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Docket Nos. 90771, 90772, 90778 cons.–Agenda 23–November 2001.

PAUL D. CARROLL, as Adm’r of the Estate of Joshua A. Carroll,

   Deceased, Appellee, v. JERRY PADDOCK et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed February 7, 2002.

       JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

       The primary issue in this appeal is whether a not-for-profitcharitable hospital and a not-for-profit mental-health-careorganization are “local public entities” within the meaning ofsection 1–206 of the Local Governmental and Governmental TortImmunity Act (Tort Immunity Act or Act) (745 ILCS 10/1–206(West 2000)). Plaintiff, Paul D. Carroll, as administrator of his sonJoshua’s estate, brought this wrongful-death action againstdefendants Jerry Paddock, Rod Neeson, Human Resources Centerof Edgar and Clark Counties (HRC), Paris Community Hospital(Hospital) and Dr. Mamerto Guinto, alleging that the defendants’malpractice caused Joshua’s death by suicide. The circuit court ofEdgar County held that the action was time barred by the Act’sone-year statute of limitations. 745 ILCS 10/8–101 (West 2000).

       The appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that HRCand the Hospital are not local public entities within the meaning ofthe Tort Immunity Act and, thus, neither those entities nor theiremployees are entitled to invoke the protection of the Act. 317 Ill.App. 3d 985, 995. We consolidated and granted all of defendants’petitions for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now affirm thejudgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

       On April 14, 1997, Paul and Patricia Carroll brought their son,Joshua, to the emergency room of Paris Community Hospital afterJoshua attempted to commit suicide. Joshua was seen by Dr.Guinto, an employee of the Hospital, and Jerry Paddock, anemployee of HRC. Joshua was discharged without being admitted.On April 15, 1997, Paul and Patricia took Joshua to HRC, wherehe received psychological assessment, care and treatment from RodNeeson. Later that morning, Joshua took his own life.

       On April 15, 1999, plaintiff filed a wrongful-death actionagainst defendants. HRC, Paddock, Neeson, and Guinto filedmotions to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2000)), arguing plaintiff’scomplaint was not timely filed under the one-year statute oflimitations contained in the Tort Immunity Act. The Hospital fileda motion for summary judgment on the same ground. In theirmotions, the defendant entities claimed that they were not-for-profit corporations organized for the purpose of conducting publicbusiness and that they and their employees were local publicentities entitled to assert immunities and defenses afforded by theAct.

       Plaintiff responded that HRC and the Hospital did not qualifyas local public entities under the Act. In the alternative, plaintiffargued that section 1–206 of the Act constitutes special legislationin violation of article IV, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution of1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13) and that section 1–206 of theAct delegates tort immunity to private entities in violation of articleI, section 12, and article XIII, section 4, of the Illinois Constitution(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12; art. XIII, §4).

       The complaint, exhibits and discovery depositions filed ofrecord supply a factual basis for assessing the status of defendantsunder the Act. HRC is a not-for-profit corporation. It is composedof three divisions: developmental disabilities, community services,and clinical services. The clinical services division provides out-patient mental-health services, and its employees administeredmental-health screening to Joshua and assessed his condition.

       HRC came into being as a result of the merger of two existingnot-for-profit corporations known as the Edgar County MentalHealth Center and the Edgar County Alcohol and Drug AbuseCouncil. Following the merger, the entity assumed its presentdesignation as the Human Resources Center of Edgar and ClarkCounties. HRC’s board of directors consists of private citizens, asdid its original incorporators.

       According to its articles of incorporation, HRC is organized“exclusively for charitable and educational purposes, the purposesbeing limited to those set forth in section 501(c)(3) of the InternalRevenue Code (26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (1994).” The articles alsoprovide that “no part of [HRC’s] net income will inure to thebenefit of private individuals” and “the organization will not beoperated for the benefit of private individuals or designatedindividuals, the creators or their families, or persons controlleddirectly or indirectly by such private interest.” Further, HRC’smission statement explains that the corporation shall “promote andconserve the mental health of the people of Edgar and ClarkCounties.”

       In a discovery deposition, the executive director of HRC, JohnYoung, testified about the operations of that entity. He stated thatHRC provides clinical services, including outpatient mental-healthcare and substance-abuse evaluations and classes. According toYoung, HRC also furnishes services for developmentally disabledpersons, including placement of those individuals with privatecorporations for work experience and income. Young furtherstated that HRC renders community services through contractswith area hospitals and health-care providers and that HRCprovides laundry services for many private entities.

       Like HRC, the Hospital is a not-for-profit organization. Itspurpose, as stated in the articles of incorporation, is:

“To conduct and carry on the work of the corporationnot for profit but exclusively for scientific, educational,and charitable purposes in such a manner that no part ofits income or property shall inure to the private benefit ofany donor, member, officer, or individual having apersonal or private interest in the activities of thecorporation.

* * *

To operate a charitable hospital in Edgar County,Illinois, for the care of the sick of the area without regardto their ability to pay for such services and without regardto their race, color, or creed.”

The Hospital’s board of directors does not include members of thecounty board of Edgar County. It is composed primarily ofcommunity business representatives.

       The interim administrator of the Hospital, Chris Ellington,testified at his discovery deposition that the Hospital is managed byhis employer, Allied Management Services, a not-for-profitcorporation, owned by another not-for-profit corporation, NortonHealth Care, Inc., of Louisville, Kentucky. Allied ManagementServices charges an annual management fee of $132,000. Inaddition to this fee, the hospital pays salaries to the chief executiveofficer and chief financial officer, both of whom are selected byAllied Management Services.

       According to Ellington, the hospital’s services are on a fee-for-service basis. It designates services as charity care only ifcollection efforts have been unavailing. Ellington stated that, to hisknowledge, there was no difference in the purpose and operationof the defendant not-for-profit hospital and other for-profithospitals.

       The bylaws of the Hospital establish classes of members.Individuals can become members of the Hospital by makingdonations to the Hospital. Members are entitled to vote at annualand special meetings.

       Following two hearings, the trial court granted the defendants’motions, concluding HRC and the Hospital are “local publicentities” within the meaning of section 1–206 of the Tort ImmunityAct (745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2000)). The trial court alsorejected plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to section 1–206 of theAct. Plaintiff appealed.

       In reversing, the appellate court held that neither HRC nor theHospital are “local public entities” within the meaning of section1–206 of the Tort Immunity Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 995. Thecourt primarily relied on the fact that neither of the entities werealmost entirely government funded. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95.Having determined that the Act did not apply, the court declinedto consider plaintiff’s constitutional challenges to section 1–206.317 Ill. App. 3d at 995. We consolidated and allowed defendants’petitions for leave to appeal.

ANALYSIS

       The present matter comes to this court following the circuitcourt’s decision to grant three motions to dismiss pursuant tosection 2–619(a)(5) and one motion for summary judgment. Anappeal from a section 2–619 dismissal is the same in nature as onefollowing a grant of summary judgment: each matter is given denovo review. Guzman v. C.R. Epperson Construction, Inc., 196 Ill.2d 391, 397 (2001). In both instances, the reviewing court mustascertain whether the existence of a genuine issue of material factshould have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue offact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Kedzie &103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17(1993).

       Defendants argue that both HRC and the Hospital are localpublic entities within the meaning of section 1–206 of the TortImmunity Act. Thus, the issue before us is one of statutoryconstruction.

       The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is toascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. In re Estate ofAndernovics, 197 Ill. 2d 500, 507 (2001). The statute’s languageis the best indicator of such intent. Michigan Avenue NationalBank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). Wheninterpreting a statute, we must, however, give effect to the entirestatutory scheme rather than looking at words and phrases inisolation from other relevant portions of the statute. MichiganAvenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504(2000). Put another way, statutes should be construed as a wholewith each provision evaluated in connection with every othersection. Primeco Personal Communications, L.P. v. IllinoisCommerce Comm’n, 196 Ill. 2d 70, 88 (2001).

       As provided within the statute, the purpose of the TortImmunity Act is “to protect local public entities and publicemployees from liability arising from the operation of government.”745 ILCS 10/1–101.1 (West 2000). The Act defines the term“[l]ocal public entity” as:

“a county, township, municipality, municipalcorporation, school district, school board, educationalservice region, regional board of school trustees,community college district, community college board,forest preserve district, park district, fire protectiondistrict, sanitary district, museum district, emergencytelephone system board, and all other local governmentalbodies. ’Local public entity’ also includes library systemsand any intergovernmental agency or similar entity formedpursuant to the Constitution of the State of Illinois or theIntergovernmental Cooperation Act as well as anynot-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose ofconducting public business. It does not include the Stateor any office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,commission, university or similar agency of the State.”(Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 1998).

       The appellate court correctly noted that no Illinois court hasspecifically defined the phrase “organized for the purpose ofconducting public business.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 991. The courtthen went on to analyze several appellate court cases and oneUnited States district court case that have applied this language indifferent fact situations. See Smith v. Northeast Illinois RegionalCommuter R.R. Corp., 210 Ill. App. 3d 223 (1991); Johnson v.Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798 (1998); O’Melia v.Lake Forest Symphony Ass’n, 303 Ill. App. 3d 825 (1999);Niehaus v. Rural Peoria County Council on Aging, Inc., 314 Ill.App. 3d 665 (2000); McQueen v. Shelby County, 730 F. Supp.1449 (C.D. Ill. 1990). In four of those cases, the court consideredto what extent the entity in question relied upon public funding inorder to determine whether the entity was “organized for thepurpose of conducting public business.” See Smith, 210 Ill. App.3d at 227 (entity with no shareholders, funded with public fundsthat operates its commuter rail line in the public interest wasorganized for the purpose of conducting public business); Johnson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 811 (regardless of its mission statement orsources of funding, an entity that existed to benefit its members,not the public at large, was not a public entity under the Act);Niehaus, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 670 (entity that received 65% of itscash funds from government sources, including local governmentfunding, was not “almost entirely government funded” and thuswas not organized for the purpose of conducting public business);McQueen, 730 F. Supp. at 1453 (entity that received over 90% ofits financing from state and local sources was organized for thepurpose of conducting public business).

       In light of these cases, the appellate court concluded thatpublic funding is a determinative factor as to whether an entity isa local public entity under the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95.With regard to HRC, the court reasoned:

“HRC argues that it receives substantial governmentfunding–66.13% from government grants and membershipdues in fiscal year 1998 and 55% from fees and grantsfrom governmental agencies in fiscal year 1997. ***

We conclude that HRC is not ‘organized for thepurpose of conducting public business’ and is not a ‘localpublic entity’ under the Act. HRC is not almost entirelygovernment funded; the fact that it receives some grantsfrom government sources does not bring it within thescope of the Act.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994.

       In relation to the Hospital, the appellate court stated:

“The Hospital obtained 49.1% of its revenue fromprivate sources, namely, insurance payments and self-paycollections. It receives the remainder of its revenue fromfederal programs–Medicaid and Medicare. The only localgovernment funding is provided by Edgar County througha contract for ambulance services. *** We conclude thatthe Hospital is not government funded, nor is it almostentirely government funded.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95.

       Having concluded that HRC and the Hospital were notgovernment funded, the appellate court held that neither was alocal public entity under the Act and, therefore, neither the entitiesnor their employees were entitled to invoke the one-year statute oflimitations pursuant to section 8–101 of the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3dat 994-95.

       Although the appellate court reached the correct conclusion,we believe the court placed too much emphasis on governmentfunding. Irrespective of the degree of government funding, anot-for-profit corporation must be “organized for the purpose ofconducting public business” in order to satisfy the definition of a“[l]ocal public entity.” 745 ILCS 10/1–206 (West 2000). The term“public business” is not defined in the Act. As indicated by theappellate court, every undefined word in a statute must be ascribedits ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Texaco-CitiesService Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Theappellate court went on to quote the O’Melia court observationthat:

“ ‘ “Public” is defined as “[p]ertaining to a state, nation, orwhole community; proceeding from, relating to, oraffecting the whole body of people or an entirecommunity. Open to all ***. Belonging to the people atlarge; *** not limited or restricted to any particular classof the community.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed.1990). *** Thus, to conduct “public business” under theAct, a corporation must pursue an activity that benefits theentire community without limitation. In addition, thephrase “public business” is also today commonlyunderstood to mean the business of the government.’ ”317 Ill. App. 3d at 992, quoting O’Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3dat 828.

We agree with this definition of “public business” and we herebyadopt it as our own.

       While HRC and the Hospital were organized for charitablepurposes, the characteristics making a not-for-profit corporationa charitable organization do not, without more, also qualify thecorporation as a “local public entity” under the Tort Immunity Act.See 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994-95. Both HRC and the Hospitalconduct operations common to many entities in the private sector.Interim administrator Ellington admitted that there was nodifference in the purpose and operation of the defendant not-for-profit Hospital and other for-profit hospitals. Moreover, both HRCand the Hospital were privately created and are privately managed.

       Furthermore, the board of directors of each not-for-profitconsists solely of private citizens. There is no evidence in therecord indicating that the entities are subject to the control of thecounty board or any other unit or agency of local government.Without evidence of local governmental control, it cannot be saidthat a not-for-profit corporation conducts “public business” forpurposes of the Act. Thus, in order to receive the benefits of theAct, the not-for-profit corporation must also be subject to thekinds of organizational regulations and control that are typical ofother governmental units.

       An indicia of the requisite control might be shown by evidencethat the governing body of the not-for-profit corporation is subjectto regulations such as the Open Meetings Act (5 ILCS 120/1.01 etseq. (West 2000)) or the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS140/1 et seq. (West 2000)) or is otherwise “ ‘[o]pen to *** the[public] at large’ ” (O’Melia, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 828, quotingBlack’s Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990)). The necessarycontrol might also be evidenced by particular local ordinances thatdictate the means and methods to be used by the not-for-profitcorporation in conducting its business. Other indicia of controlmight include evidence that members of the county board or otherlocal governing bodies control the governing body of the not-for-profit corporation.

       Private endeavors often improve or affect the public interest,but that fact standing alone does not transform those privateenterprises into public businesses. Undoubtedly, health care is anendeavor in the public interest. Nonetheless, it cannot be said thata not-for-profit hospital and a not-for-profit mental-health-careorganization are the same as public health-care facilities operatedby public employees and controlled by governmental officials or agovernmental entity.

       Public business is the business of government and a localpublic entity must either be owned by or operated and controlledby a local governmental unit. Immunity under the Act only attachesto liability arising from the operation of government. 745 ILCS10/1–101.1 (West 2000). Therefore, a not-for-profit is involved inthe operation of the government’s public business if and only if thenot-for-profit is tightly enmeshed with government either throughdirect governmental ownership or operational control by a unit oflocal government.

       As to the Hospital’s contention that its activities fall within theambit of “conducting public business” because the Act itself setsout detailed provisions regarding “hospital activities” (see 745ILCS 10/6–101 through 6–110 (West 2000)), the appellate courtwas correct that the Hospital has misread the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3dat 994. To receive immunity from injuries resulting from “hospitalactivities,” it must initially be determined that the entity is a “localpublic entity” under the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994. Simplybecause an entity engages in “hospital activities” does notnecessarily mean that the entity conducts “public business” undersection 1–206 of the Act. 317 Ill. App. 3d at 994.

       Given that the Act does not apply to HRC or the Hospital, we,like the appellate court, decline to address the constitutional issuesraised by the plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

       For the above-stated reasons, we hold that neither the HumanResources Center of Edgar and Clark Counties nor ParisCommunity Hospital were organized for the purpose of conductingpublic business. Accordingly, neither of those not-for-profitcorporations or their employees are entitled to assert theimmunities and defenses contained within the Tort Immunity Act.The judgment of the appellate court is therefore affirmed.

 Affirmed.

       JUSTICE GARMAN took no part in the consideration ordecision of this case.