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Claimant Robert Preston appeals from an order of thecircuit court of Stark County confirming the November 22, 1999,decision of the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission) denyingclaimant's claim for additional compensation and attorney feesunder sections 19(k), 19(l), and 16 of the Workers' CompensationAct (Act) (820 ILCS 305/19(k), 19(l), 16 (West 1998)). Therespondent employer is Bell Trucking. The issues are whether (1)the Commission's decision is void because the procedures employedviolated claimant's right to due process; (2) the Commission'sdenial of additional compensation and attorney fees was invalidbecause the Commission did not have a sufficient record before itto make that determination; and (3) the Commission's denial ofadditional compensation and attorney fees was contrary to law oragainst the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

Claimant filed an amended petition for additionalcompensation and attorney fees subsequent to the arbitrator'saward. This same arbitrator's award was the subject of a section19(g) proceeding, and the relevant underlying facts are set out ina Third District Appellate Court decision in that case. Preston v.Bell Trucking, 295 Ill. App. 3d 659, 660-61, 693 N.E.2d 506, 507(1998). In the section 19(g) proceeding, claimant was awardedjudgment on the arbitrator's award of $74,144.64, arbitrationattorney fees of $14,828.93, $1,651.70 arbitration costs, $71.00for the section 19(g) filing fee, $6,406.25 section 19(g) attorneyfees, $155.55 section 19(g) costs and 2-1303 interest of $5,886.16from January 24, 1996, through December 13, 1996 and $18.28 per dayuntil award, interest and section 19(g) sanctions are paid in full. In an opinion filed April 9, 1998, the appellate court affirmed thetrial court's judgment in the section 19(g) proceeding, specifically finding that "[b]ecause the defendant refused to pay theaward of the Commission for over nine months, the plaintiff wasentitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." Preston, 295 Ill.App. 3d at 662, 693 N.E.2d at 508. In the appellate court,claimant also filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 375(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b)) on May 6, 1998, that theappellate court denied on May 21, 1998.

Section 19(g) of the Act provides that a party may obtaina judgment based on a final award of an arbitrator or decision ofthe Commission "when no proceedings for review are pending." 820ILCS 305/19(g) (West 1998). The record does not disclose that theCommission took any further action on respondent employer'spetition for review.

In this case, the Commission found the following facts. Respondent employer hand delivered to claimant a check for thearbitrator's award and interest conditioned upon full satisfactionof all sums owing on December 6, 1996, and on December 9, 1996,claimant rejected the tender. The circuit court's decision in thesection 19(g) proceeding was rendered on December 16, 1996. Afterthe appellate court's decision in the section 19(g) proceeding, onMay 18, 1998, claimant filed with the Commission an amendedpetition for additional compensation under section 19(k) andattorney fees under section 16 of the Act. On October 19, 1998,claimant filed a petition for additional compensation under section19(l) of the Act. On October 27, 1998, claimant filed anotheramended petition based on nonpayment of medical expenses. On July7, 1999, respondent employer filed a response to the petitions. Claimant filed a supplemental argument on September 13, 1999.

The Commission denied claimant's petition for additionalcompensation under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16finding that the respondent employer reasonably believed it had avalid review pending before the Commission. The Commission alsofound that the appellate court's denial of the request forsanctions under Rule 375(b) included an implicit finding that theissues raised in the appeal in Preston were not frivolous and theappeal was taken in good faith. The Commission found thatrespondent employer's delay in paying the arbitrator's award wasnot unreasonable, vexatious, deliberate, or the result of bad faithor improper purpose. The Commission also denied the claim foradditional compensation under section 19(l) because the petitionfiled October 19, 1998, was time-barred, not having been filedwithin two years after the arbitrator's award. The Commissioncited section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1992)) and Blacke v. Industrial Comm'n, 268Ill. App. 3d 26, 644 N.E.2d 23 (1994).

In this appeal, claimant raises issues concerning theCommission's handling of her petition to disqualify commissionersDouglas F. Stevenson and Richard M. Gilgis filed June 23, 1998. Commissioner Gilgis was not assigned to this case, and theCommission did not address the motion to disqualify relative tocommissioner Gilgis. An evidentiary hearing was conducted onDecember 17, 1998, presided over by commissioner Stevenson. Priorto that hearing, claimant filed a motion to vacate the ordersetting the hearing on the ground that the Commission had noauthority to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Commissionconducted the hearing and denied claimant's petition to disqualifycommissioner Stevenson in an order entered February 11, 1999. Therecord on appeal contains other petitions to disqualify andtranscripts relative to those petitions in other cases before theCommission wherein claimant's attorney sought to disqualifycommissioners. Those records were before the Commission at thehearing to disqualify in this case.

Claimant argues that the Commission's denial of additional compensation and attorney fees is void because ofStevenson's participation, contending that the decision in thiscase was entered without statutory authority. In Siddens v.Industrial Comm'n, this court recognized that the Commission canentertain a petition for additional compensation and attorney feesbased on an alleged unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment ofan award. See Siddens, 304 Ill. App. 3d 506, 513, 711 N.E.2d 18,23 (1999). Claimant further contends that the Commission does nothave the statutory authority to act in violation of due process. Section 19 of the Act does not authorize the entry of a decision bythe Commission in violation of due process. Interstate Contractorsv. Industrial Comm'n, 81 Ill. 2d 434, 438, 410 N.E.2d 837, 839(1980); Gotter v. Industrial Comm'n, 152 Ill. App. 3d 822, 826, 504N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (1987). Claimant argues there was a violation ofhis right to due process because commissioner Stevenson was notdisqualified. The parties agree that the Act does not provide forthe procedure employed by the Commission in this case, i.e. anevidentiary hearing on a motion to disqualify filed prior to aCommission review proceeding.

The Act is a purely statutory remedy. See Elles v.Industrial Comm'n, 375 Ill. 107, 113, 30 N.E.2d 615, 618 (1940). The Code and Supreme Court Rules do not apply to workers' compensation proceedings where the Act or the Commission's rules regulatethe area or topic. Illinois Institute of Technology ResearchInstitute v. Industrial Comm'n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154, 731N.E.2d 795, 800 (2000). However, they may be relied on forguidance without finding that they are applicable to workers'compensation proceedings. Mora v. Industrial Comm'n, 312 Ill. App.3d 266, 274, 726 N.E.2d 650, 656 (2000) (discussing amendment of anapplication for adjustment of claim).

When a party requests oral argument in a Commissionreview proceeding, such argument is to be heard by a panel of threecommissioners comprised of no more than one from the employingclass and one from the employee class, and a decision of theCommission is to be approved by a majority of that panel. 820 ILCS305/19(e) (West 1998); Alexander, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1085, 715N.E.2d at 684. Commission rules require that an arbitrator orcommissioner with a financial or other interest in the outcome ofany litigation or any question connected therewith shall notparticipate in the adjudication of the cause. 50 Ill. Adm. Code