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Docket No. 93595-Agenda 6-November 2002.

In re ANDREA F., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois et al., 
Appellants, v. T.F., Appellee).

Opinion filed December 18, 2003.

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The State and the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) appeal from a judgment of the appellate court reversing the circuitcourt's termination of T.F.'s parental rights. The circuit court ofWinnebago County adjudicated T.F. an unfit parent, terminated hisparental rights to his daughter, Andrea, and appointed DCFS guardian ofAndrea with the power to consent to adoption. The appellate courtreversed, finding that the circuit court failed to comply with section 1-5(3)of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West1996)) because it did not admonish T.F. that if he should fail to cooperatewith the DCFS, comply with the terms of the service plans, and correctthe conditions that required to Andrea to be in its care, he riskedtermination of his parental rights. The appellate court remanded the causeto the circuit court for a new dispositional hearing pursuant to section2-22 of the Act. 327 Ill. App. 3d 1072. This court granted leave toappeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. For the following reasons, we reverse thejudgement of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt.

On November 6, 1995, the State filed separate petitions of abuseand neglect with respect to Andrea and S.H., T.F.'s daughter andstepdaughter, respectively. In the first petition, the State alleged in countI that T.F. had sexually abused Andrea, and alleged in count II that T.F.had neglected Andrea, in that he had placed her at risk of harm bysexually abusing S.H. In the second petition, the State alleged in count Ithat T.F. had sexually abused S.H., and alleged in count II that T.F. hadneglected S.H., in that he had placed her at risk of harm by sexuallyabusing Andrea.

At his first appearance on December 1, 1995, the circuit courtadmonished T.F. that if either allegation were found to be true, or if thecourt found that the parents were unable to adequately care for, protect,train, or discipline the children, the children could be declared wards of thecourt, removed from the custody of one or both parents, and placed underthe guardianship of DCFS. The trial court also admonished T.F as to hisrights under sections 1-5(1) and 1-5(2) of the Act. T.F. was notspecifically advised that his parental rights could be terminated if he shouldfail to cooperate with DCFS, comply with the terms of the service plans,or correct the conditions that caused Andrea to be in DCFS's care.

The adjudication hearing began on May 2, 1996, and continuedthrough July 2, 1996, at which time the trial court found that the allegationsof each petition had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.Following a dispositional hearing on July 30, 1996, the trial court declaredAndrea and S.H. to be wards of the court. C.J., Andrea's mother, wasgiven custody and guardianship of Andrea, and both parents were orderedto cooperate with DCFS and participate in any counseling DCFSrecommended. Again, T.F. was not specifically told that his parental rightscould be terminated if he should fail to cooperate with DCFS. T.F.appealed.

The appellate court found that while there was sufficient evidence tosupport the finding that T.F. had sexually abused S.H., there wasinsufficient evidence to support the finding that T.F. had sexually abusedAndrea. Thus, in Andrea's case, the appellate court affirmed the judgmenton count II (neglect based on an injurious environment resulting fromsexual abuse of S.H.), but reversed the judgment on count I (sexual abuseof Andrea). In S.H.'s case, the appellate court reversed the judgment oncount II (neglect based on an injurious environment resulting from sexualabuse of Andrea) but affirmed the judgment on count I (sexual abuse ofS.H.). In re A.F., No. 2-96-1050 (1997) (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23).

T.F. subsequently filed a motion to modify the order of disposition.Following a hearing on May 11, 1998,⁽¹⁾ the trial court entered a modifiedorder of adjudication finding that Andrea was neglected, in conformitywith the decision of the appellate court. The order of disposition was notmodified. In July 1998, DCFS was given custody and guardianship ofAndrea.

On August 11, 2000, the State filed a petition to terminate theparental rights of T.F. and C.J. with respect to Andrea and to appointDCFS as guardian of Andrea with the power to consent to adoption. Thepetition alleged that T.F. and C.J. were unfit parents in that: one, they hadfailed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibilityas to Andrea's welfare; two, they had substantially neglected Andrea ina continuous or repeated manner; and three, they had failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of theremoval or to make reasonable progress toward the return of Andrea tothem within nine months after an adjudication of neglect or abuse.

Immediately prior to the hearing on the petition, C.J. surrendered herparental rights to Andrea. Following the hearing, the trial court found thatthe State had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that T.F.had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern orresponsibility for Andrea, and had failed to make reasonable efforts tocorrect the conditions that led to Andrea's removal and failed to makereasonable efforts toward her return. The trial court found the evidenceinsufficient to prove that T.F. had substantially neglected Andrea in arepeated or continuous manner. Following a best interests hearing onSeptember 6, 2001, the trial court terminated T.F.'s parental rights andauthorized the DCFS to consent to her adoption. T.F. appealed.

The appellate court reversed, holding that the circuit court's failureto admonish T.F. that his failure to cooperate with DCFS, comply with theservice plans, or correct the conditions that caused Andrea to be inDCFS's care could result in the termination of his parental rights violatedsection 1-5(3) of the Act and deprived T.F. of a fair determination of hisparental rights. The appellate court acknowledged that under the versionof section 1-5(3) in effect at the time of the initial adjudication of neglectand abuse, and at the time of the order of disposition, there was nospecific requirement that courts admonish parents regarding thetermination of their parental rights. The court concluded, however, that therights set forth in section 1-5(3) would be "meaningless if the parents[were] unaware of them." 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1076. Noting that parentshave a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of theirchildren, the appellate court concluded that "the legislature intended thatthe trial courts inform the parents of all of their rights to the proceedings,including what they must do to retain their parental rights to their children"(327 Ill. App. 3d at 1077), and that while "the primary concern expressedby the Act is the best interest of the child *** the due process right of theparent outweighs our desire for conclusiveness" (327 Ill. App. 3d at1079).

T.F. also argued that the adjudication of unfitness was contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence and that the trial court violated his fifthamendment right not to incriminate himself because the findings of unfitnesswere improperly based on his refusal to admit that he had sexually abusedS.H. The appellate court declined to address these arguments, other thanto note that on remand DCFS could not compel therapy treatment thatwould require T.F. to incriminate himself and that the trial court could notbase its decision to terminate parental rights on T.F.'s refusal to admit toa crime. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1080.

Prior to addressing the merits of the appellant's argument, we mustconsider whether this appeal should be dismissed as moot. At oralargument, counsel for the State disclosed that several days earlier, T.F.had executed a surrender of his parental rights.

The existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite toappellate jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decideabstract, hypothetical, or moot questions. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher,197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001). An appeal is considered moot where itpresents no actual controversy or where the issues have ceased to exist.Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill.2d 252, 256 (1997), quoting First National Bank of Waukegan v.Kusper, 98 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1983), quoting People v. Redlich, 402 Ill.270, 278-79 (1949). The test for mootness is whether the issues involvedin the trial court no longer exist because intervening events have renderedit impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief to thecomplaining party. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989). Areviewing court can take judicial notice of events which, while notappearing in the record, disclose that an actual controversy no longerexists, rendering the issue before the court moot. Dixon v. Chicago &North Western Transportation Co., 151 Ill. 2d 108, 116-17 (1992).Where the issue or issues before the court have become moot, the appealwill generally be dismissed.

Notwithstanding these general rules, a reviewing court maynevertheless review an otherwise moot issue pursuant to the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine. Richardson, 179 Ill. 2d at 256. Thecriteria for application of the public interest exception are: (1) the publicnature of the question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determinationfor the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the likelihood that thequestion will recur. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257.

The issue in this case clearly falls within the public interest exception.The question of whether circuit courts were required under former section1-5(3) of the Act to admonish parents that they risked termination of theirparental rights if they failed to cooperate with DCFS is one of publicimportance. Further, the circumstances are likely to recur because, as theState points out, the appellate court's decision threatens to disturb a greatnumber of dispositions under the Act where the initial court appearance,adjudicatory hearing, or dispositional hearing occurred prior to January 1,1998. For this reason, authoritative guidance from this court is required.

This determination does not conflict with our pervious holdings in Inre Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362 (1999), In re India B., 202 Ill.2d 522 (2002), and In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d 383 (2003).

In Walgreen, Charles and Kathleen Walgreen filed a petition toadopt two of their grandchildren, arguing that the children's biologicalmother, Loren, was unfit. DCFS was granted leave to intervene. The trialcourt denied the Walgreens' petition based on its finding that severalprovisions of the Adoption Act were unconstitutional. Subsequent to theWalgreens' direct appeal to this court, Loren consented to the adoption.Loren and the Walgreens agreed to dismissal of the appeal on mootnessgrounds, but DCFS argued that this court should address the issues raisedin the case in order to provide guidance for future cases. We declined todo so, stating that a court should not resolve questions merely for the sakeof setting precedent to govern potential cases. With respect to the publicinterest exception, we concluded that the exception did not apply. Weacknowledged that the question of whether the challenged statutoryprovisions were constitutional was one of public importance, but found noneed for authoritative determination for the future guidance of publicofficers because various panels of the appellate court had consideredsimilar constitutional challenges to the provision in question and hadconsistently found them to be constitutional. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 364-66.

In the present case, by contrast, it was the appellate court, ratherthan a circuit court, which held in a written opinion that the pre-January 1,1998, version of section 1-5(3) required trial courts to admonish parentsthat they had to cooperate with DCFS and comply with the service plansor risk termination of their parental rights. This is an incorrect statement ofthe law which, if allowed to stand, will, as the State has argued, disturb agreat number of dispositions under the Act where the initial courtappearance, adjudicatory hearing, or dispositional hearing occurred priorto January 1, 1998.

In In re India B., the circuit court entered a default judgementterminating the parental rights of Denise S. and appointing DCFS asguardian with the power to consent to adoption. Her motion to vacate thedefault order was denied and the children were subsequently adopted.Denise S. appealed, arguing that she was denied due process and the rightto counsel when the circuit court barred her from presenting either adefense or further pleadings as a sanction for failing to appear at herparental fitness hearing. The appellate court affirmed (In re India B., No.1-99-3433 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)), and wegranted leave to appeal. In response to the State's motion to dismiss theappeal as moot, Denise S. argued that the public interest exceptionapplied because there was conflicting appellate authority on theappropriate application of Supreme Court Rule 219(c) sanctions in casesinvolving termination of parental rights. Without undertaking anexamination of her argument on appeal, we noted that each appellate caseshe cited was decided on its own peculiar facts, and that the cases werenot irreconcilably conflicting. In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543.

In re India B. is clearly distinguishable from the present case. Theonly grounds for invoking the public interest exception advanced by theappellant was that there was conflicting appellate authority. This courtdetermined that the appellate cases cited by the appellant were not inconflict. Thus, appellant failed to show that there was a need for anauthoritative determination by this court for future guidance. In the presentcase, the State's argument for invoking the public interest exception is notbased on the need to resolve conflicting precedent.

Finally, in In re J.B., Wanda B. appealed the circuit court's findingthat she was unfit and its termination of her parental rights. During thependency of her appeal, the children were adopted. In her appeal to thiscourt, she argued that section 1(D)(q) of the Adoption Act wasunconstitutional. In response to the State's motion to dismiss the appealas moot, Wanda B. argued that the public interest exception applied.Finding that we were presented with the same scenario as in In re IndiaB., we reached the same conclusion-the public interest exception did notapply. In re J.B., 204 Ill. 2d at 387-89.

As with Walgreen and India B., we find that In re J.B. isdistinguishable and does not preclude us from invoking the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine. We now turn to an analysis of themerits of the appellant's arguments.

The question of whether the trial court was required by section1-5(3) to admonish T.F. that he risked losing his parental rights if heshould fail to cooperate with DCFS is one of statutory interpretation. Theprimary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to theintent of the legislature. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002).Legislative intent is best ascertained by examining the language of thestatute itself. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001).Where the language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resortto aids of statutory construction, and courts must give effect to the statuteas written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions thatthe legislature did not express. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000), quotingGarza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d373, 378 (1996), quoting Solich v. George & Anna Portes CancerPrevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 83 (1994).

Prior to January 1, 1998, section 1-5 of the Act provided inpertinent part:

"Rights of parties to proceedings.

* * *

(3) *** At the first appearance before the court by the minor[and] his parents *** the court shall explain the nature of theproceedings and inform the parties of their rights under the first2 paragraphs of this Section." 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West1996).

The clear and unambiguous language of the version of section 1-5(3)in effect at the relevant times required courts to inform the parties of theirrights under the first two paragraphs of that section. Paragraph 1 providedthat the minor and his parents had the right to be present, to be heard, topresent evidence, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine court files andrecords, and to be represented by counsel. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West1996). Subsection (2) provided that any current or previously appointedfoster parent or representative of an agency or institution interested in theminor had the right to notice, to be heard, and, in certain circumstances,to intervene. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(2) (West 1996). Nothing in eithersubsection (1) or (2) provided that parents had the right to be admonishedthat they risked having their parental rights terminated if they failed tocooperate with DCFS. Thus, prior to January 1, 1998, section 1-5(3) didnot require trial courts to admonish parents that they risked having theirparental rights terminated if they failed to cooperate with DCFS.

Section 1-5(3) was amended, effective January 1, 1998, to requiretrial courts to admonish parents that they "must cooperate with [DCFS],comply with the terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions thatrequire[d] the child to be in care, or risk termination of their parentalrights" (705 ILCS 405/1-5(3), 2-21(1), 2-22(6) (West 1998)). Thisadmonishment is required on three occasions: at the first appearance if thechild is alleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent; following theadjudication hearing if the child is adjudicated to be abused, neglected ordependent; and following the dispositional hearing if the child is declareda ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West 1998). In the presentcase, all three events took place prior to January 1, 1998, the effectivedate of the amendment. Thus, the amended version of section 1-5(3) didnot apply to T.F.

Because section 1-5(3) did not, prior to January 1, 1998, requiretrial courts to admonish parents that they risked termination of theirparental rights if they failed to cooperate with DCFS or comply with theterms of the service plans, the trial court in the present case did not violatesection 1-5(3) by failing to give such an admonishment to T.F.

In support of its position, the appellate court noted that the amendedversion of section 1-5(3) was in effect at the time of the hearing on themotion to modify the order of disposition. This is not, however, one of thethree points at which the amended statute requires the admonishment.Moreover, the trial court did not modify the order of disposition, butrather modified its order of adjudication to find that Andrea wasneglected, in accordance with the appellate court's order. In so doing, thetrial court heard no new evidence and made no new findings, and theoriginal finding of neglect remained undisturbed. Under suchcircumstances, the trial court was not required by the amended versionsection 1-5(3) to admonish T.F. at the May 11, 1998, hearing on themotion to modify.

As noted above, the appellate court acknowledged that under theversion of section 1-5(3) in effect at the time of the dispositional order,there was no specific requirement that trial courts admonish parentsconcerning termination of their rights. After noting that the dispositionalhearing serves a crucial role in allowing the trial court to balance theparents' fundamental liberty interest in raising their children with the state'sobligation to protect the best interests of the child, however, the appellatecourt concluded that the legislature intended that trial courts must informpatents of all of their rights to the proceedings, including what they mustdo to retain their rights to their children. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1077. Thus,the court ruled that, as a matter of due process, section 1-5(3)'srequirement that T.F. be informed of the nature of the proceedingsincluded the right to be admonished that he risked termination of hisparental rights if he failed to cooperate with DCFS or to comply with theterms of its service plans. 327 Ill. App. 3d at 1079. In support of itsposition, the court relied upon In re Moore, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1117 (1980),and In re Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d 1048 (1979).

In Smith, L.S. consented to having her child, A.S., placed in thetemporary custody of DCFS until an adjudicatory hearing could be held.The trial court admonished L.S. that she was entitled to have an attorneyat that hearing. L.S. acknowledged that she had such a right, but chose notto exercise it. Following the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court foundA.S. to be neglected and placed him in the temporary custody of DCFS,pending the dispositional hearing. Following that hearing, the trial courtremoved A.S. from the custody of his parents and placed him in thepermanent custody of DCFS. In re Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1049-52.

L.S. appealed, arguing inter alia, that the trial court failed to adviseher of her rights and the nature of the proceedings, as required bysubsection (3) of section 1-20 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill. Rev. Stat.1977, ch. 37, par. 701-20(3)), which provided that at their firstappearance, parents were to be informed of the nature of the proceedingsand their rights under subsections (1) and (2) of section 1-20. Theappellate court held that while there was little authority as to what wouldconstitute adequate admonitions under section 1-20, the statutorylanguage clearly imposed a mandatory duty on the trial court to inform theparties of the nature of the proceedings and that, at a minimum, thisincluded a duty to admonish parents that the child may become a ward ofthe court and that they may lose custody of their child. Applying thisprinciple to the case before it, the court concluded that the trial court erredin failing to admonish L.S at her first appearance that she could losecustody of her son. The court noted that there was no showing in therecord that L.S. had agreed to DCFS's taking permanent custody of herson, or that she was even aware that such action was possible. In fact, thecourt further noted, a DCFS social worker had told L.S. at theadjudicatory hearing that DCFS wanted to return her son to her thefollowing summer. Thus, the court concluded that in the absence of anyadmonitions as to the nature of the dispositional proceedings or that shecould lose permanent custody of her son, L.S. was unprepared tochallenge the State when it sought permanent custody at the dispositionalhearing. In re Smith, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 1053-54.

In Moore, the trial court found E.M. to be neglected and, followinga dispositional hearing, awarded custody to E.M.'s grandmother. J.B.,E.M.'s mother, appealed, arguing that she was denied due process wherethe trial court failed to explain to her the nature of the adjudicatoryproceedings, and that such failure violated section 1-20 of the JuvenileCourt Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 37, par. 701-20). The appellate courtheld that because the record did not affirmatively demonstrate that J.B.was aware of the nature of the adjudicatory proceedings, her rights undersection 1-20 were denied. Citing Smith, the court in Moore held that anew adjudicatory hearing is required when it is not apparent that theparent was aware of his or her rights or that the proceedings could resultin the loss of custody of the child. In re Moore, 87 Ill. App. 3d at 1120-22.

Neither Smith nor Moore support the appellate court's position. InSmith, L.S. was not represented by counsel and had been led to believethat her loss of custody was temporary. Because she was not admonishedas to the nature of the dispositional proceedings, she was unable toknowingly and intelligently exercise her various procedural rights. InMoore, the court held that a new adjudicatory hearing was requiredbecause it was not apparent from the record that J.B. was aware of herrights or that she could lose custody of her child. These cases stand onlyfor the proposition that in proceedings under the Act, parents must bemade aware that they could lose custody of their children and that theirchildren could become wards of the court. They do not support theproposition for which the appellate court cited to them: that parents mustbe specifically admonished that they must cooperate with DCFS andcomply with the terms of the service plans.

In any event, we find that in this case T.F. was not denied dueprocess by the court's failure to give the admonishment in question.

A parent has a fundamental due process right to the care, custodyand control of his or her children, but that right is subject to termination.In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362-63 (2001). Because a parental rightstermination proceeding implicates a fundamental liberty interest, theprocedures employed in this type of proceeding must comply with therequirements of procedural due process. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.745, 749, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 604, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1392 (1982); In reM.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L.Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), the Supreme Court identified threefactors to be considered in determining what due process requires inproceedings implicating fundamental liberty interests: (1) the privateinterest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneousdeprivation of that interest through the proceedings used, and the probablevalue, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and (3) thegovernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal andadministrative burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards wouldentail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33, 96 S. Ct. at 903.These same factors are considered in resolving what proceduralsafeguards are required by the due process clause of the Illinoisconstitution. See People v. Gerke, 123 Ill. 2d 85, 90 (1998). Althoughthe issue in Mathews was whether the due process clause of the fifthamendment required an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of arecipients Social Security disability payments, both the Supreme Courtand this court have applied the Mathews factors to cases involving thetermination of parental rights. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,452 U.S. 18, 31, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640, 652, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2161-62(1981); In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 363-64.

Applying the Mathews factors to the facts of the present case, weconclude that T.F. was not denied due process by the trial court's failureto specifically admonish him that he risked termination of his parental rightsif he failed to cooperate with DCFS or comply with the terms of theservice plans. This court has previously held a parent's right to the care,custody and control of his or her child is a fundamental right that courtswill not terminate lightly. In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52 (1984). Wefind that the risk that T.F. was erroneously deprived of that interest as aresult of the failure to give the admonishment in question is minimalbecause the record amply demonstrates that T.F. was aware of the needto cooperate with DCFS and that his parental rights could be terminated.

The record reveals that T.F. was admonished at his first appearancethat his children could be declared wards of the court and removed fromhis custody. At the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, that trial courtexpressed its concern about "termination proceedings." Following thedispositional hearing, the court ordered T.F. to cooperate with DCFS andto participate in any and all counseling services DCFS recommended. Ata hearing on February 25, 1997, T.F.'s attorney argued that it would beunfair "to terminate his rights" because he refused to admit in sex offendercounseling that he had sexually abused his children. Thus, the record in thepresent case clearly demonstrates that T.F. was well aware of his need tocooperate with DCFS and that termination of his parental rights was apossibility.

Appellants also argue that, assuming this cause is remanded to thetrial court, the appellate court erred in holding that T.F. could not berequired to admit in sexual abuse counseling that he sexually abused S.H.because the applicable statute of limitations for any such criminal offensehas expired. They further argue that the finding of unfitness was notcontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Given our disposition ofappellants' principal argument, we need not address these arguments.

We hold that, prior to January 1, 1998, section 1-5(3) did notrequire the trial courts to admonish parents that they risked having theirparental rights terminated if they failed to cooperate with DCFS or complywith the terms of the service plans. For the foregoing reasons, we vacatethe judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt.

Appellate court judgment vacated;

circuit court judgment affirmed.

The majority purports to hold that "prior to January 1, 1998, section1-5(3) did not require the trial courts to admonish parents that they riskedhaving their parental rights terminated if they failed to cooperate withDCFS or comply with the terms of the service plans." Slip op. at 13.However, this is not, in fact, what the majority decides. The majoritymerely determines that, under the circumstances presented in the case atbar, T.F.'s due process rights were not violated by the trial court's failureto admonish him of the need to cooperate with DCFS. The majority failsto provide any analysis on the broader issue which it claims to beaddressing under the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.Because the majority does not reach the issue which is its only justificationfor assuming jurisdiction over this appeal, the public interest exception isnot satisfied. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.

In the case at bar, the circuit court granted the State's petition toterminate the parental rights of Andrea's father, T.F., after finding that T.F.was unfit because he: (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern or responsibility for Andrea, and (2) failed to make reasonableefforts to correct conditions which led to Andrea's removal or to makereasonable progress toward Andrea's return within the nine monthsfollowing adjudication. The appellate court reversed the termination order,holding that the circuit court violated section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile CourtAct and T.F.'s due process rights because the court failed to admonishT.F. at the time of T.F.'s first appearance before the court, at the time ofAndrea's adjudication, and at the time of the dispositional hearing that hisparental rights could be terminated if he should fail to cooperate withDCFS, comply with DCFS service plans, or correct conditions thatcaused Andrea to be removed from T.F.'s custody. We granted theState's petition for leave to appeal to decide whether the failure to give theparticular admonishments at issue here was a statutory violation whichimplicated constitutional rights.

Before 1998, section 1-5(3) of the Act required courts to "explainthe nature of the proceedings and inform the parties of their rights underthe first two paragraphs of this Section." 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West1996). The rights afforded by these paragraphs included the right to bepresent, the right to be heard, the right to present evidence, the right tocross-examine witnesses, the right to examine court files and records, andthe right to be represented by counsel. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West1996). Section 1-5(3) was amended by Public Act 90-28, effectiveJanuary 1, 1998. It requires the circuit court to admonish parents at thetime of their first appearance, upon adjudication, and following thedispositional hearing, that they "must cooperate with [DCFS], comply withthe terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions that require thechild to be in care, or risk termination of their parental rights" 705 ILCS405/1-5(3), 2-21(1), 2-22(6) (West 1998).

In the case at bar, all of the relevant hearings-first appearance,adjudication and disposition-took place prior to January 1, 1998. Theappellate court agreed that the pre-amended version did not explicitlyrequire the admonishments at issue here, but held that the statuteimplicitly required the court to give these admonishments as part of itsduty to inform parents of their rights regarding the "nature of theproceedings" and because the failure to so admonish parents would be aviolation of the parents' due process rights.

The appeal in this matter has been rendered moot by the fact thatT.F. has subsequently executed a surrender of his parental rights. Themajority, however, finds that the public interest exception to the mootnessdoctrine should be applied to consider "whether circuit courts wererequired under former section 1-5(3) of the Act to admonish parents thatthey risked termination of their parental rights if they failed to cooperatewith DCFS." Slip op. at 5. The public interest exception applies, themajority claims, because the State has asserted that "the appellate court'sdecision threatens to disturb a great number of dispositions under the Actwhere the initial court appearance, adjudicatory hearing, or dispositionalhearing occurred prior to January 1, 1998." Slip op. at 5.

The issue of public importance, to justify the invocation of the publicinterest exception, therefore, is the correctness of the appellate court'sdetermination that "as a matter of due process, section 1-5(3)'srequirement that [parents] be informed of the nature of the proceedingsincluded the right to be admonished that [they] risked termination of [their]parental rights if [they] failed to cooperate with DCFS or to comply withthe terms of [the] service plan." Slip op. at 9. However, this is not theissue which the majority answers.

The majority cites Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed.2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), for the factors to be considered whendetermining what process is due in proceedings implicating fundamentalliberty interests. While purporting to apply these factors to the presentcase, the majority, in essence, engages in harmless error review, holding:

"We find that the risk that T.F. was erroneously deprived of [thefundamental interest in the care, custody and control of his child]as a result of the failure to give the admonishment in question isminimal because the record amply demonstrates that T.F. wasaware of the need to cooperate with DCFS and that hisparental rights could be terminated." (Emphasis added.) Slipop. at 12.

Thus, the majority answers a question which is quite narrow, i.e.,whether T.F.'s due process rights were violated. The issue of publicimportance, and the one which purportedly threatens to disturb a greatnumber of other dispositions, is much broader: whether the requirementin former section 1-5(3) that circuit courts inform parents of the natureof the proceedings includes, as a matter of due process, the requirementthat circuit courts admonish parents that they risked the termination of theirparental rights if they failed to cooperate with DCFS.

As it stands, the majority does not resolve the issue which threatensto disturb the "great number of dispositions under the Act where the initialcourt appearance, adjudicatory hearing, or dispositional hearing occurredprior to January 1, 1998." Employing the majority's analysis, each casewill have to be examined to determine whether the record demonstratesthat the parent knew of his or her rights. Moreover, the majority's opinionprovides no guidance on the question of whether due process requires theadmonishments in question in those instances where the record fails toaffirmatively demonstrate that the parent was aware of the need tocooperate with DCFS. Thus, the public interest rationale for reviewing thisappeal as an exception to the mootness doctrine is completely lost.

If the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is to applyin this case, this court should and must decide whether, under formersection 1-5(3), parents had to be admonished at the initial hearing, atadjudication, and at disposition, that they were required to cooperate withDCFS and comply with the service plans or risk termination of theirparental rights and whether the failure to so admonish parents was a dueprocess violation which requires that orders terminating their parentalrights be reversed. Although the majority purports to answer this question,the analysis reveals that the question is still open. For this reason, Irespectfully dissent.

JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.

I respectfully dissent. This appeal is moot and should be dismissed.Not only does this court lack jurisdiction to decide this case because thereis no actual controversy, it fails to meet the rigid requirements of the publicpolicy exception to the mootness doctrine. This court's function is todecide controverted issues between real parties. Richardson v. RockIsland County Officers Electoral Board, 179 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1997).It is not a function of this court to issue advisory opinions that have noeffect whatsoever on the rights of the parties or the outcome of the casebefore the court.

This court's jurisdiction is restricted to cases that present an actualcontroversy. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001).The existence of a real controversy is not a mere technicality; rather, it isa prerequisite to the exercise of this court's jurisdiction. In re Adoptionof Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999). Today's opinion fails to followthe standards for applying the mootness exception as announced in In reJ.B., 204 Ill. 2d 382 (2003), In re Tekela, 202 Ill. 2d 282 (2002), In reIndia B., 202 Ill. 2d 522 (2002), and Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362.

The public policy exception to the mootness doctrine only existswhen the question involved (1) is of a substantial public nature, (2) anauthoritative determination for future guidance is needed, and (3) thecircumstances are likely to recur. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365;Richardson, 179 Ill. 2d at 256. This exception is to be narrowlyconstrued. J.B., 204 Ill. 2d at 391; India B., 202 Ill. 2d at 543;Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at 365.

The question of whether circuit courts were required under theformer section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS405/1-5(3) (West 1996)) to admonish parents that they riskedtermination of their parental rights if they failed to cooperate with DCFSsimply does not meet the rigid requirements of the public interest exceptionto the mootness doctrine.

The majority concludes that, although the case is moot because T.F.voluntarily surrendered his parental rights several days before oralargument, authoritative guidance from this court is required because theState alleged during oral argument that "the appellate court's decisionthreatens to disturb a great number of dispositions under the Act wherethe initial court appearance, adjudicatory hearing, or dispositional hearingoccurred prior to January 1, 1998." Slip op. at 5. There is, however, nofactual basis in the record to support the conclusion that a great numberof dispositions, or, for that matter, any pre-1998 dispositions, arethreatened to be disturbed.

This issue has not arisen in the past and it is almost certain not torecur in the future. This court's authoritative guidance is not needed forfuture cases because all post-1998 initial appearances, adjudications, anddispositions are governed by the January 1, 1998, amendments to the Act,requiring trial courts to admonish parents that they "must cooperate with[DCFS], comply with the terms of the service plans, and correct theconditions that require the child to be in care, or risk termination of theirparental rights" (705 ILCS 405/1-5(3), 2-21(1), 2-22(6) (West 1998)).Moreover, the need for authoritative guidance is further diminishedbecause there are no conflicting precedents. Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d at365-66.

I also share the Chief Justice's concern that the majority fails toaddress the very issue it uses to justify invoking the public interestexception to the mootness doctrine. Slip op. at 13 (McMorrow, C.J.,dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.). Instead, the majority employs aharmless error analysis, while purporting to apply a due process analysis.Since T.F. voluntary surrendered his parental rights, this due process issueno longer exists, making it impossible for this court to grant either partyeffectual relief.

Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed as moot.

1. ¹The appellate court incorrectly states that this took place on October 11, 1998.