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JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

The sole issue presented is whether the circuit court ofMonroe County properly invalidated every ballot cast in aparticular precinct, where none of those ballots contain therequisite initials from an election judge.

BACKGROUND

On November 5, 1996, the voters of Monroe County castballots to decide whether Julie Gummersheimer or LeonardDeFabio would serve as the county's next coroner. Two days later,the Monroe County canvassing board declared Gummersheimer thewinner by two votes.

DeFabio then filed a petition for election contest, alleging inpertinent part that the official election results were invalid because,in violation of sections 17-9, 19-8, and 20-9 of the Election Code(10 ILCS 5/17-9, 19-8, 20-9 (West 1998)), none of the 524ballots cast in Monroe County's second precinct were initialed byan election judge. In the second precinct, Gummersheimer received290 votes and DeFabio received 212 votes. DeFabio asked the trialcourt to examine the ballots cast in the second precinct, toinvalidate any ballots that were not initialed, to recount the validballots, and to declare DeFabio the winner of the November 6election. Gummersheimer moved to dismiss the petition as bothfacially deficient and time-barred, and the trial court denied thatmotion.

After the parties stipulated to both the total number of ballotscast for each candidate and the number of uninitialed ballots ineach precinct, DeFabio moved for summary judgment. DeFabionoted that the parties had stipulated that, of the 524 uninitialedballots cast in the second precinct, 290 were cast forGummersheimer and 212 were cast for DeFabio. In addition, of the59 uninitialed ballots cast in other precincts, 38 were cast forGummersheimer and 21 were cast for DeFabio. DeFabio arguedthat, in light of the stipulation, no genuine issue of material factexisted because, pursuant to both the Election Code and case law,the uninitialed ballots were legally invalid and could not becounted.

In her response to DeFabio's summary judgment motion,Gummersheimer argued that a genuine issue of material factexisted as to the legal effect of the uninitialed ballots cast in thesecond precinct. In support, Gummersheimer attached affidavitsfrom (1) the second precinct election judges, who would testifythat the absence of initials was due to mistake rather than to fraudor corruption; and (2) two second precinct voters who failed tonotice that the election judge had not initialed the ballots.

The trial court granted DeFabio's summary judgment motion.In so doing, the trial court explained that, according to both theElection Code and the Illinois Supreme Court, the initialingrequirement is mandatory for in-precinct ballots,⁽¹⁾ uninitialed ballotsare invalid and cannot be counted, and the absence or existence offraud is irrelevant to determining whether uninitialed in-precinctballots are valid. The trial court therefore invalidated all of theuninitialed ballots, including every ballot cast in the secondprecinct, and declared DeFabio the winner by 92 votes. Afterallowing Gummersheimer's petition to recount the ballots from 10additional precincts, the trial court modified its order and declaredDeFabio the winner by 70 votes.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. 307 Ill.App. 3d 381, and this court granted Gummersheimer's petition forleave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)).

ANALYSIS

The fundamental issue in this case is whether the trial courtproperly invalidated all of the ballots cast in Monroe County'ssecond precinct. We hold that it did.

Section 24A-10.1 of the Election Code provides that,"[i]f anyballot card or ballot card envelope is not initialed, it shall bemarked on the back 'Defective', initialed as to such label by alljudges immediately under the word 'Defective' and not counted."(Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/24A-10.1 (West 1998). For morethan 100 years, this court has "adhered to the rule that statutesrequiring election judges to initial ballots are mandatory, and thatuninitialed ballots may not be counted." McDunn v. Williams, 156Ill. 2d 288, 311 (1993); see also Morandi v. Heiman, 23 Ill. 2d 365(1961); Griffin v. Rausa, 2 Ill. 2d 421 (1954); Tuthill v.Rendelman, 387 Ill. 321 (1944); Laird v. Williams, 281 Ill. 233(1917); Kelly v. Adams, 183 Ill. 193, 195 (1899). This is true evenwhere the parties agree that there was no knowledge of fraud orcorruption. McDunn, 156 Ill. 2d at 320.

To be sure, this court has permitted relaxation of themandatory initialing requirement under very limited circumstances.Specifically, this court has permitted the counting of onlyuninitialed absentee ballots that are easily distinguished from in-precinct ballots. See, e.g., Pullen v. Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21(1990); Craig v. Peterson, 39 Ill. 2d 191 (1968). However, thiscourt has never permitted relaxation of the mandatory initialingrequirement for in-precinct ballots. In fact, this court hasrepeatedly rejected such a notion. In Kelly, this court stated:

"To ignore this provision of the statute and allow ballotsto be counted which do not contain the officialendorsement would authorize the voting of ballots thatmight have been surreptitiously obtained or copied, andone of the purposes of the Ballot law be entirely fritteredaway and the door opened for fraud." Kelly, 183 Ill. at195.

In Craig, this court stated:

"The statute requires the ballots to be initialled, itcommands that no unindorsed ballot shall be counted, thisrequirement substantially contributes to the integrity of theelection process and is a valid, mandatory provision whichthe courts must enforce." (Emphasis added.) Craig, 39 Ill.2d at 198.

Likewise, in addressing uninitialed absentee ballots that could notbe separated from the in-precinct ballots, this court stated:

"[T]here must *** in order to prevent fraud, be somemethod whereby illegally cast ballots may be distinguishedand rejected. The initialling provision is the principalmethod chosen by the legislature for accomplishing thispurpose since the judge who has indorsed his initials uponthe ballot can thereafter identify that ballot as legally cast.Because of the compelling importance to the public thatelections be honestly conducted, and the substantialcontribution of the initialling procedure to that result, noconstitutional problem arises and courts are free to enforcethe statutory command even though absentee voters maybe disenfranchised without fault on their part (one whovotes at the polls has the opportunity to see whether thejudge of election has initialled his ballot and request it tobe done if it has not)." Craig, 39 Ill. 2d at 200-01.

In Pullen, this court stated:

"Applying the initialling requirement to in-precinct ballotsis certainly necessary to preserve the integrity of theelection, because the initials provide the only means bywhich the election officials can identify and separate thelegally cast from the illegally cast in-precinct ballots. Thus,here, as in Craig, application of the initialling requirementto in-precinct ballots prevented fraudulent practices, suchas stuffing the ballot box." (Emphasis in original.) Pullen,138 Ill. 2d at 53.

Most recently, in McDunn, this court stated:

"[S]tatutes requiring initialling are not constitutionallysuspect. Voters who cast a ballot in-precinct will not losethe right to vote without fault of their own because suchvoters could tell whether the election judges had initialledtheir ballots. Any voter at the precinct with an uninitialledballot could ask the election judge to initial his ballot andthus ensure that his vote would be counted." McDunn,156 Ill. 2d at 314.

Significantly, notwithstanding this court's 100-year history ofstrictly construing the statutory mandate that prohibits the countingof uninitialed ballots, the legislature has never seen fit, in anymanner, to substantively amend that portion of the Election Code.See Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1983) ("Where thelegislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicialconstruction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in thecourt's statement of the legislative intent").

Applying these well-established principles to the present case,we hold that the trial court properly invalidated all of the ballotscast in Monroe County's second precinct. None of these ballotscontain the requisite initialing, and neither party argues that any ofthe uninitialed ballots can be distinguished or identified as absenteeballots. As the trial court correctly recognized, both section24A-10.1 and more than 100 years of this court's jurisprudencecompel the invalidation of those ballots.

Gummersheimer argues strongly against this result, insistingthat the foregoing precedents do not control because "[t]his courthas never considered the initialing requirement in the contextpresented here, i.e. where the judges have failed in their duties byfailing to initial any and all of the ballots cast in the precinct, andwhere there is no evidence of any fraud." (Emphasis in original.)We disagree. In Laird v. Williams, 281 Ill. 233 (1917),⁽²⁾ this courtexamined whether any of the ballots cast in a municipal electionwere valid, where the election judge who handed out the ballotsmarked those ballots with the initials of another election judge.After reviewing both the plain language of and the public policybehind the mandatory initialing requirement, this court invalidatedevery ballot cast in that election:

"As our statute makes it absolutely necessary that everyballot shall bear the official endorsement in the manneraforesaid, we must hold that the election in this case wasvoid, although there is no evidence in the record thatdiscloses any fraud or intended fraud upon the part of theelection judges. We think it would be a very dangerousrule to establish that the election judges may disregard theplain provisions of this statute, and thereby defeat theintention of the law to prevent actual frauds from beingcommitted in elections and to disarm the constitutedauthorities of the efficient means provided by the statutefor detecting such frauds. Such salutary laws should not berepealed, in effect, by the action of election judges simplybecause their mistakes are innocent or because an honestvoter may lose his vote by holding such mistakes fatal. Itis more preferable that a voter should lose his vote by theinnocent action of the judges and by his own neglect to seeto it that he votes a ballot properly endorsed by a judge,than to open the doors to wholesale fraud and corruption.Every voter is presumed to know the law, and by propercare on his part he can know, and should know, that theballot delivered to him is properly endorsed by one of theelection judges with his own initials." Laird, 281 Ill. at241-42.

Consequently, this court held that "there was not a single legalballot cast at the election in question, and for that reason no onewas elected as supervisor at that election." Laird, 281 Ill. at 242.

Certainly, if Laird permits the invalidation of every ballot castin an entire electoral district, subjecting a single precinct to asimilar fate compromises neither the constitution nor the ElectionCode.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the appellatecourt is affirmed.

Affirmed.

1. ¹As opposed to absentee ballots.

2. ²Although Laird's construction of the mandatory initialingrequirement was briefly overruled (see Waters v. Heaton, 364 Ill. 150,160 (1936)), it was promptly reaffirmed (see Tuthill v. Rendelman, 387Ill. 321, 328-30 (1944); see also Harvey v. Sullivan, 406 Ill. 472, 477(1950); Morandi, 23 Ill. 2d at 370-71).