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Docket No. 89661-Agenda 20-March 2001.

CONNIE HARRISON, Appellee, v. HARDIN COUNTY 
COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 18, 2001.

JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

In December 1995, plaintiff, Connie Harrison, filed a civilaction against Hardin County Community Unit School District No.1 (school district), Joshua Davis and his grandfather, JimmyDavis, for injuries she sustained in a motor vehicle accident.Claims against Jimmy Davis and Joshua Davis, who was drivinghis grandfather's car when he lost control and struck plaintiff'svehicle, were settled. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the schooldistrict was liable because its personnel were willful and wantonin refusing Joshua Davis's request to leave school early due toinclement weather and deteriorating road conditions. The schooldistrict filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining, interalia, that it was entitled to immunity under section 2-201 of theLocal Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort ImmunityAct (Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994)). The circuit court ofHardin County granted the school district summary judgment. Theappellate court reversed. 313 Ill. App. 3d 702. We granted theschool district's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

BACKGROUND

On December 8, 1995, Joshua Davis, age 16, drove hisgrandfather's car to school. Joshua was a student at Hardin CountyHigh School, which is owned and operated by the school district.During the school day, a mixture of freezing rain, sleet, and snowbegan falling in Hardin County.

At his evidentiary deposition, Joshua Davis testified thatduring his lunch period, at approximately 11:40 a.m., heapproached his principal, Ron Brumley, and asked if he couldleave school early because of the deteriorating weather conditions.Joshua told Brumley that he wanted to leave early before it startedsnowing heavily because he "didn't want to have a wreck."Brumley told Joshua that all of the students who drove to schoolwould be dismissed early, at a certain time after lunch. After thelunch period ended, Joshua went to his next class and asked histeacher if he could use the phone to call his parents to getpermission to leave early. The teacher told Joshua to sit down andthat school would be dismissed early.

Joshua further testified that school was dismissed atapproximately 12:15 p.m. that day. Accompanied by three otherstudents, including his girlfriend, Michelle Williams, Joshua drovehis grandfather's car from school. Joshua passed the driveway tohis home and continued toward his girlfriend's house. En route,Joshua lost control of the vehicle, crossed the center line, andstruck the front of plaintiff's vehicle. Joshua admitted that if hehad wanted to ride the bus, that option would have been availableto him. Joshua further acknowledged that the accident would nothave occurred had he not been taking his girlfriend home and thatthere was no reason why he could not have asked his girlfriend toride home on the bus and driven himself directly home.

Ron Brumley, principal of Hardin County High School,testified that a procedure was in place by which parents could callthe school and request that their children be dismissed early. If anindividual student asked to leave early due to inclement weather,the school usually required parental permission. The schoolallowed students to call home to ask their parents if they couldleave school early. Brumley stated he may deny a student's requestto call home if school was going to be dismissed within a shortperiod of time.

In plaintiff's complaint, she alleged that the accident and herinjuries were "directly and proximately caused" by the followingwillful and wanton acts committed by school district personnel:

"a. Refused to allow Joshua Davis to leave school whenit was safe to do so given the deteriorating weatherconditions on local roads;

b. Permitted Joshua Davis to leave school property in amotor vehicle after having been advised by the studentthat he had difficulty driving in inclement weatherconditions;

c. Failed to call Joshua Davis' grandparents, parents,and/or adult guardian to have him picked up fromschool."

The circuit court granted the school district's motion forsummary judgment based on the immunity protections of section2-201 of the Act. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting,held that Brumley's decision not to allow Joshua to leave earlywas not an exercise of discretion in the determination of policyand, thus, did not fall within the protections of the Act. 313 Ill.App. 3d at 707. The appellate court reversed the judgment of thecircuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the schooldistrict. 313 Ill. App. 3d at 708. We granted the school district'spetition for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(177 Ill. 2d R. 315).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper "where the pleadings, affidavits,depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in thelight most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitledto judgment as a matter of law." Busch v. Graphic Color Corp.,169 Ill. 2d 325, 333 (1996); 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996).If the party moving for summary judgment supplies facts that, ifnot contradicted, would warrant judgment in its favor as a matterof law, the opponent cannot rest on his pleadings to create agenuine issue of material fact. Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240-41 (1986); Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co., 57 Ill. 2d 376,380 (1974); see also Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm'n, 267 Ill.App. 3d 386, 391 (1994). Our review of an order grantingsummary judgment is de novo. Zekman v. Direct AmericanMarketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374 (1998).

In 1959, this court abolished the doctrine of sovereignimmunity. See Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No.302, 18 Ill. 2d 11 (1959). In response to Molitor, the GeneralAssembly, in 1965, enacted the Local Governmental andGovernmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) (745 ILCS10/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)). Under the Act, Illinois adopted theprinciple that local governmental units are liable in tort, butlimited this liability with an extensive list of immunities based onspecific government functions. Burdinie v. Village of GlendaleHeights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990). The 1970 IllinoisConstitution also abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity,except as the General Assembly may provide by law. Ill. Const.1970, art. XIII,