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Docket Nos. 86891, 87002 cons.-Agenda 28-September 1999.

THE COUNTY OF KNOX ex rel. ROBERT MASTERSON, Knox County Zoning Department Administrator, et al.,Appellants, v. THE HIGHLANDS, L.L.C., et al., Appellees.

Opinion filed December 2, 1999.

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Highlands, L.L.C., filed a complaint in the circuit court of Knox County against the Knox County zoning board ofappeals (board), Knox County State's Attorney Paul Mangieri, and John Leonard, one of others hereafter collectivelyreferred to as "Objectors." The Highlands sought a determination that it could proceed to construct and operate a large-scalehog confinement facility. In two separate complaints against the Highlands, Knox County (county) and Leonard sought aninjunction barring the construction of the facility.

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Highlands. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting,upheld the judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. We allowed the county's and Leonard's separate petitions forleave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated the causes for review. We now affirm the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

The record contains the following pertinent facts. Patricia Baird, a co-owner of the Highlands, and her husband James, ownland in a rural, unincorporated area of the county. The Highlands applied to the county zoning department for a constructionpermit to erect six buildings as part of a hog confinement facility. Several days later, the zoning department issued thepermit.

Approximately three months later, the Objectors appealed the issuance of the construction permit to the board. Theycontended, inter alia, that "the use of the property [i.e., a large-scale hog confinement facility] is not a customaryagricultural use in this area." They sought to "cancel construction permit and maintain 'F' [farming] zoning." The permitwas suspended, thereby staying construction pending the appeal.

The board held a public hearing on the appeal, where it received testimony and written evidence both for and against theissuance of the construction permit. Four of the five board members were present. At the close of the evidence, twomembers voted to rescind the permit and one passed his vote. The chairman did not vote; he explained that since four voteswere necessary to rescind the permit, the motion to rescind could not carry even if he voted in its favor. Accordingly, thechairman ruled that the motion to rescind failed.

Two days later, however, Mangieri advised the zoning department that the construction permit suspension should remaineffective until the legal effect of the board's action was clarified. Mangieri subsequently opined that the motion to rescindthe construction permit had passed. The zoning department notified the Highlands that the board had granted the appeal andcanceled the construction permit.

Despite having been told that the permit had been canceled, the Highlands began ground preparation on the proposedconstruction site. The zoning department then notified the Highlands that it was in violation of the county zoning rules anddirected it to cease all construction activities immediately.

The Highlands filed in the circuit court a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, in which it sought to enjoin thecounty from enforcing its zoning rules (counts I through III). The Highlands also sought administrative review of theboard's decision (count IV). The county then filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief against the Highlands; Leonardfiled a similar complaint.

The Highlands then moved for summary judgment in all three pending cases. In the cases brought against it, the Highlandssought summary judgment on all counts. In the case it brought, the Highlands sought summary judgment only on the countsseeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted the Highlands summary judgment in all three cases. Thecourt included a finding that the board lacked jurisdiction to proceed because the Highlands was engaged in an agriculturalpurpose, which is exempt from zoning regulations pursuant to the Counties Code. See 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). Inlight of this finding, the Highlands subsequently dismissed the remaining count of its complaint seeking administrativereview.

The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, upheld the judgment of the circuit court. 302 Ill. App. 3d 342. Theappellate court held that: (1) the circuit court could hear the Highlands' motions for summary judgment (302 Ill. App. 3d at344-45); and (2) the county lacked zoning authority over the Highlands (302 Ill. App. 3d at 345-48). The county andLeonard appeal to this court.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing a trial court's entry of summary judgment, the only issue on appeal is whether "the pleadings, depositions, andadmissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and thatthe moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). This case turns on themeaning of the term "agriculture" found in the Counties Code. 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). The interpretation of astatute is a matter of law for the court and appropriate for summary judgment. Matsuda v. Cook County Employees' &Officers' Annuity & Benefit Fund, 178 Ill. 2d 360, 364 (1977); see Lane v. Titchenel, 204 Ill. App. 3d 1049, 1053 (1990);People ex rel. Rappaport v. Drazek, 30 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313-14 (1975). Review is de novo. Matsuda, 178 Ill. 2d at 364.Prior to addressing the merits, however, we must first address a preliminary matter.

I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The parties disagree on whether the circuit court could hear the Highlands' claim for injunctive relief. The county andLeonard characterize the Highlands' claim as an improper collateral attack on the board's decision, which should have beensubject only to administrative review.

In support of their position, the county and Leonard correctly note that, pursuant to the Counties Code, the county has thepower to regulate the location and use of buildings on unincorporated land. See 55 ILCS 5/5-12001 (West 1998). Further,the Counties Code provides that all final decisions of zoning boards of appeals are subject to judicial review pursuant to theAdministrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1998)). See 55 ILCS 5/5-12012 (West 1998). The countyand Leonard then rely on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies: a party aggrieved by an administrativedecision ordinarily cannot seek judicial review without first pursuing all available administrative remedies. Castaneda v.Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308 (1989). The exhaustion doctrine includes administrative review in thecircuit court. Where the Administrative Review Law is applicable and provides a remedy, a circuit court may not redress aparty's grievance through any other type of action. The court's power to resolve factual and legal issues arising from anagency's decision must be exercised within its review of the agency's decision and not in a separate proceeding. Dubin v.Personnel Board, 128 Ill. 2d 490, 498-99 (1989); see Midland Hotel Corp. v. Director of Employment Security, 282 Ill.App. 3d 312, 316-17 (1996).

This aspect of the exhaustion doctrine is well established. However, it has several exceptions that are equally established.Two such exceptions are "where no issues of fact are presented or agency experience is not involved *** or where theagency's jurisdiction is attacked because it is not authorized by statute." Castaneda, 132 Ill. 2d at 309. This court has heldthat where an administrative assertion of authority to hear or determine certain matters is challenged on its face as notauthorized by the enabling legislation, such a facial attack does not implicate the exhaustion doctrine and exhaustion is notrequired. This court has explained that where an agency's statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction is at issue, no questionsof fact are involved. The agency's particular expertise is not implicated in the necessary statutory interpretation. Board ofGovernors of State Colleges & Universities for Chicago State University v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 78Ill. 2d 143, 147-48 (1979), quoting Landfill, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 74 Ill. 2d 541, 550-51 (1978); accord Reiter v.Neilis, 125 Ill. App. 3d 774, 777-78 (1984) ("plaintiffs did not have to comply with the Administrative Review Act in orderto challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the zoning board of appeals"). In the present case, the appellate court relied onthis exception to conclude that the circuit court could hear the Highlands' claim for equitable relief. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 344-45.

The county and Leonard contend that these exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine do not apply. They rely heavily on thereasoning of the appellate court dissent. The dissent opined that the board had the authority to determine whether theHighlands' buildings were subject to permit requirements. The dissent noted that "jurisdiction" is a limited concept, whichrefers only to the authority to hear and decide the case and does not depend on the correctness of the decision made. Thus, abody has "jurisdiction" to make a wrong as well as a right decision. Accordingly, the dissent reasoned:

"While the Code prohibits the county from requiring permits on land used for agricultural purposes, it is the countythat must determine for what purpose land is being used. Its jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of itsdecision. It has the right to be wrong; it therefore has jurisdiction over the matter." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren,J., dissenting).

We disagree. It must be remembered that the "jurisdiction" of an administrative agency has an aspect in addition to the"jurisdiction" of a court. This court has explained:

"An administrative agency is different from a court because an agency only has the authorization given to it by thelegislature through the statutes. Consequently, to the extent an agency acts outside its statutory authority, it actswithout jurisdiction. [Citation.] 'The term "jurisdiction," while not strictly applicable to an administrative body, maybe employed to designate the authority of the administrative body to act ***.' [Citation.] Thus, in administrative law,the term 'jurisdiction' has three aspects: (1) personal jurisdiction-the agency's authority over the parties andintervenors involved in the proceedings, (2) subject matter jurisdiction-the agency's power 'to hear and determinecases of the general class of cases to which the particular case belongs' [citation], and (3) an agency's scope ofauthority under the statutes." Business & Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,136 Ill. 2d 192, 243 (1989).

Thus, it is not entirely accurate to characterize the appellate court as having held that the board "has no jurisdiction overzoning." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Rather, it is more accurate to state that the board has nojurisdiction over zoning where the board's enabling legislation expressly denies the board zoning authority over land usedfor agricultural purposes. See 55 ILCS 5/12001 (West 1998).

The dissent viewed the Highlands as not attacking the board's jurisdiction, but rather as attacking the correctness of "theBoard's decision that the use of the land was not exempt from permit requirements. This is an attack on the correctness ofthe Board's decision, which should only be attacked through administrative review." 302 Ill. App. 3d at 349 (McLaren, J.,dissenting).

We disagree. The transcript of the board hearing shows that the Highlands attacked the jurisdiction of the board. Also, countI of the Highlands' complaint expressly attacks the county's zoning authority in this case. Quoting the Counties Code, countI expressly alleges that the statute does not authorize the board to regulate land used for agricultural purposes. Further, onthis theory, inter alia, the Highlands based its motion for summary judgment.

"This court has consistently held that, inasmuch as an administrative agency is a creature of statute, any power orauthority claimed by it must find its source within the provisions of the statute by which it is created." Bio-MedicalLaboratories, Inc. v. Trainor, 68 Ill. 2d 540, 551 (1977). The issue of an administrative body's authority presents aquestion of law and not a question of fact. The determination of the scope of the agency's power and authority is ajudicial function and is not a question to be finally determined by the agency itself. Lake County State's Attorney v.Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 200 Ill. App. 3d 151, 156 (1990) (and cases cited therein); accord Rockford MemorialHospital v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill. App. 3d 751, 759 (1995). Of course, administrative agencies oftendetermine the scope of their jurisdiction. When an agency acts or refuses to act in a case, it necessarily determineswhether the subject matter and its activity are or are not within the purview of the statute creating the agency. Again,however, "this is a question of law and not of fact." People ex rel. Thompson v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 22 Ill.App. 3d 316, 321 (1974); accord 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law