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Docket No. 95019-Agenda 15-May 2003.
LYNN FELTMEIER, Appellee, v. ROBERT FELTMEIER, 
Appellant.

Opinion filed September 18, 2003.

JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Lynn Feltmeier, and defendant, Robert Feltmeier, weremarried on October 11, 1986, and divorced on December 16, 1997.The judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporated the terms ofa December 10, 1997, marital settlement agreement. On August 25,1999, Lynn sued Robert for the intentional infliction of emotionaldistress. According to the allegations contained in the complaint,Robert engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse, both physical andmental in nature, which began shortly after the marriage and did notcease even after its dissolution.

On October 20, 1999, Robert filed a motion to dismiss the suitunder sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1998)), maintaining that the complaintfailed to allege facts that give rise to an action for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress and that, even if the conduct allegedwas actionable, the claim was not viable because the statute oflimitations had run on most of the alleged misconduct. The circuitcourt denied Robert's motion to dismiss on February 14, 2000.Robert then filed an amended motion to dismiss under section 2-619,arguing that provisions contained in the marital settlement agreementreleased him from the claim presented in Lynn's lawsuit. The circuitcourt denied this motion on June 23, 2000.

On April 10, 2001, following a hearing on Robert's motion forpermissive interlocutory appeal, and pursuant to Supreme Court Rule308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), the circuit court made a written findingthat its orders denying Robert's motions to dismiss involvedquestions of law as to which there are substantial grounds fordifference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the ordersmight materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.The three questions of law identified by the court were as follows:

"a. Whether the plaintiff's Complaint states a cause ofaction for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

b. Whether the plaintiff's claims for intentional inflictionof emotional distress based on conduct prior to August 25,1997, are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

c. Whether the plaintiff's claim against defendant forintentional infliction of emotional distress has been releasedby the language of the Marital Settlement Agreement."

After the circuit court made its written finding, Robert appliedto the appellate court for leave to appeal and his application wasgranted. In addition to the three issues certified for review, the courtaddressed an immunity issue raised by Robert on appeal. Theappellate court concluded that Lynn, as plaintiff, could "maintain anaction at law to recover monetary damages proximately caused by herex-husband's pattern of abusive treatment during the course of theirill-fated marriage." 333 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 1170. One justice dissentedin part. We granted Robert's petition for leave to appeal from theappellate court's judgment (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm.

Because this appeal concerns questions of law certified by thecircuit court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308, and because itarose in the context of orders denying section 2-619 and section2-615 motions to dismiss, our review is de novo. Eads v. HeritageEnterprises, Inc., 204 Ill. 2d 92, 96 (2003); Robinson v. Toyota MotorCredit Corp., 201 Ill. 2d 403, 418-19 (2002); Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank of Fox Valley, N.A., 186 Ill. 2d 472, 480, 491 (1999).Additionally, we review de novo Robert's claim of immunity, as itinvolves a question of statutory interpretation. Eads, 204 Ill. 2d at 96;Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,503 (2000). While the immunity question was not certified forreview, we agree with the appellate court that the question is properlyaddressed, because it "relates to the appropriateness of the orders thatgave rise to this appeal." 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1184; see Bright v. Dicke,166 Ill. 2d 204, 208 (1995).

The first matter before us for review is whether Lynn's complaintstates a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.In ruling on a section 2-615 motion to dismiss, the court must acceptas true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonableinferences which can be drawn therefrom. Kolegas v. HeftelBroadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 (1992). The question presentedby a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause ofaction is whether sufficient facts are contained in the pleadingswhich, if established, could entitle the plaintiff to relief. Kolegas, 154Ill. 2d at 9; see also McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 90 (1988). Inmaking this determination, the court is to interpret the allegations ofthe complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kolegas, 126Ill. 2d at 9; McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 90.

According to the allegations contained in Lynn's complaint,since the parties' marriage in October 1986, and continuing for overa year after the December 1997 dissolution of their marriage:

"[Robert] entered into a continuous and outrageous course ofconduct toward [Lynn] with either the intent to causeemotional distress to [Lynn] or with reckless disregard as towhether such conduct would cause emotional distress to[Lynn], said continuing course of conduct, including but notlimited to, the following:

A. On repeated occasions, [Robert] has battered [Lynn] bystriking, kicking, shoving, pulling hair and bending andtwisting her limbs and toes.

* * *

B. On repeated occasions, [Robert] has prevented [Lynn]from leaving the house to escape the abuse.

* * *

C. On repeated occasions, [Robert] has yelled insultingand demeaning epithets at [Lynn]. Further, [Robert] hasengaged in verbal abuse which included threats and constantcriticism of [Lynn] in such a way as to demean, humiliate,and degrade [Lynn].

* * *

D. On repeated occasions, [Robert] threw items at [Lynn]with the intent to cause her harm.

* * *

E. On repeated occasions, [Robert] attempted to isolate[Lynn] from her family and friends and would get very upsetif [Lynn] would show the marks and bruises resulting from[Robert's] abuse to others.

F. On repeated occasions since the divorce, [Robert] hasengaged in stalking behavior.

* * *

G. On at least one occasion, [Robert] has attempted tointerfere with [Lynn's] employment by confiscating hercomputer. Additionally, [Robert] broke into [Lynn's] lockeddrug cabinet for work on or about March 23, 1997."

The complaint further alleged, as examples of conduct within thecategories set forth above, dozens of episodes of abusive behavior,including specific details and time frames for the various physical andemotional attacks.

In McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78 (1988), this court set forththe three elements necessary to state a cause of action for intentionalinfliction of emotional distress, stating:

"First, the conduct involved must be truly extreme andoutrageous. Second, the actor must either intend that hisconduct inflict severe emotional distress, or know that thereis at least a high probability that his conduct will causesevere emotional distress. Third, the conduct must in factcause severe emotional distress. (Public Finance Corp. v.Davis (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 85, 90.)" (Emphases in original.)McGrath, 126 Ill. 2d at 86.

In the case at bar, Robert first contends that the allegations ofLynn's complaint do not sufficiently set forth conduct which wasextreme and outrageous when considered "[i]n the context of thesubjective and fluctuating nature of the marital relationship." Insupport of this contention, Robert cites several cases from otherjurisdictions that have addressed the policy ramifications of allowinga spouse to maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotionaldistress based upon acts occurring during the marriage. In Pickeringv. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d 758, 761 (S.D. 1989), the Supreme Courtof South Dakota held that the tort of intentional infliction ofemotional distress should be unavailable as a matter of public policywhen predicated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of amarriage. However, unlike the case at bar, the conduct serving as thebasis for the tort in Pickering was the wife's extramarital affair, andthe court noted that South Dakota law already provided a remedy forthis type of claim in the form of an action against the paramour foralienation of affections. Pickering, 434 N.W.2d at 760-61.⁽¹⁾ Next,Robert cites Hakkila v. Hakkila, 112 N.M. 172, 179, 812 P.2d 1320,1327 (App. 1991), in which the Court of Appeals of New Mexicofound that a husband's insults and occasional violent outbursts overthe course of the parties' 10-year marriage were insufficientlyoutrageous to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotionaldistress. The Hakkila court additionally found insufficient evidencethat the alleged wrongful conduct caused severe emotional distress.Hakkila, 112 N.M. at 179, 812 P.2d at 1327. Notably, whilecounseling caution, the court did not find that New Mexico's publicpolicy barred recognition of the tort in the marital context. Hakkila,112 N.M. at 174-75, 812 P.2d at 1322-23.

Finally, Robert cites a Texas case, Villasenor v. Villasenor, 911S.W.2d 411, 415 n.2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995), wherein the court, indicta, noted that because the marital relationship " 'is highlysubjective and constituted by mutual understandings and interchangeswhich are constantly in flux[,]' *** [f]or purposes of determiningoutrageous conduct, the insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, pettyoppressions, or other trivialities associated with marriage and divorcemust be considered upon the individual facts of each case." However,Illinois case law makes clear that under no circumstances would" 'mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, orother trivialities' " qualify as outrageous conduct. McGrath, 126 Ill.2d at 86, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts