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No. 1-02-2681WC

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIVISION

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The claimant, Malcolm C. Schusse, filed an application foradjustment of claim under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (Ill.Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.; now 820 ILCS 305/1 etseq. (2000)), seeking benefits for injuries he is alleged to havereceived on December 30, 1989, while in the employ of Pace BusCompany (Pace). After a hearing, an arbitrator found that, onDecember 30, 1989, the claimant sustained injuries arising out ofand in the course of his employment with Pace which rendered himpermanently and totally disabled. The arbitrator awarded theclaimant permanent total disability (PTD) benefits under the Actfor life, commencing on December 31, 1989, and ordered Pace to pay$167,623 for necessary first aid, medical, surgical and hospitalservices rendered to the claimant.

Pace sought a review of the arbitrator's decision before theIndustrial Commission (Commission). On September 16, 1998, theCommission issued a unanimous decision in which it awarded theclaimant temporary total disability benefits under the Act for aperiod of 216 4/7 weeks, commencing on December 31, 1989, and PTDbenefits for life, commencing on February 24, 1994. In all otherrespects, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator'sdecision.

Pace sought a judicial review of the Commission's decision inthe circuit court of Cook County where the action was docketed ascase number 98 L 50873. On April 28, 2000, the circuit courtentered an order: confirming the Commission's decision as itrelates to the issues of accident, permanency and causal connectionbetween the claimant's accident and a portion of his medicaltreatment; reversing that portion of the decision which found acausal connection between the claimant's work-related accident andother aspects of the medical treatment rendered to him; settingaside the Commission's award of medical related expenses; andremanding the action back to the Commission for a determination ofmedical expenses consistent with the order.

On May 25, 2000, Pace filed an appeal from the circuit court'sorder of April 28, 2000. That appeal was docketed in this court ascase number 1-00-1774WC. However, on motion of the claimant, wedismissed that appeal for want of jurisdiction on June 26, 2001.

On July 29, 2002, the Commission issued its decision andopinion on remand from the circuit court. In that decision, theCommission reduced the medical expenses which Pace was required topay to $27,732.70 and awarded the claimant all of the otherbenefits under the Act which it had awarded to him in its originaldecision. Neither party sought a judicial review of theCommission's July 29, 2002, decision. Instead, Pace filed a noticeof appeal on August 28, 2002, which states in relevant part asfollows:

"Plaintiff-Appellant, Pace Bus Company, appeals andseeks reversal of the circuit court order of April 28,2000, made final with the remand decision of the IllinoisIndustrial Commission on July 29, 2002, confirming theIndustrial Commission decision of September 16, 1998."

Even though the issue was not raised by either party, thiscourt has an obligation to determine if it has jurisdiction toentertain this appeal. In re Marriage of Betts, 159 Ill. App. 3d327, 330, 511 N.E.2d 732 (1987). Subject to exceptions created bystatute or set forth in the Rules of our Supreme Court, thejurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to reviewing appealsfrom final judgments. In re Marriage of Verdung, 126 Ill. 2d 542,553, 535 N.E.2d 818 (1989). Upon examining Pace's brief and thejurisdictional statement contained therein, this court questionedits jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. As a consequence, anorder was entered requiring both parties to file supplementalbriefs addressed solely to the question of jurisdiction andspecifically to the issue of whether an appeal can be taken from anorder of the circuit court reversing a decision of the Commission,in part, and remanding the matter back to the Commission forfurther proceedings when no judicial review of the Commission'sdecision on remand is sought.

Pace asserts that this court has jurisdiction to address itsappeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303 (155 Ill. 2d R. 303). Itargues, without reference to authority, that the circuit court'sApril 28, 2000, order became final and appealable when theCommission issued its decision on July 29, 2002. The claimantargues that we have no jurisdiction in this matter as Pace failedto seek a judicial review in the circuit court of the Commission'sdecision on remand. We agree with the claimant and, for thereasons which follow, dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

As noted earlier, Pace is appealing from the April 28, 2000,order of the circuit court which: confirmed the Commission'sdecision of September 16, 1998, in part; reversed the decision inpart; and remanded the matter back to the Commission for adetermination as to the medical expenses for which the claimant isentitled to reimbursement. Pace asserts that its appeal is broughtpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303 which governs appeals from finaljudgments in civil cases. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 303. However,contrary to Pace's assertion, the circuit court's order of April28, 2000, is not a final order.

When, as in this case, the circuit court reverses a decisionof the Commission, in whole or in part, and remands the matter backto the Commission for further proceedings involving the resolutionof questions of law or fact, the order is interlocutory and notappealable. Stockton v. Industrial Comm'n, 69 Ill. 2d 120, 124-25,370 N.E. 2d 548 (1977). That does not suggest, however, that suchan order can never be reviewed. The Commission's subsequentdecision made pursuant to the remanding order is again reviewableby the circuit court, and, if affirmed, the decision of the circuitcourt is a final order which is appealable to this court. SeeStockton, 69 Ill. 2d at 125. In reviewing the final order of thecircuit court, this court is authorized to review the entire recordand determine the propriety of the circuit court's order reversingthe Commission's original decision and remanding the matter forfurther proceedings. Stockton, 69 Ill. 2d at 126. The rule inthis regard is an application of the proposition that an appealfrom a final judgment draws into issue all prior interlocutoryorders which produced the final order. Burtell v. Charter ServiceCorp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433, 394 N.E.2d 380 (1979).

Decisions issued by the Commission acting within the powersconferred upon it pursuant to the Act are, in the absence of fraud,conclusive unless reviewed in the circuit court as provided insection 19(f) of the Act. 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2000). Jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commission is vestedin the circuit court. This court's jurisdiction in workers'compensation cases is confined to appeals from final orders of thecircuit court. 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2000). The Commission'spost-remand decisions are reviewable by this court only after theyhave been reviewed by the circuit court. Mid-American Lines, Inc.v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 47, 51, 411 N.E.2d 254 (1980).

The circuit court's April 28, 2000, order is interlocutory innature and not appealable in its own right. Stockton, 69 Ill. 2dat 124; Downey v. Industrial Comm'n, 44 Ill. 2d 28, 29, 253 N.E.2d371 (1969); Mayrath Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 33 Ill. 2d 224, 225,210 N.E.2d 529 (1965). It might have been subject to review in thecontext of an appeal from an order of the circuit court confirmingthe Commission's decision on remand. Stockton, 69 Ill. 2d at 125-26. However, since neither party filed an action for judicialreview of the Commission's July 29, 2002, decision, there is nofinal order of the circuit court from which an appeal may be taken. See Robinson v. Cook County Police & Corrections Merit Board, 93Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1052, 418 N.E.2d 170 (1981). Absent a finalorder by the circuit court and a timely appeal therefrom, we haveno jurisdiction to review the propriety of the interlocutory orderentered by the circuit court on April 28, 2000, and our only courseof action is to dismiss this appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

McCULLOUGH, P.J., and O'MALLEY, Jack, HOLDRIDGE, and GOLDENHERSH, JJ.,concur.