People v. Altom

Case Date: 03/21/2003
Court: 5th District Appellate
Docket No: 5-02-0016 Rel

                 NOTICE
Decision filed 03/21/03.  The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.

NO. 5-02-0016

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 

     Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUDY ALTOM,

     Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Marion County.

No. 85-CF-38

Honorable
Dennis E. Middendorff,
Judge, presiding.



PRESIDING JUSTICE HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court:

Judy Altom (defendant) appeals from the dismissal of her second postconvictionpetition after counsel had been appointed for her. On May 12, 1986, pursuant tonegotiations with the State, defendant pleaded guilty to murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38,par. 9-1(a)(2)), and the State agreed to dismiss two counts of the indictment that chargeddefendant with cruelty to children (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 23, par. 2368) and murder (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)) and to refrain from seeking the death penalty. Aftera sentencing hearing, defendant was sentenced to an extended term of 50 years'imprisonment with credit for 462 days served. On this appeal, defendant contends only,relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348(2000), that her extended-term sentence for murder must be reduced or vacated, where thefacts that increased the prescribed range of penalties were not found by the trier of fact tohave been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Supreme Court deliveredthe following holding in Apprendi as its bottom line:

"Other than a fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty fora crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury[] andproved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455,120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.

See People v. Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1020, 757 N.E.2d 88, 94 (2001).

At the time of defendant's offense, March 20, 1985, section 5-8-1(a)(1) of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Code) provided:

"Sentence of Imprisonment for Felony. (a) A sentence of imprisonment fora felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, accordingto the following limitations:

(1) for murder, (a) a term shall be not less than 20 years and not more than 40years, or (b) if the court finds that the murder was accompanied by exceptionallybrutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or that any of the aggravatingfactors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 arepresent, the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural[-]lifeimprisonment, or (c) if the defendant has previously been convicted of murder underany state or federal law or is found guilty of murdering more than one victim, thecourt shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural[-]life imprisonment." Ill. Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1).

Section 5-5-3.2(b) of the Code provided, in pertinent part:

"(b) the following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to imposean extended[-]term sentence under Section 5-8-2 upon any offender who was at least17 years old on the date the crime was committed:

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(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that theoffense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative ofwanton cruelty; or

(3) When a defendant is convicted of any felony committed against:

(i) a person under 12 years of age at the time of the offense;

(ii) a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the offense; or

(iii) a person physically handicapped at the time of the offense." Ill. Rev. Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b).

Section 5-8-2(a)(1) of the Code provided that a person convicted of murder could besentenced to an extended prison term of not less than 40 years and not more than 80 yearsif the judge finds that the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of section 5-5-3.2were present. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-2(a)(1).

On March 29, 1985, a three-count indictment was filed that charged defendant withone count of cruelty to children and two counts of murder.

On May 12, 1986, defendant entered a plea of guilty to murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983,ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(2)) pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162,91 S. Ct. 160 (1970). The circuit court read the charge to which defendant was entering herplea and ascertained defendant's understanding of the charge. Defendant was admonishedthat the ordinary and usual term for murder was a prison sentence of not less than 20 and notmore than 40 years and that under certain circumstances defendant could be sentenced to notmore than 80 years' imprisonment or to natural-life imprisonment. Defendant stated that sheunderstood the possible penalties. The court informed defendant that she had a right toplead not guilty or guilty and that she had a right to persist in her plea of not guilty. Thecourt further informed defendant that if she pleaded guilty she would be waiving her rightto a jury or nonjury trial and that she would be waiving her right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who would appear and attempt to prove the charge against defendant. The court then ascertained that defendant understood that if she pleaded guilty there wouldbe no trial and no confrontation of witnesses. The court inquired of defendant if anypromises had been made to her concerning her guilty plea and if any representations hadbeen made to her concerning the sentence she might receive. Defendant responded, "Justthe plea bargain the State's Attorney has offered." She also responded that she understoodthat the death penalty had been waived. After questioning defendant regarding whether anythreats had been made to her concerning her guilty plea and receiving defendant's negativereply, the court inquired whether defendant had discussed the case with her attorney andwhether he had answered her questions, and defendant responded that she had discussed thecase with her attorney and that he had answered her questions. After determining thatdefendant was pleading guilty of her own free will, defendant was presented with a writtenguilty plea, which she signed. The court read the written guilty plea, which included astatement of defendant's age, 22. The court asked defendant if the written guilty pleashowed her intention to plead guilty to murder and waive a jury trial, to which defendantresponded, "Yes."

The court asked the State's Attorney to state the factual basis for the plea, and heresponded by stating what various individuals would testify to. Two witnesses would testifythat defendant had stated that she had inflicted the cut wounds which were found on thevictim. The doctor, Harry Parks, who had performed the autopsy on the victim, JodyBranon, would testify that the cause of death was severe, multiple, blunt trauma to the bodyand that also contributing to the cause of death were 60 to 80 external lacerations on thetrunk and limbs of the victim. The doctor would further testify that during the autopsy, hehad observed various internal injuries: edema to the brain, contusions to the baby's lungs,diaphragm, spleen, right kidney, pancreas, and liver, and fractures to some of the rib bones. He also observed that the mesentery, which holds together the small intestine, was rippedapart. The doctor would opine that the internal injuries "were caused by a minimum ofbetween 15 and 20 severe bodily blows to the abdomen and trunk of the body consistentwith punches and kicks" and that most of the injuries were inflicted within 24 hours ofdeath.

The State's Attorney further stated that if the case went to trial, the State would calla radiologist, Dr. Appolinar, who would testify that he had x-rayed the victim's body andfound three broken ribs which had been broken between one and four weeks prior to thevictim's death.

The State's Attorney also stated that at Darrell Branon's trial (No. 85-CF-37),defendant had waived her fifth amendment rights and testified that more than once she hadstepped hard on the body of the victim and that later on the night of March 20, 1985, she hadinflicted cut marks with a knife on the victim's body. At the State's Attorney's request, thecourt stated that it would take judicial notice of the trial transcript in People v. Branon, No.85-CF-37, as an additional factual basis for defendant's plea.

The court then went over the prior admonishments to defendant, including a possiblesentence of 80 years' imprisonment if the victim was under 12 years of age at the time of themurder and of natural-life imprisonment if other aggravating factors were shown. Afterdefendant again stated her understanding of the charge, her rights, and the possible penalties,she stated that she wished to plead guilty to the charge. The court ascertained that defendantwas satisfied with the representation that had been provided to her by her attorney. Thecourt stated that it found that defendant was guilty of the crime charged, that she entered theplea voluntarily and knowingly, and that defendant was 22 years of age.

On June 24, 1986, the sentencing hearing commenced. Suzzanne Graham, a workerfor the Department of Children and Family Services, identified Jody Branon's birthcertificate, which stated September 27, 1984, as his date of birth. Dr. Harry Parks testified concerning the extensive injuries to the victim. On June 26, 1986, defendant was sentencedto 50 years' imprisonment, after the court found that defendant was 22 years of age, that thevictim was 5