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Outboard Marine Corp. v. IC, No. 2-99-0577WC

2nd District, 14 January 2000

Industrial Commission Division

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent employer Outboard Marine Corporation appeals from an order of the circuit court of Lake County confirming a decision of the Illinois Industrial Commission (Commission). The arbitrator awarded claimant Donald Rivord $311 per week for 4 weeks for temporary total disability and $279.90 per week for 30 weeks for permanent partial disability (PPD) due to a 25% loss of the use of each of claimant's right index, middle, ring, and little fingers (820 ILCS 305/8(b), (e)(2) through (e)(5) (West 1996)). The Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator. The issue is whether the Commission's award of PPD based on a 25% loss of the use of four fingers of claimant's right hand was against the manifest weight of the evidence and contrary to law because the disability actually affected claimant's right hand as a whole. We affirm.

The parties and this court are familiar with the facts in this case, and they will not be recited in detail. Claimant, a die cast machine operator for respondent employer since March 1994, developed stenosing flexor tenosynovitis of the fingers of the right hand. He underwent an A-1 pulley release of the right index, middle, ring, and little fingers. Claimant had a previous carpal tunnel release on the right hand.

This case concerns the interrelationship of some of the subsections of 8(e) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/8(e) (West 1996)) scheduling the maximum compensation for loss or permanent and complete loss of use of specified members as follows:

"2. First, or index finger--40 weeks.

3. Second, or middle finger--35 weeks.

4. Third, or ring finger--25 weeks.

5. Fourth, or little finger--20 weeks.

* * *

9. Hand--190 weeks. The loss of 2 or more digits, or one or more phalanges of 2 or more digits, of a hand may be compensated on the basis of partial loss of use of a hand, provided, further, that the loss of 4 digits, or the loss of use of 4 digits, in the same hand shall constitute the complete loss of a hand." 820 ILCS 305/8(e)(2) through (e)(5), (e)(9) (West 1996).

Respondent employer argues that, as a matter of law, claimant should have been awarded a percentage of a hand and not a percentage of each of the injured fingers. According to respondent employer, the facts of this case establish that the loss was for the use of the hand and not the individual fingers and that claimant presented the claim in this fashion to avoid a credit being applied as a result of an earlier settlement of 15% for injury to the right hand. Claimant's motivation in presenting the claim as he did is not an issue in this appeal.

This court has recognized that the Commission's determinations of the nature and extent of an injury are matters within the expertise of the Commission, and the Commission's findings in those regards are given substantial deference. See English v. Industrial Comm'n, 151 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86, 502 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (1986). Here, however, in spite of respondent employer's failure to make a statutory construction argument, statutory construction appears to be the appropriate analysis. The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, and that is best evidenced by the clear and unambiguous language of the statute. Modern Drop Forge Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 284 Ill. App. 3d 259, 264, 671 N.E.2d 753, 756 (1996). To the extent that the issue raised on appeal involves construing the relevant statutes, statutory construction is a question of law, which this court considers de novo. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 301 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962, 704 N.E.2d 715, 718 (1998).

Generally, the words of a statute are given their plain and commonly understood meanings, and only when the meaning of the statute is unclear will extrinsic aids to construction be employed. King, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 962, 704 N.E.2d at 718. In the context of workers' compensation law, the terms "loss" and "loss of use" are technical terms. Where technical terms are employed in a statute, they will be given their technical meaning if that is the context in which they are employed. Maiss v. Metropolitan Amusement Ass'n, 241 Ill. 177, 181, 89 N.E. 268, 269 (1909); Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Wishnevsky, 131 Ill. App. 2d 702, 704, 267 N.E.2d 355, 356 (1971); see Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 92 Ill. 2d 157, 165-66, 441 N.E.2d 318, 321-22 (1982) (technical meaning of "costs"). "When the matter is one of outright loss, as by amputation, there may be a question [of] how much of the member must be removed to amount to loss of that member." 2 A. Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation