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 Workers' Compensation
Commission Division
Filed: October 5, 2005

No. 1-04-3013WC

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Irwin Rotberg, appeals from an order of thecircuit court confirming a decision of the Industrial Commission(Commission)⁽¹⁾ denying him benefits under the Workers'Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998)), forinjuries he allegedly sustained on May 24, 1999, while in theemploy of the Chicago Board of Education (Board). For thereasons which follow, we reverse and remand the matter to theCommission with directions.

The following relevant facts were established by theevidence presented at the arbitration hearing.

In May 1999, the claimant was employed by the Chicago Boardof Education as a third-grade teacher at Gillespie ElementarySchool (Gillespie School). On May 21, 1999, between 10:30 and10:45 a.m., a fight broke out between two of the claimant'sstudents as he was taking the class for a toilet recess. According to the claimant's testimony, he tried to intervene inthe fight. He stated that he placed his hands on the wrist ofJason Sears, the aggressor, and led the child to the end of theline.

On May 24, 1999, between 9:30 and 9:45 a.m., the claimantwas summoned to the school's main office. Present in the officewere Spencer Adams, the principal, Beverly Slater, Doris Jordanand Pamela Sears, Jason's mother. Mrs. Sears accused theclaimant of beating her son. According to the claimant, Adamstold Mrs. Sears that, if the claimant beat her son, he should becharged with battery. When the meeting concluded, the claimantreturned to his classroom duties.

Between 2:30 and 2:40 p.m. on that same day, the claimantwas again summoned to the main office. When he arrived at theoffice, the claimant was met by six Chicago police officers. Theofficers placed the claimant under arrest for battery andimmediately handcuffed him. According to the claimant, he askedthe officers to loosen the handcuffs as they were hurting hishands. The officers refused. The claimant was placed in therear seat of a squad car and transported to the police station.

The claimant testified that, when he arrived at the policestation, he was handcuffed to a pole for 25 to 30 minutes beforebeing strip-searched, fingerprinted, and placed in a cell. According to the claimant, when the handcuffs were removed, hishands were bloody, scraped, and bruised. He testified that hewas refused water and, when he asked to use the restroom, he wastold to urinate on the floor.

Prior to the events on May 24, 1999, the claimant wastreated for psychiatric problems. In 1992, the claimant wasreferred to Dr. Patrick E. Ebenhoe, a psychiatrist, who treatedhim for anxiety, panic attacks, and compulsive behavior involvingeating and showers. In 1995, Dr. Ebenhoe referred the claimantto Dr. Gerald Blechman, a clinical psychologist, who has sincecontinuously treated him.

The claimant testified that, when he was arrested, he becamevery panicky and anxious, started to sweat profusely, experiencedheart palpitations, and could not stop shaking and trembling. The claimant stated that, while he was at the police station, hefelt pain and anxiety and could not stop sweating even though theair conditioning was on. According to the claimant's wife, aregistered nurse, when she spoke to the claimant by phone whilehe was in police custody, he was babbling and incoherent. GeorgeSimmons, a friend of the claimant, was present at the policestation when the claimant was released. Simmons testified that,when he saw the claimant, he was disheveled, extremelydisoriented, agitated, and very upset. Simmons drove theclaimant back to his car in the school's parking lot. Simmonsstated that, after the claimant got into his car, he led theclaimant to the expressway because the claimant was disoriented. The claimant testified that, as he drove home, his legs weretwitching, he was anxious and distraught, he was sweating andshaking, and his wrists were sore. When he arrived home, theclaimant called Dr. Blechman.

When the claimant returned to work on May 25, 1999, he wastold that he could not teach children until the charges againsthim were resolved, and he was assigned to a clerical position inthe school office.

The claimant applied for a disability pension from thePublic School Teachers Pension Fund (Fund). In support of theapplication, on September 13, 1999, Dr. Jeffrey Weinberg, theclaimant's internist who referred him to Dr. Ebenhoe in 1992,issued a report to the Fund stating that the claimant suffersfrom depression and panic/anxiety disorder, that he has beenunder psychiatric care since 1989, and that his conditionworsened since his arrest. The report states that the claimantwas taking a combination of Prozac, Xanax, and Trazadone. Dr.Weinberg reported that the claimant suffers from severe anxietywhen in a classroom and is unable to function in thatenvironment. Dr. Weinberg opined that the claimant suffers froma disability which wholly and "presumably" permanentlyincapacitates him for teaching.

The claimant continued to perform clerical duties untilSeptember 27, 1999, when the charges against him were dismissed.At that time, the acting principal requested that he return to ateaching position. The claimant testified that he requested tobe assigned to a non-teaching position, but his request wasdenied. Thereafter, the claimant worked as a gym teacher forfour days and acted as a substitute fifth-grade teacher.

On October 16, 1999, Dr. Blechman also issued a report insupport of the claimant's application for a disability pension. In that report, he diagnosed the claimant as suffering from panicdisorder without agoraphobia. Dr. Blechman revealed that theclaimant had been under his care since April of 1995, but that hehad suffered from the condition for several years beforebeginning treatment. According to the report, the accusationthat the claimant physically abused a student followed by hisincarceration exacerbated the panic-anxiety related to histeaching duties. Dr. Blechman also opined that the claimantsuffers from a disability which wholly and "presumably"permanently incapacitates him for teaching.

On November 2, 1999, the claimant requested a medical leaveof absence and, on the following day, he began receiving sickpay. In support of the claimant's request for a medical leave ofabsence, Dr. Weinberg issued a report to the Board on November18, 1999, again listing a diagnosis of depression andpanic/anxiety disorder and stating that the claimant's conditionis permanent. Dr. Blechman issued a report on November 19, 1999,repeating his diagnosis of panic disorder without agoraphobia andstating that the claimant was unable to function at work.

Relating to the claimant's application for a disabilitypension, the Fund had him examined by two psychiatrists; Dr.Richard S. Abrams on November 12, 1999, and Dr. John Utley onNovember 16, 1999. Both physicians found the claimant to besuffering from a permanent disability which incapacitates him forteaching. Dr. Abrams diagnosed the claimant as suffering frompanic disorder and obsessive-compulsive neurosis, both mild tomoderate and "probably influenced by medication." Dr. Utleydiagnosed obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder withoutagoraphobia, and social phobia. He noted that the claimant hadfunctioned successfully in spite of his condition "until theoccurance [sic] of an unfounded criminal accusation[,]" sincewhich time "his symptoms have expanded to include criteria forsocial phobia marked by fear of scrutinyi [sic] incriminationfrom the exposure of classroom work."

When the claimant's leave of absence and sick pay expired onJanuary 4, 2000, he resigned his position with the Board. Thereafter, the Fund found the claimant to be permanentlydisabled and awarded him a disability pension.

During the course of this litigation, the claimant wasexamined by a number of other psychiatrists and psychologists whoissued reports addressed to the claimant's mental condition, hisability to work as a teacher, and the causal relationship, ifany, between the claimant's arrest and incarceration and hiscurrent condition of ill-being.

Dr. William A. Hovsepian, Ph.D., interpreted a MMPI-2 testadministered to the claimant on April 29, 2000. According to Dr.Hovsepian's report dated May 1, 2000, the test results suggestthat the claimant suffers from high levels of depression withvegetative symptomatology; self-deprecating ideation; labileaffect; high aggressive potential, both verbal and physical; andcognitive decompensation with possible psychotic-like tendencies.

In a report dated May 10, 2000, based on an examination ofthe claimant which took place on April 28, 2000, Dr. Timothy M.Cullinane, M.D., diagnosed the claimant as suffering from, interalia, major depression, post-traumatic stress disorder,obsessive-compulsive disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia,probable narcissistic personality disorder, trauma from beingjailed, and longstanding and multiple psychiatric problems. Dr.Cullinane stated in his report a belief that the claimant's post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his being put in jail hasmade him unable to function as a teacher and opined that, had itnot been for the claimant being put in jail, he would still beworking. Dr. Cullinane was also highly critical of theclaimant's current treatment, calling it "sub-optimal."

Dr. Ronald J. Ganellen, Ph.D., evaluated the claimant onAugust 21, 2000. Dr. Ganellen interviewed the claimant, reviewedhis medical records and the reports from the claimant's treatingphysicians and psychologists, and administered a number of tests,including the MMPI-2. According to Dr. Ganellen's report of thatevaluation, the results of the MMPI-2 were consistent with"chronic emotional difficulties and longstandingcharacteroloigical problems." He stated that the claimant'semotional difficulties began during his childhood and persistedcontinuously until the present and include chronic symptoms ofanxiety and depression; marked characteroligical difficulties andproblems of interpersonal relationships; frequent, recurrentpanic attacks consistent with panic disorder with agoraphobia;obsessive-compulsive disorder; eating disorder; and depression. Dr. Ganellen was of the opinion that, although the claimant'sincreased worry, tension and anxiety after the May 24, 1999,incident "appear to be an exacerbation of his condition," thesymptoms of emotional distress that the claimant reported afterhis arrest and incarceration "should be considered a continuationof his lifelong, persistent anxiety and depression, rather thanthe onset of a new condition."

At the request of the Board, Dr. Jonathan Kelly, M.D.,examined the claimant on July 6, 2000, and reviewed his medicalrecords and the reports of prior examining psychiatrists andpsychologists, including Dr. Ganellen. In a report datedDecember 20, 2000, Dr. Kelly diagnosed the claimant as sufferingfrom mood disorder with depression and hypomanic features;dysthymic disorder; panic disorder with agoraphobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder; eating disorder; and personality disorderwith borderline narcissistic and antisocial features. However,Dr. Kelly opined that the claimant does not have a mentaldisorder that is causally-related to the events of May 1999. According to Dr. Kelly, the claimant is genetically predisposedto psychiatric illness, and the disorders from which he sufferswere present prior to May 1999. Dr. Kelly was also of theopinion that the claimant does not have a post-traumatic stressdisorder, and the claimant's treatment records from May 1999through November 2000 do not establish a pervasive, persistentdeterioration in functioning or a substantial increase insymptoms. He noted further that the claimant's medical recordsreference his being a pathological liar and that secondary gainand external incentives are present as motivating factors forsymptom exaggeration or fabrication.

Dr. Frank Leavitt, Ph.D., examined the claimant on March 16,2001, and March 29, 2001, and administered a variety of tests,including the MMPI-2. In a report dated April 4, 2001, Dr.Leavitt stated that the claimant has identifying characteristicsof a panic disorder without agoraphobia and meets the diagnosticcriteria for generalized anxiety, recurrent major depression, andobsessive-compulsive disorder. According to Dr. Leavitt, thereis no indication that the claimant is exaggerating his currentemotional problems. He opined that the claimant is permanentlydisabled from teaching and that his disability is causally-related to "the traumatic events that started with the allegedaccusation of a student in his care at Gillespie school on May21, 1999, and the stressful events that subsequently followedincluding incarceration and being labeled a child abuser."

In response to a request from the claimant's attorney, Dr.Blechman authored a report dated December 3, 2001, in which heoutlined his treatment of the claimant since September 1995. Dr.Blechman noted that, although the claimant suffered from anxietydisorder, dysthmic disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder, hewas functioning as a teacher until his arrest and incarcerationon May 24, 1999. According to Dr. Blechman, the events of May24, 1999, caused a severe exacerbation of the claimant'ssymptoms. He disagreed with Dr. Kelly's opinions, most notablyas they relate to his diagnosis of an antisocial personalitydisorder. Dr. Blechman stated that he always found the claimantto be forthcoming and truthful. He reasserted his opinion thatthe claimant is permanently disabled from returning to classroomduties "solely because of the exacerbation of symptoms that werecaused by the incident of May 24, 1999, and the sequelae flowingfrom this incident when he was arrested, handcuffed and jailedbecause he performed his duties as a school teacher."

Following a hearing, the arbitrator denied the claimantbenefits under the Act, concluding that the action of the policethat caused the claimant's injury "is so remote from the workactivity, it does not arise out of the employment with the[Board]." The arbitrator's decision also states that he "adoptsthe findings of Dr. Kelly and Dr. Ganellen on the issue ofcausation."

The claimant sought a review of the arbitrator's decisionbefore the Commission. In a unanimous decision, the Commissionaffirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision.

The claimant filed a petition for judicial review of theCommission's decision in the circuit court of Cook County. Thecircuit court confirmed the Commission's decision, and thisappeal followed.

We first address the claimant's argument that the Commissionerred in finding that his injuries did not arise out of hisemployment with the Board. Critical to our analysis of the issueare the specific findings of the arbitrator which were adopted bythe Commission. The arbitrator found that the proximate cause ofthe claimant's claimed condition of increased anxiety, panic, anddepression "is the action of the police officers in arresting andincarcerating him at the behest of Ms. Sears." According to thearbitrator, "[t]he claimed injury in this case was caused by thetreatment Rotberg [claimant] suffered at the hands of thepolice." The arbitrator noted that "[the claimant] was notinjured by the fighting students, but by the police whohandcuffed him and took him to the police station and forced himto urinate on the floor." Relying in part upon our supremecourt's decision in Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons ConstructionCo., 143 Ill. 2d 542, 578 N.E.2d 921 (1991), which rejected thepositional risk doctrine, the arbitrator concluded that theclaimant's injuries did not arise out of his employment, as theactions of the police which caused those injuries were too"remote" from his work activity. As a consequence, thearbitrator denied the claimant benefits under the Act. Althoughthe question of causation is a factual matter to be determined bythe Commission (Amoco Oil Company v. Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill.App. 3d 737, 747, 578 N.E.2d 1043 (1991)), we believe that thearbitrator's analysis of the question which the Commissionadopted is flawed.

An employee's injury is compensable under the Act if itarises out of and in the course of the employment. 820 ILCS305/2 (West 1998). Both elements must be present at the time ofthe claimant's injury in order to justify compensation. IllinoisBell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483,546 N.E.2d 603 (1989). The phrase "in the course of" relates tothe time place and circumstance of the injury. A claimant's injury is received in the course of his employment when it occurswhile he is working, at a place where he may reasonably be whileperforming his duties and, while he is fulfilling those duties orengaged in something incidental thereto. Scheffler Greenhouses,Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 366-67, 362 N.E.2d 325(1977). "Arising out of one's employment" refers to the originor cause of the claimant's injury. A causal connection isdemonstrated if the claimant establishes that the origin of hisinjury lies in some employment-related risk or if the conditionsor nature of the employment increase his risk of harm beyond thatto which the general public is exposed. Brady, 143 Ill. 2d at548. An injury arises out of the employment when its origin isfound in some risk connected with, or incidental to, theemployment. "A risk is incidental to the employment where itbelongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do infulfilling his duties." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. IndustrialComm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 58, 541 N.E.2d 665 (1989).

The record establishes that the claimant was at schoolperforming his duties as a teacher when he was summoned to theoffices, arrested, and handcuffed by the police. There is nodispute between the parties on the question of whether he was inthe course of his employment at that time. The issue in thiscase, and the one decided by the Commission adversely to theclaimant, is whether his injuries arose out of his employmentwith the Board.

After observing that any member of the general public can beexposed to a malicious prosecution or police brutality, thearbitrator appears to suggest that the proper remedy available tothe claimant is a malicious prosecution action against Sears anda civil action for "police brutality" against the policedepartment. Additionally, the arbitrator found that the Boardplayed no part in causing the claimant's arrest or mistreatmentat the hands of the police and could not have prevented thepolice officers from coming to the school to arrest him based onSears' complaint. Based upon that rationale, the arbitratorconcluded that the actions which caused the claimant's injury areso remote from his work activity that the injury did not ariseout of his employment. The Commission adopted both thearbitrator's findings and his conclusion in this regard.

Whether the Board caused the claimant's arrest or could nothave prevented it is not necessarily determinative of the issueof whether the claimant's injury arose out of his employment. Although it is certainly true that injuries are not compensableunder the Act merely because a claimant's employment placed himin a particular place at a particular time (Brady, 143 Ill. 2d at550), the risk of arrest in this case was incidental to thefulfillment of the claimant's duties as a teacher.

It is undisputed that the claimant was acting in hiscapacity as a teacher employed by the Board when he broke up thefight between Jason Sears and another student on May 21, 1999. The claimant was not arrested merely because he happened to be atwork when the police arrived at Gillespie School on May 24, 1999. Rather, he was arrested based on Ms. Sears' accusation that hebeat her son. Absent any facts supporting the proposition thatthe claimant stepped outside of the scope of his employment as ateacher when he broke up the fight involving Jason Sears, thefacts in this case lead to a single conclusion; namely, that therisk of the claimant being arrested and charged with a batteryupon Jason Sears was incidental to his actions as a teacher inbreaking up a fight between two students. When, as in this case,an employee is arrested for conduct committed within the scope ofhis employment and incidental to the performance of his dutiesand suffers an injury as a consequence of such an arrest, theinjury arises out of the employment for purposes of determiningcompensability under the Act. Kochilas v. Industrial Comm'n, 274Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1090-92, 654 N.E.2d 568 (1995).

Although we are reluctant to find a factual determination ofthe Commission to be against the manifest weight of the evidence,we must do so in this case as the evidence in the record compelsus to conclude that the injuries suffered by the claimant when hewas arrested, handcuffed, and incarcerated on May 24, 1999, aroseout of his employment with the Board.

Our analysis continues, however, as the Commission alsoadopted that portion of the arbitrator's decision which "adoptsthe findings of Dr. Kelly and Dr. Ganellen on the issue of causalconnection." The initial question for resolution is the meaningof the arbitrator's decision in this regard.

As noted earlier, Drs. Kelly and Ganellen were both of theopinion that the claimant suffered from longstanding mentaldisorders which pre-dated the events of May 24, 1999. Specifically, Dr. Ganellen opined that the symptoms of emotionaldistress that the claimant reported after his arrest andincarceration "should be considered a continuation of hislifelong, persistent anxiety and depression, rather than theonset of a new condition." However, Dr. Ganellen opined that theclaimant's increased worry, tension and anxiety after the May 24,1999, incident "appear to be an exacerbation of his condition." Whereas, Dr. Kelly opined that the claimant does not have amental disorder that is causally-related to the events of May1999. These opinions can be reconciled only if one interpretsthe Commission as having adopted the findings of Drs. Kelly andGanellen that the claimant had lifelong psychological problemswhich were not caused by the May 24, 1999, incident, but restedits ultimate causation finding on its earlier determination thatthe injuries caused by the claimant's arrest, handcuffing, andincarceration on May 24, 1999, did not arise out of hisemployment. Having found that the injuries sustained by theclaimant were caused by his arrest and incarceration, it would beinternally inconsistent for the Commission to have found anabsence of causation on any other basis.

Although Drs. Kelly and Ganellen agree that the claimant hadlifelong psychological problems which were not caused by the May24, 1999, incident, that conclusion alone does not precluderecovery of benefits under the Act. An employment accident neednot be the sole cause or even the principal cause of a claimant'sinjury to render it compensable under the Act. The law is clearthat aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting condition is acompensable injury if caused by some accident arising out of andin the course of the claimant's employment. Riteway Plumbing v.Industrial Comm'n, 67 Ill. 2d 404, 412, 367 N.E.2d 1294 (1977).

The evidence of record in this case establishes that, priorto the events of May 24, 1999, the claimant was capable ofdischarging his duties as a teacher, notwithstanding hislongstanding psychological problems. Drs. Weinberg, Blechman,Utley, Cullinane, Ganellen, and Leavitt each diagnosed theclaimant as suffering from mental disorders which were either, intheir respective opinions, caused by or exacerbated by hisarrest, handcuffing, and incarceration on May 24, 1999, and, as aresult, rendered the claimant unable to function as a teacher. It is only Dr. Kelly who found that the claimant does not have amental disorder that is causally-related to the events of May1999. As noted, however, his opinion in that regard is contraryto the opinion of Dr. Ganellen, whose opinion on causation wasalso adopted by the Commission.

In light of our holding that, whatever injury the claimantsuffered as a result of his arrest, handcuffing, andincarceration arose out of and in the course of his employmentwith the Board, the Commission's seemingly inconsistent adoptionof the findings of both Drs. Kelly and Ganellen on the issue ofcausation, and the weight of medical authority supporting theproposition that the claimant either suffered a mental disorderor an exacerbation of an existing mental disorder as a proximateresult of his arrest and incarceration on May 24, 1999, which hasrendered him unable to teach, we also conclude that theCommission's finding that there is no causal connection betweenthe claimant's employment and the injuries suffered as aconsequence of his arrest and incarceration is against themanifest weight of the evidence.

Based upon the foregoing analysis, we reverse the judgmentof the circuit court confirming the Commission's decision denyingthe claimant benefits under the Act. Additionally, we remandthis matter to the Commission with directions to find that theclaimant suffered injuries as a consequence of his arrest andincarceration on May 24, 1999, which arose out of and in thecourse of his employment with the Board and to conduct furtherproceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded to the Illinois Workers' CompensationCommission with directions.

CALLUM, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., concur.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., dissents.

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting:

I respectfully disagree with the majority's determinationthat the Commission's decision was against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

The majority places importance on certain findings of thearbitrator to support its decision. The majority also statesthat only Dr. Kelly found no causal connection with the events ofMay 1999. Dr. Kelly's findings are sufficient in themselves tosupport the Commission decision. The following findings by thearbitrator and adopted by the Commission support the Commission'sdecision:

"Dr. Kelly diagnosed mood disorder, dysthymicdisorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia,obsessive compulsive disorder, history ofeating disorder, and personality disorder. Dr. Kelly concludes that Rotberg does nothave a mental disorder that is causallyrelated to the incident on his job as ateacher in May 1999. He adds that there isno sign of post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Kelly states that treatment records donot indicate persistent inability to functionor a new diagnosis or new symptoms notpresent prior to May 20, 1999. (R. Ex. 2)

Ronald Ganellen, PhD, a clinicalpsychologist, conducted psychological testingon Rotberg. (R. Ex. 3) Dr. Ganellen statesthat the results of the psychological testingdata and his review of the medical recordsare consistent with longstanding emotionaldifficulties beginning in childhood andpersisting continuously until the presenttime. Dr. Ganellen adds that the symptoms ofemotional distress presented by Rotbergshould be considered a continuation of hislifelong persistent anxiety and depressionrather than the onset of a new condition.

The Arbitrator finds that the proximatecause of Rotberg's claimed condition ofincreased anxiety, panic, and depression isthe action of the police officers inarresting and incarcerating him, at thebehest of Mrs. Sears. There is no testimonyor medical evidence indicating that hiscondition is connected to the act ofseparating the two fighting students.

* * *

The claimed injury in this case wascaused by the treatment Rotberg suffered atthe hands of the police. He was not injuredby the fighting students, but by the policeofficers who handcuffed him and took him tothe police station and forced him to urinateon the floor. The police officers arrestedhim following a complaint filed againstRotberg by the mother of Jason Sears; hisemployer played no part in procuring hisarrest.

Rotberg argues that, but for the factthat he was at work, separating the twofighting students, the mother would not havefiled the complaint. Had Ms. Sears not filedthe complaint, the police would not havecome. Had the police not come, Rotberg wouldnot have been handcuffed. Had Rotberg notbeen handcuffed, he would not have sufferedan aggravation of his psychologicalcondition.

* * *

The respondent played no part in causingRotberg's arrest, and indeed, could not haveprevented the police officers from coming tothe school to arrest Rotberg based on Sears'complaint of battery. And most certainly,the respondent played no part in -- and couldneither reasonably foresee nor prevent -- thepolice's mistreatment of Rotberg, which, inthe final analysis, is the cause of hispresent condition."

A review of the record supports the Commission's decision. The order of the circuit court should be affirmed.

1. Effective January 1, 2005, the name of the IndustrialCommission was changed to the "Illinois Workers' CompensationCommission." However, because the Industrial Commission wasnamed as such when the instant cause was originally filed, wewill use this name for purposes of consistency.