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Docket No. 95431-Agenda 28-September 2003.

ELLEN HALL, Appellee, v. TIM HENN et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed December 18, 2003.

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case, we are asked to construe the scope of the RecreationalUse of Land And Water Areas Act (745 ILCS 65/1 et seq. (West2002)). Specifically, we are asked to decide whether the Act's limitationof liability applies only to landowners who open their property forrecreational use by the general public, or whether it also applies tolandowners who open their property for recreational use by invited guestsonly.

BACKGROUND

During the winter of 2000-01, defendants, Tim and Sue Henn, builtand maintained a sled run in their backyard. The run included steps, aplatform, and a luge-like course, all of which were constructed out ofsnow, sprayed with water, and hardened into ice. Although the run wasnot open to the general public, defendants made it available to certainfriends and neighbors. Those using the run first had to ask for and receivedefendants' permission, and defendants allowed the run to be used onlywhen they were present to supervise.

The Friel family lived across the street from defendants. On January6, 2001, plaintiff, Ellen Hall, was visiting the Friels with her children.During the visit, Jody Friel called defendants and asked if her family andplaintiff's family could use the sled run. Defendants agreed. After takingseveral successful turns on the run, plaintiff slipped and fell down the icystairs. The fall knocked plaintiff unconscious, and she suffered both afractured right arm and a torn anterior cruciate ligament in her left knee.

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against defendants. Defendantsmoved for summary judgment, arguing that the Act immunizes them fromnegligence liability arising out of the recreational use of their property. Thetrial court agreed with defendants and granted the motion. The appellatecourt reversed, explaining that defendants were not entitled to the Act'sprotection because they had not opened their land for recreational use bythe public. No. 2-02-0435 (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23). We granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2dR. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Summary judgment is proper where, when viewed in the light mostfavorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions,and affidavits on file reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2002); Ragan v. Columbia MutualInsurance Co., 183 Ill. 2d 342, 349 (1998). The standard of review forthe entry of summary judgment is de novo. Ragan, 183 Ill. 2d at 349.

The Recreational Use of Land And Water Areas Act (the Act) exists"to encourage owners of land to make land and water areas available tothe public for recreational or conservation purposes by limiting theirliability toward persons entering thereon for such purposes." 745 ILCS65/1 (West 2002). To that end, the Act provides that owners of land owe"no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by any personfor recreational or conservation purposes, or to give any warning of anatural or artificial dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on suchpremises to persons entering for such purposes." 745 ILCS 65/3 (West2002). In addition, the Act provides that:

"an owner of land who either directly or indirectly invites orpermits without charge any person to use such property forrecreational or conservation purposes does not thereby:

(a) Extend any assurance that the premises are safe for anypurpose.

(b) Confer upon such person the legal status of an invitee orlicensee to whom a duty of care is owed.

(c) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury toperson or property caused by an act or omission of such personor any other person who enters upon the land.

(d) Assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury tosuch person or property caused by any natural or artificialcondition, structure or personal property on the premises." 745ILCS 65/4 (West 2002).

The Act does not immunize landowners who engage in wilful and wantonconduct, nor does it apply to landowners who charge a fee for the use oftheir property. 745 ILCS 65/6 (West 2002).

As defined by the Act, "land" includes "roads, water, watercourses,private ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment whenattached to the realty." 745 ILCS 65/2(a) (West 2002). "Recreational orconservation purpose" means "any activity undertaken for conservation,resource management, exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure on landowned by another." 745 ILCS 65/2(c) (West 2002). Finally, the Actdefines "[p]erson" as "any person, regardless of age, maturity, orexperience, who enters upon or uses land for recreational purposes." 745ILCS 65/2(e) (West 2002).

Defendants argue that, under the Act, they cannot be held liable forplaintiff's injuries because defendants had invited plaintiff onto theirproperty for recreational purposes, namely, using the sled run. Citingsection 1 of the Act, plaintiff counters that the Act's limitation of liabilityapplies only when land is made available "to the public." Here, defendantsconcede that use of the sled run was limited to invited guests only and wasnot available to the public.

The resolution of this dispute turns on a question of statutoryinterpretation. The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertainand give effect to the legislature's intent. Michigan Avenue NationalBank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 503-04 (2000). Accordingly,courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind thesubject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it.People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). The best indication oflegislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinarymeaning. Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 479 (1994).Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statutewithout resort to further aids of statutory construction. Davis v. ToshibaMachine Co., America, 186 Ill. 2d 181, 184-85 (1999). Nevertheless,we will presume that the General Assembly did not intend an absurd,inconvenient, or unjust result. Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203Ill. 2d 497, 508 (2003). The construction of a statute is a question of lawthat is reviewed de novo. In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326, 330(2000).

We agree with plaintiff that the Act applies only to those landownerswho open their property to the public. Section 1 of the Act specificallystates that the Act exists "to encourage owners of land to make land andwater areas available to the public for recreational or conservationpurposes." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 65/1 (West 2002). Sections 3and 4, in turn, immunize landowners from negligence liability with respectto "any person" who enters their property for recreational purposes. 745ILCS 65/3, 4 (West 2002). Reading these provisions together, as wemust, we conclude that the Act immunizes landowners from negligenceliability with respect to any person who enters their property forrecreational purposes, provided that such property is open to thepublic. Conversely, the Act's protections are not available to landownerswho restrict the use of their property to invited guests only. This readingboth considers the Act in its entirety and vindicates the legislature'sobvious objective in enacting it. See Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at135.

In reaching this result, we note that defendant's reading of the Act,while textually plausible, renders an absurd and unjust result. The Act issweeping in its scope, immunizing a landowner from negligence liabilitywith respect to any person who enters the landowner's property for,among other things, "exercise, education, relaxation, or pleasure." 745ILCS 65/2(c), 3, 4 (West 2002). "Exercise, education, relaxation, orpleasure" encompasses just about every purpose, absent commerce, forwhich a person is invited onto another's property. Consequently, were weto ignore section 1's express caveat that the property in question be madeavailable for such purposes to the public, we would largely eliminatepremises liability in this state. This clearly was not the legislature's intent.

As the Act applies only to those landowners who open their propertyto the general public, the appellate court correctly reversed the trialcourt's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. Defendantstestified that the sled run was available only to certain friends andneighbors, and that anyone using the run first had to ask for and receivedefendants' permission. When specifically asked whether the run wasopen to the public, defendants testified that it was not. In light of theseadmissions, defendants cannot claim the Act's protection, and they werenot entitled to summary judgment. Whether defendants are ultimately liablefor plaintiff's injury is not before us, and we express no opinion on thatquestion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court isaffirmed.

Affirmed.