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PRESIDING JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Rinando Tucker (defendant) was charged with two counts of first-degree murder (720ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 1996)) in connection with the shooting deaths of Martin (Marty) andJudith (Judy) Dotson. After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty on both counts. Defendant was sentenced to natural life in prison. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) he wasdenied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney (a) failed to object to theState's presentation of two firearms that were not related to the instant case and (b) failed topresent favorable character evidence because he believed that the State could rebut thatevidence with an investigation pending against defendant in an unrelated matter; and (2) hewas denied a fair trial due to improper actions by the prosecutor, including (a) presenting two guns to the jury that were completely unrelated to the case at bar, (b) presentingevidence of papers bearing Marty Dotson's name that were unaccountably found in a thirdparty's trash can, and (c) arguing that defendant's guilt was established by comparingdefendant's actions to those of the third party who found the irrelevant papers in the trash. We affirm.

The victims, Marty and Judy Dotson, husband and wife, lived in Centreville and weremurdered in their home late in the evening on April 17, 1997, or early in the morning onApril 18, 1997. Defendant, age 20 at the time of the murders, did not deny his presence atthe scene, but he denied killing the victims. Defendant asserted that Brandon "Buck"Craighead, age 16, was the shooter. Defendant was tried under an accountability theory. Craighead was tried separately.

The evidence showed that on April 18, 1997, Centreville Police Sergeant WilliamMiller was working the midnight shift. During his shift, he observed a Chevy Corsica beingdriven in a strange manner and attempted to investigate; however, the driver of the Corsicawould not stop. A chase ensued. Ultimately, the Corsica came to a stop and its occupantsfled on foot. Sergeant Miller found a cellular phone near the car. He ran the plates on thecar and found that the car was registered to Marty Dotson. Sergeant Miller did not attemptto contact Mr. Dotson at that time.

At 9 a.m. on April 18, 1997, Centreville Police Officer Gregory Hosp was dispatchedto the victims' home to check on their well being. When Officer Hosp arrived, he found thefront door partially open. Upon entering the home, he discovered Marty Dotson's bodyslumped on a bar stool and Judy Dotson dead on her bed. Each victim died from a single,close contact gunshot to the head. Crime-scene technicians were then called to the scene.The Major Case Squad, which consists of police officers from various departments calledin to work a case for five days following the commission of a major crime, was also utilized. Patricia Jackson, a crime scene investigator for the Illinois State Police, arrived atapproximately 10:43 a.m. She found no evidence of forced entry. Both bedrooms wereransacked. She collected People's Exhibit 5c, latent fingerprints from the inside of the frontdoor and from a metal box found on a bedroom floor. The print from the metal box wastransferred and labeled as People's Exhibit 5b. A fingerprint expert identified the latent print as a fingerprint of defendant's left middle finger. Judy Dotson's daughter, Karin Morales,testified that she had seen the two metal boxes at the victims' home, but she did not knowwhat was stored in those boxes. She also testified that the victims kept several pieces ofjewelry in their bedroom. The jewelry was missing after the victims were killed.

Other evidence collected at the scene included, inter alia, a shell casing discoveredin the living room, People's Exhibit 18, and a shell casing discovered in the bedroom,People's Exhibit 17. Spent projectiles were later retrieved from the bodies of the victims and introduced at the trial as People's Exhibits 12 and 13. Police videotaped the crime scene. The videotape was shown to the jury.

Detective Coppetelli of the Collinsville Police Department testified that on April 19,1997, as part of his duties with the Major Case Squad, he discovered a Howard Universityjacket in a backyard strewn with trash. During the investigation, Detective Coppetelli alsorecovered a firearm from Judy Dotson's son, Tim Foster. Detective Coppetelli interviewedFoster, who indicated that he had a firearm at his residence. Foster turned the firearm overto the police. The gun was analyzed and identified by police as a .32-caliber, but it was notconnected to the crime in question. The gun was marked as People's Exhibit 7 and shownto the jury. Likewise, People's Exhibit 8, a super-automatic, .38-caliber Colt pistol, whichwas not connected to the crime, was shown to the jury. However, after defense counselobjected, the State withdrew its motion to have the guns admitted into evidence. CollinsvillePolice Officer Todd Link testified that he retrieved the .38-caliber gun from MichaelGillespie on April 20, 1997. The State failed to tie up Gillespie's connection with theinvestigation.

Thomas Gamboe, Jr., a forensics, firearm, and toolmark expert, examined People'sExhibits 7 and 8, along with People's Exhibits 12 and 13, which were, in his opinion, bulletsfrom a .38-caliber or 9-millimeter weapon, and People's Exhibits 17 and 18, the dischargedcartridge cases. Gamboe opined that Exhibits 12 and 13 were fired from the same weapon,as were Exhibits 17 and 18. Gamboe further opined that Exhibits 12 and 13, the spentprojectiles, could not have been fired from either People's Exhibit 7 or 8.

John Vickers, who lived on 36th Street in East St. Louis, testified that on April 18,1997, at approximately 3 a.m., he got up to use the bathroom and noticed that someone hadpiled trash near his trash cans, which he had set out the night before to be picked up thefollowing morning. Mr. Vickers returned to bed, but he stopped his car on the way to workto try to stuff the extra trash into his trash can. Some of the items would not fit, so Mr.Vickers set them in his house to be sorted through later. When he arrived home from workin the evening, he attempted to stuff the extra trash into a trash bag. He then watched theevening news and learned of the victims' murders. He realized that he had seen Mr. Dotson'sname on one of the papers in the trash left by his trash cans. Mr. Vickers called his attorneyto find out what to do. His attorney advised him to keep what he had and to bring it to theattorney's office, where he met with police and handed over the trash. Items included anashtray, a car caddy, a glove, and papers. These items were introduced into evidence asPeople's Exhibit 33.

Shondreka Hinkle, age 17, testified that near the date of the murders, defendant andCraighead were at her house while she was babysitting her four-year-old nephew. Craigheadhad a gun and insisted on showing it to her. At one point, Craighead handed the gun to thefour-year-old. Hinkle got angry and struck the gun out of her nephew's hand. On that sameevening, Craighead told her that he needed some money and was going to kill a woman inParkside. According to Hinkle, defendant told Craighead to be quiet because Hinkle mighttell someone.

Angeletta Jacobs is Craighead's cousin, and she has been acquainted with defendantfor several years. She also knew the victims. She recalled that on the evening when thevictims were killed, she was with Craighead and defendant at her mother's house. Theyarrived about 9 p.m., and she cooked them some food. Craighead had a gun, which he showed to defendant. Jacobs testified that Craighead told defendant it was a 9-millimeter. Craighead and defendant left a little before 10 p.m. Jacobs received a phone call fromdefendant at about midnight. A few minutes after her conversation with defendant,Craighead called her. Jacobs recalled that both conversations were normal conversationsand that nothing seemed out of the ordinary.

A records officer for Ameritech testified about the billing records from the victims'cellular phone. Two telephone calls were billed to the phone on April 17, 1997. The firstwas an incoming call at 2:34 p.m.; the second was an outgoing call at 11:29 p.m. Sixoutgoing calls were billed to the telephone in question on April 18, 1997, at the followingtimes: 12:21 a.m., 12:43 a.m., 1:21 a.m., 1:27 a.m., 4:11 a.m., and 4:28 a.m.

Defendant left the area after the murders and went to stay with relatives in Beloit,Wisconsin, where he was arrested. Sergeant Kurt Reynolds of the Beloit Police Departmenttestified that after he received a telephone call informing him that there was a warrant fordefendant's arrest, he called Joyce Tucker in Beloit and she confirmed that defendant wasstaying with her. When officers arrived at the Tucker residence, defendant surrendered without incident. After searching the house in Beloit where defendant was staying, policefound, hidden beneath carpet in a bedroom, photocopies of newspaper articles concerningthe victims' murders.

On May 7, 1997, defendant was interrogated in Beloit by police officers, includingSergeant Steve Brown of the Centreville Police Department. Defendant gave a nine-pagewritten statement to police, as well as a videotaped statement. Both the written statementand the videotape were introduced into evidence. The videotape was played to the jury.

Outside the presence of the jury, the State moved for the admission of any exhibitsnot previously introduced into evidence. Defense counsel objected to the admission of theweapons, citing People v. Wade, 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 366 N.E.2d 528 (1977), on the basisthat it is reversible error to admit weapons that are in no way connected to the crime. Theprosecutor argued that the guns were admissible to show that a thorough investigation hadbeen conducted by the police. The trial court reserved its ruling. Ultimately, the Statewithdrew its motion to admit the guns; however, the prosecutor qualified the withdrawal byasserting that if defense counsel attempted to argue that a complete investigation had notbeen conducted, the State should be able to rebut that argument by showing that the policehad conducted a thorough investigation, including the retrieval of two guns.

Defense counsel also stated that as part of his trial strategy he was not going tointroduce favorable character evidence on defendant's behalf. Defense counsel explained that if he introduced character evidence, the State could rebut such evidence with details ofa pending burglary investigation of defendant. Defendant took the stand in his own defense.

Defendant testified that prior to the night in question, he socialized with BrandonCraighead on only two or three occasions. He was with Craighead on the night of themurders because Craighead wanted defendant to meet his cousin from Kansas City, who wasvisiting and who was thinking about giving defendant a job. Defendant could not rememberCraighead telling Ms. Hinkle that he was going to kill someone. He did, however,remember the incident involving Hinkle's four-year-old nephew. Defendant denied planningthe events of the evening or planning to rob anyone.

Defendant explained that Mr. Dotson had a reputation for helping kids, includingdefendant. Defendant had been to the victims' home on other occasions, and Mr. Dotsonhad paid him to do odd jobs. Defendant testified that he and Craighead arrived at thevictims' home between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m., after Craighead suggested that they go to thevictims' house. Mr. Dotson let them in after defendant identified himself. Mr. Dotsonpadlocked the door after defendant and Craighead entered. Defendant and Craighead hadbrandy, cigars, and marijuana. Defendant opened a cigar and put some marijuana inside andsmoked it. The three socialized.

Mr. Dotson asked defendant how his mother was doing, and defendant responded thatshe was fine. Mr. Dotson then asked Craighead how his mother was doing, and Craigheadwent ballistic, screaming at Mr. Dotson that it was wrong to be asking about his mother. Mr.Dotson and Craighead locked arms, but defendant interceded, and the situation seemedcalmer; however, Craighead suddenly got up, drew a gun from his pants, and shot Mr.Dotson. Defendant told Craighead that he was going to leave, but Craighead turned the gunon defendant and told him that he was not going anywhere and that even if he wanted toleave, he could not because the door was padlocked.

Mrs. Dotson, who was in a back bedroom, then called out and inquired about the loudnoise. Craighead ran into the bedroom and shot Mrs. Dotson. While Craighead was in thebedroom, defendant attempted to leave, but he was stopped by the padlock. Defendant wentinto the kitchen and drank some water and smoked a cigarette in an attempt to calm hisnerves. He heard Craighead turning over things in the back of the house. Craigheadappeared, carrying jewelry and other items. Craighead still had the gun and told defendantthat it was time for them to leave.

They exited by the front door, and defendant tried to get away quickly because hefeared the neighbors would see him leaving the house after the shooting. Defendant madesome calls to try to find a place to spend the night. He recalled the chase with the policeofficer and explained that he had been drinking and was not thinking clearly. He was afraidthe police would conclude that he had been involved in the shootings, so he ran away. Hethought the police would catch only him and pin the murders on him. He testified that henever intended to kill the victims and denied stealing anything. He said that he had been tothe victims' home a week or so before the murders and had helped them move some things;however, he did not remember ever touching the metal boxes that had been introduced intoevidence. The morning after the shooting, defendant asked his mother to take him out oftown. He went to a cousin's house in Rockford, but after a couple of weeks he went toanother cousin's house in Beloit. Defendant agreed that his videotaped statement wasaccurate. The defense rested.

Defense counsel objected to the admission of the trash that Mr. Vickers discoveredin his yard. Initially, the trial court sustained the objection but then allowed it for a limitedpurpose. The State argued that it was necessary to show that Vickers was an innocent manwho had found some evidence and reacted by giving it to the police, whereas defendantreacted by running away to Wisconsin. The trial court allowed the evidence, and the Statediscussed the trash during rebuttal.

The jury retired to consider its verdict at 12:05 p.m. At 4 p.m., the jury sent a noteasking if they could have the written statement of Ms. Hinkle. The trial court and thelawyers agreed that the statement should not be given to the jury because it was neverintroduced into evidence. The trial court then stated on the record that an hour earlier thejury had asked the bailiff for a transcript of the entire trial. Without consulting anyone, thebailiff told the jury that the transcript was not available. The trial court concluded that thebailiff's answer was correct, and both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed. At 7:45p.m., the jurors announced that they were deadlocked. The trial court instructed the jury toattempt to break the deadlock. At 9:50 p.m., the jury came back with guilty verdicts on bothcounts. Defendant was later sentenced to life in prison. Defendant now appeals.

We have separated defendant's allegations of error into three specific categories: (1)evidentiary issues, (2) complaints of the ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3) cumulativeerror. While some of defendant's complaints overlap, we will address each issue separately.

We consider first whether defendant was denied a fair trial due to the actions of theState, as we believe this complaint has the most merit. Defendant contends that he wasdenied a fair trial due to improper actions by the prosecutor, including presenting to the jurytwo guns that were completely unrelated to the instant case, presenting evidence of papersbearing Mr. Dotson's name that were unaccountably found in John Vickers' trash, andarguing that defendant's guilt was established by comparing defendant's actions to those ofJohn Vickers. The State responds that these issues are waived because in his posttrialmotion defendant failed to allege as error any of the three instances mentioned above andat the trial failed to object to the presentation of Mr. Vickers' trash and to comments duringclosing argument comparing Vickers' actions to defendant's actions. The State also assertsthat the alleged errors do not amount to plain error because this case was not closelybalanced and because the alleged errors were not of such magnitude that defendant wasdenied a fair trial. According to the State, error, if any, was harmless because there is nopossibility that the verdict would have been different had the evidence not been presentedor the prosecutor not commented upon Mr. Vickers' actions and compared them todefendant's actions. After careful review, we find that the alleged errors were harmless.

The State is correct that defendant failed to complain in his posttrial motion of thealleged errors complained of herein. However, defendant did object to the presentation ofthe guns at the trial. In any event, "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights maybe noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." 134 Ill. 2d R.615(a). In order to invoke the plain error doctrine, it must be plainly apparent that an errorso prejudicial has occurred so that real justice has been denied or that the verdict of the jurymay have resulted from the error. See People v. Carlson, 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577, 404 N.E.2d233, 239 (1980). Defendant raises serious questions on appeal, and we are compelled toaddress defendant's arguments under the plain error doctrine.

The most troubling aspect of this case is that two guns that were totally unrelated tothe victims' murders were offered to the jury. A weapon may be admitted into evidence onlywhere there is proof to connect it both to the crime and to the defendant. See People v.Wade, 51 Ill. App. 3d 721, 729, 366 N.E.2d 528, 534 (1977). In order to establish aconnection there must be: (1) sufficient testimony to establish that a weapon was used, (2)substantial evidence the defendant participated in the crime, and (3) testimony that theweapon admitted was similar to the one used during the crime. See People v. McCasle, 35Ill. 2d 552, 559, 221 N.E.2d 227, 231 (1966).

In the instant case, the State failed to establish that the two guns were connected tothe crime. To the contrary, the State's expert, Thomas Gamboe, testified that People'sExhibits 12 and 13, the spent projectiles recovered at the scene, could not have been firedfrom either People's Exhibit 7 or 8, the two guns presented to the jury by the prosecutor. People's Exhibit 7 was a .32-caliber weapon that the police recovered from Judy Dotson'sson. People's Exhibit 8 was a .38-caliber automatic weapon recovered from MichaelGillespie. The State was fully aware that neither weapon was in any way relevant to theseparticular murders; nevertheless, the State presented extensive evidence about both weapons.For example, police officers testified about recovering the guns and sending them toforensics for testing. James Duggan, Jr., a fingerprint expert, testified that he tested the gunsfor fingerprints but that neither weapon had readable prints. As defendant points out, theState presented "pages and pages of testimony" concerning the two guns.

In particular, we point to testimony regarding Michael Gillispie and the gun recoveredfrom his house. The record here fails to disclose how or why Michael Gillespie became partof the State's investigation. All the jury heard was that Officer Todd Link from theCollinsville Police Department was "assigned a lead" as part of his duties with the MajorCase Squad and that, through this lead, he recovered a .38-caliber handgun from Gillispie. Gillispie's role in this matter was never identified.

By presenting two irrelevant guns and securing testimony about the guns, theprosecutor engaged in deliberate prosecutorial overkill and jeopardized a strong prosecutioncase. The State not only failed to connect the guns to the instant case, but it ultimatelyexcluded them from the crime. Since there was no connection in the instant case making theguns relevant as evidence to the alleged crime or defendant, the prosecutor erred in offeringthe guns as evidence.

Defendant argues that he was further prejudiced by the State's presentation of papersbearing Marty Dotson's name that were unaccountably found in a third party's trash can. While trash is not as intrinsically prejudicial as guns, the problem remains that there was noconnection made between the trash and the murders. The defense attorney explained thathe did not object to the introduction of the trash evidence during the State's case-in-chiefbecause he had no idea why the State was offering the evidence but that he "assumedsomehow they [the State] would link it up with the defendant." However, since the trashwas never connected, he felt compelled to object. The prosecutor replied, "If the defenseis going to get up and say my client is an innocent bystander, well, I think the jury is entitledto hear what an innocent bystander really does when they have found information of note." The trial court agreed with the State and said, "For that very limited purpose, I will allowyou to address it."

The test for the admissibility of evidence is whether it fairly tends to prove theparticular offense charged; whether that which is offered as evidence will be admitted orexcluded depends upon whether it tends to make the question of guilt more or less probable. See People v. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d 443, 455, 463 N.E.2d 696, 702 (1984). The admission ofevidence is within the trial court's discretion, and its ruling will not be reversed unless thereis a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Ward, 101 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 463 N.E.2dat 702. The trash was certainly not relevant to defendant's guilt. The jury was left tospeculate as to how the trash might have been placed in Vickers' trash can and as todefendant's role, if any.

The prosecutor discussed the trash during closing argument, even though there wasno evidence that the trash was ever at the victims' home or that the trash was deposited inVickers' trash can by either Craighead or defendant. While courts allow prosecutors greatlatitude in making closing arguments (see People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175, 514N.E.2d 970, 976 (1987)), he or she can only argue the facts introduced into evidence andreasonable deductions and inferences to be drawn from those facts. See People v. Vasquez,8 Ill. App. 3d 679, 681, 291 N.E.2d 5 (1972). The comments about which defendantcomplains concerned irrelevant evidence, which should not have even been allowed by thetrial court.

Notwithstanding our criticism of the prosecutor's actions, the question becomeswhether the error caused by the guns and trash evidence constitutes reversible or harmlesserror. See People v. Jackson, 195 Ill. App. 3d 104, 113-14, 551 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (1990). Error is deemed harmless where the evidence supporting a defendant's conviction is sooverwhelming that the defendant would have been convicted even if the error waseliminated. Jackson, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 114, 551 N.E.2d at 1030.

In People v. Howard, 209 Ill. App. 3d 159, 568 N.E.2d 56 (1991), our colleagues inthe First District determined that it was harmless error to admit a gun that was in thedefendant's possession when he was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon four days afterthe actual murders for which he was on trial. The Howard court held that even though thegun was improperly admitted, the defendant was not prejudiced in light of the overwhelmingevidence adduced at the trial that established the defendant's guilt. Howard, 209 Ill. App.3d at 180, 568 N.E.2d at 69.

In the instant case, the prejudicial effect of the error was significantly reducedbecause the State withdrew its motion and the guns were not admitted into evidence. Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence in this case was not close. Uponcareful review, we find that the evidence is actually overwhelming.

Defendant admitted that he was present at the scene. Defendant, not Craighead, waswell acquainted with the victims. Shondreka Hinkle testified that on the evening of themurders, Brandon Craighead told her that he needed some money and was going to kill awoman in order to get some money. According to Hinkle, defendant responded toCraighead's remark by telling him to be quiet because Hinkle might tell someone of theirplans. Craighead admitted that he was at Hinkle's house on the night of the murders. Defendant's fingerprint was found on a metal box in the victims' bedroom, and defendantoffered no plausible explanation as to how it might have gotten there.

Ameritech phone records showed that calls were made on the victims' cellular phoneafter the victims were killed. Angeletta Jacobs, Craighead's cousin and a friend ofdefendant's, testified that she received a phone call from defendant around midnight. According to Jacobs, the tone of the conversation was normal and nothing defendant saidled her to believe that anything was amiss. Hinkle's and Jacob's testimony established thatdefendant was a willing participant in the crimes.

Furthermore, defendant fled after the murders. Flight, when considered in connectionwith all other evidence in a case, is a circumstance that may be considered by a jury astending to prove guilt. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill. 2d 305, 349, 651 N.E.2d 72, 93 (1995). First, defendant left the scene with Craighead. Defendant testified that Craighead coercedhim into the car; however, when a police officer tried to stop the vehicle in which he andCraighead were riding, defendant gave Craighead directions in order to elude the officer. When Craighead stopped the vehicle, defendant did not surrender himself to police butinstead ran away with Craighead. Second, defendant went on the lam. He hid out at hiscousin's house in Rockford, and he later went to another cousin's home in Wisconsin. Hemade no attempt to contact the police during this time.

When defendant was found by police in Beloit, Wisconsin, several weeks after themurders, photocopies of newspaper articles describing the murders were found hiddenbeneath his bedroom carpet. The evidence against defendant was overwhelming. Defendantwas aware of Craighead's plans to rob and murder the victims and used his friendship withthe victims to gain entry into their home. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the recordshows that defendant was a willing participant in the scheme. Therefore, we do not believethat the errors of the prosecution reasonably affected the verdict.

We next consider whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to theState's presentation of the guns to the jury and (2) failing to present favorable evidence ofdefendant's character. We disagree.

A two-part standard for claims of the ineffective assistance of counsel was set forthin Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), andwas subsequently adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d504, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). To establish such a claim, a defendant must show thatcounsel committed such serious errors that, by an objective standard, his performance wasincompetent and that the incompetence so prejudiced defendant that he was denied a fairtrial. Perry v. Berry, 175 Ill. App. 3d 420, 427, 529 N.E.2d 1001, 1006 (1988). It is notenough to demonstrate that counsel's errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome ofthe case; rather, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but forcounsel's unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. Berry, 175 Ill. App.3d at 427, 529 N.E.2d at 1006.

"[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient beforeexamining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the allegeddeficiencies. *** If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the groundof lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course shouldbe followed." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.

In the instant case, defendant did not suffer any prejudice.

Regarding defendant's first assignment of counsel error, defense counsel did, in fact,object to the introduction of the guns into evidence after it became obvious that the gunswere in no way relevant to the case. Ultimately, the State withdrew its motion, and the gunswere not allowed in evidence. Therefore, the record indicates that defense counsel actedeffectively.

Defendant's second assignment of counsel error is that defendant's counsel's decisionnot to introduce character evidence favorable to defendant constituted ineffective assistance. Defense counsel explained that he was not going to submit favorable character evidence onbehalf of defendant because he believed that if he did, the State could then introduceevidence against defendant of a pending investigation of an armed robbery in Springfield. The general rule is that evidence that defendant committed another crime is inadmissible forthe purpose of showing that the defendant is predisposed or has a propensity to commit thecrime in question. People v. Lucas, 151 Ill. 2d 461, 485, 603 N.E.2d 460, 470 (1992). However, evidence of other crimes may be admitted if it is relevant for any other purposethan to show the propensity to commit crime (People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 182, 449N.E.2d 821, 824 (1983)), such as to show motive, intent, or identity. See Lucas, 151 Ill. 2dat 486, 603 N.E.2d at 470.

Here, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether defense counsel was right orwrong about his decision not to present character evidence on defendant's behalf. Evenassuming, arguendo, that defense counsel was wrong, defendant has failed to show that, butfor defense counsel's error, the verdict would have been different. As previously set forth,the evidence against defendant was overwhelming.

We are cognizant of the fact that prejudice is not to be our sole concern whenreviewing whether or not a defendant is entitled to a new trial, but we are also required toconsider whether the trial was fair, orderly, and impartial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d99, 724 N.E.2d 920 (2000). Relying on Blue, defendant insists that he was denied a fairtrial. However, the errors in the instant case did not attain the level reached in Blue, nor didthe errors prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial.

In Blue, our supreme court held that each of the errors committed at the defendant'strial "cast[] doubt upon the reliability of the judicial process" and "created a pervasivepattern of unfair prejudice to defendant's case." 189 Ill. 2d at 139, 724 N.E.2d at 941. Errors in Blue included the improper introduction and display of the dead police officer'sbloodied uniform on a headless torso (189 Ill. 2d at 120-26, 724 N.E.2d at 931-34),inflammatory testimony by the victim's father concerning the distress and sorrow felt by thefamily over the loss of the victim (189 Ill. 2d at 130-32, 724 N.E.2d at 936-37),inflammatory testimony from a police commander (189 Ill. 2d at 132-34, 724 N.E.2d at938), inflammatory testimony by the prosecutors (189 Ill. 2d at 134-37, 724 N.E.2d at 938-40), and improper argument by the prosecutors that the victim's family needed to "hear" fromthe jury and that the jury should send a "message" of its support to the police (189 Ill. 2d at126-27, 724 N.E.2d at 934).

It is well-accepted that a defendant is not entitled to an error-free trial, and few, ifany, trials are free from error. People v. Peter, 55 Ill. 2d 443, 447, 303 N.E.2d 398, 401(1973). Unlike Blue, we conclude that in this case, unlike the situation in Blue, the overallintegrity of the judicial process was not compromised due to the errors committed. A reviewof the record here reveals that despite the improper conduct of the prosecutor, the evidencepresented at the trial overwhelmingly implicated defendant in the murders of Marty and JudyDotson. The State ultimately withdrew its motion to admit the irrelevant guns, therebyreducing the effect of the prosecutor's error. Moreover, we find that other improperevidence, such as the trash, had only a de minimis effect on the outcome of this trial.

Overall, we find that defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's actions. We alsofind that defendant was not denied a fair trial due to the cumulative effect of error. We,however, caution the State to use restraint and not expose the jury to highly prejudicial,irrelevant evidence in the future. Because our review of the record overwhelmingly showsthat defendant was an active participant in these ghastly crimes against two innocent victims,we do not find that the prosecutor's wrongdoing warrants a new trial. We are confident thatdefendant received a fair trial. However, if we were presented with a less clear-cut case, theoutcome would, in all likelihood, be different.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of St. Clair County ishereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG and KUEHN, JJ., concur.