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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

As a general rule, people are supposed to enjoy total freedom, released from jail and/orconditions of bail, on those occasions where the State launches interlocutory appeals fromsuppression orders or adverse evidentiary rulings. People v. Wells, 279 Ill. App. 3d 564, 567-68, 664 N.E.2d 660, 663 (1996). Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) dictates the following:

"A defendant shall not be held in jail or to bail during the pendency of an appealby the State, or of a petition or appeal by the State under Rule 315(a), unless there arecompelling reasons for his continued detention or being held to bail." 188 Ill. 2d R.604(a)(3).

This rule is based on two simple truths. First, appeals can take a long time to run theircourse. An interlocutory appeal by the State embraces an indefinite and lengthy delay of anaccused's trial, while speedy trial guarantees stand suspended. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(4) (thefiling of an interlocutory appeal by the State tolls the statutory speedy trial time constraints). Second, a trial judge or an appellate court has entered a ruling favorable to the accused. In thecase of interlocutory appeals from suppression orders or adverse evidentiary rulings, theState's ability to successfully proceed has been "substantially impaired." In many cases, thecharges would never have been leveled absent the anticipated use of the suppressed evidence.

The weakened posture of the State's case, while the State delays a trial to overturn apresumptively valid ruling, warrants the immediate restoration of complete freedom, absentreasons more compelling than those that support the imposition of bail conditions followingthe filing of criminal charges.

Kyle W. Beaty (the defendant) is presently confined to the Christian County jail, in lieuof a $2 million bail that he is financially unable to post. He has been there for well over a year,awaiting his trial on multiple charges of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The defendant'sright to a speedy trial under Illinois law was indefinitely suspended in early January 2004, whenthe State filed its notice of appeal and certificate of substantial impairment and commencedthis interlocutory appeal. The State seeks to overturn an evidentiary ruling that barred the useof a graphic 1994 videotape that records the defendant and his then wife engaged in violentsexual intercourse and sodomy. The woman depicted in the videotape, the defendant's now ex-wife, is the alleged victim of the pending sexual assault charges.

We are presented with several issues of first impression. There are certain proceduraland jurisdictional questions that we must address before we reach the overriding question thatthis appeal poses: Should the defendant be held in jail, or have his freedom bound to conditionsof bail, during the pendency of this interlocutory appeal by the State?

The State filed this appeal on January 9, 2004. When it did so, it did not take steps tosecure the defendant's concurrent release in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3). The Christian County State's Attorney felt that certain reasons compelled the defendant'scontinued pretrial detention. Before the State's Attorney could seek judicial approval of hisposition, the defendant's attorney filed a motion for the defendant's immediate release basedupon the call for freedom set forth in Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3). On the very same daythat the State perfected its appeal, Judge David Slater heard the parties' respective positionson the motion. At that hearing, the State's Attorney articulated his reasons for the defendant'scontinued detention during the appellate review process.

On January 13, 2004, Judge Slater, following the standard set forth in Supreme CourtRule 604(a)(3), denied the defendant's request for release. He found that reasons compelledthe defendant's continued detention while the State prosecuted its appeal. The ruling visitedfurther pretrial incarceration upon the defendant. The defendant will remain in jail indefinitely,without the benefit of speedy trial protections, unless we review his jailed status and disagreewith Judge Slater. The length of his stay will be measured in part by how long it takes us toprocess this interlocutory appeal.

The defendant did not immediately pursue a review of Judge Slater's order. Instead, heasked Judge Slater to reconsider bail. On January 30, 2004, his attorney filed an amendedmotion that set forth all the criteria necessary for the review of bail orders pending a trial. See188 Ill. 2d R. 604(c) (addressing appeals from bail orders by a defendant before conviction). The motion to reconsider was denied.

The defendant chose not to appeal from that order under Supreme Court Rule 604(c)(188 Ill. 2d R. 604(c)). Instead, he returned to the circuit court with another bail motion. OnFebruary 11, 2004, the defendant's attorney appeared before Judge Alan Buck. He argued thatthe lengthy delay of the trial proceedings, made necessary by the State's appeal, warranted thereconsideration of the bail amount. The defendant also invited as a condition of reasonable bailan order confining him to his mother's house rather than the Christian County jail. Judge Buckdenied the motion.

While the defendant pursued his release before two circuit judges, we began processingthe State's interlocutory appeal. We created a case file, bearing the docket number of thisappeal, No. 5-04-0022, and we appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender tochampion the defendant's interests in this matter.

On February 17, 2004, the defendant filed a notice of appeal, which notice was filed inappeal No. 5-04-0022, the State's interlocutory appeal from the adverse evidentiary rulingmade prior to trial.

Seemingly, the defendant wanted a review of the trial court orders that left himimprisoned in the Christian County jail. However, his notice of appeal failed to identify theorder from which he appealed, either by date or by nature.

On March 4, 2004, the defendant's appointed appellate counsel filed a motion in thisappeal, an appeal initiated by the State, and asked us for leave to amend the defendant's flawednotice of appeal. Appellate counsel wanted the notice of appeal to reflect a desired review ofthe February 11, 2004, order, a decision that denied the request for a bond reduction and homeconfinement. The February order was clearly a pretrial bail order.

The State responded. It moved to strike the defendant's notice of appeal. It also movedto dismiss the defendant's attempt to appeal a preconviction bail order within these appellateproceedings. The State maintained that preconviction bail orders were only reviewable underthe limited and clearly defined procedures set forth in Supreme Court Rule 604(c).

On March 11, 2004, we ruled on the State's motion, noting, in part, as follows:

"[T]he State's motion to strike is well-taken. The order denying a motion forbond reduction is not appealable by right in the classic sense. Apart from not beingauthorized under the rules, a notices [sic] of appeal delays any response from the Stateuntil the filing of briefs. The purpose of seeking expeditious review of defendant'sincarcerated status pending a determination of the State's appeal is defeated if defendantlinks that process to the State's appeal by filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal. Thus, the notice of appeal as a jurisdictional vehicle deprives defendant of the veryrelief he seeks on appeal. Defendant is free to file a proper Supreme Court Rule604(c) motion for review of bail order or a motion directly challenging hisincarceration in light of Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3), or both." (Emphasis added.)

In light of our invitation, appellate counsel filed a terse motion that requested thedefendant's release pending the outcome of the State's appeal. The motion was filed in thisappeal-the appeal of an adverse evidentiary ruling initiated by the State. The motion does notseek the review of Judge Slater's January 13, 2004, order, which denied an identical requestpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3). The motion does not question or address JudgeSlater's findings or seek the review of his conclusion that there are compelling reasons tocontinue the defendant's detention pending the outcome of this appeal. Counsel has simplyfiled a freestanding motion for his release based upon the standard promulgated in SupremeCourt Rule 604(a)(3) and has asked us to grant the requested relief.

On March 25, 2004, trial counsel filed a verified motion for a review of Judge Slater'sJanuary 13, 2004, order holding the defendant to bail pending appeal. The request does notcomply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 604(c), and accordingly, we deny themotion.

On March 26, 2004, the State filed a motion to strike the motion for release pendingappeal and to dismiss the defendant's effort to appeal the denial of bail pending trial. The Statetakes the position that we lack the power to act on either request. That position is as follows.

There can be no review of an interlocutory order in the absence of a statute ora rule specifically authorizing it. People v. Woolsey, 139 Ill. 2d 157, 163, 564 N.E.2d764, 766 (1990). Since the imposition of a sentence marks the final judgment in acriminal case, any preconviction bail order is interlocutory.

The rule that sets forth the standard which must be met in order to hold adefendant in jail or to bail during an appeal by the State under Supreme Court Rule 604does not provide a procedure by which defendants may seek the review of a trial judge'sapplication of that standard. The only rule which establishes a right to reviewinterlocutory bail orders, and which sets forth limited and specific procedures forinvoking that right, is Supreme Court Rule 604(c). The defendant has not followed thatrule's prerequisites for appellate review.

The defendant's effort to obtain his release pending the State's appeal has beenheard and decided by two different circuit judges. Those judges made their decisionsin accordance with the standard promulgated by Rule 604(a)(3). The record supportstheir determination that the defendant should remain in jail in lieu of posting a $2million bail, while the State pursues its appeal. The defendant's attempts to obtain thereview of that determination are in the nature of an interlocutory appeal in which thedefendant, and not the State, is the appellant. There is no authority for a review of thebail question litigated in the circuit court, other than Supreme Court Rule 604(c). Thedefendant has utterly failed to follow that rule's procedural requirements predicate toa review of bail. Ergo, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to proceed on the bailissue and should strike the defendant's motion for his release.

The State's position overlooks the fundamental nature of the protection that SupremeCourt Rule 604(a)(3) confers upon accused individuals. That protection has nothing to do withan accused's right to reasonable bail pending trial or reasonable bail pending an indefinitelypostponed trial that awaits the completion of an interlocutory appeal by the State.

Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) confers unconditional release and restores people tothe same freedom enjoyed before any charges were initiated. Generally, this freedom will besecured by the same State officials who lodged the charges, requiring no motion, hearing, ordisputed order of any kind. On those rare occasions when the State feels that compellingreasons for detention during appeal exist, those reasons will be presented to a judgecontemporaneously with the initiation of the interlocutory appeal. That is precisely whathappened here.

The ruling that flowed from the State's presentation of reasons compelling thedefendant's continued detention during its appeal was not a bail order. It was an order denyingthe unconditional freedom that Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) bestows in the absence of ashowing that reasons compel otherwise. Orders appealable under Supreme Court Rule604(c)(1)-orders "setting, modifying, revoking, denying, or refusing to modify bail or theconditions thereof" (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(c)(1))-are different from an order applying thestandard set forth in Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3)-an order which denies the unconditionalrelease pending an appeal that Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) normally affords.

Our power to address pleas for freedom under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) is a partof the power we acquire when the State invokes Supreme Court Rule 604 in order to seek ourinterlocutory review of an adverse ruling made by a circuit judge. It is the same power that wepossess when the State petitions the Illinois Supreme Court in an attempt to undo one of ourrulings. Obviously, a determination of whether compelling circumstances justify detention inthe face of a standard that favors freedom is not a determination confined to circuit judges. Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3) requires that determination when the State petitions thesupreme court for leave to appeal an adverse ruling from the appellate court under SupremeCourt Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). In that circumstance, the determination would be madeby us or the supreme court.

For these reasons, we believe that we have jurisdiction to address the defendant'smotion for release under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(3). We deny the State's motion to strikethat request.

The State expresses its concern over our independent determination of the need forcontinued detention pending interlocutory appeals by the State. It questions how we couldpossibly make the factual determinations necessary to conclude that reasons either do or donot compel continued detention.

While there may be cases where the record does not allow for an informed decisionabout the existence of reasons to compel further detention, this is not such a case. The recordsufficiently demonstrates the reasons that compel detention pending the outcome of thisappeal. We believe continued pretrial incarceration is warranted under the circumstancespresented.

The current state of the evidence in this case is an important ingredient in reaching ourdecision. The outcome of this appeal will not determine the outcome of the prosecution. Therefore, in addressing the question of the defendant's release, we need not examine themerits of the State's underlying appeal. The merits of the State's appeal would be a similarlyimportant part to our decisionmaking, if we felt that the appeal's outcome controlled theoutcome of the prosecution.

The State will still have plenty of evidence to proceed to a verdict, in the event that itseffort here proves unsuccessful. Moreover, that remaining evidence clearly points to thelikelihood of a successful prosecution, even if the State cannot show the 1994 videotape to thejury. The likelihood of a conviction on the evidence that the State currently possesses providesa sound foundation for the State's position that enhances the compelling nature of the reasonsset forth to justify continued detention. In the absence of such a likelihood, or in the absenceof a clearly meritorious appeal, none of the reasons tendered by the State to justify continueddetention would necessarily, standing alone, compel continued detention.

The risk of flight, coupled with legitimate safety concerns for the defendant's soleaccuser, supported by the likelihood of a conviction on the evidence currently possessed bythe State, compels detention pending appeal.

The defendant faces mandatory life imprisonment if convicted. The severe mandatorypenalty that awaits the defendant in the event of a conviction, coupled with the current strengthof the State's case against the defendant, presents a heightened risk of flight. If unconditionallyreleased, the defendant could easily disappear, without the risk of an enhanced penalty, eitherin forfeiture of money or in future freedom. In fact, flight would seem the smart choice, giventhe odds of a conviction that would spell certain lifelong confinement behind prison walls.

Standing alone, a past criminal history is not necessarily a reason to compel furtherdetention pending appeal. However, this defendant's criminal history conveys a penchant forviolent assaults against his ex-wife. It is a propensity that the State has been authorized toestablish during the defendant's trial. It is also a propensity that bodes real potential for futureviolence against his ex-wife, should the defendant gain his freedom.

The State seeks the use of the 1994 videotape because it feels that the tape depicts aproudly videotaped, unreported sexual assault committed against the defendant's then 22-year-old wife. While the videotape's contents might be open to some interpretation,⁽¹⁾ from itsdescription in this record and from the trial judge's ruling, the tape's contents obviously portraya violent manner to the sexual behavior in which the defendant and his then wife engaged.

The sexual assaults alleged in this case occurred just two weeks after the defendant wasreleased from prison. His prison term was punishment meted out on a plea of guilt to sexuallyassaulting his then ex-wife in 1998. The State possesses the defendant's admission that hesexually assaulted his ex-wife again because he was angry about his recently completed five-year stint for the earlier assault.

In 1996, the defendant was convicted of aggravated battery. Again, the victim of hisviolence was the same person, his then wife. The defendant threw a punch that shattered hernose. She was trying to escape the family residence with two minor children in tow at the time. The State will be permitted to present evidence of this prior bad act, in order to corroboratethe alleged victim's claim that the defendant offered her a Hobson's choice prior to sexuallyassaulting her.

The defendant's ex-wife now claims that her prior experiences with the defendant'sviolence provided her with palpable images to contemplate when the defendant gave her the"choice" in 2003 of a beating or sexual abuse. The State possesses the defendant's admissionthat he articulated such an option prior to his sexual acts.

It is fairly easy to draw safety concerns for the defendant's ex-wife, based upon thedefendant's long-standing criminal history and his known propensities toward her.

Indeed, the State advances a decidedly stern argument in this regard. In addition toreferences to the defendant's criminal history beyond the crimes mentioned, the State'sargument references two facts that its evidence will support. A telephone message machineat the home of the defendant's mother recorded a call from the defendant, shortly after thesexual assaults are alleged to have occurred. When investigating officers had the defendant'sbrother play the recorded messages for them, they heard the message left by the defendant. The message solicited his mother to lie for him and to supply him with a false alibi for thenight. Incredibly, the defendant's brother managed to erase the recording before the policecould retrieve it.

Here is the State's argument.

"The picture painted is not a pretty one from the defendant's standpoint. Theclient his appellate counsel would have this court release into his mother's custody isa man who has demonstrated his propensity for brutal sexual violence-a propensitywhich has spawned retaliatory crimes against his present accuser, a man who hasdemonstrated low regard for the laws of this State in general, a man who has twiceacquired a firearm in violation of the law, a man confident that one of his principalcommunity ties, his mother, is willing to shield him from apprehension[] and whosebrother is willing to assist. Defendant raped his ex-wife in retaliation for the few yearsof imprisonment the State meted out for his raping her on a previous occasion. If heis released, what weapon will this scofflaw now use to punish the woman perceivedresponsible for his facing incarceration from which he will never be released?"

We doubt that the State's question will ever find an answer. The defendant's motion forrelease pending this appeal is denied.

Motion denied.

WELCH and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.

1. Originally, the State agreed with the defendant that the videotape was irrelevant toquestions presented in this case. When the defendant's attorney presented the State with theex-wife's written recantation of accusations she had leveled against the defendant in 1998, oneof the prior offenses the State intended to use to show the defendant's propensity, the Statechanged its position with regard to the videotape. Judge John Coady examined the videotape'scontents. He found them to be so highly inflammatory that a presentation to a jury wouldovershadow evidence to support the commission of the crimes charged. Judge Coady felt thatthe videotape harbored the potential to control the trial's outcome, regardless of what the otherevidence did or did not establish. He balanced its probative value against its prejudicial effectand, exercising his discretion, banned the use of the videotape at the defendant's trial.

Interestingly, Judge Coady recognized the potential for a different point of viewregarding the videotape. He expressed concern that someone else might view the videotape'scontents as evidence that advanced a defense of consent. Prior to ruling, he had the defendantview the videotape. He made sure that the defendant, and his attorney, wanted the tapeexcluded, before he excluded it.