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Safeco/American States Insurance Company (Safeco) appeals from the trial court'sMay 4, 2001, and May 30, 2001, orders, by which the court dismissed Safeco's complaint andcertified the question at issue for immediate appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a)(155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)). We reverse and remand.

This case was filed following an arbitration award in favor of Lucille Fay Hagler inan uninsured-motorist-insurance situation. Specifics about her accident, injuries, anddamages are not known, because those facts were not included in the record. Following aNovember 19, 2000, arbitration, in a two-to-one vote, the arbitrators awarded Hagler$70,000. The dissenting arbitrator did not sign the award until January 15, 2001. By coverletter dated January 16, 2001, notice of the award was sent to the attorneys representingSafeco and Hagler.

On January 31, 2001, Safeco filed its complaint seeking a jury trial on the issue ofHagler's damages, as was allowed by its policy language. Safeco's policy allowed for therejection of an arbitration award when the award exceeded the minimum limit for bodilyinjury specified by the Illinois Safety and Family Financial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS5/7-601(a) (West 1998))-$20,000.

Counsel for the parties discussed the impending service of Safeco's complaint. Safecoasked Hagler's attorney if he would be willing to accept service of the complaint on hisclient's behalf. Hagler's attorney recalled that he advised Safeco's attorney that he wouldcheck on whether or not he could accept service for his client. Safeco was under theimpression that he would accept service, and it forwarded the complaint and summons toHagler's attorney on February 5, 2001. By letter dated February 23, 2001, Hagler's attorneywrote back to Safeco. Hagler's attorney apologized for any confusion but indicated that hewas unable to accept service on behalf of his client.

On February 27, 2001, Safeco's attorney sent the original summons back to theMadison County circuit clerk's office and requested that an alias summons be issued. Thatsummons, as well as the original summons, was addressed to Hagler at 2301 Missouri inGranite City, Illinois. The alias summons was prepared and file-stamped on February 28,2001. Service was attempted within the next week, but the alias summons was returnedunserved because the process server learned that Hagler had moved and left no forwardingaddress.

On March 15, 2001, Safeco's attorney again asked the Madison County circuit clerk'soffice to issue an alias summons with the identical erroneous address. A second aliassummons was prepared and dated March 16, 2001. The process server again unsuccessfullyattempted to serve Hagler at the listed address. The United States Post Office provided theprocess server with Hagler's new address, and the process server served her on April 4, 2001,with a copy of the complaint and the summons.

Instead of answering the complaint, Hagler filed a motion to dismiss pursuant tosection 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)). Haglerargued that the complaint had not been filed within 60 days of the arbitrators' decision, ascontemplated by Safeco's insurance policy, since service upon Hagler had not been achievedduring that time frame. Hagler also argued that Safeco had not exercised due diligence inobtaining service upon her, in contravention of Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (177 Ill. 2d R.103(b)). In support of her argument that Safeco had not exercised due diligence in obtainingservice, Hagler pointed out that Safeco had to have known of her correct address, becauseher Safeco insurance agent was sending her premium statements to the new address-theaddress at which service was ultimately achieved.

Without any reason indicated, the trial court granted Hagler's motion on May 4, 2001,and dismissed Safeco's complaint. Safeco's motion to reconsider was heard and denied onMay 30, 2001, but pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the trialcourt certified its previous order for appeal.

On appeal from a trial court's involuntary dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure we must determine "whether the existence of a genuineissue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact,whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law." Doyle v. Holy Cross Hospital, 186 Ill. 2d104, 109-10, 708 N.E.2d 1140, 1144 (1999). In other words, our review is de novo. In reEstate of Mayfield, 288 Ill. App. 3d 534, 542, 680 N.E.2d 784, 789 (1997).

The only case cited by Hagler in support of her motion to dismiss was Curtis v. PekinInsurance Co., 105 Ill. App. 3d 561, 434 N.E.2d 555 (1982). In that case, the appellate courtaffirmed the trial court's dismissal of the insured's complaint for lack of diligence in servingthe complaint upon the defendant insurer. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 565-66, 434 N.E.2d at558. The foundation for the dismissal could be located in an insurance policy provisionincluded at the Illinois Department of Insurance's mandate. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 562,434 N.E.2d at 556. That clause stated that claims against the insurance company followinga fire loss had to be made within 12 months. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 562, 434 N.E.2d at556. Flora May Curtis sued Pekin Insurance Company within the 12-month period datingfrom her loss, but she failed to obtain service upon the insurance company within that sametime frame. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 562-63, 434 N.E.2d at 556. In fact, she did notachieve service until 20 months had passed since the date of loss. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3dat 563, 434 N.E.2d at 556. Citing the main purpose of Supreme Court Rule 103(b), whichis keeping applicable statutes of limitation from being undermined, the trial court stated thatif service did not have to occur within that 12-month period of time, the provision would berendered a virtual nullity. Curtis, 105 Ill. App. 3d at 565, 434 N.E.2d at 558.

The difference between that case and this one is that there was an administrativeregulation mandating a 12-month statute of limitation. In this case, there is no suchadministrative or statutory mandate of which we are aware. Hagler has cited no otherauthority for her contention that the 60-day period contemplated in the policy required thatthe complaint be filed and service achieved during that time frame.

Sixty days is such an incredibly short period of time for a limitation period. There isnothing comparable in our state. Safeco filed suit 16 days after the arbitration award wasentered. Service was achieved 79 days after the award was made, or 63 days after suit wasfiled. It is true that Safeco's insurance sales agent was aware of Hagler's change of address,and had a more thorough research job been conducted by Safeco's counsel, that change mighthave been discovered sooner. However, we do not find this error to be critical to the issueof diligence. Three summonses were issued during the 63 days after suit was filed. Theseefforts reflect a conscientious effort to achieve service-not a lack of due diligence.

Furthermore, the factors suggested by the Illinois Supreme Court for consideringwhether service was made diligently support the conclusion that Safeco's efforts werediligent. Those factors include "(1) the length of time used to obtain service of process; (2)the activities of plaintiff; (3) plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's location; (4) the ease withwhich defendant's whereabouts could have been ascertained; (5) actual knowledge on the partof the defendant of pendency of the action as a result of ineffective service; (6) specialcircumstances which would affect plaintiff's efforts; and (7) actual service on defendant." Segal v. Sacco, 136 Ill. 2d 282, 287, 555 N.E.2d 719, 720-21 (1990).

Service was achieved 63 days after the complaint was filed. Safeco made twoattempts at service on three issued summonses during that time frame. Safeco should haveknown of Hagler's new address in light of the fact that its insurance agent sent premium billsto that address. In light of this agent's knowledge, the information could easily have beenobtained. But no forwarding information was left at the old address. Because her attorneywas aware of the complaint's pendency and content, Hagler was aware that suit had beenfiled against her in rejection of her arbitration award. The attorneys for Safeco and Haglerhad maintained communication during this 63-day period, regarding whether Hagler'sattorney would accept service on his client's behalf. Unfortunately, this communication andsubsequent misunderstanding that service would be so accepted delayed the start of theservice process. Hagler was ultimately served.

We find, given the circumstances of this case, that service of process was made in adiligent fashion and that the trial court's involuntary dismissal, pursuant to section 2-619 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure, was improper.

Alternatively, Hagler argues that Safeco breached its contract and is thus barred frominvoking the contractual provisions of its policy against her. The trial court's orderdismissing the complaint did not specify upon which grounds it was based. However,perhaps because of comments made by the trial judge prior to ruling upon the motion,Safeco's motion to reconsider strictly addresses the issue of diligence. Nevertheless, weconsider the argument.

Hagler contends that Safeco cannot demand a jury trial on the issue of damageswithout first paying her $20,000-the minimum required by the Illinois Safety and FamilyFinancial Responsibility Law (625 ILCS 5/7-601(a) (West 1998)). She argues that the$20,000 amount is binding and cannot be rejected. Because Safeco filed its suit, she claimsthat it is holding inappropriate, contradictory stances. Hagler cites no authority for herposition that the proper rejection of an arbitration award in excess of $20,000 cannot includethe first $20,000.

The policy provides that the decision of a majority of the three arbitrators is bindingupon the issue that the insured is legally entitled to damages. We agree with this statement. However, the policy also states that if the amount of damages exceeds $20,000, either partymay demand the right to a trial.

We conclude that Hagler's interpretation of Safeco's policy language is flawed. If thearbitrators' award was less than $20,000, then that amount would have been binding. Because the amount exceeded that threshold, either party maintained the right to reject theaward and seek a trial. Nothing in the policy or the law indicates that the first $20,000 mustmandatorily be paid before a party may proceed to trial. The judge or jury who hears thiscase will make the determination of the amount of Hagler's damages.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is hereby reversed, andthe cause is remanded.

Reversed; cause remanded.

CHAPMAN, Melissa, and RARICK, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: July 24, 2002

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J., and

Honorable Philip J. Rarick, J.,

Concur

Attorney P. Michael Read, Law Offices of P. Michael Read, 114 East

for Lincoln Street, Belleville, IL 62220

Appellant

Attorney Dennis A. Brandt, Calvo & Mayteka, 1517 East 20th Street,

for P.O. Box 1384, Granite City, IL 62040

Appellee