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The defendant, Anna M. McClellan, was charged by a second amended informationwith aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1) (West 1998)) for sexuallyabusing her minor son in 1995 and 1996. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to threeyears of probation. The terms of her probation required her to obtain a mental healthevaluation and to complete any counseling recommended as a result of the evaluation. Thedefendant was also required to complete sex offender counseling. The trial court revokedher probation on the basis that the defendant had failed to complete sex offender counseling,and the court sentenced her to five years in prison. For the reasons that follow, we reversethe ruling of the trial court.

The defendant is a 39-year-old woman from Breese, Illinois. This case involves heroldest son, T.B., now 21 years old. In June 1998, when T.B. was 15, his biological fatherand stepmother informed law enforcement that they suspected that the defendant hadsexually abused T.B. over a 12-year period. T.B. informed authorities that the sexual abusehad begun when he was three or four but that he did not remember much of it. He recalledthat it began again in 1995 and continued thereafter. Given the timing of the latest abuse,he suspected that he was the father of his mother's youngest son.

On June 11, 1998, the State charged the defendant by information with one count ofpredatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-14.1(a)(1) (West 1998)). TheState filed an amended information on January 27, 1999, adding a second count foraggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i) (West 1998)). Although notmade a part of the record, it appears that the State filed a second amended information onJuly 21, 1999, adding a third count for aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1) (West 1998)). The defendant pleaded guilty to the third count in exchange for theState dismissing the first two counts and recommending three years of probation. The trialcourt sentenced her to three years of probation, from July 21, 1999, until July 21, 2002. Theprobation order stated that the defendant was required to obtain a mental health evaluationand complete any counseling recommended as a result of the evaluation, in addition tocompleting sex offender counseling.

A summary of the defendant's counseling history follows. The mental healthevaluation required by the probation order was performed by Karol Kiel, M.A., whoprovided individual therapy to the defendant from January 6, 2000, until March 1, 2001. Thewritten report of the evaluation, entitled "Mental Health Assessment", is not dated. Thedefendant had been seeing Kiel to work on personal issues, including emotional stressresulting from the sexual abuse charges and her divorce. Kiel recommended in the reportthat the defendant continue individual therapy and treatment for sex offenders. Nothing inthe record demonstrates that the defendant followed Kiel's recommendation that she continueindividual therapy.

The defendant entered group therapy for sexual offenders with Darlene Diamond-Bushue, M.A., in September 1999. She attended and participated in Diamond-Bushue'sgroup for two years. On September 8, 2001, Diamond-Bushue discharged the defendant andauthored a progress report which states that the defendant maintained her innocence throughthe course of treatment and was being discharged because she had reached maximum benefitas a result of her denial of guilt. Diamond-Bushue recommended that the defendant obtainindividual therapy with a female sex offender specialist to address any unresolved issues. Again, nothing in the record demonstrates that the defendant engaged in the specializedindividual therapy recommended by Diamond-Bushue in September 2001.

The defendant reentered group therapy with Diamond-Bushue on November 19, 2001,approximately one month after she had been discharged. Therapy continued until June 2002and concluded in conjunction with the termination of her probation. Diamond-Bushueauthored two additional documents during this second period of therapy with the defendant. The first document, dated March 25, 2002, entitled "Client Staffing Evaluation", wasauthored by Diamond-Bushue four months into this second period of therapy. Diamond-Bushue noted that the defendant had made progress in all the areas evaluated, includingbehavior control, group therapy involvement, understanding criminal thinking, andappreciation of the harm and costs of crimes. However, Diamond-Bushue noted that thedefendant had made minimal or no progress in her ability to disclose her abusive history, andshe recommended that the defendant continue in group therapy, which she did. Diamond-Bushue stated in her August 5, 2002, "Discharge Summary" that the defendant hadconsistently attended and actively participated in group therapy sessions and demonstratedknowledge and understanding of the concepts presented. Diamond-Bushue further statedthat the defendant was able to confront other group members about their offenses and toprovide insight. Nonetheless, at the end of the defendant's third and final year of probationand counseling, Diamond-Bushue discharged her "unsuccessfully" based on her "lack ofaccountability regarding sexual abuse allegations". She recommended that the defendantparticipate in a sex offender evaluation and a clinical polygraph examination to determineher level of risk to children. Like the individual therapy recommended by Kiel andDiamond-Bushue in 2001, there is no evidence in the record that reflects that the defendantparticipated in a sex offender evaluation or polygraph examination as recommended.

During her second course of treatment with Diamond-Bushue, the defendant contactedMarie Clark, M.A., of the Behavioral Science Institute on November 5, 2001. It is not clearfrom the record whether she treated with Clark voluntarily. It is also not clear whether Clarkspecialized in female sex offenders, as had been recommended by Diamond-Bushue twomonths earlier. Regardless, it appears that the defendant did not obtain any therapy fromClark at all. She only completed an intake evaluation over the course of three appointmentsin November and December 2001.

In summary, after our review of the documentation of the defendant's group sexoffender counseling, individual therapy, and evaluations, it appears that she first attendedgroup sex offender counseling with Diamond-Bushue from September 1999 until June 2002,which was interrupted for one to two months following her first discharge. From January6, 2000, until March 1, 2001, she attended individual therapy with Kiel, who authored themental health evaluation required by the probation order. Last, the defendant completed theintake process with Clark over three visits in November and December 2001 but did notengage in any therapy during that time.

On July 3, 2002, shortly after the defendant was discharged from therapy byDiamond-Bushue for the second time, the State filed a petition to revoke probation, allegingthat the defendant had violated the terms of her probation by failing to support her lawfuldependents and by failing to complete sex offender counseling. The petition was filed lessthan three weeks before the defendant's probationary period expired. The defendant filed amemorandum in opposition to the State's petition. She argued that she had complied withthe trial court's probation order in every respect and that the trial court could not revoke herprobation because she was not "cured" or because she did not benefit from the court-orderedtherapy. She relied solely on People v. Prusak, 200 Ill. App. 3d 146, 558 N.E.2d 696 (1990)(holding that a condition placed on the sex offender's probation-to complete a treatmentprogram-was not violated when the offender was asked to leave group therapy when hewould not accept responsibility for his sexual misconduct).

The parties filed a stipulation related to the State's revocation petition. The partiesagreed to the following facts. They agreed that the defendant had been ordered to completesex offender counseling. She attended therapy with Diamond-Bushue from September 1999until September 2001 and from October 2001 until March 2002⁽¹⁾. The parties also agreedthat the defendant had attended and participated in all the group sessions required and haddemonstrated appropriate effort on homework assignments and contributed to groupdiscussions. She had made good progress in every respect except she had not admitted theoffense. The parties attached exhibits to the stipulation: Diamond-Bushue's progress report,client staffing evaluation, and discharge summary. It appears, however, that Kiel's mentalhealth assessment required by the probation order was omitted from the parties' stipulation.

The trial court heard argument on the State's petition to revoke on October 28, 2002. The parties' arguments focused mostly on the applicability and propriety of Prusak, uponwhich the defendant relied. The trial court took the matter under advisement and onNovember 6, 2002, revoked the defendant's probation "for her failure to complete sexoffender counseling." The docket entry states in pertinent part:

"4) Whether or not defendant is willing to admit the acts for which she is onprobation has not been considered by this court on the issue of whether defendant hasviolated the probation order.

5) Paragraph 13 of the probation order states, 'The defendant shall completesex offender counseling.'

6) Defendant has not completed sex offender counseling. The stipulationsubmitted by counsel and defendant indicates that defendant requires continued grouptherapy, a sex offender specific evaluation[,] and further individual therapy. Thiscounseling has not been completed.

7) Defendant has not requested an extension of the term of probation tocomplete sex offender counseling."

The defendant filed a posttrial motion or alternative motion to reconsider, arguing thatshe had completed sex offender counseling as required by the probation order even thoughshe had not admitted the offense. She again relied solely on People v. Prusak, 200 Ill. App.3d 146, 558 N.E.2d 696 (1990).

Prior to the trial court hearing this motion, the defendant's probation officer filed apresentence investigation report on January 2, 2003. He stated that the defendant hadcomplied with all probation conditions except for the successful completion of sex offendercounseling. He stated that counseling services had concluded in conjunction with thetermination of her probation and that she had attended counseling regularly. Thecircumstance of the probation violation was that she never admitted her responsibilityregarding the offense and had been discharged unsuccessfully from treatment as a result.

The parties appeared before the trial court on the defendant's motion to reconsider andfor sentencing on January 29, 2003, at which time the defendant requested a continuance toallow her to voluntarily complete additional counseling, testing, and evaluation with MarieClark, M.A. The trial court allowed the continuance, reserved ruling on her motion toreconsider, and stated, "It is Defendant's intention to address issues raised by CounselorDarlene Diamond-Bushue's Discharge Summary of 8/5/2002." The defendant contactedClark on January 30, 2003, and participated in the intake process at Behavioral ScienceInstitute during four visits in February and March of 2003.

Two additional circumstances delayed matters further. Over the course of February,March, and April 2003, the defendant's counsel withdrew at her request and she obtained anew attorney. She was arrested on April 8, 2003, for violating the terms of her bond whenshe left the state to remarry. According to Clark, the defendant's husband cancelled her April9, 2003, appointment with Clark because she had been incarcerated and her bond wasrevoked. She made no further appointments with Clark.

On April 17, 2003, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and heard argument onthe defendant's previously filed motion to reconsider. The defendant argued that she hadcomplied with the conditions of her probation in every respect and that her probation hadbeen revoked only because she had not admitted her involvement in the offense and hadmaintained her innocence. The State argued that the trial court should deny the defendant'smotion to reconsider on the basis that she had failed to complete sex offender counselingrecommended by the counselor, and it argued that the court should refrain from emphasizingwhether or not she failed to admit her guilt.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reconsider and clarified its ruling ofNovember 6, 2002, revoking the defendant's probation. The court stated that it based itsrevocation on Diamond-Bushue's reports that the defendant needed group therapy, a sexoffender evaluation, and further individual therapy. The court explained that when it initiallyrevoked her probation on November 6, 2002, these had not been completed and that they stillhad not been completed. The trial court stated:

"Contrary to Mr. Courtney's argument I never took a position that Ms.McClellan had to be cured. I am not sure and I am certainly not an expert on sexoffender treatment, but I think it would be the same as an alcoholic person or a personwho has an addiction to drugs that maybe you can't cure somebody, but you cancontrol it, and I never intended probation required that she be cured."

Prior to sentencing, the trial court considered the presentencing investigation report andaddendum and heard argument on mitigation and aggravation factors. The defendant askedthe trial judge on her own behalf that she be allowed to complete the counseling she hadbegun with Clark prior to her incarceration. The trial court denied her request and sentencedher to five years in the Department of Corrections with credit for time previously served. The defendant appeals.

To revoke the defendant's probation, the State has the burden of demonstrating, by apreponderance of the evidence, that the defendant violated a condition of her probation. 730ILCS 5/5-6-4(c) (West 2002). The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to revokeprobation, and we will not disturb the court's ruling unless it is against the manifest weightof the evidence. People v. Prusak, 200 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149, 558 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1990). We find that the State did not carry its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of theevidence that the defendant violated a condition of her probation, and as a result we find thatthe trial court's finding of a probation violation was against the manifest weight of theevidence.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly revoked her probationon the basis that she failed to complete sex offender counseling, because she consistentlyattended and fully participated in therapy for more than 2