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JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Frederick M. Rokita, was convicted in the circuit court of JacksonCounty of five counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count each of homeinvasion, residential burglary, and theft, all arising out of an attack on C.S.

At a bench trial held on May 9, 1994, and presided over by the Honorable David W.Watt, Jr., C.S. testified that in the early morning hours of November 13, 1993, she wasawakened by the sound of dishes rattling in the kitchen of her mobile home. When she gotout of bed to investigate, she saw a man standing at the end of the hallway. He grabbed herand ordered her into the bedroom. C.S. testified that she had the opportunity to observe herattacker for 15 to 20 minutes.

During the sexual assault that followed, C.S. could not see her attacker because eithershe had her eyes closed or her face was covered by bedding. C.S. testified that her attackerdid not ejaculate. At some point, C.S. escaped and ran to a neighbor's trailer for help. Asshe was knocking on the door, her assailant came toward her and stood several feet from herfor a period of 30 to 40 seconds.

Several days after the attack, C.S. assisted a sketch artist in preparing a compositesketch of her attacker. On November 23, 1993, Rokita was arrested by a Carbondale policeofficer who noticed a resemblance between Rokita and the sketch.

Prior to Rokita's arrest, C.S. had described her attacker as wearing a plaid shirt. Following Rokita's arrest, the police executed a search warrant of Rokita's home and foundtwo pictures of him wearing a plaid shirt. When shown the photographs, C.S. recognizedRokita as her attacker, and she recognized the plaid shirt he was wearing in the photographas being the shirt her attacker had worn.

Peggy Huffstotler, a neighbor of C.S.'s, testified that around 5 a.m. on November 13,1993, she was awakened by a knock on the door. She answered the knock and spokethrough her screen door for about five minutes with a man whom she identified as Rokita. Huffstotler testified that the man asked if "Jason" lived there. Huffstotler further testifiedthat the man returned about 30 minutes later, knocked on her door again, and shoutedobscenities.

Chris Stark testified that he had allowed Rokita to stay in his mobile home for a shorttime prior to November 12, 1993. Stark stated that around 3 a.m. on November 13, 1993,he and Rokita had an argument. Rokita left and walked off in the direction of Carbondale,toward C.S.'s trailer park. Stark last saw Rokita about a mile from the trailer park.

Shortly after the attack, C.S. was taken to the hospital, where sexual assault evidencewas taken, including vaginal and rectal swabs, as well as blood and saliva samples. Spermcells were found on the rectal swab. No sperm cells were found on the vaginal swab, butit tested positive for the presence of semen. Samples from vaginal and rectal swabs, as wellas blood-stain samples from both Rokita and C.S., were forwarded to the Illinois State PoliceForensic Science Laboratory in Springfield, Illinois (State lab), for deoxyribonucleic acid(DNA) testing.

The State lab attempted to perform a type of DNA testing known as "restrictionfragment length polymorphism" (RFLP) on the samples. The RFLP procedure failed todevelop a DNA profile on the material from the rectal swab. With respect to the materialfrom the vaginal swab, the only DNA profile the RFLP procedure was able to develop wasthat of C.S. David Metzger, the scientist from the Springfield lab who performed the RFLPanalysis, testified that the RFLP procedure requires a certain quality of DNA in order todevelop a profile and that RFLP analysis tends to be more successful in developing a profilefrom seminal material in those cases where ejaculation has occurred.

At the conclusion of the trial, Rokita was found guilty on all counts. He wassentenced to a total of 80 years' imprisonment. In an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23), this court vacated Rokita's conviction for residential burglary butaffirmed the case in all other respects. People v. Rokita, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 708 N.E.2d1289 (1996). Rokita's petition for leave to appeal to our supreme court was denied. Peoplev. Rokita, 175 Ill. 2d 549, 689 N.E.2d 1145 (1997).

While his petition for leave to appeal was pending, Rokita filed a pro se petition forpostconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(West 1996)). On April 15, 1997, the circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous andpatently without merit. Rokita's appeal of the dismissal of his postconviction petition wasdismissed by this court for want of prosecution. People v. Rokita, No. 5-97-0285 (June 30,1998) (unpublished order).

On April 14, 1999, Rokita filed a motion for forensic testing pursuant to section 116-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)). Rokita'smotion and supporting memorandum alleged that he has satisfied the requirements forobtaining postconviction DNA testing set forth in section 116-3: (1) identity was a centralissue in his trial, (2) the evidence to be tested had been subject to a chain of custodysufficient to establish that it had not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered inany material respect, (3) the result of DNA testing based on a "polymerase chain reaction"(PCR) had the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materiallyrelevant to Rokita's assertion of actual innocence, and (4) PCR-based DNA testing wasgenerally accepted within the relevant scientific community.

Hearings on Rokita's motion were held on May 5, 1999, and on June 3, 1999, beforethe Honorable David W. Watt, Jr., the same judge who had presided at his bench trial. Atthe May 5, 1999, hearing, the State argued that although the State lab was not doing PCRtesting at the time of Rokita's trial, such testing was available at private laboratories. Although Rokita's motion and supporting memorandum referred only to PCR-based DNAtesting, a review of the transcript of the June 3, 1999, hearing reveals that what Rokitasought was a particular type of PCR testing known as short tandem repeat (STR). Duringthe hearing, the State acknowledged that Rokita had met three of the requirements of section116-3: misidentification was the basis of Rokita's defense and was the issue at the trial, theevidence to be tested was subject to a proper chain of custody, and while the STR-basedDNA testing sought by Rokita had been unavailable at the time of his trial in 1994, at thetime of the hearing it was generally accepted in the scientific community.

The trial court found that identity was an issue in Rokita's trial, that the chain ofcustody had been established, and that the test requested is generally accepted in the relevantscientific community. The court denied Rokita's motion, however, finding that the result ofthe testing did not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence relevant toRokita's assertion of actual innocence. The judge stated that this had been a simpleidentification case and that DNA had little to do with the finding of guilt. The judgereasoned that even if the DNA testing revealed that Rokita was not the source of the seminalmaterial, C.S.'s identification of Rokita was clear and certain and that, given the evidence,any result of the DNA testing would not have altered the outcome of the trial. The court alsoexpressed its concern that Rokita was utilizing section 116-3 in an effort to file a secondpostconviction petition and that defendants might continually seek DNA testing undersection 116-3 each time a new DNA test was developed, resulting in a lack of finality totheir convictions. The court was concerned that, in effect, defendants would be usingsection 116-3 to obtain multiple postconviction hearings. The judge further indicated thatshould he be reversed and the case remanded, it should be assigned to another judge,because he was certain of Rokita's guilt.

On appeal, Rokita argues that he has satisfied all of the requirements of section 116-3and that the trial court erred in determining that the result of testing did not have thepotential to produce new, noncumulative evidence relevant to his assertion of actualinnocence. Rokita also contends that the trial court erred in requiring him to meet criterianot contained in the statute in order to obtain DNA testing. Specifically, he contends thatthe trial court mistakenly believed that it could grant the motion only if Rokita could showthat the finding of guilt might have been erroneous and that there was no time limit for asection 116-3 motion.

Section 116-3 provides:

"(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial court that entered thejudgment of conviction in his or her case for the performance of fingerprint orforensic DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to the trial whichresulted in his or her conviction, but which was not subject to the testing which isnow requested because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of[the] trial. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State.

(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case that:

(1) identity was the issue in the trial which resulted in his or herconviction; and

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain ofcustody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tamperedwith, replaced, or altered in any material aspect.

(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under reasonable conditions designedto protect the State's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing processupon a determination that:

(1) the result of the testing has the scientific potential to producenew, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant'sassertion of actual innocence;

(2) the testing requested employs a scientific method generallyaccepted within the relevant scientific community." 725 ILCS 5/116-3(West 1998).

Prior to the analysis of Rokita's arguments, a brief discussion of DNA testing is inorder. Within the nucleus of each human cell are 23 pairs of chromosomes composed ofdeoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, which contains the coded information that provides thegenetic blueprint that determines the physical structure and characteristics for eachindividual. With the exception of identical twins, no two individuals have the same DNAstructure, and the DNA contained in one cell of an individual will be identical to the DNAcontained in every other cell of that individual.

A DNA molecule is shaped like a double helix, resembling a twisted ladder or spiralstaircase. The sides of the ladder are composed of phosphate and sugar molecules. Therungs are composed of a pair of organic compounds called nucleotides, or bases. There arefour bases: adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). Two bases form asingle rung called a base pair. Because of their chemical composition, T always pairs withA, and G always pairs with C. This strict complementary pairing means that the order, orsequence, of bases on one side of the ladder will determine the sequence of the other side. The order in which these base pairs appear in the ladder is the genetic code of thatindividual.

A sequence of base pairs responsible for producing a particular trait is called a gene. A gene may be composed of anywhere from several thousand to several million base pairs. The total number of base pairs in a set of 23 chromosomes, one chromosome from each pairof chromosomes in a cell, is about three billion. Because human beings share many morebiological similarities than differences, 99.9% of the DNA molecule, or base-pair sequences,in each human being are the same. Certain sections of the DNA ladder take different formsin different individuals. These areas of variation are called "polymorphisms." The totalfragment length of the polymorphism is determined by the number of repeat core sequencesof base pairs. These are called "variable number of tandem repeats." The position a geneor other DNA fragment occupies on the DNA ladder is called its "locus." Certain types ofgenes are polymorphic and can occur in alternating forms, each of which is capable ofoccupying the gene's locus. These alternate forms of genes are called "alleles" and arehighly variable from one person to another.

There are various types of DNA technologies: (1) "multilocus probe testing," betterknown as DNA fingerprinting, (2) "single-locus restriction fragment length polymorphism"(RFLP), (3) "polymerase chain reaction," or PCR, using "amplified length polymorphism"(AMPLFP), (4) PCR testing using dot blot technology, and (5) mitochondrial DNAsequencing. C. Strom, Genetic Justice: A Lawyers Guide to DNA Testing, 87 Ill. B.J. 18-25(1999). The testing Rokita seeks in the present case is a type of PCR-AMPLFP testingknown as "short tandem repeat" (STR).

Turning to the merits of Rokita's argument, we note that with respect to subsection(a) of section 116-3, Rokita did not allege in his motion or in the supporting memorandumthat STR-based PCR testing was unavailable at the time of his trial. Indeed, neither themotion nor the supporting memorandum even mentions STR-based PCR testing. They referonly to PCR testing generally, and they do not even allege that PCR testing was unavailableat the time of the trial. At the hearing on his motion, Rokita introduced no evidencedemonstrating when STR-based PCR testing first became available.

Although Rokita failed to provide any evidence of the unavailability of STR testingat the time of the trial, we note that at the hearing on Rokita's motion, the State conceded thatat the time of the trial PCR testing was in its infant stages and that STR-based PCR testingdid not exist. The State cannot now deny on appeal a fact it admitted in the trial court. Inits reply brief, the State now argues that PCR testing was available at the time of Rokita'strial in 1994. The State contends, "PCR-based DNA testing was developed in 1985, and'[b]y 1990, the PCR method was one of the most widely used techniques in medical andbiological research,' " quoting People v. Pope, 284 Ill. App. 3d 695, 697, 672 N.E.2d 1321,1323 (1996). The State's argument is correct but is not relevant. As Rokita notes, while anearly form of PCR-based DNA testing, known as DQ-Alpha typing, the type of PCR testingat issue in Pope, was in use around the time of his trial, STR-based PCR testing was not. We note that while the State argues that PCR testing was available at the time of Rokita'strial, it does not argue that STR-based PCR testing was available, which is what Rokita wasseeking.

With respect to subsection (b) of section 116-3, Rokita contends that the trial courtcorrectly found that he made a prima facie case that identity was the issue in his trial and thatthe evidence to be tested has been subject to a proper chain of custody. Rokita notes that theState disputed neither of these at the hearing. The State advances no argument on appealwith respect to the chain of custody, but it now contends that identity was not the issue onappeal. Again, the State now attempts to argue a fact that it conceded at the hearing. Further, a review of the transcript of Rokita's trial demonstrates that the State's assertion isincorrect. The basis of Rokita's defense at his trial was that he was not the person whoassaulted C.S. In his closing argument, defense counsel stated, "[I]t's our belief that this issimply a case of mistaken identity." Clearly, identity was the issue at the trial. The trialcourt correctly found that Rokita fulfilled the requirements of subsection (b) of section 116-3.

With respect to subsection (c), we note that the State does not dispute that STR-basedDNA testing is now generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The focus ofour inquiry, therefore, will be on whether the trial court erred in finding that the result of therequested testing did not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidencematerially relevant to Rokita's assertion of actual innocence. Reviewing the transcript of thehearing, it is evident that, in denying Rokita's motion, the circuit court based its decision ona factor not contained in the statute. Specifically, the court stated that even if DNA testingdemonstrated that the seminal material did not come from Rokita, such evidence would notalter the court's opinion of his guilt. The ultimate impact of the new, noncumulativeevidence on the defendant's conviction is not relevant to the determination of whether adefendant is entitled to such testing, and the trial court erred in denying the motion on thisbasis.

Rokita contends that STR-based PCR testing has the potential to produce new,noncumulative evidence materially relevant to his assertion of actual innocence. Specifically, he contends that such testing can produce a genetic profile from a much smallersample of genetic material than is required for successful RFLP testing. The State does notcontest this assertion. Rather, the State maintains that because C.S.'s attacker did notejaculate when assaulting his victim, the results of any DNA test would not have beenconclusive. Thus, the State maintains, the results would not be materially relevant to hisclaim of innocence. In support of its argument, the State relies on People v. Savory, 309 Ill.App. 3d 408, 722 N.E.2d 220 (1999).

In Savory, the defendant was convicted of two counts of murder. He filed a section116-3 motion seeking DNA testing of blood from a pair of pants and of fingernail scrapings. The defendant argued that the testing would prove that the blood on his pants did not comefrom the victim and that any DNA recovered from under the victim's fingernails did notcome from him. The trial court denied the motion. In affirming the trial court's decision,the court in Savory held that because the results of the testing could not conclusivelyexonerate the defendant, the evidence sought was not materially relevant to his assertion ofactual innocence. The court in Savory reasoned that by using the term "actual innocence,"the legislature intended to limit the scope of section 116-3 to allow scientific testing onlywhere it has the potential to exonerate a defendant.

In reaching this conclusion, the court in Savory relied primarily on People v.Gholston, 297 Ill. App. 3d 415, 697 N.E.2d 375 (1998). In Gholston, the defendant was oneof six persons convicted of sexually assaulting the victim. The defendant filed a petition forpostconviction relief, seeking DNA testing of the victim's sexual assault kit. The trial courtdenied his petition, and the defendant appealed. The court in Gholston first noted that oursupreme court had recognized the viability of a free-standing postconviction claim of actualinnocence based upon newly discovered evidence but had held that the evidence supportingsuch a claim must be new, noncumulative, and most importantly, of such conclusivecharacter as would probably change the result of the trial. Gholston, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 419,697 N.E.2d at 378, citing People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (1996).Based thereon, the court in Gholston held that even if the defendant's DNA did not matchthat taken from the victim, such a result could not conclusively establish that the defendanthad not sexually assaulted the victim, because there were multiple attackers and there wasno testimony that the defendant had ejaculated. Thus, the court concluded, the results of theDNA test would not be material to his claim of actual innocence.

The Savory court's reliance on Gholston is misplaced. Gholston involved apostconviction petition claim of actual innocence based upon new evidence. In Washington,upon which Gholston relied, our supreme court held that a claim of newly discoveredevidence showing a defendant to be actually innocent was cognizable as a matter of dueprocess and could be raised in a postconviction petition. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489, 665N.E.2d at 1337. Because the relief sought in a postconviction petition is a new trial, thestandards for determining whether to grant a new trial based upon newly discoveredevidence govern whether a postconviction petition alleging newly discovered evidenceshould be granted. See Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489, 665 N.E.2d at 1337. A new trialbased upon newly discovered evidence will be granted only where such evidence is of "suchconclusive character that it will probably change the result on retrial." People v. Silagy, 116Ill. 2d 357, 368, 507 N.E.2d 830, 834 (1987), quoting People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128,134, 461 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1984). Thus, it was appropriate for the court in Gholston toaffirm the dismissal of the postconviction petition because the evidence was not of such aconclusive character as would probably change the result on a retrial. A section 116-3motion does not seek a new trial, however, but merely forensic testing. Thus, the rationaleemployed in Gholston does not support the holding in Savory.

Moreover, the Savory court's interpretation of section 116-3 ignores the plainlanguage of the statute. Section 116-3 does not require that the requested DNA testingproduce evidence of such a conclusive character as would probably change the result on aretrial. Instead, the statute requires only that it has the "potential to produce new,noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actualinnocence." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/116-3(c)(1) (West 1998). Words in statutesare to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and when the intent of the legislature canbe ascertained from the language of the statute itself, such language will be given effectwithout resorting to other aids for construction. People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448, 539N.E.2d 1221(1989). As the dissent in Savory correctly observed, the plain and unambiguouslanguage evinces no legislative intent to limit the use of scientific testing only to situationswhere the testing will result in total vindication or has the potential to exonerate thedefendant. See Savory, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 416-17, 722 N.E.2d at 226 (Holdridge, J.,dissenting). Had the legislature intended to limit testing to such situations, it could easilyhave done so. Instead, it chose to allow testing in any case where the result might bematerially relevant.

The testing sought in this case clearly meets that standard. The RFLP method wasunable to produce a definitive result because of the size of the sample. The DNA testingmethod sought by Rokita can obtain results from a much smaller sample. A conclusivedetermination of whether Rokita's DNA matches the sample taken from the victim wouldbe both new and noncumulative and would be materially relevant to his assertion of actualinnocence.

The State also argues that section 116-3 should be interpreted in a way that will limitthe circumstances under which a section 116-3 motion can be brought and, if denied,subsequently appealed. Specifically, the State urges this court to impose a time limitationon a defendant's ability to seek forensic testing pursuant to section 116-3 and urges us tofollow the reasoning in People v. Dunn, 306 Ill. App. 3d 75, 713 N.E.2d 568 (1999), andhold that a section 116-3 motion is properly considered only in connection with a timelypostconviction petition or one that is excusably late.

In Dunn, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction hearing petition. During thependency of the petition, the public defender appointed to represent Dunn filed, thenwithdrew, a motion to compel genetic testing. Ultimately, the trial court dismissed hispostconviction petition with prejudice. On December 1, 1998, Dunn filed an affidavit in theform of a supplemental record with the appellate court, in which he averred that he had onlyrecently learned that his motion to compel genetic testing had been withdrawn.

On appeal, the court granted the State's motion to strike the affidavit because itviolated Supreme Court Rule 329 (134 Ill. 2d R. 329), which allows for the correction ofmaterial omissions or inaccuracies in the record. The court nevertheless considered Dunn'srequest for genetic testing because it was raised by Dunn's correspondence and by defensecounsel before it was withdrawn. Noting that section 116-3 was not in effect at the timeDunn filed his postconviction petition, the court evaluated Dunn's claim under thefundamental fairness exception to the waiver rule. Citing the accuracy and definitivenessof DNA testing and the recent enactment of section 116-3, the court remanded the cause tothe circuit court for a determination of whether he had made a prima facie case for suchtesting and for further proceedings, if necessary, consistent with those results.

Contrary to the State's assertion, nothing in Dunn implies that the proper time forfiling a section 116-3 motion is during a postconviction review. As noted above, wheninterpreting a statute, courts should give effect to the intent of the legislature, and that intentis best ascertained from the language of the statute itself. There is no language in section116-3 indicating any legislative intent to impose a time limit for filing a motion for forensictesting. Had the legislature wished to impose a time limit on the filing of a section 116-3motion, it could easily have done so. It is not the prerogative of this court to read into thestatute limitations that the legislature chose not to include. Moreover, were we to go beyondthe clear and unambiguous language of the statute, the legislative history of section 116-3clearly demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to impose a time limit for filing amotion. See 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 15, 1997, at 1-20; 90th Ill.Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 9, 1997, at 106-07.

[Nonpublishable material removed under Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).]

For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County isreversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with thisopinion.