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Kenneth L. Lindsay (respondent) was scheduled to be released from the Departmentof Corrections. Shortly before that time, the Illinois Attorney General filed a petition for hiscommitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq.(West 1998)). Respondent moved to dismiss the petition as violating the plea he negotiatedfor his charged offense. The circuit court of Montgomery County denied the motion todismiss. On appeal, respondent raises the following issues: (1) whether the plea bargainencompassed a prohibition against pursuing a petition under the Sexually Violent PersonsCommitment Act, as well as the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West1998)), and (2) whether respondent was induced to enter into the plea agreement by promisesmade by the office of the State's Attorney in bad faith. We affirm.

On March 30, 1998, respondent entered into a plea whereby he agreed to plead guiltyto the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) (West 1998))in return for a recommendation that he would be sentenced to six years in the IllinoisDepartment of Corrections with credit for time already served. The court was informed asfollows: "In addition[,] the agreement is the State will not pursue a [s]exually [d]angerous[p]ersons petition for any events that have occurred prior to today[']s date."

Shortly before respondent was scheduled to be released, the Illinois Attorney Generalfiled a petition for civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it violated the terms of his pleaagreement.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the State called as a witness Neil Schroeder,the assistant State's Attorney who negotiated the plea. This colloquy occurred duringSchroeder's direct examination:

"Q. [Assistant Attorney General:] *** Did you feel that you had the standingto waive the Sexually Violent Persons Act?

A. The reason that this came up was that I had filed a Sexually DangerousPerson's [sic] petition in People versus Dale Comer sometime before that and thatwas[,] to the best of my knowledge[,] the first time that had been done here. Wetalked about that extensively[,] and although I never filed one here, it was anegotiating tool that I used as far as[:] ['][F]ine, your guy pleads guilty[;] he goes toprison[;] I won't file a D as in David, Sexually Dangerous Person's [sic] petition.['] And it was my opinion at the time[,] and still is today[,] that I don't have jurisdictionto say what will happen at the time he is prepared to be released from the Departmentof Corrections.

Q. Did you feel that Anne Fitzgerald [respondent's attorney] understood thedistinction between the two [a]cts?

A. She was very versed in both that [sic], and I believe that was herunderstanding, as well. Although, obviously, that calls for a conclusion."

The State also presented an affidavit by respondent's attorney at the time of the plea, thepublic defender. In the affidavit she indicated that it was her understanding that Schroederwould not enter into an agreement regarding the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Actfor any defendant. The public defender stated that it was her understanding that Schroederhad agreed not to pursue a Sexually Dangerous Persons Act petition that would be foundedon the facts of the charged offense. On his behalf, respondent testified that the publicdefender had informed him that he would not be subject to civil commitment if he enteredthe plea.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. A bench trial was then held, andrespondent was found to be a sexually violent person and was committed to the custody ofthe Illinois Department of Human Services.

In the absence of other circumstances, a trial court accepting a guilty plea would notbe obligated to admonish a defendant of the possibility of civil commitment under theSexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. People v. Norris, 328 Ill. App. 3d 994, 997, 767N.E.2d 904, 907 (2002). A defendant need only be admonished of the direct consequencesof his guilty plea. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 370, 721 N.E.2d 539, 543 (1999). Thedirect consequences of a guilty plea are those that are related to the sentence imposed by theplea and that are within the control of the trial court. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 372, 721 N.E.2dat 543. In contrast, the court need not inform a defendant of the collateral consequences ofhis plea. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 372, 721 N.E.2d at 543. Civil commitment as either asexually dangerous person or a sexually violent person is a collateral consequence of a guiltyplea. Norris, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 997, 767 N.E.2d at 907. Collateral consequences are futureor contemplated, but not certain, and are not related to the length or nature of the sentenceimposed from the plea. Generally, collateral consequences result from actions taken by theState's Attorney or an other agency that the trial court does not control. Williams, 188 Ill.2d at 372, 721 N.E.2d at 543. Therefore, prior to accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the trialcourt is not required to admonish a defendant of the possibility of commitment under theSexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Norris, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 997, 767 N.E.2d at907.

Respondent's contentions stem from the State making promises regarding civilcommitment. Respondent contends that in order for his plea to make sense, it mustnecessarily have encompassed a prohibition against pursuing a Sexually Violent PersonsCommitment Act petition, as well as a Sexually Dangerous Persons Act petition. Respondenttestified at the hearing on his motion to dismiss that it was his understanding that he wouldnot be civilly committed if he entered into the plea bargain. Respondent contends that thecourt never admonished him regarding the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act andthat his counsel could have overlooked the issue because the statute had been recentlyenacted. Respondent asserts that it would have made no sense for him to enter into such abargain if he would still be exposed to civil commitment.

The State points out that a plea bargain is a contract that is not to be measured by thesubjective beliefs of the parties but instead must be interpreted according to the reasonableexpectations of the parties. People v. Wolfe, 156 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1027, 510 N.E.2d 145,148 (1987). The rights of a defendant are limited to what the parties agreed to, and the courtsinterpret the terms of the agreement according to the reasonable expectations of the parties. People v. Navarroli, 146 Ill. App. 3d 466, 470, 497 N.E.2d 128, 131 (1986), aff'd, 121 Ill.2d 516, 521 N.E.2d 891 (1988). The analysis of a plea agreement, including whether it hasbeen violated, is objective in nature and not based on the motives and justifications of theparties. Navarroli, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 470, 497 N.E.2d at 131. Under the terms of theagreement described at the time the plea was entered, the State, in return for a guilty plea,agreed to recommend a sentence of only six years' imprisonment, a sentence less than themaximum, and agreed not to pursue a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.

The plea made sense and benefited respondent. Respondent received a sentence lessthan the maximum despite having a prior conviction, and he was not fined. See 720 ILCS5/12-16 (West 1998). Respondent also received the benefit of the State's Attorney's officenot proceeding under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act at that time. The fact that hissentencing precluded his immediate confinement under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Actdoes not mean respondent did not benefit from the bargain. See People v. Edwards, 29 Ill.App. 3d 625, 628, 331 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1975) (the defendant could have been convicted ofboth the theft charge and the burglary charge).

It would not be unreasonable for a respondent to bargain to prohibit a petition underthe Sexually Dangerous Persons Act while allowing for the possibility of commitment underthe Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. There are several vital differences betweenthe two acts. In order for a respondent to be found sexually dangerous, the State need onlyprove a "propensity" to commit a sex offense, as opposed to having to prove that it is"substantially probable" that a person will engage in sexual violence. 725 ILCS 205/1.01(West 1998); 725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998). In addition, the sexually violent personsstatute requires the treatment to be in the least restrictive manner and allows a detainee topetition for his release. 725 ILCS 207/40(b)(2) (West 1998). The sexually violent personsstatute is administered by the Department of Human Services and not the Department ofCorrections and requires continuing examination. 725 ILCS 207/55 (West 1998); cf. 725ILCS 205/8 (West 1998).

The court had no duty to discuss the possibility of a petition under the SexuallyViolent Persons Commitment Act, because such a possibility was a collateral matter. Theplea was explicit and benefited respondent. There is no basis for contending that respondentreasonably expected not to face the possibility of a petition under the Sexually ViolentPersons Commitment Act.

The State did not bargain in bad faith. The agreement by the State's Attorney's officenot to pursue a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, while being silentregarding the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, was sound policy. Respondentcontends that the State acted in bad faith by inducing him to plead guilty by promising thatno petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act would be filed. Respondent contendsthat this promise was unfulfillable because the State's Attorney's office could not controlwhether the Attorney General's office would file such a petition upon the completion of hissentence. At the hearing on respondent's motion to dismiss, the assistant State's Attorneytestified that he believed that action by the Attorney General was outside his jurisdiction atthe time of the plea. The assistant State's Attorney testified that it was his belief that thepublic defender understood his position, as well as the distinctions between the two acts. Inaddition, respondent's counsel testified through affidavit that her understanding was that theState would not enter into an agreement relating to the Sexually Violent PersonsCommitment Act, as opposed to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. There was no badfaith.

Whether respondent would have a legitimate argument if the Attorney General hadfiled a petition under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is not at issue in this case. Evenassuming this happened, the strongest remedy to which respondent would be entitled is thespecific performance of the promise not to file a petition under the Sexually DangerousPersons Act. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495,499 (1971); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F. 2d 286, 295 (2d Cir.1976). The filing of a petition under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is in noway contrary to the plea bargain.

The trial court correctly pointed out that silence about the Sexually Violent PersonsCommitment Act was reasonable. The implication underlying all of respondent's argumentsis that the absence of mention of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act wasirrational or deceptive. As the trial court pointed out, however, jurisdiction for proceedingsunder the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act is in the circuit courts and both the State'sAttorney and the Attorney General have the discretion to file a petition. 725 ILCS 205/3(West 1998). In contrast, a State's Attorney is allowed to file a petition under the SexuallyViolent Persons Commitment Act only if the Attorney General has first declined to act. 725ILCS 207/15(a) (West 1998).

This insight might explain the happenings of this case, but it is not necessary for ourdecision. The terms of the agreement control the bargain given to respondent. Respondententered into a plea bargain that, by its plain terms, only addressed the filing of a petitionunder the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. The State has fulfilled its obligations.

Accordingly, this court affirms the order of the circuit court of Montgomery County.

Affirmed.

WELCH and HOPKINS, JJ., concur.