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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The rule of law handed down in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976), has been with us since 1976. Despite unrelenting change in criminalprocedure over the past 25 years, its prohibition against comment on postarrest silence hasendured. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 97, 96 S. Ct. at 2244. Hence, its teachingspans a course of time that encompasses the entire work history for most prosecutors, eventhose with long and notable careers like the prosecutor in charge of this case.

On April 5, 1999, a St. Clair County jury was sworn, and the defendant's trial on thecharge of first-degree murder began. The prosecutor rose to his feet and addressed the jurywith opening remarks. Among them was a comment about what happened when thedefendant was taken to the police station. He told the jury that the defendant was taken tothe police department, where he exercised his right to remain silent "under what's calledMiranda [sic] ***."

The comment drew a prompt objection, followed by the defendant's request for amistrial. The prosecutor responded to the request:

"Judge, there's no way I can tell this jury how the parents-how the foster mother got[to the police station] and why DCFS [the Department of Children and FamilyServices] was called. He obviously called and asked for DCFS to come and askedfor his foster mom. *** If you want to strike [the reference to Miranda], that's fine. I just wanted to put it in context."

Thus, it appeared that the comment upon the defendant's postarrest silence was notdelivered in ignorance of the law's ban on such a comment. Nor did it appear to be aninnocent slip of the tongue. The prosecutor seemed to acknowledge a conscious decisionto inform the jury that the defendant had exercised the right to remain silent because he feltthat it would provide the jury with a better understanding of how and why the defendant'sfoster parent appeared at the police station and subsequently engaged in conversation withthe defendant. The prosecutor seemed to harbor a belief that Doyle's prohibition againstcomment on postarrest silence could find an exception where the rule's violation could helpto provide context for other events.

Although the trial judge was not convinced that the comment on Miranda needed tobe made, he decided to deny the defendant's motion for a mistrial. Thereafter, he promptlyadmonished the jury to disregard the comment. The trial continued. The State called MaryLeflore to the witness stand. She was the defendant's foster parent. She was a key witnessfor the prosecution, as she was present during the shooting that led to this murder charge. Her direct and cross-examination completed the trial's first day. The next morning, whenthe trial judge asked if the State was ready to proceed, the following colloquy occurred inchambers:

"[Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, I wanted to bring to the Court'sattention[-]*** I've done some research on *** the comments that I made in openingstatement regarding the defendant's invoking his Miranda rights.

It appears, your Honor, *** that my statements were, in fact, prosecutorialerror, *** and we would end up having to retry this case again [sic].

I would ask the Court to reconsider [defense counsel's] motion for mistrial atthis time based upon *** prosecutorial error on my part[.] *** [T]he appellate courtwould reverse that and we would be back here again having to retry this case.

So I would ask the Court to reconsider his motion for mistrial at this time.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, is the State making a motion to mistry thiscase?

[Assistant State's Attorney]: No, your Honor, I'm asking the Court toreconsider [defense counsel's] motion for mistrial.

I'm saying, Judge, that it was an error on my part, it was not misconduct by anystretch of the imagination[;] I did not intentionally do that[;] I had no reason tosabotage my case or sabotage this case to try to get a mistrial.

Obviously, *** I was trying to get the link, the reason why Mary Lefloretalked to the defendant. It was error on my part to do so. I'm coming to this Courtas an officer of the Court and telling the Court that it was prosecutorial error, it isgoing to get reversed on appeal, and [defense counsel] moved for a mistrial, and theCourt denied that motion, and I'm asking *** the Court to reconsider his motion formistrial. I'm not asking for one[;] I'm asking the Court to reconsider his motion, orthe Court sua sponte can ask for his own mistrial.

[Defense counsel]: This is coming back. I knew this-I knew this was goingto happen this morning[.] [L]ast night when I was at the ball game, I sat there withmy old man[,] and he said there isn't an appellate court justice in this state that willallow that to stand.

[Assistant State's Attorney]: I agree, Judge. It's going to come back onreversal. I'm asking the Court to reconsider [defense counsel's] motion for mistrial.

THE COURT: Anything else-

[Defense counsel]: Judge, *** to suggest that it was anything less than anintentional act, I mean, you know, was it an accident? I mean he knows what he issaying. He's responsible. He's tried a bunch of cases. I'm not saying that youintended to put error in, but you intended to say what you said. Was it an accident?

[Assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, it was an accident, I did not intend to saythat, it slipped, it was an error, and the only reason it came out, Judge, is because Iwas trying to link up Mary Leflore talking to the defendant.

There was no reason in an opening statement for me to do this to my case.[T]he Court *** has heard the opening and heard evidence[;] it's a relatively strongcase for the State[.] *** [T]here's no reason for me to do that in openingstatement[.] [T]here was nothing that was detrimental to the People at that stage, andadditionally[,] judge, there was no bad faith, and I'll take an oath, and I'll go on therecord if the Court wants me to do that, and I will say that.

[Defense counsel]: I'm not asking you to do that ***.

[Assistant State's Attorney]: I'm telling the Court it was not intentional[;] itwas not done in bad faith. I would ask the Court to make a finding that it was, infact, prosecutorial error, as opposed to prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching,and, as I said, I will-[defense counsel] had every right to ask for a mistrial[;] theCourt should have granted it[;] I should have conceded the motion for mistrial at thattime. It was error on my part, and like I said, I want to be fair to the defendant andhe's got every right *** to have a different jury.

If he wants a mistrial, again, I think the Court should grant the mistrial[,] andI would ask you to reconsider his motion for one.

[Defense counsel]: The thing that the State seems to be overlooking in thisregard is *** the procedure that's been employed[.] [D]uring the last 24 hours theState has had the benefit of eliciting the testimony of Mary Leflore and seeing howshe would perform in the presence of the jury.

I think we all agree that *** you could ask her if she had ten fingers and tentoes, she would have had to have counted them first.

My point is this, your Honor, to have a witness go in the dumper on you andthen say oh, well, we better start again, we opposed the motion for mistrial yesterday,our witness goes to shit on us, and, you know, we'll come in and concede error thenext day. I would ask that the Court construe this as the State now making a motionto mistry the case.

It really doesn't matter procedurally, because this will be the subject of amotion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds, which I will be preparing if theCourt grants the motion, which I think it has to do.

THE COURT: *** We're all honorable men here, and *** the Court finds thatthere was not any prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching or any bad faith, and Idon't think that the-I don't believe that defense counsel is suggesting that. Thatwould be outrageous[,] and I don't want it in my courtroom unless there is some solidevidence for that. But I don't believe that [defense counsel] is saying that to beginwith.

[Defense counsel]: No, that's not what I'm saying, Judge[.] I'm saying that theeffect is the same.

THE COURT: *** I don't have any misgivings as to any strategy about havingMary Leflore, and what she had to say and all this stuff, or that there's any nexusbetween that and what occurred as far as this Mirandized statement is concerned. Butagain, I don't think the defense is suggesting that either.

So, we're all friends here[;] I will reconsider or sua sponte[;] I don't know thatit makes a difference-

[Assistant State's Attorney]: I'm assuming *** that [defense counsel] stillwishes the mistrial. Obviously, it's his right to if he wants to withdraw that[.] I'm notgoing to suggest that[;] that's up to him ***.

THE COURT: We'll beat a dead horse and nobody wants to do that. So I willgrant the mistrial."

The trial ended. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. It sought to barfurther proceedings based upon the former-jeopardy clauses of the United States and IllinoisConstitutions. U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,