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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The miracle and wonder of DNA forensic technology has assumed an ever-increasingrole in our quest for truth and justice. At times, DNA can possess the power to decisivelynegate other evidence that suggests guilt and virtually establish a person's innocence.

Because this technology is of relatively recent origin, it was not available for use ata time when many current Illinois inmates, convicted on less infallible evidence, might haveemployed it to confirm a claim of innocence. In some of those cases, evidence that containsgenetic material capable of testing for DNA is still intact. Depending upon the nature of theState's proof in those cases, belated DNA testing may still have value. It may still be capableof discovering a genetic truth that belies previously established guilt. It may answer someinmate's persistent plea for justice.

In recognition of the fact that new forensic testing could potentially provide the keyto a cell that houses an innocent person, our legislature enacted a provision that permitspostconviction DNA testing in certain cases. See 725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998). Today,we examine the scope of that provision to determine whether Mark Urioste (Urioste) isentitled to conduct DNA tests on typed blood samples admitted into evidence during his1987 trial.

Following a 1987 bench trial, Urioste was found guilty but mentally ill in the stabbingdeath of Rebecca Rodgers. Since then, he has been serving a 40-year prison term formurder, together with multiple concurrent prison terms for his convictions on related chargesof home invasion, armed violence, and attempted criminal sexual assault. We reviewed the1987 proceedings and affirmed his convictions in 1990. People v. Urioste, 203 Ill. App. 3d1062, 561 N.E.2d 471 (1990). The facts of the case are set forth in detail in that opinion. See Urioste, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 1065-70, 561 N.E.2d at 473-76. We revisit only the factsnecessary to an understanding of the questions presented here.

Urioste sustained a closed head injury in 1981. He suffered brain damage as a resultof it. Over the course of a lengthy recovery, he was able to recapture intellectual function,but he exhibited a lingering decrease in control over impulses, particularly sexual ones. Healso exhibited a decrease in control over aggressive behaviors. During his treatment at arehabilitation center, he gained access through the window of another patient's room andraped her.

Rebecca Rodgers died from multiple stab wounds. She was Urioste's 20-year-oldnext-door neighbor. She lived next door with her mother, Joyce Rodgers, her 16-year-oldsister, Renee, and her two-year-old son. In the early morning hours of August 8, 1986, Joyce Rodgers was awakened by sounds from the second floor of her two-story residence. When she went upstairs to investigate, she saw Urioste on top of Rebecca, attempting toengage in sexual intercourse with her. Having known Urioste for his entire life, she orderedhim to get off of her daughter. He complied. She could see that his arms and hands werecovered with blood and that he was holding a knife. Urioste approached her. As the twoof them stood face to face, he addressed her as "mom," an expression he had for years usedin addressing her. He ordered her to let him out of the front door.

Renee Rodgers saw Urioste stumble down the stairs and run out the front door afterthe stabbing. A few days before the murder, Renee had seen Urioste attempting to breakinto her bedroom window. She summoned another neighbor, who confronted Urioste andasked him to explain his conduct. Urioste responded that he had to use the restroom. Among the several statements that Urioste made to authorities was a statement that it wasRenee, not Rebecca, who he planned to engage in sex with.

An examination of the murder scene revealed that entry into the house was obtainedthrough the bathroom window. The window screen was removed. Urioste's palm print wasfound on the bathtub, in close proximity to the point of entry. The entry into the housemirrored how Urioste had accessed the patient's room at the rehabilitation center.

When Joyce Rodgers reported the crime and who had committed it, authorities wentto the Urioste residence. They were admitted into the house by Urioste's father, who tookthem to Urioste's room. They found Urioste in bed. He had fresh blood on his hands, neck,and clothing. A knife, bearing fresh blood, was found on the ground along a direct trackfrom the murder scene to Urioste's home. At the time of the murder investigation in 1986,blood found on Urioste's underwear and on the knife was tested for blood type. The bloodwas not Urioste's type O blood. It matched Rebecca Rodgers' type A blood.

In addition to the eyewitness testimony from people who had known Urioste for along time, testimony that was corroborated by the fingerprint and blood matches, Uriostemade incriminating statements to the police and to the judge who arraigned him.

At the trial, Urioste entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. He counteredthe State's case with psychiatric testimony about his mental state at the time of the stabbing. After hearing conflicting expert testimony on the question of insanity, the trial judge foundthat Urioste was mentally ill rather than insane when he committed the acts charged. Thereafter, he imposed lengthy concurrent prison terms upon the findings of guilty butmentally ill.

This appeal stems from proceedings that originated in August of 1999. Uriosteinvoked section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)) and petitioned the circuit court for an order to further test the bloodevidence. His petition asserted actual innocence, as required by statute. It sought todetermine whether the blood found on Urioste's clothing and on the knife bore the geneticprofile of Rebecca Rodgers. The State responded to the petition with a request that it bedismissed. The trial judge granted that request. He ruled that since identity was not at issueduring Urioste's trial, Urioste lacked a statutory prerequisite for further forensic testing ofthe blood evidence. This appeal ensued.

Our review of the ruling is de novo. People v. Savory, 903 Ill. App. 3d 408, 412, 722N.E.2d 220, 223 (1999), appeal allowed, 188 Ill. 2d 578, 729 N.E.2d 502 (2000).

When our legislators enacted section 116-3, they intended to provide an avenue forconvicted defendants who maintained their innocence to test available genetic materialcapable of producing new and dramatic evidence materially relevant to the question ofinnocence. The legislature recognized that advances in scientific technology harbored thepotential to correct injustice through the highly reliable use of genetics. However, thelegislature did not access postconviction forensic testing to everyone. It limited the scopeof the postconviction remedy in several ways. Three limitations imposed upon the statute'suse frame the questions raised in this appeal.

In order to successfully open the door for further forensic testing of evidence, aconvicted defendant must present a prime facie case that:

"(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or her conviction;and

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficientto establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in anymaterial aspect." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(b) (West 1998).

Provided that these two criteria are met, the circuit court is required to make a thirddetermination. It must decide whether "the result of the testing has the scientific potentialto produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion ofactual innocence." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (West 1998). If it finds that testing couldproduce evidence capable of exonerating the defendant, the circuit court is mandated toorder new testing of evidence. See Savory, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 412, 722 N.E.2d at 223.

Initially, we note that Urioste's motion for DNA testing merely alleged that it wascustomary for the police to preserve blood samples. There is nothing in the record fromwhich to conclude that the necessary samples still exist, much less that a proper chain ofcustody has preserved their integrity. A judgment may be sustained upon any groundwarranted by the record regardless of the ground relied upon by the trial judge. People v.Johnson, 188 Ill. App. 3d 147, 153-54, 544 N.E.2d 35, 39 (1989). Therefore, we couldeasily affirm the dismissal order based upon Urioste's failure to comply with section 116-3(b)(2). There simply was no showing that the evidence was intact and capable of reliabletesting.

We could thus end the inquiry without reaching the issues presented on appeal.However, matters not of record were set forth in Urioste's reply brief. The State moved tostrike those matters, we took the motion with the case, and we find that the State's motionis well taken. We strike Urioste's reference to a witness who was prepared to testify aboutthe samples.

Since a possibility exists that Urioste can meet the requirement of section 116-3(b)(2)and since the issues raised here are likely to arise again by the filing of another motion, wechoose to address them now and put this matter to rest.

Urioste maintains that the trial judge erred by concluding, as a matter of law, thatidentity was not at issue during the course of his trial. He points to defense counsel'sadversarial testing of the State's case-in-chief, which included evidence on the question ofidentity. By virtue of the fact that identity was tested through the cross-examination of theState's witnesses and was at no time conceded, Urioste argues that identity was a contestedissue. He further maintains that the only question that need be answered under therequirement of section 116-3(b)(1) is whether identity was a contested issue at the trial. Heargues that even if the State produced significant evidence of the offender's identity, thatwould be of no import to the inquiry. This argument stems from comments made by theassistant State's Attorney when he asked for the dismissal of Urioste's motion. In arguingthat identity was not an issue at Urioste's trial, he emphasized the overwhelming nature ofthe State's proof that it was Urioste who committed the crime.

We agree with Urioste when he argues that the strength of the State's case was not ahurdle that he had to overcome in order to meet the statute's requirements for postconvictionforensic testing. In fact, everyone is in agreement that when the court is deciding whetherto grant a statutory request, the statute does not call for the circuit court to revisit the trial'sidentification evidence in order to measure its weight. The State readily concedes that, hadthe legislature intended the overwhelming nature of other evidence to be a factor in grantinga motion filed pursuant to section 116-3, it would have said so.

However, the State does not concede that Urioste is a candidate for an order to furthertest the blood samples admitted into evidence at the trial. The State's position consists ofthree arguments-two based upon the statutory criteria that must be met and a third basedupon a construction of the statutory language in a way that limits its reach. The argumentsare essentially as follows:

1. The question of who stabbed Rebecca Rodgers was not truly the issue atthe trial. If identity was at issue in the sense that Urioste challenged the State's case-in-chief before tendering his defense, it ceased to be the issue when Urioste raised theaffirmative defense of insanity.

2. Urioste's request is incapable of producing new evidence materiallyrelevant to the question of actual innocence. In the unlikely event that the bloodfound on Urioste's underwear and on the recovered knife would prove not to beRebecca Rodgers' blood, the revelation would not exonerate Urioste. It might castdoubt on whether the knife found and placed in evidence was the knife that he used. It might raise new questions about how he got another person's blood on hisunderwear and whose blood it was. But it would not negate sound eyewitnesstestimony, his palm print found at the point of entry into the home, his dualconfessions, and the evidence that this murder fit a method used by Urioste to satisfya similar sexual impulse during his rehabilitation from head injuries.

3. The legislature drafted section 116-3 in a way that would foreclosepostconviction DNA testing to Urioste because he raised an issue other than identityduring the course of his trial. By its use of the language "identity was the issue in thetrial," the legislature intended to afford postconviction DNA testing only to thosewhose trials tested solely the issue of who committed the crime. The legislature's useof the word "the" rather than the word "an" meant to prohibit any defendant whocontested more than the question of identity from invoking the statute's remedy. Since Urioste raised matters other than the question of identity during his trial, he isnot an intended user of the statute and is foreclosed from filing a motion undersection 116-3.

We first examine the State's statutory construction of section 116-3. We do notbelieve that our lawmakers intended convicted defendants who challenged identity, andnothing else during the course of their trial, to be the only users of section 116-3.

We try to construe legislative enactments in a way that gives effect to the legislature'sintent and in a way that avoids absurd results. See People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 345,589 N.E.2d 508, 517 (1992). The clear purpose of section 116-3 was to provide convicteddefendants with a means by which to establish actual innocence through advances inforensic technology. It was designed for the singular case where modern testing methods,not available when a conviction was obtained, could potentially discover new evidence thatsupports actual innocence in a decisive way.

When the legislature required a showing that identity was the issue at the trial that ledto the conviction, it sought to guard against frivolous requests by limiting the remedy tothose cases where identity was truly at issue, cases where the use of the new technologycould test properly preserved genetic material to either confirm or decidedly negate otheridentification evidence that produced the conviction. The limitation imposed by section116-3(b)(1) excludes from the statute's reach those defendants whose cases turned uponquestions other than the question of who committed the acts charged. The limitation is amatter of common sense. Unless the question of identity was truly in dispute during the trial,new forensic testing would be pointless. A lingering question of who committed the actscharged would not exist. If a defendant did not deny committing the acts charged, butdefended on other grounds, there would be no reason to test for new evidence potentiallycapable of exonerating. Simply stated, our legislature wanted new forensic tests to occuronly in those cases where such testing could discover new evidence at sharp odds with apreviously rendered guilty verdict based upon criminal acts that the defendant denied havingengaged in.

It would make no sense to allow DNA testing in cases where identity was not theissue at the trial. Likewise, it would make no sense, and run contrary to the underlyingpurpose of the enactment, to restrict its remedy to that isolated case where a defendant choseto forego a test of the State's case in all its particulars, save the question of who committedthe acts charged. We can think of no reason the legislature would want to provide the givenremedy and, at the same time, confine its use so narrowly. Provided that identity was agenuine issue, contested during the trial that led to the conviction, a lingering question ofactual innocence could still exist. Even if other questions were litigated during the sametrial, the identity of the crime's perpetrator would remain a question that postconvictiontesting with modern procedures could potentially address. The reason the legislatureprovided for postconviction testing would still exist, whether identity was an isolated issueor one among several issues litigated at the trial.

Section 116-3(b)(1) was not enacted for the purpose of limiting the number of issuesthat potentially innocent defendants could raise and litigate during the trial. It was made apart of the postconviction testing statute to assure its use only by those defendants whoclaimed at their trial that they did not commit the acts charged. When the legislature usedthe language "identity was the issue at the trial," it confined the statutory remedy to trialswhere identity was a legitimate contested issue, but not necessarily the only issue litigated.

The following hypothetical case provides a clearer view of why the State's statutoryconstruct is wrong.

Our imaginary defendant stands convicted of reckless homicide. He has filed amotion pursuant to section 116-3 in order to test the genetic profile of blood found on thesteering wheel, dash, and windshield of his car. He wants present-day forensic experts todetermine whether that profile matches his genetic profile.

The conviction rests upon the following facts. The defendant's unoccupied car wasfound involved in a fatal two-car collision. The steering wheel, dash, and windshield werecovered with fresh blood. Human flesh, hair strands, and hair follicles were found imbeddedin that blood. Obviously, whoever was driving the unoccupied vehicle was injured in theaccident and left behind genetic material. However, at the time of the trial, forensic expertswere only able to positively match the blood to the defendant's common blood type. Theywere also able to say that the hair strands were consistent with samples of the defendant'shair.

The authorities determined that the unoccupied vehicle belonged to the defendant andpaid him a visit. His home was located a short distance from the accident site. A disorienteddefendant, reeking of alcohol, answered the door. He held a towel over a serious openwound to his forehead. When questioned about the accident, the defendant denied beinginvolved, disavowed knowledge of his car's whereabouts, and claimed that the wound onhis forehead was the result of a blow to the head inflicted by an unknown intruder heencountered upon entry into his home after he returned from his night out on the town.

There were many eyewitnesses who saw the defendant drive away from a nightclublocated a few miles from the accident site. The witnesses saw obvious signs of inebriation. They watched his erratic departure toward the direction of the accident site. A short timelater, they heard distant sirens.

At the trial, identity was put at issue. The defendant persisted in his claim that he wasthe victim of a home invasion and car theft. He remained steadfast in the assertion that hehad not committed the acts charged. His assailant had to have been the driver of his car atthe time of the accident.

The defendant also challenged the State's proof of recklessness and causation. Hetendered an accident reconstruction expert who disputed the State's evidence about how theaccident occurred and who was at fault. The defense expert opined that the operation of thedeceased's vehicle, not the defendant's vehicle, was the sole cause of the accident. Thus,identity was a legitimate issue, but not the only issue at the trial that led to the defendant'sconviction.

When presented with a similar hypothetical during oral argument, the State could notsay whether our imaginary defendant could avail himself of the postconviction testingprocedures provided by the legislature. However, under the State's construction of section116-3(b)(1), clearly he could not. Since he made recklessness and causation additionalissues and did not rely solely upon the question of who drove the vehicle, under the State'sview he would not be an intended user of the statute. Identity was not the issue, meaningthe only issue, raised in the trial that led to his conviction. Yet if the blood found on hissteering wheel and dash and the hair follicles imbedded in that blood are still in existenceand capable of being tested with integrity, they harbor a potential for exonerating. Ourimaginary defendant's circumstance is precisely the circumstance that section 116-3 wasdesigned to address. If the genetic makeup of the freshly spilled blood and hair folliclesdoes not match the genetic makeup of the defendant's blood and hair follicles, in alllikelihood he was not the driver of the vehicle. In all likelihood, he was assaulted, and anassailant who stole his car was at the wheel when the accident occurred. DNA testing wouldclearly possess the potential to produce new evidence materially relevant to his assertion ofactual innocence. Denying the defendant access to new forensic testing under such acircumstance, simply because other issues in addition to identity were litigated at the trial,would produce an absurd result not intended by those who drafted section 116-3.

While the State misses the mark with its restrictive interpretation of the languagecontained in section 116-3(b)(1), it is precisely on target when it argues that identity was notthe issue at Urioste's trial. As previously noted, our legislature wanted postconvictionforensic testing to occur only in those cases where such testing could discover new evidenceat sharp odds with a previously rendered guilty verdict based upon criminal acts that thedefendant denied having engaged in. Our legislature did not want convicted defendantswho admitted at their trial to the commission of the acts charged, and did not contest thequestion of who committed those acts, to make a mockery of the criminal justice system andthe statute's grace. It did not want defendants who tendered unsuccessful affirmativedefenses at their trial to later disavow the commission of the acts charged, just so they couldobtain postconviction testing of evidence meaningless to how they contested their guilt.

Where a defendant contests guilt based upon self-defense, compulsion, entrapment,necessity, or a plea of insanity, identity ceases to be the issue. Insanity is like an affirmativedefense in the sense that the defendant admits to the charged conduct but claims that he isnot criminally responsible for that conduct because of a mental disease or defect. SeePeople v. Kashney, 111 Ill. 2d 454, 464-65, 490 N.E.2d 688, 693 (1986). When Uriosteraised the question of insanity, he necessarily abandoned the question of who committed theacts charged for purposes of a section 116-3 motion. When he chose to present psychiatrictestimony that peered into the mental state with which he committed the stabbing, he askedthe trier of fact to determine whether, at the time that he committed the acts charged, hesuffered from a mental malady the effect of which relieved him of criminal responsibilityfor his criminal conduct. He could not pursue an insanity plea and continue to maintain thathe was not the person who committed the acts charged.

Notwithstanding, Urioste claims that his trial was unique. He claims that he waspermitted to challenge the State's identification evidence, persist in his plea of not guilty, andat the same time, maintain a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. We are told, in effect,that the insanity plea was fashioned like this-"I did not commit the acts that caused the deathof Rebecca Rodgers and whoever did is still at liberty. However, had I committed those actsinstead of whoever did, I would not have been criminally responsible. I was legally insanebefore, during, and after someone else stabbed Rebecca Rodgers."

Thus, Urioste contends that identity was a contested issue at his trial and remainedcontested even as he pursued his plea of insanity.

Initially, we note that Urioste did not file a report of the trial proceedings with therecord on this appeal. We entered a rule to show cause why the appeal should not bedisposed of by a summary order in light of the trial transcript's absence and the lack of anycitation to a record in support of his claim of what happened at the trial. The response wasa motion to file an uncertified report of proceedings.

We choose to address the claim despite the flawed record. The position that Uriostetakes is untenable. When Urioste chose to put his mental condition at issue in order to freehimself from criminal responsibility, he requested the trial judge to shift focus and decidethe case on the defense of insanity as that term is defined under the criminal law. Indeed,if the transcript that we now have in our possession is the transcript of the trial proceedings,that is precisely what Urioste's trial counsel asked the trial judge to do. In that transcript,trial counsel, in closing, states:

"I am asking you to find that he's not criminally responsible.

The law is clear in this state. It states that a person is not criminally responsible forconduct if at the time of such conduct as the result of mental disease or defect helacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or toconform his conduct to the requirement of the law." (Emphasis added.)

Under Illinois law, when Urioste tendered and pursued a plea of not guilty by reason ofinsanity, he called upon the trial judge to decide whether or not he was legally responsiblefor criminal conduct that he committed. By pursuing insanity as a defense, he removedidentity as a legitimate issue the trial judge had to decide. The question at the trial was nolonger a question of who committed the acts charged. Thus, identity was not the issue at histrial, and Urioste cannot meet a statutory prerequisite for new forensic testing.

Finally, we agree with the State that the testing Urioste seeks is incapable ofproducing the kind of new evidence that postconviction forensic testing was designed toobtain. We have already determined that since postconviction testing is predicated upon aclaim of actual innocence, the legislature intended to limit the scope of section 116-3 tothose rather unique cases where scientific testing could produce decisive evidence capableof exonerating. See Savory, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 414-15, 722 N.E.2d at 225. Contra Peoplev. Rokita, No. 5-99-0453 (September 8, 2000). Our legislature did not intend to giveconvicted defendants free reign to claim innocence in order to test, or retest, evidencetangential to the core evidence of guilt. It did not intend to provide a mechanism forconvicted defendants to cast doubt upon extraneous evidence incapable of shaking ourresolve in a guilty verdict's worth.

Here, new forensic testing of blood samples is simply incapable of producingdramatic evidence of innocence. It would not decisively refute other evidence of guilt. Joyce Rodgers knew the defendant for his entire life. Their relationship was of such a naturethat Urioste referred to Joyce as "mom." When Joyce saw Urioste on top of her daughter,she knew immediately who it was and reacted based upon that knowledge. She was notidentifying a stranger. Her daughter's assailant was the boy next door who complied withher request to disengage, approached her face to face, and addressed her in a way unique tohim. We cannot imagine a sounder eyewitness identification.

The identification did not stand alone. It was corroborated by a wealth of otherevidence that pointed out who committed the stabbing. The report of the crime led toUrioste's immediate arrest. Urioste was found in his bed, his body and underwear soiledwith another person's fresh blood. The blood fit the type possessed by the victim of a recentstabbing and attempted sexual assault.

There was a second eyewitness who identified him, and his palm print was discoveredinside the victim's home at a point of forced entry.

There was evidence of prior conduct that mirrored the crime. Urioste, in his defense,tendered evidence to establish that his mental condition prevented him from controllingsexual impulses and aggressive behavior. He proved that his makeup made him capable ofcommitting the crimes involved.

Finally, all of this evidence found confirmation in Urioste's gratuitous admissions tothe police and to the judge who arraigned him.

We know that Urioste was soiled with human blood that did not belong to him. While we are uncertain of whose blood Urioste thinks he collected on his underwear thenight of the attempted rape and murder, we are certain that no court in this land would feelcompelled to release him based upon a belief in his innocence, even if DNA testingestablished that the blood on his underwear and on the knife was not Rebecca Rodgers'blood. New forensic testing simply does not harbor the potential contemplated under thestatute.

The legislature enacted section 116-3 as a safety net for use in special cases wherepostconviction tests could produce dramatic results that virtually confirm actual innocence. It is a sound provision that was enacted for good reason. One day it will no doubt providea measure of genetic justice where human justice has failed. It deserves better than to betrivialized by pointless efforts to invoke its favor.

For all of the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of Urioste's motionfor postconviction forensic testing of the blood evidence admitted at his 1987 trial.

Motion to strike granted; judgment affirmed.

GOLDENHERSH, P. J., and WELCH, J., concur.