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Docket Nos. 97481, 98309 cons.-Agenda 15-November 2004.

LULA HOBBS, Appellee, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE
COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, Appellant.-LEE ANN
ANHEUSER et al., Appellees, v. PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 21, 2005.
 

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

At issue in these consolidated appeals is whether an insured may"stack," i.e., aggregate, the limits of liability for underinsured-motoristcoverage where multiple vehicles are covered under one policy. Thelower courts determined that the policies at issue were ambiguous andmust be construed in favor of the insureds to permit stacking. Wereverse.

In June 2000, plaintiff Lula Hobbs was involved in a motorvehicle accident, allegedly sustaining injuries and damages in excessof $200,000. Hobbs settled claims against the driver of the othervehicle for the driver's policy limits of $50,000. At the time of theaccident, Hobbs carried underinsured-motorist coverage for twovehicles under a single policy issued by Hartford Insurance Companyof the Midwest (Hartford), in the amount of $100,000 per person,$300,000 per occurrence. Pursuant to the underinsured-motoristcoverage, Hartford tendered to Hobbs a check in the amount of$50,000. This amount represented the difference between the$100,000 per person underinsured-motorist coverage afforded underHobbs' policy and the $50,000 Hobbs received from the other driver'sinsurer. Hobbs maintained, however, that she was entitled to anadditional sum from Hartford and, in February 2002, filed adeclaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Madison County.In her subsequent motion for summary judgment, Hobbs argued thatthe Hartford policy was ambiguous as to the limits of underinsured-motorist coverage and that she should be allowed to stack theunderinsured-motorist coverage for the two vehicles, thus producinga per-person limit of $200,000. In its cross-motion for summaryjudgment, Hartford countered that the policy contained unambiguousantistacking language and that the underinsured-motorist bodily injurylimit was $100,000 per person. The trial court found that thedeclarations page of the Hartford policy contained languageinconsistent with and contradictory to the antistacking provisions,creating an ambiguity that must be construed in favor of Hobbs topermit stacking. Thus, the trial court declared that the underinsured-motorist bodily injury limit was $200,000 per person. The appellatecourt affirmed. Hobbs, No. 5-02-0429 (unpublished order underSupreme Court Rule 23). We allowed Hartford's petition for leave toappeal. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

Prudential maintained that the bodily injury limits under Sample'spolicy were equal to the underinsured-motorist benefits under theAnheusers' policy: $100,000 per person. Therefore, according toPrudential, Sample was not an "underinsured" motorist andunderinsured-motorist benefits were not available to the Anheusers.Prudential also maintained that the policy prohibited stacking ofunderinsured-motorist coverage. The Anheusers argued that thePrudential policy was ambiguous as to the limits of underinsured-motorist coverage and that stacking should be permitted to determinewhether Sample was underinsured. The trial court ruled that thedeclarations page of the policy contained language creating anambiguity that the antistacking clause in the policy could not cure. Thetrial court ruled in favor of the Anheusers and declared that theunderinsured-motorist bodily injury limits were $300,000 per person.We allowed Prudential's motion for a direct appeal to this court (see134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b)), and consolidated this case with the Hobbsappeal for review.

ANALYSIS

The salient facts in each case are not in dispute. The Hartford andthe Prudential policies each provide some measure of underinsured-motorist coverage. The only issue is whether these policies, properlyconstrued, prohibit or permit stacking of underinsured-motoristcoverage. On this legal issue our review proceeds de novo. SeeAmerican States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479-80(1997); Grzeszczak v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 168 Ill. 2d 216,223 (1995).

An insurance policy is a contract, and the general rules governingthe interpretation of other types of contracts also govern theinterpretation of insurance policies. Dempsey v. National Life &Accident Insurance Co., 404 Ill. 423, 426 (1949); see also MaremontCorp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 272, 276 (2001);Pekin Insurance Co. v. Willett, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037 (1998).Accordingly, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect tothe intention of the parties, as expressed in the policy language.American States Insurance Co., 177 Ill. 2d at 479. If the policylanguage is unambiguous, the policy will be applied as written, unlessit contravenes public policy. Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,78 Ill. 2d 420, 423 (1980). Whether an ambiguity exists turns onwhether the policy language is subject to more than one reasonableinterpretation. Although "creative possibilities" may be suggested,only reasonable interpretations will be considered. Bruder v. CountryMutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill. 2d 179, 193 (1993). Thus, we will notstrain to find an ambiguity where none exists. McKinney v. AllstateInsurance Co., 188 Ill. 2d 493, 497 (1999). Although policy termsthat limit an insurer's liability will be liberally construed in favor ofcoverage, this rule of construction only comes into play when thepolicy is ambiguous. Menke, 78 Ill. 2d at 424.

This court has determined that antistacking clauses in general donot contravene public policy. Grzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 229.Moreover, the Illinois Insurance Code expressly authorizes the use ofantistacking provisions in motor vehicle insurance policies. 215 ILCS5/143a-2(5) (West 2002). Thus, if the antistacking clauses at issue inthese cases are unambiguous, they will be given effect. SeeGrzeszczak, 168 Ill. 2d at 230.

Because the Hartford and Prudential policies do not containidentical antistacking language, we examine each policy separately.

Hartford identifies three provisions in the policy issued to Hobbswhich it argues unambiguously prohibit stacking of underinsured-motorist coverage. We agree with Hobbs that two of the provisionsare inapplicable to the present dispute and we need not review themhere. We turn our attention to the remaining antistacking provisionidentified by Hartford, which reads in relevant part:

"LIMIT OF LIABILITY

The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for eachperson for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximumlimit of liability for all damages, including damages for care,loss of services or death, arising out of bodily injury sustainedby any one person in any one accident. *** This is the mostwe will pay regardless of the number of:

1. Insureds;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident."

The "Declarations," referenced in the "Limit of Liability" provisionquoted above, lists the coverages, the limits of liability, and thepremiums by auto as follows:

Relying principally on Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co.,156 Ill. 2d 179 (1993), Hartford argues that the "Limit of Liability"provision, when read in conjunction with the declarations page of thepolicy, unambiguously prohibits stacking and limits underinsured-motorist bodily injury coverage to $100,000 per person. Although weagree that Bruder is relevant, it is not entirely dispositive of the issuebefore this court.

In Bruder, the plaintiffs insured two vehicles under a single policythat contained the following antistacking clause:

" 'The most we will pay for all damages resulting frombodily injury to any one person caused by any one accidentis the limit of Bodily Injury shown in the declarations for"Each Person." ' " Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 189.

The declarations page, in turn, listed the two vehicles covered underthe policy and set forth the coverages, limits of liability and premiums.The information was arranged in columns, with the types of coverage(bodily injury, property damage, etc.) appearing as column headings,and the corresponding premiums listed below the headings. Directlybelow the bodily injury column heading, two premiums were listed,one for each vehicle. The bodily injury limit of liability for "EachPerson"-$100,000-appeared once above the bodily injury columnheading.

The Bruders argued that the declarations page was ambiguousbecause it could be construed in three possible ways: the limit ofliability could be read twice, once for each vehicle, resulting in anaggregation of $200,000 of coverage; or the limit of liability could beread as the total amount available for either or both of the vehicles,resulting in $100,000 of coverage; or the limit of liability could beread as an amount that was to be proportionally decreased by thenumber of vehicles, resulting in $50,000 of coverage.

We rejected the Bruders' argument, holding that the declarationspage was subject to only one reasonable interpretation. Bruder, 156Ill. 2d at 193. Although two entries appeared in the bodily injurycolumn for the premiums for each of the two vehicles, the $100,000per person bodily injury limit was noted only once on the page.Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192-93. "The only reasonable interpretation isthat the policy provides only $100,000 of liability for bodily injuryoccasioned to each person insured no matter how many vehicles arelisted in the column arrangement and no matter how many premiumsare paid." Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 193-94. We found the representationof the limit of liability for bodily injury consistent with the antistackingprovision and consistent with other policy language indicating that theantistacking provision would apply regardless of the number ofcovered vehicles. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 194. We thus reversed theappellate court's determination to permit stacking. "Because there isno ambiguity in the limitation of liability provision, the provision mustbe applied as written." Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 194. We noted, however,that had the limit of liability for bodily injury been listed twice on thedeclarations page, "[i]t would not be difficult to find an ambiguity."Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192. In such a case, the policy could easily beinterpreted as providing a total limit of $200,000 because a figure of$100,000 would be shown for each vehicle. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 192.

The similarities between the instant case and Bruder are apparent.The antistacking clause in the Hartford policy at issue here, like theantistacking clause in Bruder, ties the limit of liability to the limitshown in the declarations page. The declarations page here, like thedeclarations page in Bruder, lists the premiums for the two vehiclesseparately, but, importantly, lists the relevant limit of liability onlyonce. In addition, the Hartford policy, like the policy in Bruder,indicates that the antistacking provision applies regardless of thenumber of covered vehicles. Hartford thus argues that, in line withBruder, the antistacking clause and the declarations page in the policyissued to Hobbs are consistent and are capable of only one reasonableinterpretation: that the underinsured-motorist bodily injury limit is$100,000 per person, no matter how many vehicles are covered orpremiums paid.

All other considerations aside, we agree with Hartford that,pursuant to our holding in Bruder, underinsured-motorist coverageunder Hobbs' policy cannot be stacked. Indeed, since Bruder wasdecided, our appellate court has examined antistacking languagevirtually identical to the antistacking clause here, in combination witha declarations page substantially similar to the declarations page here.See Domin v. Shelby Insurance Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 688 (2001).Following Bruder, Domin held that the policy was unambiguous:stacking was not allowed. Domin, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 697.

The present case, however, is distinguishable from Bruder andDomin in one respect. Hobbs' argument that the Hartford policy isambiguous rests on policy language that was not addressed in Bruderand Domin. The language to which Hobbs refers appears on thedeclarations page directly above the coverages, limits of liability, andpremiums. It reads: "COVERAGE IS PROVIDED ONLY WHEREA PREMIUM IS SHOWN FOR THE AUTO AND COVERAGE."Hobbs argues that this language, together with the notation "INCL,"in the space for the underinsured-motorist premium, might be read asproviding underinsured-motorist coverage once, twice, or not at all.

The appellate court, relying on Yates v. Farmers AutomobileInsurance Ass'n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797 (2000), and Hall v. GeneralCasualty Co. of Illinois, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655 (2002), agreed withHobbs, stating in relevant part:

"We find the following language on the declarationspage, 'COVERAGE IS PROVIDED ONLY WHERE APREMIUM IS SHOWN FOR THE AUTO ANDCOVERAGE,' in combination with the abbreviations'INCL' for each vehicle under the column titled'PREMIUMS BY AUTO,' contradicts the antistackingprovision(s) in the policy. The notation 'INCL' is notdefined or explained either in the policy or on thedeclarations page. When the language is considered as awhole, it leaves the reader asking whether there is[underinsured-motorist] coverage at all, and if so, howmuch. Because the declarations page is the source of theambiguity here, it is not necessary for us to pass on whetherany or all of the three provisions of the policy that purportto prohibit stacking are unambiguous." (Emphasis added.)Hobbs, No. 5-02-0429 (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23).

First, we note that "whether there is [underinsured-motorist]coverage at all" has never been an issue in this case. As Hobbs'complaint and motion for summary judgment make plain, the issue hasalways been whether underinsured-motorist coverage may be stacked.The issue of whether coverage may be stacked arises only because theexistence of coverage is a given. Bruder, 156 Ill. 2d at 187. Thus, weconsider only whether the policy is ambiguous as to the extent ofunderinsured-motorist coverage, not the existence of underinsured-motorist coverage.

Second, the statement on the declarations page that "COVERAGEIS PROVIDED ONLY WHERE A PREMIUM IS SHOWN FORTHE AUTO AND COVERAGE" does not, under any reasonablereading, contradict the antistacking clause. This statement simplyinforms the policyholder which coverages are applicable to each auto.The fact that coverage is provided does not somehow imply thatcoverage limits may be stacked. At most, the statement that"COVERAGE IS PROVIDED ONLY WHERE A PREMIUM ISSHOWN FOR THE AUTO AND COVERAGE" leaves open thequestion of stacking. This does not mean that the policy is ambiguous.The declarations page of an insurance policy is but one piece of theinsuring agreement. See 1 Holmes's Appleman on Insurance 2d