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Docket No. 90950-Agenda 24-November 2001.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK et al., Appellants, v. RICHARD GUERINE et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed January 25, 2002.

JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

On the evening of September 26, 1999, Richard Guerine ofMelrose Park, Cook County, was driving his Jeep Carryall onSomonauk Road in De Kalb County, pulling a speedboat on atrailer manufactured by J.Q. Tex, Inc. (J.Q. Tex), a Mishawaka,Indiana, corporation. The trailer broke away from Guerine'svehicle, crossed the road into oncoming traffic, and struck head-ona Hyundai Accent driven by Angel Malone of Batavia, KaneCounty. Angel was pronounced dead on arrival at Valley WestCommunity Hospital in Sandwich, De Kalb County. Dr. L.W.Blum, a coroner's physician from Rockford, Winnebago County,performed an autopsy on Angel's body and reported her cause ofdeath as head trauma due to blunt force injuries she suffered in theaccident.

Detective Rogers, Sergeant Newby, and Deputy Sullivan ofthe De Kalb County sheriff's police investigated the accidentscene. These officers interviewed Guerine, his passenger AshleyMcKinney of Melrose Park, Cook County, and Randall Baker, aneyewitness from Sandwich, De Kalb County. The record does notindicate whether the officers spoke with Guerine's otherpassenger, April Tischer of Addison, Du Page County, or Angel'spassengers, her two minor sons Christopher and Samuel.According to J.Q. Tex, Guerine's vehicle, boat, and trailer werestored in De Kalb County.

First National Bank, as executor of Angel's estate, andChristopher and Samuel, by their father and Angel's husband,Patrick Malone, filed a nine-count wrongful-death complaint inthe Cook County circuit court against Guerine for negligentoperation of his vehicle, and J.Q. Tex for defective design andmanufacture of the boat trailer. The parties engaged in a limitedamount of discovery, which revealed the location of potentialwitnesses. The plaintiffs, in their interrogatory answers, stated thatPatrick lives in St. Charles, Kane County, with Christopher,Samuel, and Michelle Schumpert. The plaintiff's interrogatoryanswers also listed James and Bonnie Schumpert, Angel's parents,who live in Somonauk, De Kalb County, as persons with relevantinformation.

J.Q. Tex filed a forum non conveniens motion to transfervenue to De Kalb County. The trial court granted this motion,stating:

"It appears to me that all we have here is defendant andone witness in Cook County, an accident that clearly hasno connection to Cook County, a boating accident.

There is nothing alleged here that there is [sic]numerous other cases pending against this J Q in CookCounty, and it's an ongoing problem, et cetera, et cetera.

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So I am basing my decision on that I think it stronglyfavors transfer.

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*** I'm deciding the case on the whole state of therecord, but the accident also happened in De Kalb. Thepolice officers are from De Kalb. The streets were inDe Kalb. Let the De Kalb people hear their litigation, andtheir burden *** of the jury consideration of the case. Ithink it's in conformance with Illinois law, the decision,and if you look at the books, I've done a lot of caseswhere I stuck my neck out for plaintiffs and the AppellateCourt refused to allow it. So they made a believer out ofme."

The trial court gave the plaintiffs a choice betweentransferring the case to De Kalb County, where the accidentoccurred, or Kane County, where the Malone family lives. Theplaintiffs chose Kane County, but filed an interlocutory appealunder Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2)).The appellate court denied the plaintiffs' petition for leave toappeal, and the plaintiffs sought review from this court. Wegranted the plaintiffs' subsequent petition for leave to appeal. See177 Ill. 2d R. 315.

For the first time since Peile v. Skelgas, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 323(1994), we are called upon to evaluate the continued vitality of theintrastate forum non conveniens doctrine. We reaffirm that thedoctrine is Illinois law, but we conclude that the trial court abusedits discretion in granting J.Q. Tex's motion to transfer venue. Wereverse and remand for further proceedings.

ANALYSIS

Section 2-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:"every action must be commenced (1) in the county of residenceof any defendant who is joined in good faith and with probablecause for the purpose of obtaining a judgment against him or herand not solely for the purpose of fixing venue in that county, or (2)in the county in which the transaction or some part thereofoccurred out of which the cause of action arose." 735 ILCS5/2-101 (West 2000). Here, the plaintiffs filed their complaint inCook County, where Guerine resides. Before the trial court, J.Q.Tex did not dispute that venue is proper in Cook County. Rather,J.Q. Tex asserted, another venue is more appropriate than CookCounty. In ruling on a forum non conveniens motion, a trial courtenjoys considerable discretion. Peile, 163 Ill. 2d at 336; seeFender v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 49 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (1971).Accordingly, the sole issue before us is whether the trial courtabused its discretion in granting J.Q. Tex's motion to transfervenue.

Forum non conveniens is an equitable doctrine "founded inconsiderations of fundamental fairness and sensible and effectivejudicial administration" (Adkins v. Chicago, Rock Island & PacificR.R. Co., 54 Ill. 2d 511, 514 (1973)), which allows a trial court todecline jurisdiction in the exceptional case where trial in anotherforum with proper jurisdiction and venue "would better serve theends of justice" (Vinson v. Allstate, 144 Ill. 2d 306, 310 (1991)).Although the forum non conveniens doctrine has a long history atcommon law, its general application crystalized following theUnited State Supreme Court's landmark decision in Gulf Oil Corp.v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839 (1947). TheGulf Oil Court stated:

"The principle of forum non conveniens is simply thata court may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction evenwhen jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a generalvenue statute. ***

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Wisely, it has not been attempted to catalogue thecircumstances which will justify or require either grant ordenial of remedy. The doctrine leaves much to thediscretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts, andexperience has not shown a judicial tendency to renounceone's own jurisdiction so strong as to result in manyabuses.

If the combination and weight of factors requisite togiven results are difficult to forecast or state, those to beconsidered are not difficult to name. An interest to beconsidered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is theprivate interest of the litigant. Important considerationsare the relative ease of access to sources of proof;availability of compulsory process for attendance ofunwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view wouldbe appropriate to the action; and all other practicalproblems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious andinexpensive. There may also be questions as to theenforcibility of a judgment if one is obtained. The courtwill weigh relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial.It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of aninconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' thedefendant by inflicting upon him expense or trouble notnecessary to his own right to pursue his remedy. Butunless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.

Factors of public interest also have place in applyingthe doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courtswhen litigation is piled up in congested centers instead ofbeing handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden thatought not to be imposed upon the people of a communitywhich has no relation to the ligation." (Emphasis added.)Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 507-08, 91 L. Ed. at 1062, 67 S. Ct.at 842-43.

Our cases subsequently have recast these factors. In Illinois,the private interest factors include (1) the convenience of theparties; (2) the relative ease of access to sources of testimonial,documentary, and real evidence; and (3) all other practicalproblems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, andinexpensive-for example, the availability of compulsory processto secure attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost to obtainattendance of willing witnesses, and the ability to view thepremises (if appropriate). See Griffith v. Mitsubishi AircraftInternational, Inc., 136 Ill. 2d 101, 105-06 (1990); Bland v.Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 116 Ill. 2d 217, 224 (1987); see alsoAdkins, 54 Ill. 2d at 514 (these factors also may include therelative capacities of the two forums to provide a fair trial). Thepublic interest factors include (1) the interest in deciding localizedcontroversies locally; (2) the unfairness of imposing the expenseof a trial and the burden of jury duty on residents of a county withlittle connection to the litigation; and (3) the administrativedifficulties presented by adding further litigation to court docketsin already congested fora. See Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106. Courtcongestion is a relatively insignificant factor, especially where therecord does not show the other forum would resolve the case morequickly. See Brummett v. Wepfer Marine, Inc., 111 Ill. 2d 495, 503(1986) ("Courts should be extremely reluctant to dismiss a casefrom the forum rei gestae merely because that forum's docket hasa backlog"). These factors govern both interstate and intrastatetransfers.

A further consideration is the forum which the plaintiff haschosen to file the complaint. The plaintiff has a substantial interestin choosing the forum where his rights will be vindicated, and theplaintiff's forum choice should rarely be disturbed unless the otherfactors strongly favor transfer. Griffith, 136 Ill. 2d at 106; Jones v.Searle Laboratories, 93 Ill. 2d 366, 372-73 (1982), quoting GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508-09, 91 L. Ed. at 1062-63, 67 S. Ct. at 843; seeRestatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws