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JUSTICE RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

After a jury trial, Larry Joe Adams (defendant) was convicted of armed robbery andmurder in connection with the shooting death of Eugene Ponder on May 10, 1982, in Alton,Illinois. Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder and to 60 years' imprisonment forthe armed robbery. On direct appeal, defendant's sentence of death was vacated because ofimproper comments made at both stages of the sentencing hearing. People v. Adams, 109Ill. 2d 102, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985). On remand, the circuit court of Madison Countyimposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The court found that the murder had occurredduring the course of an armed robbery and was "brutal and *** indicative *** of wantoncruelty." Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which wasdismissed. Defendant next appealed the dismissal of his petition. We reversed the dismissalafter we found that defendant had made a substantial showing that his counsel on directappeal had provided him ineffective assistance in failing to argue that defendant had beenarrested without probable cause and in failing to urge that his police statement was theproduct of his unlawful arrest. People v. Adams, No. 5-95-0549 (June 2, 1998) (unpublishedorder pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23)).

While defendant's postconviction appeal was pending, some 11 years after beingresentenced to life imprisonment, defendant filed a motion for fingerprint testing usingtechniques not available at the time of the trial. Apparently, eight fingerprints found at themurder scene remained unidentified. The circuit court ordered the Illinois State Police tosearch its files for fingerprints collected from Ponder's drug store. The Illinois State Policeinformed the court that it had returned the requested fingerprints to the Alton policedepartment "after termination of this cause." The Alton police department subsequentlyinformed the court that the unidentified prints no longer existed. The court denieddefendant's motion for fingerprint testing.

Defendant filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing into the circumstances attendingthe loss or destruction of the fingerprints. The court denied defendant's motion but did holdan evidentiary hearing on the questions of whether the police had probable cause to arrestdefendant and whether defendant had received the effective assistance of counsel on directappeal. The court ruled against defendant, and defendant now appeals these rulings pro se. We affirm.

Defendant first challenges the trial court's findings that there was sufficient probablecause to justify his arrest and that he was not denied the effective assistance of appellatecounsel. Determinations made by a postconviction court following an evidentiary hearingwill not be disturbed on review unless they are manifestly erroneous. People v. Montgomery,192 Ill. 2d 642, 654, 736 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (2000). We cannot say that the trial court'srulings are manifestly erroneous in this instance.

In order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, defendantmust show that counsel's failure to raise an issue on direct appeal was objectivelyunreasonable and that, but for this failure, a reasonable probability exists that defendant'sconviction or sentence would have been reversed. People v. Wilson, 191 Ill. 2d 363, 380,732 N.E.2d 498, 507 (2000). Evidence at the postconviction hearing demonstrated thatdefendant's arrest was not without the benefit of probable cause, and therefore, neither trialcounsel nor appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

Police may make a warrantless arrest, but only if they have knowledge which wouldlead a reasonable person to believe that a crime has occurred and that it has been committedby that defendant. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 405, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (1995);People v. Dizon, 297 Ill. App. 3d 880, 885, 697 N.E.2d 780, 784 (1998). Two witnessesplaced defendant at the victim's store at a time just prior to the murder. A third witness alsoidentified defendant running from the shop carrying a white paper bag within the time framein which the murder occurred. An informant who had spoken to defendant prior to themurder told the police that defendant was trying to obtain a gun to rob a pharmacy for certaindrugs, drugs which were later found missing from Ponder's store. Collectively, the evidencedemonstrated probable cause and, as a result, the lack of any reason for suppressing hispostarrest statements. Defendant did not satisfy his burden of showing a constitutionalinfirmity at the trial or on appeal. The trial court, therefore, properly denied defendant'spostconviction petition.

Defendant next contends on appeal that he was entitled to fingerprint testing but wasdenied that right by the destruction of the unidentified fingerprint lifts recovered from themurder scene. Defendant further asserts that the trial court engaged in a private, off-the-record investigation of the missing fingerprints and then denied him a hearing to investigatethe loss.

Some 18 years after the victim was murdered and 11 years after defendant wasresentenced to life imprisonment, defendant filed a motion for fingerprint testing notavailable at the time of his trial. The State opposed the motion, contending that the testingdid not have the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant todefendant's assertion of innocence. The State argued that the jury heard extensive evidenceand arguments about the unidentified fingerprints before concluding that defendant wasguilty beyond a reasonable doubt. While the matter was under advisement, the trial courtissued an order to the Illinois State Police Bureau of Scientific Services to search its files forthe fingerprint lifts collected from the crime scene. The crime lab notified the court that thefingerprint lifts had been returned to the Alton police department. The Alton policedepartment subsequently informed the court that the unidentified prints no longer existed. The trial court therefore denied defendant's motion because defendant failed to meet therequirement that the evidence to be tested was subjected to a proper chain of custody (see725 ILCS 5/116-3 (West 1998)). The trial court further denied defendant's request for anevidentiary hearing to ferret out the reason the fingerprints were missing. The courtspecifically noted that there was no order requiring the police to keep the evidence⁽¹⁾, and itfurther noted that the existence of the unidentified fingerprints at the murder scene wasargued extensively at the trial.

We find no reversible error in this instance. Initially, we fail to see how defendantwas prejudiced by the court's investigation of the location and existence of the fingerprintlifts. Defendant could have conducted the same investigation to verify any of the court'sinformation. More importantly, none of the information obtained by the court was used toreach conclusions on defendant's guilt or innocence (cf. People v. Rowjee, 308 Ill. App. 3d179, 719 N.E.2d 255 (1999)). Second, there was no court order requiring the preservationof the fingerprints, and there certainly appeared to be no evidentiary need for retaining them. A mere showing of negligence by the police in losing evidence, if we can even say that wasthe case here, is insufficient to prove any due process violation. People v. Danielly, 274 Ill.App. 3d 358, 363-64, 653 N.E.2d 866, 869-70 (1995); cf. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404,439-41, 696 N.E.2d 313, 331-32 (1998). Additionally, the fact that unidentified fingerprintswere found at the crime scene was argued extensively at the trial. There was simply nolikelihood that there was a potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materiallyrelevant to an assertion of actual innocence. As we noted in People v. Urioste, 316 Ill. App.3d 307, 317-18, 736 N.E.2d 706, 715 (2000), "Our legislature did not intend to giveconvicted defendants free rein to claim innocence in order to test, or retest, evidencetangential to the core evidence of guilt." The evidence was unrebutted that defendant wasalone with the victim at a time just preceding the murder. It is gross speculation to suggestthat after defendant left the store, an "unidentified" killer suddenly appeared and murderedthe victim, especially when the unidentified fingerprints could have been impressed at anytime in the past. Defendant was not entitled to a hearing on the matter of the missingfingerprints, and the trial court properly denied defendant's motions.

For his last point, raised for the first time on the appeal from the denial of hispostconviction petition, defendant argues that his sentence of life imprisonment isunconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct.2348 (2000). Several recent cases have already answered this question-defendants who haveexhausted their direct appeal rights prior to the issuance of the Apprendi decision may not,on collateral review, challenge their sentences on the basis of that decision. See, e.g., Peoplev. McGee, 328 Ill. App. 3d 930, ___ N.E.2d ___ (2002); People v. Scullark, 325 Ill. App. 3d876, 759 N.E.2d 565 (2001); People v. Helton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 420, 749 N.E.2d 1007(2001); People v. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 238, 741 N.E.2d 1103 (2000). Until our supremecourt tells us differently, we see no reason not to follow these well-reasoned decisions. Werecognize that another panel from this court has reached a different conclusion (see Peoplev. Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 757 N.E.2d 88 (2001)); we choose to follow, however, theline of cases culminating in the more recent pronouncement. We likewise find no merit todefendant's contention that we should vacate his extended-term sentence for armed robbery. Because extended-term provisions do not apply to natural-life sentences for murder,extended-term provisions can properly be applied to the next most serious offense of whichthe defendant was convicted, in this instance armed robbery. People v. Terry, 183 Ill. 2d298, 305, 700 N.E.2d 992, 995-96 (1998); People v. Jones, 297 Ill. App. 3d 688, 693, 697N.E.2d 457, 461 (1998). Consequently, we also affirm defendant's extended-term sentencefor armed robbery.

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court ofMadison County.

Affirmed.

CHAPMAN, Melissa, J., concurs.

JUSTICE KUEHN, specially concurring:

Since a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that facts necessary to expose thisdefendant to the punishment imposed did occur, I do not believe that his sentence isunconstitutional. See People v. Ford, 198 Ill. 2d 68, 761 N.E.2d 735 (2001). However, I dobelieve that he should be able to raise that question, even though the judgment that imposedthat punishment has already been reviewed and affirmed.

I write separately to side with those of my colleagues who have held that no personshould be held in prison, without recourse, for the commission of a criminal offense that wasneither charged nor proven to the satisfaction of 12 fellow citizens. See People v. Beachem,317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 740 N.E.2d 389 (2000); People v. Rush, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 757N.E.2d 88 (2001). While I am mindful of the State's interest in finality, we confront a newconstitutional rule grounded in principles so basic to the concept of ordered liberty thateveryone should be afforded its protection.

When the United States Supreme Court established the limited path to the collateralreview of a new constitutional rule, it held that prisoners could avail themselves of the rule'sprotection only if the rule required the observance of procedures implicit in the concept ofordered liberty. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). I cannot imagine what kind of new constitutional rule could fit within this exception if therule set forth in Apprendi does not meet its criteria. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). If our professed goal is justice and that goalmust be reached through a process that ensures fundamental fairness to everyone, we hadbetter pause at the thought of punishing people for crimes that were never charged and formisconduct that was never found to exist by a method we deem constitutionally fair andsound. What kind of procedures implicitly form our view of ordered liberty if we can allowfor punishment without charge or proof?

I would hold that those people being punished under circumstances that offend therule set forth in Apprendi should be afforded the opportunity to pursue relief.

Accordingly, I specially concur.

Opinion Filed: August 13, 2002

Honorable Melissa A. Chapman, J.,

Concurs

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.,

Specially Concurs

Attorney Larry Joe Adams, Reg. No. N-16147, Menard Correctional Center,

for P.O. Box 711, Menard, IL 62259

Appellant

Attorneys Honorable William Haine, Madison County State's Attorney, Madison

for County Courthouse, 157 North Main, Edwardsville, IL 62025; Norbert

Appellee J. Goetten, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Patrick D.

Daly, Staff Attorney, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor,

Route 15 East, P.O. Box 2249, Mt. Vernon, IL 62864

1. Effective January 1, 2001, evidence used in a prosecution for murder is to bepreserved permanently, subject to a continuous chain of custody, and only by means of anevidentiary hearing is a custodial agency permitted to destroy evidence. See 725 ILCS5/116-4 (West Supp. 2001).