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Docket No. 85835-Agenda 11-March 1999.

SANA JAMIL ABBASI, a Minor, by and Through Her Father and Next Friend, Jamil Abbasi, Appellee, v. PANAGIOTISPARASKEVOULAKOS et al., Appellants.

Opinion filed July 1, 1999.

CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Sana Abbasi, through her father, Jamil Abbasi, brought an action in the circuit court of Cook County againstdefendants, Panagiotis Paraskevoulakos and Katina Paraskevoulakos. Plaintiff sought damages for injuries that she receivedfrom ingesting lead-based paint.

The circuit court struck those counts of the complaint that alleged private causes of action based on defendants' violationsof the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (Act) (410 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1996)) and several chapters of the ChicagoMunicipal Code (City Code) (Chicago Municipal Code, chs. 5-4, 5-12, 7-4, 13-196 (1990)). The appellate court reversedthe dismissal. 296 Ill. App. 3d 278.

We allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We hold that neither the Act nor the City Codesupports a private cause of action. We reverse the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for furtherproceedings.

BACKGROUND

In determining whether to allow a motion to dismiss, a court must take as true all well-pled allegations of fact contained inthe complaint and construe all reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338,341 (1997).

Plaintiff's first-amended complaint alleged as follows. From May 1990 through January 1996, plaintiff was approximatelytwo through six years old. During that time, plaintiff and her family were tenants in an apartment in Chicago; defendantsowned and managed the building. Surfaces in the apartment were covered with deteriorated paint containing a dangerouslyhigh level of lead. Plaintiff ingested the lead-based paint in the form of dust, flakes, or chips, and was thereby injured.

Counts I through IV of the eight-count complaint were directed against Panagiotis, and counts V through VIII repeatedthose claims against Katina. Plaintiff pled three general theories of recovery: common law negligence evidenced byviolations of the Act and of the City Code, a private cause of action under the Act, and a private cause of action undervarious chapters of the City Code.

Counts I and V stated a cause of action for negligence. Those counts alleged that defendants owed duties to plaintiff, whichdefendants breached. Defendants owed plaintiff a duty to maintain the building in a habitable and safe condition, and toexercise reasonable care in owning, managing, and maintaining it. Further, defendants owed plaintiff a duty based ondefendants' actual or constructive knowledge that: (1) the building's surfaces were covered with lead-based paint; and (2)plaintiff may ingest the paint in the form of dust, flakes, or chips, thereby rendering the paint dangerous to children. SeeGarcia v. Jiminez, 184 Ill. App. 3d 107, 109-12 (1989).

Defendants knew or should have known about the presence of lead-based paint in the building because, inter alia, in 1992,with defendants' knowledge, the Chicago Department of Health inspected the building for lead-based paint, and notifieddefendants that the building contained such paint; the City of Chicago sued defendants for lead-based paint violations; andplaintiff's family complained to defendants about the condition of the building and, after plaintiff was diagnosed as beinglead-poisoned, complained to defendants about the presence of lead paint.

Defendants breached these duties, i.e., were negligent, by violating several provisions of the Act and of the City Code. As aproximate result of this breach, plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff sought, inter alia, damages and injunctive relief.

Counts III and VII alleged a private cause of action under the Act. Those counts contained the identical allegations as toduty, and allegations that defendants breached their duty to plaintiff. However, instead of characterizing defendants'violations of the Act as negligence, those counts simply stated that defendants violated the Act.

Counts II and VI alleged a private cause of action for nuisance under section 5-4-090 of the City Code (Chicago MunicipalCode