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JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, the State of Illinois, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of its petitionto revoke probation, which had been filed against the defendant, David W. Bredemeier. Onappeal, the State argues that the trial court erred in holding that a six-year delay inprosecuting its petition to revoke probation was "presumptively prejudicial" and indismissing its petition to revoke probation. We affirm.

Following a jury trial in Marion County, Illinois, the defendant was convicted ofunlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 1994)). OnFebruary 10, 1995, the court sentenced the defendant to 30 months' probation.

On May 17, 1996, the defendant was convicted of attempted burglary in GibsonCounty, Indiana, and was sentenced to eight years' incarceration, with two years suspendedto probation. On May 30, 1996, the Marion County, Illinois, State's Attorney filed a petitionto revoke probation, based upon the 1996 Indiana conviction. The court issued a warrant forthe defendant's arrest on June 27, 1996, which the defendant acknowledged he received,apparently while he was incarcerated in Indiana.

On July 24, 1998, the defendant sent to the Marion County courthouse a letterrequesting a certified copy of the docket sheet regarding the petition to revoke probation. He stated that he needed this document for evidence when he filed his motion for a speedytrial. The defendant further stated:

"Please also provide me with the trial rules of your court as I do not have access tosuch documents in the Indiana Department of Corrections. Also, if there has been alawyer appointed to represent me in this cause of action, please send the name andaddress of such, as he/she may be able to get the information that I am nowrequesting."

On April 7, 1999, the defendant filed a pro se "Motion for Relief from Judgment." On August 11, 2000, the defendant sent to the circuit clerk a letter asking that counsel beappointed to represent him in the proceedings on the petition to revoke probation. OnSeptember 29, 2000, the defendant sent another letter to the circuit clerk and again asked thatcounsel be appointed to represent him in proceedings on the petition to revoke probation. On October 16, 2000, the defendant sent the judge a letter, which stated, in pertinent part:

"I have been trying since 1996 to get a probation matter resolved. I haverequested that an attorney be appointed to represent me in this matter to know [sic]avail. Three weeks ago, I wrote the court asking that a[n] attorney be appointed toassist me and I have not heard anything. The State of Illinois filed a Petition forRevocation against me in July of 1996. I have been incarcerated in the IndianaDepartment of Corrections for almost (5) five years. I have approximately (27)twenty[-]seven months remaining on my Indiana sentence.

Also, be advised that all my fines have been paid in full, [and] I have requesteda fast and speedy [trial] to this matter since it affects my elgibility [sic] to beclassified as a level one, et Trusty Status [sic] etc."

On December 4, 2000, the defendant sent a letter to the court, which stated:

"I recently recieved [sic] correspondence from the Clerk of the Court indicating thatthe court could not take action on my Probation revocation until I complete myIndiana sentence.

Sir, Indiana DOC officials have informed me that if the Illinois Court sends aTransport Order, it would be honored."

All the documents the defendant sent to the court indicated a return address in the IndianaDepartment of Corrections.

On June 28, 2002, the defendant appeared in court pro se, at which time the trial courtappointed counsel for him. The record reflects that the defendant had served his sentencein Indiana at that time.

On July 8, 2002, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition to revokeprobation. In his motion, the defendant argued that the State's delay in prosecuting thepetition violated his due process rights. At the hearing held on the defendant's motion onJuly 17, 2002, the prosecutor acknowledged that the only prejudice the defendant couldclaim is that he lost his chance to ask that his sentence in Illinois run concurrently with hissentence in Indiana. The prosecutor stated that he could have asked for a writ but that Indiana would not have honored it. The prosecutor, apparently relying on section 3-8-9 ofthe Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-8-9 (West 2002)), advised the court that hehad no authority to extradite the defendant from Indiana because a petition to revokeprobation is not an "untried complaint, charge[,] or indictment pending against him." Theprosecutor acknowledged that he did not try to have the defendant brought to Illinois for thepetition to revoke probation while the defendant was incarcerated in Indiana. The prosecutoralso acknowledged that the defendant had sent both the State's Attorney's office and the courtsome letters saying that the defendant wanted to be brought to Illinois from Indiana to takecare of the probation revocation proceeding while he was in custody. The prosecutorindicated that he intended to seek the minimum sentence following the revocation of thedefendant's probation, i.e., two years' incarceration.

On July 24, 2002, the trial court entered its order granting the defendant's motion todismiss the petition to revoke probation. The trial court held that it was fundamentally unfairto delay a hearing on the petition for more than six years and that the State's failure to try tohave a hearing on the petition violated the defendant's right to a prompt hearing. The courtalso noted that there was no evidence that the State had tried and failed to get the defendantback to Illinois when everyone knew where he was and that he wanted a hearing. At thehearing on the State's motion to reconsider, the court reiterated its prior ruling and stated thatthe State's delay was presumptively prejudicial. The State appeals the trial court's dismissalof the petition to revoke probation.

On appeal, the State argues that there can be no "presumption" that a lengthy delayin a probation revocation proceeding is inherently prejudicial because there is no talismanicformula for determining whether a probation revocation hearing was held within a reasonabletime. The State therefore contends that the trial court's ruling that the delay was"presumptively prejudicial" was error. The State also argues that it was the defendant'sburden to show that the petition to revoke should be dismissed and that the defendant failedto meet that burden. The State also argues that the defendant failed to show that he wasprejudiced by the delay in prosecuting the petition to revoke probation. In addition toanswering the State's arguments, the defendant argues that the State's appeal should bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a))makes no provision for the appeal of a dismissal of a petition to revoke probation.

We first consider the defendant's argument that this court lacks jurisdiction to considerthe State's appeal because Rule 604(a) does not provide for the appeal of a dismissal of apetition to revoke probation. In its brief, the State indicated that it was bringing its appealunder the civil appeal rules, i.e., Supreme Court Rule 301 (155 Ill. 2d R. 301). As the Statecorrectly states, a probation revocation proceeding is a civil proceeding. People v. Lindsey,199 Ill. 2d 460 (2002). Because a probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, theState can appeal an adverse ruling in a probation revocation proceeding under Rule 301, andwe have jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal.

The State argues that the trial court's ruling that the six-year delay in prosecuting thedefendant's probation revocation was "presumptively prejudicial" was erroneous. The Statealso argues that the defendant failed to prove that the probation revocation petition shouldbe dismissed or that the defendant was prejudiced by the six-year delay in prosecuting thepetition.

The standard of review for a trial court's ruling is de novo when the parties do notdispute the facts or the credibility of the witnesses. People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269 (2002). Here, the facts and the credibility of the witnesses are not in dispute. Instead, the Statequestions the trial court's application of the law to the facts.

Because a probation revocation involves a potential loss of liberty, probationrevocation proceedings must comply with the minimum requirements of due process. Peoplev. Renner, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1022 (2001); People v. White, 273 Ill. App. 3d 638 (1995). Procedural protections ensure that a probationer's liberty is not unjustifiably denied and thatthe State does not thwart a successful effort at rehabilitation or imprudently prejudice thecommunity's safety. People v. Tillman, 237 Ill. App. 3d 971 (1992). One of the due processprotections afforded a defendant in a probation revocation proceeding is that the hearing onthe petition must be brought within a reasonable time. Tillman, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 973. Whether the State's delay in proceeding on a probation revocation petition is reasonable isevaluated on a case-by-case basis. Tillman, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 974. If a defendant does notcause the delay (People v. Williams, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1022 (2000)), an unreasonable delayby the State is a violation of the probationer's due process rights. White, 273 Ill. App. 3d638. Other factors a trial court should consider in determining whether a delay inprosecuting a probation revocation was unreasonable are whether the defendant wasprejudiced and whether the defendant protected his rights by requesting a hearing. Peoplev. Randolph, 98 Ill. App. 3d 696 (1981).

We agree with the State that there are no speedy trial rights attached to a probationrevocation proceeding (White, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 643) and that a considerable delay, withoutmore, does not make the delay "presumptively prejudicial." However, under the facts of thiscase, we agree with the trial court that the State's delay was unreasonable.

The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to dismiss established that theState filed its petition to revoke probation six years before it brought the defendant beforethe court for a hearing on the petition. The State knew where the defendant was during thissix-year period but made no attempt to have him brought to Illinois for a hearing. At thehearing, the State considered only section 3-8-9 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730ILCS 5/3-8-9 (West 2002)) as a vehicle for obtaining the defendant's presence at a hearingon the probation revocation petition. However, in its appellate brief, the State acknowledgedthat section 5 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (725 ILCS 225/5 (West 2002)) wouldhave allowed the State to procure the defendant's presence for a hearing while he was stillincarcerated in Indiana.

The evidence at the hearing also demonstrated that, because of the State's delay, thedefendant lost the opportunity to have his sentence in Illinois run concurrently with hissentence in Indiana. In addition, the State advised the court at the hearing that it intendedto seek a two-year sentence for the probation violation. Thus, if the defendant had beengiven the opportunity to seek concurrent sentences during his incarceration in Indiana andif the court had ordered a concurrent sentence, his Illinois incarceration would have beenserved by the time he served his time in Indiana. Accordingly, we find that the defendantwas prejudiced by the delay.

In addition, as evidenced by his motions and letters contained in the record, thedefendant made numerous requests to be transported to Illinois for a hearing on the probationrevocation petition. In fact, the prosecutor acknowledged at the hearing that the defendanthad sent the State's Attorney's office and the court letters saying that he wanted to betransported from Indiana to Illinois to take care of the probation revocation proceeding whilehe was in custody.

The record supports the trial court's finding that the State's failure to prosecute itspetition to revoke probation within a reasonable time violated the defendant's due processrights, and the trial court was correct in concluding that the State's delay was fundamentallyunfair. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed the State's probation revocationpetition.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

MAAG, J., concurs.

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The circuit court dismissed the State's petition to revokeprobation on due process grounds because six years had elapsed between the time thepetition to revoke probation was filed and the time the defendant returned to Illinois to facethe allegation that he had violated his probation, and it is upon those same due processgrounds that the majority affirms that dismissal. I do not agree with the majority that underthe circumstances of this case the defendant's due process rights have been violated. TheUnited States Supreme Court does not attach to revocation proceedings the full range ofprocedural safeguards associated with a criminal trial, because the probationer already standsconvicted of a crime. See United States v. Sanchez, 225 F.3d 172, 175 (2d Cir. 2000). Adelay between a defendant's violation of probation and the execution of the violation warrantdoes not, in and of itself, violate a defendant's due process rights. See Sanchez, 225 F.3d at175. Furthermore, the delay in this case does not impair the defendant's ability to contest therevocation petition; either he was convicted of attempted burglary in Indiana or he was notso convicted.

The defendant claims prejudice, however, because he does not have the chance tohave his sentences served concurrently. I do not believe that the lost opportunity to askpermission to serve sentences concurrently amounts to the deprivation of a due process right. The statute allowing for concurrent sentencing under the circumstances of this case states,"A defendant who has a previous and unexpired sentence of imprisonment imposed byanother state *** and who, after sentence for a crime in Illinois, must return to serve theunexpired prior sentence may have his sentence by the Illinois court ordered to be concurrentwith the prior sentence in the other state." 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(e) (West 2000). The operativeword in the statute is "may." The defendant did not have a right to concurrent sentences, nordid he have a right to credit against the time he served in Indiana. The defendant has beenconvicted of felonies in Illinois, Kentucky, and Indiana. The conviction on which he wasgranted probation in this cause was the defendant's fifth felony conviction. The fact that thecircuit court attempted probation on the underlying conviction in the first place must not beallowed to denigrate the gravity of that offense. Rather, it merely indicates that the court waswilling to give the defendant a chance. People v. Reznick, 141 Ill. App. 3d 593, 598, 491N.E.2d 444, 447 (1986). Accordingly, I believe that the circuit court should be afforded thediscretion to punish the defendant for his violation of probation.

In support of its proposition that a due process violation has occurred, the majoritystates that "section 5 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (725 ILCS 225/5 (West 2002))would have allowed the State to procure the defendant's presence for a hearing while he wasstill incarcerated in Indiana." Slip op. at 6. I take issue with that statement on two counts. First, section 5 is couched in permissive, rather than mandatory, language as well, and thereis no duty on the part of the requestee state to return the defendant to the requesting state. 725 ILCS 225/5 (West 2002). The defendant has presented no credible evidence that Indianawould have agreed to return him to Illinois for a probation revocation hearing during thedefendant's Indiana prison term. Second, although the defendant would presumably berestrained while in transit, the transportation of the defendant to Illinois from Indiana whilethe defendant was still incarcerated in Indiana nevertheless would expose the citizens of bothIndiana and Illinois to unnecessary risk and would divert law enforcement and correctionsofficers in both states from more pressing duties.