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Docket No. 89043-Agenda 16-March 2001.

STEVEN HANSEN, Special Adm'r of the Estate of AndrinaHansen, Appellee, v. 
BAXTER HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, Appellant.

Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff's decedent, Andrina Hansen, suffered an airembolism because an intravenous (IV) tube became detached froma catheter inserted into her jugular vein. The embolism causedbrain damage and paralysis; Andrina died a little more than fouryears later.

The administrator of Andrina's estate filed medicalmalpractice claims, in the circuit court of Cook County, againstthe hospital and one of her treating nurses. He later added survivaland wrongful-death claims based on a products liability theoryagainst the manufacturer of the IV tube and connecting devices,Baxter Healthcare Corporation (Baxter). Shortly before trial, theplaintiff settled all claims against the medical malpracticedefendants for a total of $2,880,000. The administrator then filedan amended complaint against Baxter alleging products liabilityand negligence theories.

Following trial, plaintiff dismissed the negligence claims andthe matter was submitted to the jury on only the products liabilitytheory. The jury awarded plaintiff $18,047,000. The award wasreduced by a partial setoff of the amounts paid by the settlingdefendants.

On appeal, the appellate court found that the evidence wassufficient to justify the verdict based on a defective-design theory.The appellate court further found that the jury's verdict could notbe sustained on the theory that Baxter breached its duty to warn ofits products' inherent dangers. However, because the jury reacheda general verdict, unchecked by any inconsistent answers tospecial interrogatories, the appellate court refused to disturb theverdict except to reduce the judgment amount by the full amountof the settlements. 309 Ill. App. 3d 869.

Baxter appeals to this court, primarily arguing that theappellate court erred in finding that the jury's verdict could besupported under a defective-design theory. Plaintiff cross-appeals,arguing that we should reverse the appellate court's finding thatBaxter had no duty to warn the medical profession of dangersinherent in its product. We affirm the judgment of the appellatecourt.

BACKGROUND

Baxter designs, manufactures and distributes IV tubing sets tohospitals nationwide. These IV sets are prescription medicaldevices used to deliver fluids, such as blood products, medicines,or nutrients. An IV set consists of tubing and a connector, allowingit to be attached to other sections of tubing or to a catheter insertedinto a patient's venous system.

There are two types of connectors: "friction-fit" and "Luer-lock." The friction-fit type consists of two mating tapered fittings.A medical professional must push the ends of the two fittingstogether with sufficient force to maintain a leak-proof connection.The Luer-lock type is similar to a friction-fit connector but alsohas a threaded collar that screws onto the hub of the catheter. In itspatent application, Baxter stated that the Luer-lock was designedto overcome the problem of inadvertent disconnection that occurswith friction-fit connectors. Baxter continued to distribute bothfriction-fit and Luer-lock connectors to hospitals.

In March 1991, Andrina was admitted to Mt. Sinai Hospitalfor treatment of stomach ulcers. Following successful surgery,fluids were administered intravenously to Andrina through herjugular vein. This procedure is known as a "central line"application. Unfortunately, the Baxter friction-fit connector usedto connect the IV tube to a catheter came apart, causing Andrinato suffer a seizure. She also suffered an air embolism resulting inbrain damage, paralysis and, ultimately, death.

The administrator's complaint alleged, inter alia, that: (1) thetubing was unreasonably dangerous because it was designed,manufactured, and sold without a Luer-lock connection; (2) thefriction-fit connection failed when the product was used in areasonably foreseeable manner; and (3) Baxter failed to warn ofthe likelihood of unintentional disconnection and the need to usetubing equipped with the Luer-locking device.

At trial, plaintiff called Baxter employees as adversewitnesses to establish the propensity of the friction-fit connectorsto disconnect unintentionally and to prove that Luer-lockingdevices provided a more secure connection. According toMargaret Foss, a registered nurse and Baxter vice-president,Baxter was aware at the time Andrina was injured that friction-fitconnectors sometimes failed due to patient movement. Fossadmitted that this could cause air embolisms in central lineapplications. She conceded that friction-fit connectors wereinadequate for central line use and that, in such instances, medicalprofessionals should use Luer-locks. She testified, however, thatBaxter did not encourage sales representatives to recommendLuer-locks for central line applications. Instead, Baxter simplymade both products available to its customers.

Baxter's sales representatives provided similar testimony. Forexample, one representative admitted that she knew prior toAndrina's injury that friction-fit IV sets could unintentionallydisconnect and should not be used in central line applications.

Birenda Lal, Baxter's chief engineer in charge of the IVproduct line, was called as an adverse witness. He testified thatfriction-fit connectors could accidentally disconnect. He alsostated that friction-fit connectors were being used in central linesand agreed that an air embolism could result if they becamedisconnected. For this reason, he recommended using Luer-locksin central line applications. He added, however, that Baxter did notadvise hospitals to use one product or the other, and Baxter hadnot developed and marketed Luer-locks to prevent accidentaldisconnections or to increase patient safety. Rather, the Luer-lockmechanism was a competitive response to industry demands. Laltestified that adding Luer-locks to all connectors was technicallyfeasible and would add between three and five cents to the cost ofeach unit. He believed that Baxter would put locking collars on alltheir connectors if customers demanded it.

Neil Sheehan testified as plaintiff's expert witness withoutobjection. Sheehan is a mechanical engineer and had worked forseveral companies that developed and sold IV components.Sheehan had personally designed and, in some cases, patentedmedical devices, including IV equipment. He explained that themain problem with using a friction-fit connector was that theamount of force needed to disconnect it depended on severalfactors, including (1) the force used to connect it; (2) itscomposition; (3) the method used to sterilize it; and (4) variationsin molding. Thus, the strength of the connection varied as differentpersons used different friction-fit connectors at different times.Generally, however, if the connection was made with less force,it was more likely to fail.

Sheehan also described the technical aspects of the Luer-lock.He stated that a Luer-lock prevents the accidental disconnection ofIV lines and that it is four to five times stronger than a friction-fit.In order to disconnect a Luer-lock without unscrewing it, thecomponents would have to be pulled apart with great force untilthe threads on one component tore. Sheehan testified that airembolisms can be avoided by using Luer-locks and that Luer-locksshould always be used in central line applications. In his opinion,the friction-fit connector became obsolete once the Luer-lockbecame available.

In addition, Sheehan stated that is was foreseeable thatfriction-fit connectors might be used in a central line application.He opined, however, that a friction-fit connection was not a safedesign in any application and that it was especially hazardouswhen used in a central vein. He also believed that if medicalpersonnel had used a Luer-lock connector, Andrina's injury wouldhave been prevented.

Dr. William Schumer, chief of surgery at Mt. Sinai Hospital,testified that decisions regarding the purchase of medical supplieswere made by a nursing products committee. He said that Luer-locks were not used at Mt. Sinai prior to the incident, and hebelieved that most hospitals did not use them at that time. Hestated that he assumed friction-fit connectors were safe becausethey were readily available in the market.

The chair of the nursing products committee at Mt. Sinaitestified that the hospital staff relied on product manufacturers toadvise them of the appropriate uses for their products.

The nurse responsible for the actual purchase and distributionof medical supplies at Mt. Sinai stated that at the time ofAndrina's injury she did not know the difference between afriction-fit connector and a Luer-lock connector. She also notedthat at that time she did not know that friction-fits should not beused in central line applications.

Dr. Ricky Maddox, a second-year resident in general surgeryat Mt. Sinai at the time of Andrina's operation, testified that heplaced the catheter in Andrina's jugular vein. Although he knewabout using friction-fit connectors on IV tubing, he was unfamiliarwith Luer-lock connectors. He did not learn of them until afterAndrina was injured, when they began to be used exclusively atMt. Sinai Hospital.

Dr. Henry Roztoczynski, Andrina's surgeon, testified that hewas aware that friction-fit connectors could unintentionallydisconnect and that Luer-lock connectors were safe to use incentral lines. He never mentioned Luer-lock connectors to hiscolleagues at Mt. Sinai and did not advocate their use prior to theincident involving Andrina.

Dr. Norbert Strohmayer, was a fifth-year surgical residentwhen he assisted Dr. Roztoczynski with Andrina's surgery. Hetestified that he was familiar with both friction-fit and Luer-lockconnectors. He was unaware of the requisite force necessary todisconnect friction-fit connectors and could not specifically recallone coming apart. He was also unaware of any literaturedescribing the frequency of accidental disconnection, although heread several well-known medical journals. He agreed that theunintentional disconnection of an IV device could have adverseeffects in any application and is "never a good idea." Heacknowledged that Luer-lock connectors were less likely to faildue to a patient's movement.

In its case in chief, Baxter presented testimony from twoexpert witnesses. First, William McVay, a "medical deviceconsultant" with a degree in mechanical engineering, testified asan expert witness. He agreed that only Luer-locks should be usedin central line applications. McVay acknowledged that Baxter wasaware of the dangers of using friction-fit connectors in centrallines but believed that Baxter was not obliged to reveal thisinformation.

Next, Kathleen Medica, a registered nurse with a master'sdegree, testified as an expert witness for Baxter. In her opinion, afriction-fit connector was much more likely to fail than a Luer-lock, although she did not know whether this was a well-knowncomplication in the field. She acknowledged that some nurses maynever have had the experience of a friction-fit coming apart.

After hearing the evidence, the jury returned a general verdictfor the decedent's estate. No special interrogatories were requestedor submitted to the jury. The trial court denied Baxter's post-trialmotion seeking judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a newtrial. Baxter then appealed.

Relying on the learned intermediary doctrine, the appellatecourt found that Baxter was not obliged to warn Andrina's health-care providers of the risks associated with friction-fit connectorsbecause they already knew that such risks existed. 309 Ill. App. 3dat 882. The court found, however, that the evidence sufficientlysupported the verdict based on the theory of defective design. 309Ill. App. 3d at 883. The court affirmed the judgment but reducedthe award by the full settlement amount. We granted Baxter'spetition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

ANALYSIS

Baxter argues that the appellate court erred in (1) holding thatthe patient, rather than the prescribing physician, is the "ordinaryconsumer" of prescription medical products; (2) finding that theconnector was defective based on Sheehan's expert opiniontestimony since he was an engineer and had no medical training;(3) performing its proximate cause analysis; and (4) applying risk-benefit analysis in determining whether the friction-fit connectorwas unreasonably dangerous due to a defect in its design.

Plaintiff argues that Baxter has waived the last three of thesearguments. Therefore, we will first determine whether waiverapplies here.

A. Waiver

Baxter argues that the appellate court erred in finding aprescription medical product defective without expert medicaltestimony on its proper uses. On that issue, plaintiff offered onlythe testimony of Neil Sheehan, who is a mechanical engineer andlacks medical training.

We agree that Baxter failed to preserve this issue for review.At trial, Baxter did not challenge Sheehan's qualifications totestify or the sufficiency of his testimony to support plaintiff'sburden of proof. Baxter also failed to raise this issue in theappellate court and raised it for the first time in its petition forleave to appeal before this court. In Daniels v. Anderson, 162 Ill.2d 47 (1994), we held that parties may not raise arguments for thefirst time on appeal. To do so weakens the adversarial process andwould likely prejudice the other party, who did not presentrelevant evidence and argument on that issue at trial. Daniels, 162Ill. 2d at 59. Baxter offers no persuasive reason to depart from thewaiver doctrine in this case.

Baxter also argues that the appellate court erred in performinga proximate cause analysis. Plaintiff contends that Baxter failed toraise this argument in its petition for leave to appeal and thereforeshould be foreclosed from raising it now.

Again, we agree with plaintiff. Supreme Court Rule 315(b)provides that a party's petition for leave to appeal "shall contain*** (3) a statement of the points relied upon for reversal of thejudgment of the Appellate Court." 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b)(3). Failureto raise an argument in the petition for leave to appeal may bedeemed a waiver of that argument. Federal Deposit InsuranceCorp. v. O'Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (1994). Adherence to therule is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of an issue; itis a principle of administrative convenience. Dineen v. City ofChicago, 125 Ill. 2d 248, 265 (1988). Here, the issue of proximatecause was thoroughly and thoughtfully discussed in the appellatecourt's opinion and it need not be repeated here. We find nosufficient justification to overlook the administrative requirementsof Rule 315 in this instance.

Finally, we examine whether Baxter has waived its argumentthat the appellate court erred in applying the risk-benefit test inanalyzing whether the friction-fit connector was unreasonablydangerous by reason of a defective design. We conclude that it hasnot. Although Baxter did not expressly designate this point as aseparate argument in its petition for leave to appeal, it did arguethat the appellate court's decision is contrary to a body ofprecedent prohibiting a finding of liability solely on the existenceof an alternative design. Thus, the application of the risk-benefittest is inextricably intertwined with any fair analysis of theelements of plaintiff's defective design case. For that reason wewill consider the merits of Baxter's argument on this issue.

B. Duty To Warn

We first address whether Baxter had a duty to warn of dangersinherent in the friction-fit connector. For the reasons that follow,we conclude that it did.

Generally, the manufacturer of a prescription medical devicehas a duty to warn prescribing physicians or other healthprofessionals who may prescribe the device of the product'sknown dangerous propensities. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital &Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (1987). Likewise, physicians,using their medical judgment, have a duty to convey the warningsto their patients. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 517. The duty to warn thehealth-care professional, rather than the ultimate consumer orpatient, is an expression of the "learned intermediary" doctrine. Acorollary of that doctrine is the principle that a prescriptionmedical device manufacturer need not provide a warning of risksalready known to the medical community. Proctor v. Davis, 291Ill. App. 3d 265, 277 (1997). In this case, the appellate court heldthat Baxter had no duty to warn Mt. Sinai Hospital's doctors aboutthe risks of disconnection of the friction-fit device because themedical community was already aware of those risks. 309 Ill. App.3d at 882.

In plaintiff's request for cross-relief in this court, he arguesthat the appellate court erred by finding that Baxter had no duty towarn as a matter of law because health-care providers alreadyknew of the dangers associated with friction-fit connectors and theneed to use Luer-locks. Plaintiff asserts that since there isconflicting evidence concerning the comparative knowledge ofBaxter and the medical community about this peril, the jury wasproperly allowed to decide this issue.

We agree that the record contains sufficient conflictingevidence to raise factual questions concerning the comparativeknowledge of Baxter and that of the medical communityconcerning both the danger of using friction-fits in central linesand the need to use only Luer-locks in these applications. Therecord indicates that Baxter's employees knew of the inherentdangers of friction-fits and that Baxter's patent indicates that Luer-locks were designed to avoid accidental disconnections. Forexample, both Baxter's chief engineer, Birenda Lal, and its expertmedical device consultant, William McVay, knew that only Luer-locks should be used on central lines because they are less likelyto come apart.

In contrast, the testimony from persons on the medical staff atMt. Sinai shows that they had significantly less knowledge. Thechairperson of the nursing products committee testified thathospital staff relied on product manufacturers to advise themregarding the appropriate uses of a product. The nurse responsiblefor the actual purchase and distribution of medical supplies at Mt.Sinai testified that, in March 1991, she did not know the differencebetween a friction-fit connector and a Luer-lock and that she didnot know that friction-fit connectors should not be used in centrallines.

Morever, Dr. Norbert Strohmayer, the fifth-year resident whoassisted at Andrina's surgery, was unaware of any literaturedescribing the frequency of unintentional separation with friction-fit connectors, despite reading and subscribing to several well-known medical journals. He was also unaware of the forcenecessary to disconnect a friction-fit connector.

In addition, Dr. Ricky Maddox, who actually placed thecatheter in Andrina's jugular vein, stated that he was unfamiliarwith Luer-lock connectors and did not learn about them until afterthe incident. Thus, he could not have known that friction-fitconnectors should never be used in central line applications.

In Proctor v. Davis, 291 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1997), the appellatecourt held that a drug manufacturer that only shared informationabout its product's toxicity with its own employees breached itsduty to warn the medical community because without thisinformation, doctors could not provide appropriate andcomprehensive medical advice for their patients. This preventedthem from functioning as "learned intermediaries" to protect theirpatients' best medical interests. The court said, "Doctors who havenot been sufficiently warned of the harmful effects of a drugcannot be considered 'learned intermediaries' and the adequacy ofwarnings is a question of fact, not law, for the jury to determine,as it did in the instant case." (Emphasis added.) Proctor, 291 Ill.App. 3d at 283.

In the instant case, Baxter gave the medical community nowarning at all about the need to use Luer-locks in central lineapplications. Thus, this issue was properly submitted to the jury.The jury's general verdict for plaintiff could have been reasonablybased on a finding that Baxter's knowledge with respect to the useof friction-fit connectors was superior to that of the medicalcommunity and thus Baxter breached its duty to warn. Theevidence does not so strongly favor Baxter that the jury'sconclusion cannot stand and therefore we will not disturb it onappeal. See Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494,510 (1967). The appellate court erred by holding otherwise.

C. Design Defect

We next consider whether the jury's verdict can be supportedunder a design-defect theory. We find that it can.

A manufacturer has a nondelegable duty to produce a productthat is reasonably safe for all intended uses. Doser v. SavageManufacturing & Sales, Inc., 142 Ill. 2d 176, 189 (1990). InLamkin v. Towner, 138 Ill. 2d 510, 529 (1990), we said:

"A plaintiff may demonstrate that a product is defectivein design, so as to subject a retailer and a manufacturer tostrict liability for resulting injuries, in one of two ways: (l)by introducing evidence that the product failed to performas safely as an ordinary consumer would expect whenused in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or(2) by introducing evidence that the product's designproximately caused his injury and the defendant fails toprove that on balance the benefits of the challengeddesign outweigh the risk of danger inherent in suchdesigns."

The first way is commonly referred to as the consumer expectationtest. The second is called the risk-utility or risk-benefit test. Theappellate court held that under either test, the evidence justified afinding of defective design. We agree.

1. The Consumer Expectation Test

In affirming the jury's verdict, the appellate court held that itwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the jury tofind that the friction-fit device failed to meet Andrina's reasonableexpectation that it would function properly. 309 Ill. App. 3d at884.

Baxter contends that the health-care professional (rather thanthe patient) should be deemed "the consumer" for purposes of theconsumer expectation test. This approach, Baxter argues, isconsistent with the traditional application of the learnedintermediary doctrine. Baxter further argues that this is truebecause, in the case of a prescription medical device, the patienthas no more independent ability to assess the product's risks orbenefits than to appreciate or assess the warnings as to its use.Thus, under the consumer expectation test, the issue is whether theproduct is more dangerous than expected by the ordinary learnedintermediary.

Neither Baxter nor its amicus, the Product Liability AdvisoryCouncil, has cited any Illinois authority in support of thisargument. Baxter refers us to Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d1189 (Alaska 1992). In that case, the court concluded that aprescription drug is defectively designed and imposes strictliability on its manufacturer if it fails to perform as safely as anordinary doctor would expect, when used by the patient in anintended and reasonably foreseeable manner. Shanks, 835 P.2d at1195. In a footnote, the court observed:

"With certain types of prescription drugs, the role of thedoctor in the decision to use a specific product issignificantly reduced. Examples of such atypicalprescription products include contraceptives, where thepatient initiates and directs the usage, drugs administeredin a clinical setting with little or no physicianinvolvement, or drugs marketed under a strategy designedto appeal directly to the consuming public. These areareas where courts have held that manufacturers have aduty to warn patients directly. In strict liability designcases involving such products, it may be appropriate toapply the 'ordinary consumer expectation' test rather thanthe 'ordinary doctor expectation test.' " Shanks, 835 P.2dat 1195 n.7.

In the case before us, the evidence showed that the decisionto purchase friction-fit connectors was made exclusively by thenursing products committee at Mt. Sinai. The chairperson of thatcommittee testified that the hospital staff relied on the productmanufacturer to advise them of the proper uses for the product.The person who actually purchased the friction-fit connectors fromBaxter's sales representative was not a physician and did not knowthat those devices should not be used in central line applications.Since the purchase of the product had little physician involvement,it would appear that the facts in this case are similar to thosedescribed in the Shanks footnote. In such cases, the application ofthe "ordinary consumer" expectation test, rather than the "ordinaryphysician" expectation test, is appropriate.

Moreover, in Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525(1996), plaintiff sought recovery on a strict liability theory againstthe manufacturer of a knee prosthesis that failed prematurely,causing personal injuries. The evidence was conflicting as towhether the device failed because of a design defect, amanufacturing defect, or both. In any event, this court held that theevidence was sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff wasinjured by an unreasonably dangerous condition of the kneedevice. The court stated: "sufficient evidence was presented tosupport a finding that the device failed to perform in a mannerreasonably expected in light of its nature and intended functionand subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm beyondthat contemplated by an ordinary person." (Emphasis added.)Haudrich, 169 Ill. 2d at 542. Although the Haudrich court was notpresented with the argument that the contemplation of the doctors,rather than the patient, should be controlling, that case clearly usedthe "ordinary person" standard in applying the consumerexpectation test.

Andrina, who was conscious after surgery, could havereasonably expected that her IV catheter connection, if properlydesigned and manufactured, would be safe to use for its intendedpurpose. She was the person who would be harmed if the devicefailed. The expert testimony adduced at trial was sufficient toestablish that the design of the device was defective and that thisdefective design caused her injury. Thus, we agree with theappellate court's conclusion that the jury's decision did notcontradict the manifest weight of the evidence.

2. The Risk-Utility Test

Baxter also argues that the appellate court erred in finding thatthe jury's verdict could be supported under the risk-utility test. Theappellate court held that the record supported a finding that aconnector existed that would prevent foreseeable harm withouthindering its function or significantly increasing its price. Hansen,309 Ill. App. 3d at 884.

We disagree with Baxter on this point. As this court held inKerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 162-63 (1979), a plaintiff maydemonstrate that a product is unreasonably dangerous because ofa design defect by presenting evidence of an alternative design thatwould have prevented the injury and was feasible in terms of cost,practicality and technological possibility. The record in this casecontains sufficient evidence to establish that the Luer-lock collarwas designed to, and would have, prevented an unintentionaldisconnection at a cost of between three and five cents per unit.This record is sufficient to sustain a finding of unreasonabledangerousness under a risk-utility analysis.

Baxter argues, however, that a risk-utility analysis isinappropriate in this case because the device in question is simpleand because the risks are well-known to the medical communitythat uses the device.

Baxter cites Scoby v. Vulcan-Hart Corp., 211 Ill. App. 3d 106(1991), in support of its argument. In that case, the appellate courtreviewed a grant of summary judgment by the trial court in favorof the defendant manufacturer of a deep-fat fryer used in arestaurant. Plaintiff was a cook who was burned when he slippedand lost his balance, causing his arm to be submersed in hot oil.Plaintiff claimed the injury could have been prevented if the fryerhad been equipped either with a simmer cover or a tank cover. Themanufacturer offered each protective cover as a separate product.The parties stipulated that the purpose of the simmer cover was totrap moisture in the product being cooked, and that the purpose ofthe tank cover was to prevent vermin from getting into the jelledcooking oil after it had cooled. Neither cover was developed ormarketed as a safety device. In affirming the trial court's decision,the appellate court remarked:

"We do not deem that Lamkin or other cases applyingaspects of the danger-utility test intend that allmanufacturers of products described above should besubject to liability depending upon a trier of fact'sbalancing under that test, when suit is brought by oneinjured by such a product. Somewhere, a line must bedrawn beyond which the danger-utility test cannot beapplied. Considering not only the obvious nature of anydanger here but, also, the simple nature of the mechanisminvolved, we conclude the circuit court properly appliedonly the consumer-user contemplation test." Scoby, 211Ill. App. 3d at 112.

That conclusion is not compelled by the facts in this case.Baxter's patent application stated that the Luer-lock was designedto overcome the problem of inadvertent disconnection of thefriction-fit. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that Baxter, unlike themanufacturer in Scoby, developed and marketed its product as asafety device. As plaintiff's expert Neil Sheehan testified, thelikelihood of disconnection of a friction-fit device is dependent onseveral variables, including the force applied to engage it,differences in molding and differences in sterilization procedures.Sheehan further opined that the friction-fit connectors becameobsolete once the Luer-lock was invented.

Even though the doctors assumed the friction-fit device wassafe to use in central line applications, the reasonable conclusionis that the danger in the friction-fit was not obvious, nor was themechanism simple. There can be no rational comparison betweenthis device and a kettle of boiling oil. Thus, Scoby is inapposite.We believe the analysis of the appellate court was correct on thisissue and we hold that the jury's decision against Baxter based onapplication of the risk-utility test was not against the manifestweight of the evidence.

Baxter also argues that if the risk-utility test is to be appliedin the defective design analysis, then we should apply the standarddefined by the new Restatement (Third) of Torts. That standardwould allow a finding of unreasonably dangerous design only ifreasonable health-care providers, knowing the foreseeable risksand therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the device for anyclass of patients. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability