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JUSTICE KUEHN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Kathy Manus, filed suit against the defendant, Trans States Airlines,Inc., in the circuit court of Williamson County, Illinois. After a trial, a jury returned averdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the plaintiff raises the issue of whether the trialcourt committed reversible error by not properly instructing the jury on the duty owed by thedefendant. We affirm.

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant and alleged injuries incurred at theWilliamson County airport on July 2, 1998. The plaintiff alleged that she had injured herselfexiting an airplane. According to the plaintiff, when the airplane door opened, stairsextended into place and a stool was placed at the bottom of the steps by an agent of thedefendant. The plaintiff alleged that she injured herself when she fell and landed on thetarmac as she was attempting to step on the stool. She alleged that it was the defendant'spolicy to have an employee positioned at the base of the staircase to assist exiting passengersand that there was no employee positioned there at the time of her fall.

The plaintiff presented testimony from Mike Comer, an employee of the defendant. Comer testified that at the time of the incident he was assigned the task of standing at thebase of the staircase. Comer testified that he was not at the base of the staircase when theplaintiff fell. Instead, Comer was walking towards the terminal and turned around to see theplaintiff fall.

The court presented instructions concerning the duty the defendant owed to theplaintiff. The jury was given the defendant's modified instruction based upon Illinois PatternJury Instructions, Civil, No. 100.01 (1995):

"At the time of the occurrence in question, the Defendant, Trans StatesAirlines, Incorporated, was a common carrier. A common carrier is not a guarantorof its passengers' safety, but it has a duty to its passengers to use the highest degreeof care consistent with the mode of conveyance used and the practical operation ofits business as common carrier by air. Its failure to fulfill this duty is negligence."

The plaintiff tendered the following definition:

"When I use the term 'highest degree of care,' I mean extraordinary care, caremore than the ordinary. It means the same as the greatest care or utmost care."

The court rejected the plaintiff's tendered instruction. The jury rendered a verdict in favorof the defendant. The plaintiff appeals.

The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in its instructions regarding the standardof care owed by the defendant. The court presented the defendant's pattern instruction onthe duty of a common carrier to a passenger. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No.100.01 (1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil (1995)). Supreme Court Rule 239(a) requires the useof pattern instructions unless a court determines that an instruction does not accurately statethe law. 177 Ill. 2d R. 239(a); Schultz v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter R.R. Corp.,201 Ill. 2d 260, 273, 775 N.E.2d 964, 972 (2002).

Specifically, the plaintiff contends that the trial court should have separatelyinstructed the jury on the definition of "highest degree of care," as the court typically doesin "ordinary care" situations pursuant to IPI Civil (1995) No. 10.02.

This court has previously found there was no need to define "highest degree of care." Lockett v. Board of Education for School District No. 189, 198 Ill. App. 3d 252, 267, 555N.E.2d 1055, 1065 (1990). In Lockett, a child was injured when he was struck by glass afteran object was thrown at an open window of a school bus. The jury was instructed that thedefendant owed a duty to exercise the highest degree of care. The plaintiffs contended that"highest degree of care" was a technical legal term that required a definition to be presentedto the jury. Lockett, 198 Ill. App. 3d at 267, 555 N.E.2d at 1065. The court concluded:

"The term 'highest degree of care' as used in the instruction given to the jury is not sotechnical or arcane as to require explanation. Any attempt to further define or explainthe term would have quite possibly led to confusion and error. Accordingly, it is ouropinion that the court did not err in refusing plaintiffs' tendered instruction." Lockett,198 Ill. App. 3d at 267, 555 N.E.2d at 1065.

In essence, the plaintiff does not contend that the issue instruction was incorrect, onlythat the instructions were incomplete. The standard for deciding whether the trial courtabused its discretion is whether, taken as a whole, the instructions fairly, fully, andcomprehensively apprised the jury of the relevant legal principles. Schultz, 201 Ill. 2d at273-74, 775 N.E.2d at 972-73. A court is to give nonpattern instructions when the patterninstructions do not contain a proper instruction on a subject. Mikus v. Norfolk & WesternRy. Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 11, 32, 726 N.E.2d 95, 111 (2000).

The plaintiff contends that the inherent contradiction and error contained in theinstructions is its use of the term "highest degree of care." The plaintiff contends that thefailure to define the term misled the jury into concluding that the defendant's duty, in effect,was the same as in a typical negligence claim. The jury was instructed that the defendanthad a duty to use the highest degree of care and that a failure to fulfill this duty would benegligence. IPI Civil (1995) No. 100.01. The phrase "highest degree of care" was notdefined. The plaintiff contends this is misleading considering that negligence is usuallyunderstood to consist of a duty to exercise ordinary care. The jury was not instructed on theissue of ordinary care.

The standard of care for a carrier is not ordinary care. Under Illinois law, a commoncarrier for hire owes a duty to exercise the highest degree of care for its passengers. Katamay v. Chicago Transit Authority, 53 Ill. 2d 27, 29, 289 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1972);Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 158 Ill. App. 3d 19, 24-25, 510 N.E.2d 1288, 1292(1987). As a result of the unique control it possesses over the safety of its passengers, acommon carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care consistent with the mode ofconveyance adopted and the practical operation of its business. De Bello v. Checker TaxiCo., 8 Ill. App. 3d 401, 405, 290 N.E.2d 367, 370 (1972).

We believe that the plaintiff's counsel did not veer from standard pattern instructionsin order to enlighten the jury with a better, or even more complete, statement of the law. Hisversion was simply another statement of the same law, worded differently to suit him. Apparently, he felt that his modification of a well-settled instruction would pave an easierpath to a favorable verdict, a path already made simple, albeit not a foregone conclusion, bythe duty instruction that he attempted to alter. We find nothing incomplete in the patterninstruction on a common carrier's duty of care. The term "highest degree of care" needs nofurther definition. Care described in that fashion is conceivably more care than"extraordinary care." While "utmost care," "greatest care," or even quintessential care mightoffer appropriate synonyms for "highest degree of care," the adjectives are superfluous. There can be no amount of care higher than the highest degree of care.

Further adjectives were simply unnecessary to a proper understanding that commoncarriers shoulder a heightened duty of due care to the traveling public. Moreover, there wasanother reason for Judge Speroni's adherence to the standard instruction and his rejection ofthe modified instructions tendered by the plaintiff. In addition to his desire to use extraadjectives to describe the duty of care, the plaintiff's counsel wanted the last sentence of IPICivil (1995) No. 100.01 to read, "Its failure to use this degree of care would be a breach ofits duty."

While the language of the proposed modification is a correct statement, we are unableto discern, nor have we been told during this appeal, how the proposed alteration of thepattern instruction would better explain the law to the jury. This additional profferedinstruction was a part of the equation that resulted in an adherence to the pattern instruction.

The plaintiff argues that providing only the pattern instruction on the issue wouldconfuse the jury. Somehow, the jury would believe that the defendant only owed an ordinaryduty of care when it was told that a failure to exercise the highest degree of care would benegligence. We fail to understand how a plaintiff could complain about an instruction thattells jurors that a defendant must exercise the highest degree of care towards the plaintiff orbe guilty of negligence. We find no basis to conclude that the instruction as given did notfairly, fully, and comprehensively apprise the jury of the relevant legal principles.

The plaintiff also argues that defense counsel engaged in inappropriate conduct duringclosing argument by injecting statements of personal beliefs and opinions. Generallyspeaking, the injection of such statements is improper. See Ryan v. Blakey, 71 Ill. App. 3d339, 389 N.E.2d 604 (1979).

Specifically, defense counsel likened the plaintiff's attorney to a used-car salesman,to which there was no objection. Additionally, there was a reference to defense counsel'sown experience in twisting an ankle during sporting events. Defense counsel also referredto the plaintiff's action as a "misstep" and argued the plaintiff's familiarity with the plane. Defense counsel also argued that the plaintiff bore a high burden of proof.

To the extent that the plaintiff's counsel failed to object, those matters are waived. Hubbard v. Sherman Hospital, 292 Ill. App. 3d 148, 156, 685 N.E.2d 648, 654 (1997).Furthermore, whether an unobjected-to argument denied the plaintiff a fair trial is a matterwithin the trial court's sound discretion, and that discretion will not be disturbed unless it wasclearly abused. Ellington v. Bilsel, 255 Ill. App. 3d 233, 239, 626 N.E.2d 386, 390 (1993). Nothing argued in the brief or at oral argument leads us to overturn the trial judge's exerciseof sound discretion on those matters.

All but two of the remaining comments made by defense counsel were objected to bythe plaintiff's attorney and were sustained by the trial court. A trial court's prompt action insustaining an objection generally cures any prejudice resulting from improper comments. Smith v. Seiber, 127 Ill. App. 3d 950, 957, 469 N.E.2d 231, 236 (1984).

The trial court overruled the objection relative to defense counsel's argument thatlikened the plaintiff's accident to twisting his ankle as he "used to do *** all the time insports and basketball." Additionally, the trial court overruled the objection that the plaintiff'scounsel had done a wonderful job with the facts of this case and that he had a high burdenof proof to reach. In both cases, the trial court noted that arguments were fine in the contextof a closing argument.

We give considerable deference to the trial court on matters such as these because thetrial court saw the presentation of evidence and heard the arguments of counsel and wastherefore in a far superior position to assess the accuracy and prejudicial effect that thosearguments might have had upon the jury. See Decker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 268 Ill. App.3d 521, 531, 644 N.E.2d 515, 522 (1994).

From our review of the evidence, it appears that defense counsel's comment regardingthe possibility that the plaintiff merely twisted her ankle was supported by that evidence asa possible cause. While it was not proper for defense counsel to comment about twisting hisown ankle, given the wide latitude allowed in argument we cannot find fault in the trialcourt's ruling on the objection and otherwise do not find that the comment was so prejudicialto have denied the plaintiff a fair trial.

Overruling the objection to defense counsel's comments that emphasized the plaintiff'sburden of proof was not improper given the context of this case. We find no error in the trialcourt's ruling.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Williamson County ishereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOPKINS, J., concurs.

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring:

Plaintiff contends that the inherent contradiction and error contained in theinstructions was in the use of the term "highest degree of care." She contends that the failureto define the term misled the jury into concluding that defendant's duty, in effect, was thesame as in a typical negligence claim. The jury was instructed that defendant had a duty touse the highest degree of care and that a failure to fulfill this duty would be negligence. IPICivil (1995) No. 100.01; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 100.01 (2000)(hereinafter IPI Civil (2000)). The phrase "highest degree of care" was not defined. Plaintiffcontends this is misleading, considering that negligence is usually understood to consist ofa duty to exercise ordinary care.

The expression "highest degree of care" is a legal phrase that should be defined. Thephrase is similar to other legal terms that have a specific legal meaning. See Assise v. Dawe'sLaboratories, Inc., 7 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1049, 288 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1972) (a failure to define"wilful"); Shore v. Turman, 63 Ill. App. 2d 315, 322, 210 N.E.2d 232, 235 (1965) (a failureto define "intoxication"). The standard of care owed by a party in other situations is definedby pattern instructions, for example, "ordinary care" and "willful and wanton conduct." IPICivil (2000) Nos. 10.02 ("Ordinary Care-Adult-Definition"), 10.05 ("OrdinaryCare-Minor-Definition"), 14.01 ("Willful and Wanton Conduct-Definition"). Illinoispattern instructions are also offered for terms essential for determining liability. See, e.g.,IPI Civil (2000) No. 500.02 ("Definition-'Active Conduct'-'Passive Conduct' ").

The necessity of defining legal terms was discussed in Rikard v. Dover Elevator Co.,126 Ill. App. 3d 438, 441, 467 N.E.2d 386, 388 (1984). In Rikard, reversible error wascommitted when the trial court failed to instruct the jury of the burden of proof to be applied. In language applicable to the case at hand, the court stated:

"It is elementary that the court instructs the jury in the law and the jury findsthe facts and applies them to the law. Without basic instructions, each juror wouldbe free to make his or her own interpretation of the law. Instructions provide jurorswith a uniformity of approach in the application of the facts to the law." Rikard, 126Ill. App. 3d at 440, 467 N.E.2d at 387.

The court pointed out that a failure to properly instruct a jury left open the possibility thata juror applied an incorrect standard, possibly applying a burden from a prior case on whichthe juror had sat. Rikard, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 441, 467 N.E.2d at 388.

Likewise, the possibility of confusion in this case is increased by the use of the term"negligence." The definition for "negligence" involves a failure to exercise ordinary care. IPI Civil (2000) No. 10.01 ("Negligence-Adult-Definition"). In typical negligence cases,the jury is instructed on the meaning of "ordinary care." IPI Civil (2000) No. 10.02("Ordinary Care-Adult-Definition"). In those cases, providing the definition of "ordinarycare" ensures that the jury will be informed of the applicable law and that the law will beapplied uniformly. In contrast, the failure to define the legal phrase "highest degree of care"leaves open the possibility of confusion and disparate application.

Other jurisdictions have ruled that confusion about the meaning of "highest degree ofcare" in jury instructions constitutes reversible error. Wood v. Groh, 269 Kan. 420, 426, 7P.3d 1163, 1169 (2000) ("There is a substantial difference between the two standardsproposed: ordinary care or the highest degree of care. Other jurisdictions consideringinstructional errors concerning the standard of care to be applied by the jury in its evaluationof the defendant's conduct have concluded that such error requires reversal"); Jones v. PortAuthority of Allegheny County, 136 Pa. Commw. 445, 449, 583 A.2d 512, 514 (1990)(considering the instructions as a whole, the trial court failed to adequately explain thehighest duty of care); Urban v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 256 Minn. 1, 6, 96 N.W.2d 698,701 (1959) (holding that the instructions were confusing because the jury was likely toevaluate the defendant's actions under an "ordinary care" standard rather than the "highestdegree of care" standard); see also Kindle v. Keene, 676 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Mo. App. 1984);Doyle v. Bi-State Development Agency, 628 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. App. 1982) (explicitlyrejecting an argument that the terms "negligence" and "highest degree of care" aresynonymous and need not be separately defined).

Defendant contends that the instruction offered by plaintiff would lead a jury tobelieve that this is not a case involving negligence but, rather, one of strict liability. Plaintiffin this case tendered the following definition:

"When I use the term 'highest degree of care,' I mean extraordinary care, caremore than the ordinary. It means the same as the greatest care or utmost care."

Defendant contends that this is essentially strict liability, because the jury could concludethat if there were anything more that defendant could have done to prevent plaintiff's injury,then defendant has breached a duty. I disagree. With plaintiff's proposed definition, whichdoes not mention or imply strict liability, the jury would be fully informed of the existenceof the degrees of care and which degree was appropriate in this case. The failure to so definein this case in which the jury is instructed to determine if a party is "negligent" invitesconfusion.

Plaintiff's proposed instruction is consistent with the law. Defendant did not objectto the proposed instruction to the trial court except on the ground that the definition was notan Illinois pattern instruction. See Balestri v. Terminal Freight Cooperative Ass'n, 76 Ill. 2d451, 456, 394 N.E.2d 391, 393 (1979). The proposed instruction informed the trial court ofthe problem, accurately stated the law, and preserved the issue for appeal.

The need to properly instruct the jury is particularly acute in regard to the standardof care.

"A jury instruction which erroneously defines the standard of care to be applied in apersonal injury case constitutes reversible error." Fravel v. Morenz, 151 Ill. App. 3d42, 45, 502 N.E.2d 480, 482 (1986) (citing Cooper v. Cox, 31 Ill. App. 2d 51, 57, 175N.E.2d 651, 654 (1961)).

The inclusion of a proper instruction does not cure the error if the jury might still be misledregarding the definition of the standard of care. See Fravel, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 46, 502N.E.2d at 482; Seibert v. Grana, 102 Ill. App. 2d 283, 285, 243 N.E.2d 538, 540 (1968);Milford Canning Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 39 Ill. App. 2d 258, 263, 188N.E.2d 397, 400 (1963). The failure to define "highest degree of care" in a context wherethe jury is asked whether a party is negligent is inviting confusion.

The majority relies on our opinion in Lockett v. Board of Education for SchoolDistrict No. 189, 198 Ill. App. 3d 252, 555 N.E.2d 1055 (1990), for the proposition that itwas not error to refuse a definitional instruction for the term "highest degree of care." TheLockett instruction given, however, did not include the word "negligence," while the giveninstruction in the instant case does. Lockett does not prohibit a definitional instruction, andone that accurately states the law, as does plaintiff's proposed instruction, does not run afoulof Lockett and is consistent with Balestri.

All this being said, I fully recognize that a circuit judge has a fairly wide range ofjudgment concerning jury instructions. The primary touchstone is care that the instructionsaccurately state the law, do not confuse or mislead, are not contradictory, and follow andbuild on the foundation of Illinois pattern instructions. In this case, the judge also had ouropinion in Lockett. While for the reasons stated above I conclude that plaintiff's proposedinstruction should have been given, I would be hard-pressed to say that Judge Speroni abusedhis discretion or committed an error of law in refusing the proposed instruction. Instead, weshould consider overruling Lockett.

Accordingly, I specially concur.

Opinion Filed: July 1, 2005

Justices: Honorable Clyde L. Kuehn, J.

Honorable Terrence J. Hopkins, J.

Concurs

Honorable Richard P. Goldenhersh, J.

Specially Concurs

Attorneys John Womick, Womick Law Firm, Chtd., 1100 West Main Street,

for P.O. Box 1355, Carbondale, IL 62903

Appellant

Attorneys James B. Bleyer, Bleyer and Bleyer, 601 West Jackson Street, P.O. Box 487,

for Marion, IL 62959-0487; Curtis R. Picou, Carl W. Lee, Gundlach, Lee, Eggmann,

Appellee Boyle & Roessler, 5000 West Main Street, P.O. Box 23560, Belleville, IL

62223-0560