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JUSTICE WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

Richard Morton (plaintiff), independent administrator for the estate of William R.Morton, the decedent, appeals from the dismissal of counts III and IV of his amendedcomplaint. At issue is whether section 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 1998)), comprising the "relation back" doctrine for the amendmentof pleadings, requires that a summons must be served upon a subsequent defendant withinthe limitations period. We hold that it does. For the following reasons, we affirm thejudgment of the circuit court of Madison County.

On August 3, 1998, plaintiff filed a two-count complaint pursuant to the WrongfulDeath Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6(West 1998)) against the Madison County Nursing Home Auxiliary (Auxiliary), a not-for-profit corporation. The decedent, while a resident of the Madison County Nursing Home(nursing home), either jumped or fell from a third-story window of the nursing home onFebruary 15, 1998, resulting in his death. The Auxiliary was served with process on August7, 1998. On September 9, 1998, the Auxiliary filed its answer to the complaint. TheAuxiliary's answer, among other things, denied that the decedent was its resident and deniedthat it had nursing-home-type duties. The Auxiliary filed an amended answer to thecomplaint on December 18, 1998, setting forth the affirmative defense that it has no title orinterest in the nursing home, that it has no authority or power of management or control overthe nursing home, and that the nursing home is subject to the authority and control of theCounty of Madison (Madison County), a governmental corporation.

On March 29, 1999, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint by addingMadison County as a defendant pursuant to section 2-616 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-616(West 1998)), alleging that Madison County was a proper defendant, that the failure to joinMadison County as a defendant had been inadvertent, that the cause had been filed withinthe limitations period, that a summons had been served upon Roger Hotson, the director ofthe nursing home and an agent of Madison County, that Madison County had been awareof the lawsuit, and that the cause of action against Madison County arose out of the sameoccurrence as the cause of action against the Auxiliary. This motion was granted on March30, 1999, and the amended complaint adding counts III and IV naming Madison County asa defendant was filed on the same date. The Madison County clerk was served withsummons on April 12, 1999.

On April 15, 1999, Madison County filed a motion to dismiss counts III and IV ofthe amended complaint. Madison County argued that the complaint against the countyshould be dismissed because it was filed beyond the one-year statute-of-limitations periodand that the requirements of section 2-616 of the Code for allowing the amended complaintto relate back to the time of the filing of the original complaint had not been satisfied. Specifically, Madison County alleged that plaintiff's failure to join it as a defendant was notinadvertent under section 2-616(d)(2) (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(2) (West 1998)) and that asummons was not in fact served upon Madison County or upon its agent or partner undersection 2-616(d)(3) (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 1998)).

On May 24, 1999, the circuit court of Madison County entered an order dismissingcounts III and IV of plaintiff's amended complaint against Madison County. Specifically,the court ruled that plaintiff's failure to join Madison County was inadvertent within themeaning of section 2-616(d)(2) but that the service of summons on the director of thenursing home did not satisfy the section 2-616(d)(3) requirement that there must in fact beservice on Madison County, because the service requirements of section 2-211 of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 1998)) had not been met. Section 2-211 of the Code provides, inpertinent part, that in actions against municipal corporations "summons may be served byleaving a copy with the chairperson of the county board or county clerk in the case of acounty ***." 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West 1998). Thus, the circuit court concluded that theservice on the nursing home director was insufficient to constitute service on MadisonCounty. The court noted that plaintiff failed to cite authority to support his argument thatthe service requirement of section 2-616(d)(3) could be fulfilled after the running of thestatute of limitations period, and furthermore, the court ruled that the argument was meritlessbecause it rendered subsection (d)(3) unnecessary.

Plaintiff's motion to reconsider was denied on July 14, 1999. Specifically, the courtruled that the service of summons on the county clerk after the statute of limitations hadexpired did not meet the requirements of section 2-616(d)(3), so that plaintiff's amendedcomplaint cannot relate back to the original complaint. In effect, the circuit court ruled thatactual service on the subsequent defendant must be within the statute of limitations. Plaintiffnow appeals.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that section 2-616(d)(3) of the Code does not expresslyrequire that a summons be served upon a subsequent defendant within the limitations periodand that the trial court erred by requiring service within the limitations period.

Although this case comes before us on a motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West1998)), based on the trial court's allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint under section2-616, where an abuse-of-discretion standard is usually applied to questions of whether anamendment of pleadings should be allowed (Cochran v. Perry County Road District No. 1,295 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1094 (1998)), the ultimate issue in this case is the interpretation ofsection 2-616(d)(3). The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review denovo. See Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer, 183 Ill. 2d 540, 554 (1998);In re Application for Tax Deed, 285 Ill. App. 3d 930, 932 (1997).

The issue in this case is whether section 2-616(d)(3) of the Code requires that asummons be served upon a subsequent defendant within the limitations period. We believeit does.

Section 2-616(d) provides:

"A cause of action against a person not originally named a defendant is notbarred by lapse of time under any statute or contract prescribing or limiting the timewithin which an action may be brought or right asserted, if all the following termsand conditions are met: (1) the time prescribed or limited had not expired when theoriginal action was commenced; (2) failure to join the person as a defendant wasinadvertent; (3) service of summons was in fact had upon the person [or] his or heragent or partner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate, even though he orshe was served in the wrong capacity or as agent of another, or upon a trustee whohas title to but no power of management or control over real property constituting atrust of which the person is a beneficiary; (4) the person, within the time that theaction might have been brought or the right asserted against him or her, knew that theoriginal action was pending and that it grew out of a transaction or occurrenceinvolving or concerning him or her; and (5) it appears from the original and amendedpleadings that the cause of action asserted in the amended pleading grew out of thesame transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, even though theoriginal pleading was defective in that it failed to allege the performance of some actor the existence of some fact or some other matter which is a necessary conditionprecedent to the right of recovery when the condition precedent has in fact beenperformed, and even though the person was not named originally as a defendant. Forthe purpose of preserving the cause of action under those conditions, an amendmentadding the person as a defendant relates back to the date of the filing of the originalpleading so amended." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 1998).

All the requirements of section 2-616(d) must be satisfied for a plaintiff to add adefendant after the statute-of-limitations period has expired, and if any element is not met,the amended complaint cannot relate back. See Webb v. Ambulance Service Corp., 262 Ill.App. 3d 1039, 1043-44 (1994). In this case, all the elements have not been satisfied. Weshall briefly address the first, second, fourth, and fifth requirements, which are uncontested,and then turn to the third requirement for a full discussion.

Under the first requirement (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(1) (West 1998)), the original actionin this case was timely commenced within a few months of the decedent's death.

Pursuant to the second requirement (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(2) (West 1998)), thecircuit court made an express finding of inadvertence in plaintiff's failure to add MadisonCounty as a defendant. Although the trial court noted that there were problems withplaintiff's argument regarding inadvertence, it concluded that such a finding was inconformance with our decision in Campbell v. Feuquay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 584 (1986), andfurthered the ends of justice. We agree.

The fourth requirement (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(4) (West 1998)) necessitates that thedefendant knew prior to the running of the statute of limitations that a complaint had beenfiled. See Vaughn v. Speaker, 126 Ill. 2d 150, 159-60 (1988). In this case, the defendanthas consistently admitted that it had knowledge of the proceeding. Indeed, counsel for theAuxiliary was also counsel for Madison County.

Regarding the fifth requirement (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(5) (West 1998)), it isundisputed that the cause of action in the amended pleading arose from the same transactionor occurrence as alleged in the original complaint concerning William R. Morton's death.

We turn now to the contested third requirement (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West1998))-that a summons was in fact served upon the person or his or her agent or partner, asthe nature of the defendant made appropriate, even though he or she was served in the wrongcapacity or as an agent of another.

Plaintiff argues that section 2-616(d)(3) does not expressly require that the serviceof summons be within the limitations period and that the trial court erred in interpreting thesection in that manner. Plaintiff urges us to take the language of this particular section at"its face value." Madison County argues that a common sense reading of the statuteestablishes that section 2-616(d)(3) requires that the summons be served within the statuteof limitations applicable to the case. Madison County contends that if we are to adoptplaintiff's position, then section 2-616(d)(3) would be rendered meaningless.

When a court interprets a statute, no paragraph should be interpreted so as to berendered meaningless. See Collins v. Board of Trustees, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (1993). Legislative intent, nevertheless, remains the primary inquiry and controls our interpretationof a statute. See Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111.

Section 2-616(d)(3) requires that "service of summons was in fact had upon theperson ***." 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 1998). This reference indicates to us thatservice must be accomplished before the protection of section 2-616(d) is sought. In otherwords, a subsequent party must be served with a summons and the amended pleading withinthe limitations period so that the amended pleading may relate back to the timely filedoriginal pleading.

If we were to read section 2-616(d)(3) as plaintiff suggests, then the service ofsummons could be accomplished at any time so long as the other statutory requirements aremet. Such a reading renders section 2-616(d)(3) meaningless. The section is unnecessaryif the service of summons is not required within the limitations period, because a subsequentdefendant could then be added at any time. Such an interpretation eviscerates the statute oflimitations and is unacceptable.

Furthermore, it seems to us that the legislature intended section 2-616(d)(3) to workwhen a plaintiff gets close-that is, he serves the right person but in the wrong capacity. Thatis not what happened here. In this case, plaintiff served the wrong person.

Cases of mistaken identity, analyzed under section 2-616(d), have resulted in harshbut predictable ends in the Illinois courts. See, e.g., Thomson v. McDonald's, Inc., 180 Ill.App. 3d 984 (1989). Cases of mere misnomer, analyzed under section 2-401(b) of the Code(735 ILCS 5/2-401(b) (West 1998)) and usually due to a misspelling of a defendant's name,have resulted in far more favorable results for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Thielke v. OsmanConstruction Corp., 129 Ill. App. 3d 948 (1985). The critical distinction has been, Who didthe plaintiff intend to sue? See Thielke, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 951. In cases of mistakenidentity where section 2-616(d) applies, service is required before the running of the statuteof limitations. See Thielke, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 951; see also Retzler v. Pratt & Whitney Co.,309 Ill. App. 3d 906, 921 (1999); Rapier v. First Bank & Trust Co., 309 Ill. App. 3d 71, 80(1999). Indeed, this court has expressly declared that service on a subsequent defendant bewithin the statute of limitations. See Greenfield v. Ray Stamm, Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 320,326 (1993) (conducting section 2-616(d) analysis); Silver v. Lee Shell Equipment Corp., 31Ill. App. 2d 266, 270 (1961) (conducting analysis under the predecessor of section 2-616(d)).

Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not error in interpreting section2-616(d)(3) to require that the summons be served upon a subsequent defendant within thelimitations period.

Additionally, section 2-211 of the Code provides that a county may only be properlyserved through the county clerk or the county board chairperson. 735 ILCS 5/2-211 (West1998). Here, the Madison County clerk was not served until after the statute of limitationshad expired. Service on Hotson, although an agent of Madison County as the director of itsnursing home, before the running of the statute of limitations was not the equivalent ofservice on the county through its clerk or board chairperson. Accordingly, the relation-backdoctrine does not apply, and counts III and IV of plaintiff's amended complaint wereproperly dismissed as having been filed beyond the limitations period.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

KUEHN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

I agree with my colleagues in citing Collins v. Board of Trustees, 155 Ill. 2d 103(1993), for the principle that in determining legislative intent, which is the primary inquirya court of review must undertake, no paragraph should be interpreted so as to render thatparagraph meaningless. Unfortunately, the majority's interpretation of subsection 3 ofsection 2-616(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d) (West 1998)) wouldrender subsection 4 meaningless.

Subsection 3 reads as follows:

"(3) [S]ervice of summons was in fact had upon the person [or] his or her agent orpartner, as the nature of the defendant made appropriate, even though he or she wasserved in the wrong capacity or as agent of another, or upon a trustee who has titleto but no power of management or control over real property constituting a trust ofwhich the person is a beneficiary[.]" 735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(3) (West 1998).

Subsection 4 reads as follows:

"(4) [T]he person, within the time that the action might have been brought or the rightasserted against him or her, knew that the original action was pending and that itgrew out of a transaction or occurrence involving or concerning him or her[.]" 735ILCS 5/2-616(d)(4) (West 1998).

I contend that a reading of subsection 3 as the majority has done would render subsection4 meaningless. Subsection 4 specifically addresses the actual or implied knowledge that aperson would have during the time in which that person or entity could be sued within thestatute of limitations. In subsection 4 the language is that the "person *** knew that theoriginal action was pending ***" (735 ILCS 5/2-616(d)(4) (West 1998)), which implies thatthat person had knowledge of the action during the time that that person could be served,and that knowledge is viewed from a point after the person could no longer be sued withinthe statute of limitations. To have subsection 4, which contemplates the examination ofknowledge prior to the running of the statute of limitations, have any effect or meaning,subsection 3 must be read without the limitation of service being accomplished within theoriginal statute of limitations. Otherwise, subsection 4 is meaningless and superfluous. Areading of subsection 3, however, without the limitation of service within the original statuteof limitations means that in order to come under section 2-616, the plaintiff must haveaccomplished actual service, whether before or after the running of the statute of limitations. That meaning is consistent with a reasonable reading of subsection 4 and the othersubsections of section 2-616.

Accordingly, I dissent.

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RICHARD MORTON, as Independent ) Appeal from the

Administrator for the Estate of William R. ) Circuit Court of

Morton, ) Madison County.

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, )

• ) No. 98-L-577

)

MADISON COUNTY NURSING HOME )

AUXILIARY, )

)

Defendant, )

and )

)

THE COUNTY OF MADISON, ) Honorable

) P. J. O'Neill,

Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.

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Opinion Filed:

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Justices: Honorable Thomas M. Welch, J.

Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Concurs

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

Dissents

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Attorneys Mark Levy, Levy, Levy & Stipes, P.C., 220 South Buchanan,

for Edwardsville, IL 62025; Roy C. Dripps, The Lakin Law Firm,

Appellant 301 Evans Avenue, P. O. Box 229, Wood River, IL 62095-0229

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Attorneys Donald L. Smith, Hoagland, Fitzgerald, Smith & Pranaitis, 401

for Market Street, P. O. Box 130, Alton, IL 62002

Appellee

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