2) the trial court's failure to order a social investigation reportbefore committing B.L.S. to the DOC was harmless error.

I. BACKGROUND

B.L.S., a minor, pleaded guilty to an aggravated battery andwas held in custody in a juvenile detention home before beingadjudicated an habitual juvenile offender under section 5-815(f)of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000)). Pursuant to therequirements of section 5-815(f) of the Act, B.L.S. was committedto the DOC until his twenty-first birthday. The trial court did notaward any predisposition credit, nor did the trial court order asocial investigation report before committing B.L.S. to the DOC.The appellate court affirmed the adjudication and commitment,but held that B.L.S. was entitled to predisposition credit andremanded the cause for calculation of predisposition detentioncredit. 325 Ill. App. 3d 96. This court allowed the State's petitionfor leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

II. ANALYSIS

At issue is whether habitual juvenile offenders are entitled toreceive credit for predisposition custody. The relevant portion ofthe Act, section 5-815(f), provides as follows:

"If the court finds that the prerequisites established insubsection (a) of this Section have been proven, it shalladjudicate the minor an Habitual Juvenile Offender andcommit him to the Department of Corrections, JuvenileDivision, until his 21st birthday, without possibility ofparole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence.However, the minor shall be entitled to earn one day ofgood conduct credit for each day served as reductionsagainst the period of his confinement. Such good conductcredits shall be earned or revoked according to theprocedures applicable to the allowance and revocation ofgood conduct credit for adult prisoners servingdeterminate sentences for felonies.

For purposes of determining good conduct credit,commitment as an Habitual Juvenile Offender shall beconsidered a determinate commitment, and the differencebetween the date of the commitment and the minor's 21stbirthday shall be considered the determinate period of hisconfinement." 705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000).

The State contends that habitual juvenile offenders are notentitled to credit for predisposition confinement because the Actdoes not expressly provide for such credit. B.L.S. argues that anhabitual juvenile offender is entitled to receive the same credit asan adult offender sentenced to a determinate sentence.

Also at issue is the social investigation report requirement ofthe Act. Section 5-705(1) of the Act provides, in relevant part:

"At the sentencing hearing, the court shall determinewhether it is in the best interests of the minor or the publicthat he or she be made a ward of the court, and, if he orshe is to be made a ward of the court, the court shalldetermine the proper disposition best serving the interestsof the minor and the public. *** No order of commitmentto the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, shallbe entered against a minor before a written report of socialinvestigation, which has been completed within theprevious 60 days, is presented to and considered by thecourt." 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2000).

B.L.S. argues that the trial court erred in failing to order asocial investigation report before committing him to the DOC. TheState contends that a social investigation report is not requiredbefore sentencing an habitual juvenile offender to the DOCbecause the trial court has no sentencing discretion.

The parties raise issues of statutory construction. We reviewissues of statutory construction de novo. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d405, 418 (2001). The primary purpose of statutory construction isto determine and give effect to the legislature's intent, whilepresuming the legislature did not intend to create absurd,inconvenient, or unjust results. D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 418-19. Thebest indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute.In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000). If the language of the statute isclear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other aids ofconstruction. D.L., 191 Ill. 2d at 9. A statute is ambiguous if it iscapable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). In ascertaining legislative intent, it isproper to compare statutes that concern the same subject matterand to consider statutes on related subjects. See Anderson v. Cityof Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947).

A. Credit Against Commitment for Time Spent inPredisposition Detention

On the first issue, section 5-815(f) of the Act requires that anhabitual juvenile offender be committed to the DOC until age 21.705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000). Commitment as an habitualjuvenile offender is considered a determinate commitment andgood-conduct credit for habitual juvenile offenders is determinedaccording to the procedures applicable to adult prisoners. 705ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2000). Section 5-8-7(b) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (the Code) provides the rules for calculatingthe length of imprisonment for offenders and states that "[t]heoffender shall be given credit on the determinate sentence *** fortime spent in custody as a result of the offense for which thesentence was imposed." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b) (West 2000).Whether an habitual juvenile offender is entitled to credit forpredisposition detention is an issue of first impression.

Our appellate court districts are divided on the issue ofwhether a delinquent minor should receive sentence credit for timespent in predisposition detention. Compare In re E.C., 297 Ill.App. 3d 177 (4th Dist. 1998), and In re Jesus R., 326 Ill App. 3d1070 (4th Dist. 2002) (holding that juveniles sentenced toindeterminate terms are entitled to predisposition credit), with Inre J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327 (2d Dist. 1998), and In re C.L.P.,332 Ill. App. 3d 640 (2d Dist. 2002) (holding that juvenilessentenced to indeterminate terms are not entitled to predispositioncredit).

The appellate court in this case relied on E.C. to reach itsconclusion that habitual juvenile offenders are entitled topredisposition credit. In his brief, B.L.S. relies on E.C. and JesusR. to support his argument that there is no statutory support fordenying predisposition credit. As the State correctly points out,E.C., Jesus R., J.J.M., and C.L.P. are distinguishable because eachof those cases involved an indeterminate commitment. We agreewith the State that the issue of whether a juvenile sentenced to anindeterminate term is entitled to predisposition credit is not beforethis court.

The issue before this court is confined to whether an habitualjuvenile offender sentenced to a determinate term is entitled toreceive credit for predisposition detention. In other words, wemust determine whether the rules for calculating the length of theterm of imprisonment for offenders, provided in section 5-8-7 ofthe Code, are applicable to an habitual juvenile offender sentencedto a determinate term under section 5-815(f) of the Act. We neednot decide whether a juvenile sentenced to an indeterminate termis entitled to predisposition credit.

The State argues that B.L.S. is not entitled to credit for hispredisposition confinement. According to the State, the right topredisposition credit is statutory and no such right has beenprovided to habitual juvenile offenders by the Act. The Statereasons that the legislature's failure to include such a provisiondemonstrates its intent to render the statutory right topredisposition detention credit inapplicable to habitual juvenileoffenders. Conversely, B.L.S. argues that nothing in the Actprohibits granting predisposition detention credit to an habitualjuvenile offender.

The State's interpretation of the statute is reasonable.However, B.L.S.'s construction of the statute is just as reasonable.A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood byreasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 288 (1994). Here, the statuteis clearly subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and isthus ambiguous. See B.C., 176 Ill. 2d at 543. Accordingly, wemust employ aids of statutory construction to determine legislativeintent, while avoiding absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. SeeD.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419. Where the language of the statute isambiguous, it is appropriate to examine the legislative history.People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 40 (1994). In this case, theintent of the legislature concerning predisposition credit wasabsent from the legislative history of the Act. Another source toascertain legislative intent is the council commentary to thestatute. People v. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (1995). Although notbinding upon this court, council commentary is persuasiveauthority. Ross, 168 Ill. 2d at 352.

The council commentary to section 5-8-7 of the Code states,in relevant part, "[t]his section *** gives full credit for time servedin custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence wasimposed. This would apply irrespective of where the offender wasconfined ***." 730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-8-7, Council Commentary, at622 (Smith-Hurd 1997). The council commentary continues,explaining, "[g]enerally, Illinois has operated under a full creditingstatute *** to give benefit to the offender for all time served inconfinement both prior to and subsequent to actual imprisonment."730 ILCS Ann. 5/5-8-7, Council Commentary, at 622 (Smith-Hurd 1997). Accordingly, the council commentary indicates thelegislature's intent that offenders receive credit for all time spentin confinement.

Moreover, this court has stated that "[t]he credit requirementof section 5-8-7(b) is meant to account for all time served inconfinement for a particular offense." People v. Latona, 184 Ill. 2d260, 270 (1998). The purpose of the credit requirement of section5-8-7(b) is to ensure that offenders do not ultimately remainincarcerated for periods in excess of their eventual sentences.Latona, 184 Ill. 2d at 270. "Through section 5-8-7(b) thelegislature has explicitly required that offenders receive creditagainst their terms of imprisonment when they are 'in custody asa result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed.' "People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 462 (1996).

Accordingly, the resolution of the issue before us isstraightforward. The habitual juvenile offender provisions mandatea determinate sentence in the DOC. Section 5-8-7(b) of the Coderequires full credit against determinate sentences for all timeserved in confinement. Thus, the legislature had no need to includeany predisposition credit provision in the habitual juvenileoffender statute.

Nothing in the Code restricts section 5-8-7(b) to adultoffenders, and we can conceive of no rationale for denying ajuvenile credit against a determinate sentence for time spent inpredisposition custody. Consequently, we conclude the legislatureintended that the rules for calculating the term of imprisonment foran offender sentenced to a determinate sentence are applicable toan habitual juvenile offender. Any other interpretation would leadto an absurd and unjust result. Moreover, the State has notpresented any argument as to harm that would result from grantingsuch predisposition credit.

Furthermore, our holding here is consistent with this court'srecent ruling concerning the applicability of another rule injuvenile proceedings. See In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313 (2001). InA.G., we considered whether Supreme Court Rule 604(d),governing appeals from a judgment entered on a guilty plea, isapplicable to juvenile proceedings. We recognized that recentamendments to the Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings thatare similar to adult criminal proceedings. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 317-19. We commented that amendments to the Act "represent[ ] afundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation toinclude the overriding concerns of protecting the public andholding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law."A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 317. We further noted that "virtually all of theconstitutional requirements of a criminal trial have beenintroduced into juvenile delinquency proceedings." A.G., 195 Ill.2d at 318. Accordingly, we held that compliance with Rule 604(d)is required in juvenile proceedings. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 319.

A similar result is compelled by the circumstances in thiscase. Public safety and punishment are now the overridingconcerns of the juvenile justice system. A.G., 195 Ill. 2d at 317.The incarcerated juvenile's liberty is restrained just as effectivelyas that of an adult offender. See In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 541(1967). We therefore hold that an habitual juvenile offender isentitled to receive credit for time spent in custody prior tosentencing.

B. Commitment Under Section 5-815(f) Without a SocialInvestigation Report

In his request for cross-relief, B.L.S. contends that theappellate court erred in holding that a social investigation reportwas not required prior to committing him to the DOC. Respondentbases his claim on the mandatory language of section 5-705(1) ofthe Act (705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2000)), requiring the trialcourt to consider a social investigation report before committinga minor to the DOC.

Section 5-705(1) of the Act specifies the circumstances to beconsidered in determining whether to make the minor a ward ofthe court. If the minor is made a ward of the court, then the trialcourt must determine the disposition best suited to the interests ofthe minor and the public. Section 5-705(1) further provides thatthe judge may rely on "[a]ll evidence helpful in determining thesequestions, including oral and written reports." 705 ILCS405/5-705(1) (West 2000). A social investigation report includesinformation of the minor's physical and mental history andcondition, family situation and background, economic status,education, occupation, personal habits, and history of delinquencyor criminality. 705 ILCS 405/5-701 (West 2000). Thus, the socialinvestigation report provides the trial court with information toassist in determining whether to make the minor a ward of thecourt and in determining an appropriate disposition for the minor.

Here, the language of the statute clearly and unambiguouslystates that "[n]o order of commitment to the Department ofCorrections, Juvenile Division, shall be entered against a minorbefore a written report of social investigation *** is presented toand considered by the court." 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West2000). There are no exceptions made for those situations when thejudge lacks sentencing discretion. Therefore, a social investigationreport must be prepared before sentencing any minor to the DOC,and the trial court erred by sentencing B.L.S. without the benefitof the report.

In affirming the trial court, the appellate court erroneouslyheld that a social investigation report was not required in this case.However, we may affirm the trial court's decision on any basisestablished by the record. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 511(1999). We are instructed by Supreme Court Rule 615(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variancewhich does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Rule615(a) is applicable in juvenile appeals. In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d307, 322 (1995). Here, the trial court had no sentencing discretionbecause, once B.L.S. was adjudicated an habitual juvenileoffender, section 5-815(f) of the Act mandated that the trial courtcommit him to the DOC until his twenty-first birthday. Thus, asocial investigation report would have served no purpose in thedecision to enter the sentencing order and remandment forresentencing is not necessary because B.L.S. was not prejudicedby the absence of the report.

We recognize that information provided in a socialinvestigation report may be useful to the DOC and others involvedin the ward's care, treatment, and rehabilitation. However, B.L.S.has not raised such an argument, and we have been provided withno information that the DOC requires such a report. Accordingly,we hold that the trial court's error in failing to order a socialinvestigation report was harmless.

III. CONCLUSION

We hold that an habitual juvenile offender is entitled toreceive credit against a determinate sentence for time spent inpredisposition detention. We also hold that the trial court's failureto order a social investigation report prior to committing B.L.S. tothe DOC was harmless error.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of theappellate court.

Affirmed.