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PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Gregory Bowman (defendant) was convicted in 1979 for the murders of two youngwomen. Twenty years later, a newspaper article alleged a previously unknown collaborationbetween the detective to whom defendant confessed and a cellblock mate of defendant'sduring the time of his confession. Defendant filed a postconviction petition asserting thatthe new information rendered his confession coerced and his constitutional rights violated. After a hearing on defendant's postconviction petition, the trial court granted defendant anew trial. During the proceedings, the trial court imposed sanctions against the St. ClairCounty State's Attorney's office, to reimburse defendant for his expenses in responding tomotions filed by the State.

The State appeals the trial court's order granting defendant a new trial and the trialcourt's order imposing sanctions. The State asserts, inter alia, that the trial court erred inordering a new trial, because the evidence indicated no police scheme to coerce defendant'sconfession, and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions. We affirm.

On September 7, 1979, defendant was charged by indictment with the murders ofElizabeth West and Ruth Ann Jany. At a hearing on October 24, 1979, defendant waivedhis right to a trial by a jury, in exchange for the State's waiving its plea for a death sentence. At the hearing, defendant's counsel indicated that defendant was entering his plea asprovided by North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970),and that defendant indicated a willingness to plead guilty but a nonwillingness to concedefacts admitting his guilt. Defendant's counsel stated, "[Defendant], in effect, is pleadingguilty[-] desires to plead guilty." Defendant agreed with his counsel's statement, and thetrial court admonished defendant as required by Supreme Court Rule 402 (58 Ill. 2d R. 402)for a criminal defendant who pleads guilty.

Thereafter, the State presented a factual basis for defendant's guilty plea, includingthe testimony of deputy sheriff Robert Miller, who described defendant's confessions to theabductions and murders of Elizabeth West and Ruth Ann Jany. The State presentedevidence corroborating defendant's confession to the murder of Elizabeth West: Elizabethdisappeared at approximately 11:15 p.m. on April 22, 1978, after walking home from a playat Belleville Township High School West; when Elizabeth's body was discovered, it waslying face down in a wooded creek and it was fully clothed, except for a missing bra strap;and Elizabeth had been sexually assaulted, struck twice on the head with a blunt object, andthen strangled to death. The State also presented evidence that, on the night of Elizabeth'sdisappearance, Judy Barnum had refused defendant's invitation to attend a play at eitherBelleville Township High School West or the Muny Opera.

Likewise, the State presented evidence corroborating defendant's confession to themurder of Ruth Ann Jany: Ruth Ann was abducted on July 7, 1978, at approximately 11:30p.m. from a First National Bank automated teller machine located in downtown Belleville;at the time of her disappearance Ruth Ann did not have her purse in her possession; afterRuth Ann disappeared, a number of successful and unsuccessful attempts were made towithdraw money from her checking account via her automated teller machine card and atotal of $330 was successfully withdrawn; and when Ruth Ann's body was discovered in arural area south of Belleville, approximately 20 feet from a farmer's road and 400 feet fromthe county line, it was not buried, was fully dressed, and had around the neck a halter topwith a knot. The State further produced evidence that both defendant and Ruth Ann hadaccounts with, and automated teller machine cards for, the First National Bank of Bellevilleand that, at the time of Ruth Ann's disappearance, defendant was spending an unusualabundance of cash. Defendant's corroborated admissions regarding the murder of Ruth Annand the location of her body were made prior to the discovery of her body.

The trial court concluded that defendant was entering his plea voluntarily, afterhaving knowingly and understandingly waived his rights, and that a factual basis existed forthe plea. Defendant was sentenced on November 30, 1979, to two concurrent terms ofnatural-life imprisonment.

On January 7, 1980, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guiltyplea. Defendant appealed his sentence only, and in an order entered pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 23 (73 Ill. 2d R. 23), on February 25, 1982, this court affirmed defendant'ssentences. People v. Bowman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1207 (1982) (unpublished Rule 23 order).

On June 3, 1999, almost 20 years later, defendant filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)). Defendant alleged thathis statements to deputy sheriff Robert Miller were involuntary because defendant hadrecently learned from an article published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that Deputy Millerand Danny Stark had contrived a scheme to acquire defendant's confession, thereby creatingcircumstances bespeaking fraud, trickery, deceit, and coercion and that, thus, they hadviolated defendant's constitutional rights.

On November 28, 2000, at the postconviction hearing held before the HonorableRichard Aguirre, the following evidence was adduced.

Defendant testified that while he was incarcerated in the county jail, after hissentencing in an unrelated case and while awaiting his return to Menard Correctional Center(Menard), in which he had previously spent four years, defendant met Danny Stark, acellblock mate. Defendant stated that he revealed to Stark that defendant was terrified ofreturning to Menard and that Stark thereafter orchestrated a plan to bond out of jail, returnto jail, and help defendant escape. Defendant testified that in order to circumvent the weeklytransfers to Menard until Stark returned to free defendant, he threw himself from the topbunk of the cell and was taken to the hospital. Defendant testified that he thereafteraccepted Stark's suggestion that defendant make a statement regarding the Elizabeth Westand Ruth Ann Jany murders, about which defendant previously had been questioned afterhis arrest in the unrelated case. According to the escape scheme, defendant could remainin the county jail while the police investigated his statements, avoiding a transfer to Menard,until Stark was released and could return to free defendant. Defendant explained that hisattorney had provided him with newspaper articles and police reports and that police officershad, while questioning defendant previously concerning the murders, also revealed policereports to defendant. Defendant testified that from this information, he and Stark created"a believable story." Defendant testified that he never believed that his statements wouldbe used against him because he had an alibi during the murders and he understood that theinvestigators had corroborated the alibi.

Defendant testified that after he requested to speak with an investigator, deputysheriff Robert Miller arrived to interview him. Defendant stated that during theinterrogations, Deputy Miller suggested the answers to the questions he had askeddefendant. Defendant told Deputy Miller that he would provide a written statement on thefollowing Sunday, the day after the day defendant expected to escape with Stark. Stark wasreleased, but on Sunday, after Stark failed to appear at the jail on Saturday, defendantrecanted his confession. Defendant stated that he had been unaware of the collusionbetween Deputy Miller and Stark until the St. Louis Post-Dispatch published an articlestating that Deputy Miller had admitted tricking defendant into confessing by recruitingStark to convince defendant that Stark would assist in defendant's escape and keepdefendant from returning to Menard.

Carolyn Tuft, a St. Louis Post-Dispatch investigative reporter, testified that she hadinterviewed Deputy Miller in February 1999. Tuft stated that during the interview, DeputyMiller indicated that he had placed Stark, a "con artist," in a cell with defendant and had toldStark to convince defendant that if defendant discussed the murders, defendant would avoida transfer to Menard and stay in the county jail long enough for Stark to be released fromjail, to return, and to assist in defendant's escape.

Bill Smith, also a St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter, accompanied Tuft during herinterview with Deputy Miller. He testified that during the interview Deputy Miller hadreferred to his knowledge of defendant's fear of returning to Menard. Smith testified thatduring the interview with Deputy Miller, Deputy Miller had conveyed the idea that it washis plan to obtain information from defendant through the escape scheme.

Danny Stark testified that prior to the underlying incident, he had worked as aninformant for Deputy Miller. Stark testified that Deputy Miller did not place him indefendant's cellblock with the intent of promoting the escape scheme to obtain defendant'sconfession. Stark stated that while he was in the cellblock with defendant, defendantindicated his involvement with the disappearances of Ruth Ann Jany and Elizabeth West. Stark stated that because it was the right thing to do, he notified Deputy Miller thatdefendant was implicating himself in the murders. He testified that Deputy Miller told Starkto keep his ears open.

Stark explained that he and defendant, not Deputy Miller, concocted the escape planand that it was common for inmates to discuss escaping. Stark testified that he had notreviewed information from the newspapers and had not discussed with defendant how toobtain additional information about the murders. Stark admitted, however, that he utilizeddefendant's intense fear of returning to Menard to promote the escape plan and that he mighthave relayed defendant's fear to Deputy Miller.

On March 21, 1979, the same day that defendant gave his first taped statement toDeputy Miller, the State's Attorney agreed to a bond reduction for Stark, and he wasreleased. Stark asserted that although his charge at the time of defendant's confession wasultimately reduced to misdemeanor theft, that was based on a theory of Stark's accountabilityfor the theft and was not based on the assistance Stark gave Deputy Miller in defendant'scase.

Deputy Miller testified that he did not place Stark in the cellblock with defendant andthat he did not propose the escape plan. Deputy Miller also denied that he conveyed the ideato Tuft and Smith that he had contrived the escape scheme between Stark and defendant toobtain defendant's confession.

Deputy Miller testified that he had utilized Stark as an informant approximately fourto six times prior to defendant's case. Deputy Miller testified that in return for Stark'sprevious assistance, Deputy Miller would thereafter "[c]atch him speeding, let him go, givehim a warning ticket." Deputy Miller stated that on March 10, 1979, Stark approached himwith defendant's admissions and that he encouraged Stark to continue talking withdefendant. Deputy Miller admitted that he may have told Stark to convince defendant thatif defendant discussed the murders, defendant could stay in the county jail.

Deputy Miller testified that before speaking with defendant, he reviewed the July 28,1978, report or spoke with investigator David Gravot regarding Investigator Gravot'sinterrogation of defendant concerning the abduction and murder of Elizabeth West, in whichdefendant invoked his fifth amendment right to counsel and referred all questions to hisattorney. Deputy Miller thereafter reread defendant his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)) before speaking with him. DeputyMiller explained that he had given details to defendant during his interview, i.e., thatElizabeth West's bra was missing, to persuade defendant to continue his statements.

Deputy Miller testified that he was unaware of defendant's intense fear of returningto Menard but was aware that as a means of acquiring information from defendant, Starkwas telling defendant that he would assist in defendant's escape. Deputy Miller explainedthat he did not note the escape plan in his police reports because he did not believe that anescape would occur. Deputy Miller stated that during his and defendant's fourth and lastconversation, on Sunday, March 25, 1979, after defendant was to escape on Saturday withthe assistance of Stark, who had been released from jail on Wednesday, March 21, 1979,defendant recanted his confession.

Deputy Miller testified that in exchange for Stark's assistance in defendant's case,Deputy Miller probably attempted to obtain leniency through the State's Attorney's officeregarding Stark's pending theft charges.

On April 12, 2001, the trial court found that defendant had pleaded guilty in 1979 inaccordance with Alford. In its order, the trial court also made the following pertinent factualfindings:

• On March 10, 1979, while defendant remained in the county jail awaitingtransport to Menard for his conviction concerning an unrelated abduction, Stark approached Deputy Miller to inform him that defendant had madestatements implicating himself in the abduction and murder of Elizabeth West.
• On March 20, 1979, defendant told jailers he wanted to talk to a detective. Miller appeared, obtained a waiver of defendant's constitutional rights, andconducted an oral interview during which defendant admitted the abduction,assault, and murder of Elizabeth West. He promised a future writtenstatement and to take Deputy Miller to Ruth Ann Jany's body, yet unfound.

(3) On March 21, 22, and 25, 1979, defendant implicated himself in bothmurders, promising to lead Deputy Miller to Ruth Ann Jany's body on Sunday,all for the purpose of delaying his departure for Menard so that Stark couldmake bail and return to help defendant escape, and Deputy Miller, feigningignorance of the escape plan, pressured defendant to lead Deputy Miller toRuth Ann Jany's body to justify delaying defendant's transfer to Menard.

• Stark's bond was reduced, at the request of an assistant State's Attorney, to$500 cash, and on March 21, 1979, Stark posted bail and was released at 6:40p.m., soon after the first recorded interview with defendant.
• When the escape did not materialize, defendant recanted his prior statements,without revealing the escape plan to Deputy Miller.

The trial court held that the unusual facts of this case, including the escape schemeorchestrated through Stark's agency relationship with Deputy Miller, amounted to a type ofpolice overreaching that could result in a false confession, that defendant's incriminatingstatements to Deputy Miller were involuntary, and that defendant is entitled to a new trial.

Prior to the postconviction hearing, in an order filed September 28, 1999, the trialcourt, over the State's objection, granted defendant's motion for discovery. On October 12,1999, the State filed a motion to vacate the order granting defendant's motion for discovery,and the State also filed a petition to transfer the postconviction proceedings to the trial judgewho had presided over defendant's plea proceedings in 1979.

On November 3, 1999, the State filed a motion for substitution of judge for cause,explaining why Judge Roger Scrivner was under a conflict of interest, was biased in favorof defendant, and was prejudiced against the State. On November 15, 1999, Judge Scrivnerdenied the State's motion to substitute judge, ordered that all evidence and police reports beproduced to defendant, and ordered a deposition of Deputy Miller. The State filed a motionin the supreme court for a supervisory order directing Judge Scrivner to vacate his order ofNovember 15 and to transfer the cause to another judge for a hearing on the motion tosubstitute. On December 21, 1999, the supreme court entered an order denying the motionfor a supervisory order.

On February 23, 2000, defendant filed a motion seeking attorney fees for respondingto the motions by the State. On June 15, 2000, Judge Scrivner entered an order wherein hefound that the State's conduct in filing the motion to transfer to the original trial judge andthe motion to vacate the order for discovery, while never requesting a hearing, therebyabandoned said issues and caused defendant's attorney a great waste of time and effort. Judge Scrivner also imposed sanctions in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill.2d R. 137), because the motion for substitution of judge for cause was not well founded infact or warranted by existing law and because the motions were filed to unnecessarily delaythe proceedings and increase the cost of litigation for defendant. Judge Scrivner ordered theState's Attorney's office to pay attorney fees to defendant's attorneys in the total amount of$1,950.

On July 7, 2000, the State filed a motion to vacate the order granting sanctions, andon August 25, 2000, Judge Scrivner denied the State's motion. The State filed its timelyappeal.

Initially, defendant contends that he did not enter an Alford plea, i.e., that the trialcourt had rejected his Alford plea, and that therefore he was subjected to a trial. Wedisagree.

At the guilty plea proceeding, defendant's counsel stated that although defendant wasunwilling to concede facts admitting his guilt, defendant was in effect entering a guilty plea. The court admonished defendant in accordance with a guilty plea proceeding, i.e., explainedto defendant that he was waiving his right to a trial by jury and his right to cross-examine. The State presented evidence to establish the factual basis for the guilty plea, in compliancewith Alford. See Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (although Alfordstated that he had not committed the crime, the guilty plea was deemed valid where Alfordentered his plea of guilty and the State presented a sufficient factual basis for the plea). Thetrial court, after recognizing that defendant had waived his right to a trial by jury inexchange for the State's waiver of its right to seek a death sentence, stated that it wouldproceed in the fashion of a bench trial, without evidence being presented by defendant orcross-examination by defendant. The trial court stated, "[I]n effect *** the [d]efendant ***would be pleading to the case." The court asked defendant if he, in effect, desired to pleadguilty, and defendant answered in the affirmative. The State then presented lengthyevidence, by way of witnesses and stipulations, designed to satisfy the requirement in Alfordthat a strong factual basis be presented when a defendant wishes to plead guilty whilemaintaining his innocence. Defendant entered an Alford plea and was not subjected to atrial.

Although neither the State nor defendant addresses how the ramifications ofdefendant's Alford plea relate to defendant's contentions concerning his coerced confession,we refuse to proceed with our analysis as if defendant's confession had been offered intoevidence at a trial. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 775,90 S. Ct. 1441, 1447-49 (1970).

In Illinois, a voluntary plea of guilty waives all errors or irregularities that are notjurisdictional. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 490 (1993). "Issues waived by adefendant's plea of guilty include the admissibility of his or her confession." Peeples, 155Ill. 2d at 491.

The Supreme Court has expressly held that a defendant's relinquishment of his rightto challenge a confession is a valid bargaining point in plea negotiations. McMann, 397U.S. at 768-71, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 771-74, 90 S. Ct. at 1447-49; People v. Stice, 160 Ill. App.3d 132, 139 (1987). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct.1463 (1970), McMann, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 90 S. Ct. 1441, and Parker v. NorthCarolina, 397 U.S. 790, 25 L. Ed. 2d 785, 90 S. Ct. 1458 (1970), the Court dealt at lengthwith the effect of a plea of guilty on the later assertion of constitutional right violations.

Although in each case the Supreme Court refused to subject the defendant's plea ofguilty to collateral attack on the ground that it was motivated by a constitutional violationprior to the guilty plea, i.e., a coerced confession, we find the Supreme Court's analyses tobe instructive. In Brady, the Court explained, "Central to the plea and the foundation forentering judgment against the defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that hecommitted the acts charged in the indictment." Brady, 397 U.S. at 748, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 756,90 S. Ct. at 1468. The Court in Tollett explained that even if the circumstances relating tothe constitutional violation were unknown at the time of the guilty plea, "[w]hen a criminaldefendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense withwhich he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to thedeprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Tollettv. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 36 L. Ed. 2d 235, 243, 93 S. Ct. 1602, 1608 (1973).

In the present case, unlike Brady, McMann, Parker, and Tollett, defendant did notsolemnly admit in open court that he was in fact guilty of the offense with which he wascharged. We therefore hold that if a defendant enters a guilty plea but maintains hisinnocence of the crime, as permitted by Alford, and the State's factual basis for thedefendant's plea primarily concerns a confession, of which facts unknown at the time of thedefendant's plea suggest coercion, the defendant may collaterally attack his guilty plea.

Accordingly, we now review defendant's claim that the St. Louis Post-Dispatcharticle in February 1999 alerted him to a previously unknown scheme between DeputyMiller and Stark to obtain defendant's confession and that the scheme rendered hisconfession involuntary.

In reviewing whether defendant's confession was voluntary, we must accord greatdeference to the trial court's factual findings, and we will reverse those findings only if theyare against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000). We review de novo the ultimate question of whether the confession was voluntary. In re G.O.,191 Ill. 2d at 50. In determining whether a statement has been voluntarily given, we mustconsider the totality of the circumstances. People v. Martin, 102 Ill. 2d 412, 426-27 (1984).

Certain interrogation tactics, in isolation or as applied to the unique characteristicsof a suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 208 (1998). To determine if defendant's confession wasvoluntary, we must focus on the crucial element of police overreaching. Manning, 182 Ill.2d at 208.

"The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turnalone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feelingthat the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life andliberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thoughtto be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." Spano v. New York, 360U.S. 315, 320-21, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1265, 1270, 79 S. Ct. 1202, 1205-06 (1959).

A defendant's confession will be considered involuntary when the defendant's willwas overborne at the time of his confession so that the confession cannot be deemed theproduct of a rational intellect and a free will. People v. Foster, 168 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (1995)."[P]olice are allowed to play on a suspect's ignorance, fears[,] and anxieties so long as theydo not magnify these emotionally charged matters to the point where a rational decisionbecomes impossible." See United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1130 (1990).

The State may not extort confessions by deliberate fraud or trickery. People v. Smith,108 Ill. App. 2d 172, 180 (1969). Evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, orcajoled into the waiver of his rights will, of course, show that the defendant did notvoluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d at 179;see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 725, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1629(1966). " 'Trickery' involves affirmative acts of fraud or deceit." Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d at179. The confession must not result from deceptive interrogation tactics calculated toovercome the defendant's free will. United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 818 (2001).

In Spano, the defendant had contacted a close childhood friend who was a recruit atthe police academy, and the defendant implicated himself in the murder for which he wasindicted. Spano, 360 U.S. at 317, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1268, 79 S. Ct. at 1204. Bruno, thechildhood friend, contacted his superiors with the information, and officials requested thatBruno falsely convey to the defendant that the defendant's contact had placed Bruno's jobin jeopardy and that the loss of his job would be disastrous to his wife, his children, and hisunborn child. Spano, 360 U.S. at 319, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1269, 79 S. Ct. at 1204-05. After foursessions playing on the defendant's sympathies, the defendant succumbed to his friend'sprevarications and agreed to make a statement to officials. Spano, 360 U.S. at 319, 3 L. Ed.2d at 1269, 79 S. Ct. at 1205. The court, considering the totality of the circumstances, heldthat the defendant's will was overborne by "official pressure, fatigue[,] and sympathy falselyaroused." Spano, 360 U.S. at 323, 3 L. Ed. 2d at 1272, 79 S. Ct. at 1207.

In the present case, the trial court found that with the knowledge of defendant'sprevious assertion of his right to remain silent, Deputy Miller collaborated with Stark toobtain defendant's confession to the underlying murders. Stark and defendant contrived theescape scheme, and in reliance on the escape scheme, defendant and Deputy Miller each"essayed strategic deception on the other": defendant making admissions, promising to leadDeputy Miller to the location of Ruth Ann Jany's body on Sunday, and delaying hisdeparture for Menard so that Stark could make bail and return to help defendant escape onSaturday; and Miller feigning ignorance of the escape plan and asking to be led to Ruth AnnJany's body to justify delaying defendant's transfer to Menard, of which defendant wasintensely fearful. Stark was rewarded for his persuasive tactics when his bond was reduced,and Stark posted bail and was released soon after Deputy Miller's first recorded interviewwith defendant. When defendant realized that he had been tricked by Stark, yet still unawareof the relationship between Deputy Miller and Stark, defendant recanted his prior statementsto Deputy Miller. Deputy Miller's knowledge of the escape plan and his involvement in thedeception were never recorded and never disclosed to the defense.

We find that the trial court's factual findings were not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. Deputy Miller admitted that he and Stark had a history of Stark providingDeputy Miller with information in exchange for lenient consequences for Stark's illegalbehavior. Deputy Miller admitted knowledge of the previous interrogation of defendant inwhich defendant asserted his right to remain silent. Even though Stark and Deputy Millertestified that Stark's placement in jail near defendant, and the coincidence of suchplacement, was the result of mere happenstance, Deputy Miller soon learned of Stark'sdeception of defendant concerning the escape scheme. Deputy Miller encouraged Stark tocontinue the interplay with defendant. Stark was ultimately rewarded when his charge waslater reduced to misdemeanor theft. Defendant had an intense fear of returning to Menard. Stark was aware of that fear and utilized it to promote the escape scheme to persuadedefendant to confess. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude thatdefendant's confession was the result of deceptive interrogation tactics calculated toovercome defendant's free will at the time of his confession and that defendant's confessioncannot be deemed to be the product of a rational intellect. The trial court correctly granteddefendant a new trial, an authorized disposition under section 122-6 of the Post-ConvictionHearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2000)).

The State further argues that the circuit court was without authority to order sanctionsagainst the office of the State's Attorney of St. Clair County because Supreme Court Rule137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) is inapplicable to proceedings initiated under the Post-ConvictionHearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2000)).

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 provides in pertinent part as follows:

"The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has readthe pleading, motion[,] or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warrantedby existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversalof existing law[;] and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as toharass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.

Section 122-4 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, regarding pauper petitions,provides, "A petitioner who is a prisoner *** who files a pleading *** that purports to bea legal document seeking post[]conviction relief *** against the State *** in which the courtmakes a specific finding that the pleading *** is frivolous shall not proceed as a poor personand shall be liable for the full payment of filing fees and actual court costs ***." 725 ILCS5/122-4 (West 2000). Contrary to the State's assertion, section 122-4 does not prohibit theapplication of Rule 137 in postconviction proceedings. See also 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West2000) (regarding proceedings on a postconviction petition, this section provides, "The courtmay in its discretion make such order as to *** filing further pleadings *** as shall beappropriate, just[,] and reasonable and as is generally provided in civil cases.").

Imposing sanctions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 137 is within the sounddiscretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed by a court ofreview absent an abuse of discretion. Wagener v. Papie, 242 Ill. App. 3d 354, 363 (1993).

In imposing sanctions, Judge Scrivner held that the State's conduct in filing themotion to transfer to the original trial judge and the motion to vacate the order for discovery,while never requesting a hearing, thereby abandoned said issues and caused defendant'sattorney a great waste of time and effort. Judge Scrivner also held that the motion forsubstitution of judge for cause was not well founded in fact or warranted by existing law andthat the motions were filed to unnecessarily delay the proceedings and increase the cost oflitigation for defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctionsagainst the State.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN and MAAG, JJ., concur.

Opinion Filed: 12/27/02

Justices: Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, P.J.

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.

Honorable Gordon E. Maag, J.

Concur

Attorneys Hon. Robert Haida, State's Attorney, St. Clair County, 10 Public

for Square, Belleville, IL 62220; Norbert J. Goetten, Director, Stephen

Appellant E. Norris, Deputy Director, Gerry R. Arnold, Staff Attorney, Office

of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Route 15 East, P.O.

Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

Attorneys Al W. Johnson, Johnson, Fellows, Blake & Terry, University Club

for Tower, Suite 1380, 1034 South Brentwood Boulevard, St. Louis,

Appellee MO 63117; Stephen B. Evans, Deeba Sauter Herd, 3415 Hampton

Avenue, St. Louis, MO 63139