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Docket No. 93620-Agenda 36-September 2002.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Sam 
Lakhia, Appellant, v. MENARDS, INC., Appellee.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is before us on a question of Illinois law certified bythe United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 145 Ill.2d R. 20. The certified question is:

"What is the applicable statute of limitations in Illinois foran action for damages to property based on the doctrine ofstrict liability in tort when that action is brought withinthe applicable statute of repose?"

For the reasons that follow, the answer to the certified question isfive years.

I. BACKGROUND

We take the following facts from the Seventh Circuit'sopinion in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630(7th Cir. 2002).

"Prior to December 18, 1994, Sam Lakhia or a memberof his family purchased a torchiere halogen lamp in aMenards store in Hillsdale, Illinois. The lamp was placedin the family home in Bellwood, Illinois and situatedalong the south wall near the basement stairs for thepurposes of providing ambient light. On December 18,there was a fire in the Lakhia home that resulted in aclaim by Mr. Lakhia for $144,799.05 for property damageand related living expenses incurred as a result of the fire.Allstate, Lakhia's insurer and subrogee, paid the claimand then brought this action against Menards on March10, 1999. The jurisdiction of the district court was basedon the diverse citizenship of the parties. Menards filed amotion to dismiss on the ground that the action wasbarred by the applicable statute of limitations.

In a hearing before the district court, the partiesdisagreed with respect to the applicable statute oflimitations period for a products liability action. InAllstate's view, the applicable statute of limitations wasfive years. It relied upon the decision of the SecondDistrict in American Family Insurance Co. v. VillagePontiac-GMC, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 385, 131 Ill. Dec.484, 538 N.E.2d 859 (1989). Menards, on the other hand,submitted that the applicable statute of limitations wastwo years. It relied on the decisions of the First District inMcLeish v. Sony Corp. of America, 152 Ill. App. 3d 628,105 Ill. Dec. 648, 504 N.E.2d 933 (1987) and CalumetCountry Club v. Roberts Environmental Control Corp.,136 Ill. App. 3d 610, 91 Ill. Dec. 267, 483 N.E.2d 613(1985).

In discharging their responsibility to ascertain thecontent of state law in diversity cases, the sitting judges ofthe Northern District of Illinois have developed twoconflicting approaches when confronted with nocontrolling decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois andwith conflicting decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court.Some judges have followed the standard practice for adistrict court sitting in diversity and have attempted topredict how the Supreme Court of Illinois would resolvethe question. Others have deemed themselves bound bythe prevailing rule of the state appellate district in whichthe suit would have been brought in state court, reasoningthat this approach would prevent forum shopping. Thedistrict court in this case had followed the latter approachin earlier cases and decided that, in the absence of explicitguidance from this court, it would not alter its course.Accordingly, it followed the decisions of the First Districtand held that the applicable statute of limitations was twoyears and dismissed the action." Allstate, 285 F.3d at 631-33.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit noted that statutes oflimitations reflect important policy choices by the state and havesevere consequences for the administration of justice within thestate. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. In addition, the Seventh Circuitmentioned that this court is "far more familiar with the policychoices that have been made, and [has] far more directresponsibility for the administration of justice within the state thando the members of [the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals]."Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. The Seventh Circuit furtheracknowledged that the districts of our appellate court are indisagreement about the applicable statute of limitations for strictliability property damage actions and that this court has not hadthe opportunity to address the question squarely. Allstate, 285 F.3dat 639. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the intrusion of"unguided federal precedent" into the situation would only furtherdestabilize this state's jurisprudence on the issue and make it moredifficult for the members of the Illinois bar to counsel their clientsaccurately. Allstate, 285 F.3d at 639. According to the SeventhCircuit, the issue at hand is, moreover, likely to arise withsignificant frequency both in state and federal forums. Allstate,285 F.3d at 639. As a result, the Seventh Circuit certified thequestion to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 20 (145 Ill.2d R. 20). For these same reasons, we accepted the certifiedquestion on April 17, 2002.

II. ANALYSIS

The dispute between our appellate districts, acknowledged bythe federal courts, arises from differing interpretations of section13-213 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS5/13-213 (West 2000)). The relevant text of section 13-213 readsas follows:

"