Illinois Republican Party v. Bd. of Elections
Case Date: 12/31/1969
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 85176
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Docket No. 85176-Agenda 13-May 1999. ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN PARTY, Appellee, v. THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al. (TheDemocratic Party of Illinois et al., Appellants). Opinion filed October 21, 1999. JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: The question presented by this appeal is whether the Illinois State Board of Elections (the Board) must conduct a publichearing on a complaint when the Board fails to determine in a closed preliminary hearing that the complaint was not filedon justifiable grounds. We hold that it must. BACKGROUND On February 19, 1997, the Illinois Republican Party filed two complaints with the Board. One complaint alleged that theDemocratic Party of Illinois had violated sections 9-10 and 9-11 of the Election Code (the Code) (10 ILCS 5/9-10, 9-11(West 1996)) by filing inaccurate reports of campaign contributions received and made by it during 1996. The othercomplaint alleged that the United Democrats of Illinois had violated sections 9-3, 9-4, and 9-10 of the Code (10 ILCS5/9-3, 9-4, 9-10 (West 1996)) by failing to file a statement of organization with the Board and by failing to report itscontributions received and expenditures made during 1996. Upon receiving the complaints, the Board scheduled a closedpreliminary hearing for March 11, 1997, and appointed a hearing examiner. At the closed preliminary hearing, the Republican Party (hereinafter, complainant) offered exhibits supporting theallegations of its complaints. The Democratic Party of Illinois and United Democrats of Illinois (hereinafter, respondents)submitted written objections to the complaints. Following the hearing, the hearing examiner concluded that the complaintswere filed on justifiable grounds and recommended to the Board that the complaints be docketed for public adjudicativehearings. The Board's general counsel then notified the Board that he agreed with the recommendation of the hearingexaminer. On March 17, 1997, four members of the Board voted to find that the complaints were filed on justifiable grounds. ThreeBoard members voted against making such a determination.(1) Because a five-vote majority of the eight-member board hadnot been achieved, the Board's general counsel then recommended that the Board enter an order "dismissing the complaintsfor grounds of procedure and not on the merits" so that an appeal might be taken from the Board's action. The Board thenvoted unanimously to enter the following order: "The Board is unable to reach a decision by vote of 5 members with respect to any matter raised by the record atclosed preliminary hearing and the Board makes no determination as to whether complaint [sic] was filed uponjustifiable grounds. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. No further action is to be taken. 2. That the complaint isdismissed on procedural grounds, the Board being unable to achieve a vote of 5 members with respect to any issueraised by the record." Complainant appealed this order directly to the appellate court as provided by section 9-22 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/9-22(West 1996)). In a published opinion, the appellate court remanded the cause to the Board, ordering that those memberswho voted that the complaints were not filed on justifiable grounds state of record their reasons for so voting. 294 Ill. App.3d 915. Respondents petitioned this court for leave to appeal, which we granted. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). ANALYSIS Section 9-21 of the Code provides, in relevant part, as follows: "Upon receipt of [a] complaint, the Board shall hold a closed preliminary hearing to determine whether or not thecomplaint appears to have been filed on justifiable grounds. *** If the Board determines that the complaint has notbeen filed on justifiable grounds, it shall dismiss the complaint without further hearing. Whenever in the judgment of the Board, after affording due notice and an opportunity for a public hearing, any personhas engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which constitutes or will constitute a violation of any provisionof this Article or any regulation or order issued thereunder, the Board shall issue an order directing such person totake such action as the Board determines may be necessary in the public interest to correct the violation." 10 ILCS5/9-21 (West 1996). In addition, section 1A-7 of the Code provides that "[f]ive members of the Board are necessary to constitute aquorum and 5 votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective ***." 10 ILCS 5/1A-7 (West1996). Respondents contend that if the Board is unable to achieve a majority determination as to whether or not a complaint hasbeen filed on justifiable grounds following the closed preliminary hearing, the Board is prohibited from taking furtheraction on the complaint. Respondents assert that because five votes are necessary for any action of the Board to becomeeffective, the Board may not conduct a public hearing on a complaint unless five of its members determine that thecomplaint was filed on justifiable grounds. Respondent's arguments are based on an incorrect reading of the relevantstatutory provisions. Section 9-21 of the Code requires the Board to hold a closed preliminary hearing upon receipt of a complaint alleging aviolation of the Code. 10 ILCS 5/9-21 (West 1996). This same section then requires that the Board dismiss the complaintwithout further hearing if, at the conclusion of the closed preliminary hearing, the Board determines that the complaint hasnot been filed on justifiable grounds. Because five votes are necessary for any action of the Board to become effective, theBoard may not dismiss a complaint after the closed preliminary hearing unless at least five members vote to do so. Respondents suggest that because five votes are needed to dismiss a complaint after the closed preliminary hearing, fivevotes are also required to proceed with a public hearing on a complaint. Nothing in the Code, however, supports such arequirement. Respondents appear to be laboring under the belief that, at the conclusion of the closed preliminary hearing,the Board is required to vote on whether the complaint was filed on justifiable grounds. On the contrary, the onlyrequirement in the statute is that the Board dismiss the complaint if it determines that the complaint was not filed onjustifiable grounds. 10 ILCS 5/9-21 (West 1996). The statute thus does not require any majority vote by the Board prior toa public hearing on the complaint. Furthermore, it is clear that the statute contemplates a public hearing for those complaints not dismissed by the Board. Inthe sentence which immediately follows the description of the procedure for dismissing a complaint, section 9-21 requiresthat the Board afford "an opportunity for a public hearing" before taking any action to correct an alleged violation of theCode. 10 ILCS 5/9-21 (West 1996). This requirement of a public hearing is consistent with the broader purposes of theCode's campaign finance disclosure provisions. See 10 ILCS 5/9-10 et seq. (West 1996) (mandating the filing of reportslisting the source and amount of campaign contributions and expenditures). By requiring that every complaint not dismissedby a majority of the Board proceed to a public hearing, the Code effectively promotes the goals of candor and opennessunderlying these substantive provisions. At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing in the instant case, the Board failed to achieve a vote of five members todismiss the complaints as not filed on justifiable grounds. For the reasons stated above, the complaints were then requiredto proceed to a public hearing. The Board thus lacked authority to enter its subsequent order dismissing the complaintswithout reaching their merits. Accordingly, the judgment of the Board is set aside and the complaints are remanded to theBoard for a public hearing. Respondents also contend that the appellate court erred in addressing a number of defenses raised by respondents in theirobjections to the complaints filed with the Board. Because we have concluded that the Board's action on the complaintswas unauthorized, we agree with respondents that it was improper for the appellate court to address these additional matters.Therefore, the appellate court's judgment remanding the proceeding to the Board is affirmed but the remainder of itsopinion is vacated. Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part; Board decision set aside; cause remanded. JUSTICE RATHJE, specially concurring: I agree entirely with the majority's conclusion that, unless five Board members conclude during the closed preliminaryhearing that a complaint was not filed on justifiable grounds, the Board must conduct a public hearing on that complaint. Iwrite separately only to underscore the disastrous public policy consequences associated with the contrary result. The State Board of Elections, unlike most other state agencies, boards, and commissions, is constitutionally mandated.Article III, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution provides: "A State Board of Elections shall have general supervision over the administration of the registration and electionlaws throughout the State. The general assembly by law shall determine the size, manner of selection andcomprehension of the Board. No political party shall have a majority of members of the Board." To this end, the General Assembly has provided that the Board membership shall consist of eight members, four from eachof the two major political parties. 10 ILCS 5/1A-2 (West 1998). In addition, "5 votes are necessary for any action of theBoard to become effective." 10 ILCS 5/1A-7 (West 1998). In construing the legislature's intent with respect to theseprovisions, this court has held that "the General Assembly obviously sought to negate partisanship as much as possible andto guarantee the Board's political independence." (Emphasis added.) Lunding v. Walker, 65 Ill. 2d 516, 527 (1976). With these principles in mind, consider the following question: Whose reading of section 9-21 does a better job of negatingpartisanship and guaranteeing the Board's political independence, the majority's or the dissent's? A simple hypotheticalprovides the answer. Assume that a verified complaint is filed against a Republican candidate. Assume next that, during the closed preliminaryhearing, the Board membership votes along strict party lines on whether the complaint was "filed on justifiable grounds."Under the majority's construction of section 9-21, these facts would lead to a public hearing on the verified complaint.Partisanship goes unrewarded, and the investigation continues. By contrast, under the dissent's construction of section9-21, a strict party line vote precludes any further inquiry into the verified complaint. Thus, as long as partisanship prevailsand the two sides never break ranks, no complaint will ever be considered on its merits in a public forum. Were thedissent's view to prevail, the Board might as well pack up and go home, as no complaint would ever receive a publichearing. Again, in designing the Board membership, the General Assembly "sought to negate partisanship as much as possible andto guarantee the Board's political independence." Lunding, 65 Ill. 2d at 527. The dissent's reading of section 9-21, whileperhaps expedient under the particular facts presented, makes a mockery of the General Assembly's designs. The majority,by contrast, not only construes section 9-21 consistently with its plain language, but it also ensures that the public policiesthat inspired the Board are vindicated. CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: I join in Justice Bilandic's dissent. Like Justice Bilandic, I believe that a determination to hold a public hearing is an actionof the Board. Pursuant to section 1A-7 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/1A-7 (West 1996)), "5 votes are necessary for anyaction of the Board to become effective." The majority holds that five members of the Board must find that a complaint isnot filed on justifiable grounds in order for the Board to dismiss the complaint. However, the majority holds that the Boardis not required to find that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds in order to proceed to a hearing. Thus, one action ofthe Board, a determination that a complaint is not filed on justifiable grounds and must be dismissed, requires five votes tobecome effective, whereas another action of the Board, a determination that a complaint is filed on justifiable grounds andmerits a public adjudicative hearing, does not require a vote. The majority's holding ignores the plain language of section1A-7, which mandates five votes for any action of the Board to become effective. I believe that the majority is mistaken inits selective application of section 1A-7. I also believe that the legislative history supports Justice Bilandic's position. As originally conceived, the Board consistedof four members appointed by the Governor. The speaker of the House of Representatives, the House Minority Leader, thePresident of the Senate and the Senate Minority Leader each designated two nominees to serve on the Board. The Governorchose one member from the nominees designated by each leader. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 1A-3. Three members ofthe Board were necessary to constitute a quorum and a majority of the members voting was necessary for any action of theBoard to become effective. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 46, par. 1A-7. Since the membership of the Board was divided equallybetween the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, any action of the Board required the votes of two members of oneparty, plus the vote of one member of the opposite party. In 1974, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 1568 as Public Act 78-1183.(2) See Pub. Act 78-1183, eff. September 3,1974. Public Act 78-1183 amended the Code, adding thereto article 9, "Disclosure of Campaign Contributions andExpenditures." As introduced in the General Assembly, Senate Bill 1568 contained the following provision: "Sec. 9-19. Any person who believes a violation of this Article has occurred may file a formal complaint with theBoard, in a manner prescribed by the Board. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Board shall expeditiously make aninvestigation of the matter complained of." 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 1568, 1974 Sess. Various legislators proposed amendments to Senate Bill 1568. Senate amendment 9 reflected the concerns of members ofthe General Assembly that the Board might be used as a forum in which baseless complaints are filed against a candidateand/or a political committee associated with the candidate during the course of an election: "Partee: 'Amendment No. 9 is an amendment which Senator Roe has seen which is just an extension of the conceptfor what to do when a complaint is filed during a campaign. And, this amendment simply says that the Board shallneither accept nor publicize a complaint unless three members believe that a reasonable basis exists for making aninitial determination if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the complaint can be verified. Now what we seekto do here is the same kind of thing they do in the Judicial Inquiry Board and many other of our statutory areas wherecomplaints are filed. And, so that you can keep scurrilous complaints from being filed for the purpose of publicity, thethree members of the Board must first make a determination that there is some reasonable basis for it. And, that fact issuppressed so that nobody files against you simply because he's looking for a newspaper headline three or four daysbefore the election. I think, I state the fact correctly when I say that there is acceptance of this amendment. Is thatright Senator Roe?' " 78th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 6, 1974, at 205-06 (statement of SenatorPartee). Representative Shea proposed a similar amendment in the House. The following exchange then took place: "Shea: 'Bill, I'll tell you what my problem is and perhaps when Retunis is drawing another Amendment he can putthis one in it and that it's very easy to make accusations and it's the accusation that hits the front page; it's theaccusation that makes the big dent and then when and [if] I prove or somebody proves that they're right, you find itsomeplace back buried and the damage has been done. Now all I want to do is protect people. I want to say ifsomebody wants to make [an] accusation against [you] before we start publicizing it, before we make it publicknowledge, let's find out if there is, in fact, some basis to that complaint.' Collins: 'I couldn't agree with you more as far as it goes, Jerry. However, I do think we're opening oursel[ves] up forcriticism that it is our desire right from the start to conduct things in secret and I just, I don't think [it's] a good idea.If we can achieve. . . If we can achieve what you desire and phrase it differently, I don't know ah. . . maybe we couldget together on this. ***' *** Shea: '*** All I want to do is insure that you're not going to do to the Members of this House, to other politicalcandidates, just open up another avenue to blast them and then don't give them a chance to respond in kind.' " 78thIll. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 11, 1974, at 37-38 (statements of Representatives Shea and Collins). Senate Bill 1568 was redrafted to address these concerns. The version of Senate Bill 1568 adopted by the Legislaturecontains the following provisions. " |